Games

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Open AccessEditorial

by Games Editorial Office

Games 2011, 2(4), 463-464; https://doi.org/10.3390/g2040463 - 20 Dec 2011

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Games has received help from many individuals since its inaugural issue in 2009. We are especially grateful to the following 146 referees for their great support of Games during the past two years. [...] Full article

284 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The Resolution Game: A Dual Selves Perspective

by Dimitri Migrow and Matthias Uhl

Games 2011, 2(4), 452-462; https://doi.org/10.3390/g2040452 - 9 Dec 2011

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Abstract

This article explains the emergence of an unique equilibrium resolution as the result of a compromise between two selves with different preferences. The stronger this difference is, the more generous the resolution gets. This result is in contrast to predictions of other models in which sinful consumption is distributed bimodally. Therefore, our result fits better with our daily observations concerning a lot of ambivalent goods where we often form nonrigid resolutions. The normative analysis uses the device of a hypothetical impartial self that regards both conflicting motives as equally legitimate. The result of this analysis is dilemmatic. It demonstrates that the resolution is broken too often to be welfare maximal. However, the introduction of external self-commitment devices results in their overuse and is welfare decreasing. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Games and Psychology)

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326 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Unraveling Public Good Games

by Pablo Brañas-Garza and Maria Paz Espinosa

Games 2011, 2(4), 434-451; https://doi.org/10.3390/g2040434 - 21 Nov 2011

Cited by 11 | Viewed by 8026

Abstract

This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict end-game effects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects’ beliefs on contributions and allows us to conclude that, first, the weight of the signal is relatively unimportant, while priors have a large weight and, second, priors are the same for all periods. Hence, subjects do not expect end-game effects and there is very little updating of beliefs. We argue that the sustainability of cooperation is related to this pattern of belief formation. Full article

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391 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Building Trust—One Gift at a Time

by Maroš Servátka, Steven Tucker and Radovan Vadovič

Games 2011, 2(4), 412-433; https://doi.org/10.3390/g2040412 - 27 Sep 2011

Cited by 5 | Viewed by 8348

Abstract

This paper reports an experiment evaluating the effect of gift giving on building trust. We have nested our explorations in the standard version of the investment game. Our gift treatment includes a dictator stage in which the trustee decides whether to give a gift to the trustor before both of them proceed to play the investment game. We observe that in such case the majority of trustees offer their endowment to trustors. Consequently, receiving a gift significantly increases the amounts sent by trustors when controlling for the differences in payoffs created by it. Trustees are, however, not better off by giving a gift as the increase in the amount sent by trustors is not large enough to offset the trustees’ loss associated with the cost of giving a gift. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fairness in Games)

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Games, Volume 2, Issue 4 (December 2011) – 4 articles , Pages 412-464

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