The Role of Capital Assets in the Success and Failure of Water Allocation Reform Arrangements: A Case Study of Joint Ventures in South Africa

Abstract

Joint ventures (JVs) are an example of a government facilitated arrangement geared towards water allocation reform (WAR) designed to improve the lives of emerging farmers through participation in the agricultural economy in South Africa and other emerging countries around the world with segregated agricultural sectors. This paper will qualitatively analyse semi-structured, in-depth interviews with emerging farmers and key institutional actors to investigate the extent that JVs produced perceptible socio-economic benefits for emerging farmers in the Eastern Cape, South Africa. Socio-economic benefits are operationalised across five types of capital assets (human, natural, financial physical, social). The paper posits that an analysis of the socio-economic benefits derived from emerging farmers in JVs can be useful for informing the governance and institutional arrangements geared towards accelerating equity imperatives. The findings of the analysis, which is conducted using a sustainable livelihoods framework (SLF), reveal that factors such as level of education, formal training in agriculture, and power differentials within the partnership arrangements determine whether JVs produce tangible benefits for emerging farmers. This paper recommends the SLF be used in conjunction with concepts, tools, and modes of analysis used in other fields to address differential conditions, assets, and strategies of differentiated groups.

1. Introduction

The South African agricultural landscape has been profoundly impacted by the legacy of apartheid evidenced in widespread inequities throughout the sector [1,2,3]. This legacy has created a skewed distribution of land and water resources that favours a white minority over a black majority, with cascading implications across the agricultural value chain [4,5,6,7]. Statistics indicate that as of 2022, black farmers accounted for between just 5 and 10% of all agricultural output, indicating a country of two agricultures: one for commercial white farmers and one for subsistence black farmers, which has been widened by inefficient government policies, programmes, and support systems across the land–water–agriculture nexus [8].

These inequities have resultantly put equity at the forefront of most governance and institutional arrangements within the agricultural sector [9]. The South African government has used policy as a tool to address inequity at both strategic and operational levels, and this is evidenced in the policy and regulations frameworks aligned with respective government sectors, as can been seen in water allocation reform (WAR) policies and arrangements alongside those related to land reform. The concept of WAR is a deeply political issue [10], particularly in the South African context. It was implemented to support acceleration to water access by emerging farmers to address historical inequalities. WAR is recognised as having potential to contribute towards growth and development if viewed as a means of enhancing diversification of livelihoods among the rural poor [11]. For this reason, there have been numerous WAR-related policies within the land–water–agriculture nexus targeted at emerging farmers. Despite these policy interventions, many of them have been largely ineffective as evident in the following examples.

The Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development policy (LRAD) of 2001 targeted redress but has mostly failed to meet its equity objective due to poor monitoring and evaluation functions resulting in major information gaps [12]. The Financial Assistance for Resource Poor Farmers policy of 2004 experienced challenges in implementation due to a lack of formal agreement among the state, landowners, and targeted beneficiaries [13]. The Water Allocation Reform Strategy of 2008, which is informed by the notion of WAR, has been greatly challenged by the resource-intensive nature of the water license review process [11]. The National Water Resource Strategy (all editions) was largely unsuccessful due to implementation problems such as inadequate establishment of water management institutions and inadequate compliance, monitoring, and enforcement of decentralised water management [14].

Emerging farmers are characterised by low-input and labour-intensive forms of agricultural production [1,2,6,15,16]. These farmers often lack access to markets and credit and are primarily the focus of post-apartheid reform programmes [2]. Many of the post-apartheid reform programmes, such as water, land, and agricultural reforms in South Africa, are intended to facilitate access to water and land by historically disadvantaged farmers, support their technical operation, and facilitate access to markets and credit with the goal of transforming these sectors in ways that address equity imperatives [6]. These farmers are of specific interest in equity-focused arrangements due to their historical disadvantage and the fact that they are typically challenged by a myriad of constraints to participation in the agricultural value chain which mainly stem from the inherent inequality of the sector [2]. The current study takes a detailed look at joint ventures as a case study of an equity-focused arrangement facilitated by the government, through the arm of the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS), geared towards improving the agricultural productivity of emerging farmers.

Joint ventures (JVs) are strategic partnerships in which the government facilitates the pairing of emerging farmers with established commercial farmers for capital and economic purposes [17]. JV arrangements typically involve emerging farmers contributing land and water rights while the commercial partner provides financial capital, technical expertise, and market access [18]. The literature on JVs in South Africa differentiates between a diversity of modalities of JVs (

Table 1. Description of the various modalities of JVs found in South Africa derived from the literature.

Type of JV	Key Defining Features/General Description of the Agricultural Agreement
Joint ventures (JVs)	Strategic partnership in which government facilitates the pairing of an emerging farmer with an established commercial farmer for capital and economic purposes, achieved through water allocation reform [17].
Contract farming	An agreement between a farmer and a buyer, ranging from simple oral arrangements to formal written documents, in which parties formally commit to sell and buy specific volumes or acreages under pre-established conditions. The literature differentiates between three classic types: market-specification contracts, management-providing contracts, and resource-providing contracts [23].
Inclusive business models	Businesses that integrate smallholders into markets with mutual benefits for the poor and the business community while enabling the poor to move out of poverty [24].
Strategic partnerships	A joint venture or other form of collaboration between an established commercial firm and a new (or “emerging”) group of workers, shareholders, small farmers, entrepreneurs, or community members with limited commercial experience and little or no access to finance or leading-edge markets. Ownership of the land is transferred to the claimant community, which enters into agreements with agribusiness partners who commit themselves to managing the land on behalf of the community on the contractual understanding that benefits are shared between the partners [25].
Farmworker equity-sharing schemes	Privately owned farming operations that are generally restructured as companies. The original owner of the farm and the farmworkers become shareholders in the enterprise, sometimes with a third-party investor [26].
Mentorship programmes/partnerships	A form of alliance between established commercial farms and developing farms/farmers where the former provides complementary mentorship to the latter in the form of addressing specific areas where both farms experience the same strengths and weaknesses [27]. The alliance is expected to be simple but to involve three of the key elements of a successful partnership, namely identifying clear objectives, establishing an operational process, and establishing a measure of reward.

); these include but are not limited to equity share schemes, contract farming, strategic partnerships, and mentorship partnerships [19,20,21,22].

The rationale is that through the JVs, emerging farmers can be supported to become commercial farmers through structured operational, financial, and strategic support, including skills transfer and access to market and credit [20]. The South African government promoted JVs as a mechanism for improving the livelihoods of emerging farmers through participation in the agricultural economy. For example, DWS encourages emerging farmers to use agricultural land tenure rights leased from government and water rights ownership to initiate JVs [17]. DWS is simultaneously pressuring commercial farmers to establish JVs through land-for-water deals, whereby water rights are only granted to commercial applicants if they form partnerships with water allocation reform beneficiaries [28]. Similarly, the South African National Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) has made strategic partnerships between emerging farmers and commercial farmers a requirement for its recapitalisation and development programme (RADP)—one of the government’s most prioritised agricultural support programmes [29].

Despite government efforts to transform the agricultural landscape in South Africa through arrangements such as JVs, there have been limited success stories. Fraser [30] argues that “even though JVs are being promoted by the government as a way to protect the viability of the land and ensure the transfer of skills to the beneficiaries, the approach may turn out to be less favourable for the beneficiaries”. Critics contend that JVs are informed by colonial and apartheid ideology and philosophy and are therefore always in favour of the established commercial farmers who typically dominate the management and decision-making in the JV, thus rendering them fundamentally problematic [17,22,31]. JVs are viewed by some authors as an exploitative relationship in which commercial partners wield more power and are thus able to dictate output prices and manipulate input costs [32]. These power differentials also leave emerging farmers with very little flexibility in enterprise choices and participation in alternative markets.

This lack of elasticity has dire consequences for emerging farmers’ income and welfare in instances of poor performance of produce [33]. There are cases where commercial farmers decide to pull out of JVs, leaving emerging farmer partners in great debt [20]. Overall, failures of JVs have been attributed to multiple contributing factors, including power dynamics, incoherent policy implementation, inequitable access to water and related resources, profit-sharing formulae that do not favour emerging farmers, poor dispute resolution mechanisms, and powerful alliances influencing JV processes and their outcomes [20,22]. At a global level, the literature reveals one major critique of JVs as a reform mechanism is a questionable, implicit assumption that the commercial farming model is superior [34,35,36].

A great deal of research has also been dedicated to understanding the structure of and impacts on the livelihoods of JV participants in South Africa [21,22,34,37,38,39], with an emphasis on the need for more inclusive structures and processes to affect better outcomes for participants. Several policy documents (National Water Act of 1998, Water Allocation Reform Strategy of 2008, The Strategic Framework on Water for Sustainable Growth and Development of 2008) also emphasise inclusion, particularly of emerging farmers, as the equity goal of WAR. However, discussion on how inclusion might be achieved or what inclusion might even mean is not explicit in these policy documents, suggesting a need for a contextually embedded analysis of how these reforms may have transformed the livelihoods of those affected. The scant research detailing the aspect of how JVs have contributed to equity imperatives through livelihood security of emerging farmers presents a need for more livelihood-focused research that explores this view. This is where the analysis of this paper is positioned.

We argue that an analysis of the social, economic, and livelihood benefits derived from reform initiatives such as JVs, expressed by the intended beneficiaries themselves from their lived experiences, can be useful for informing the governance and institutional arrangements geared towards accelerating equity imperatives. The sustainable livelihoods framework (SLF) [40] is useful for broad conceptualisation of livelihoods as including human (e.g., experiences, skills), natural (e.g., access to land, water), physical (e.g., physical infrastructure), social (e.g., relationships and networks), and financial assets (e.g., credits). Although there is an abundance of studies on the impacts of farmers’ sustainable livelihood capacity, there are fewer studies centred at the micro-level of farmers’ livelihoods [41]. Guo et al. [41] argue that over time, peoples’ understanding of and needs for livelihood capital have changed, and new livelihood problems have emerged, thus necessitating deeper understanding of the application of the livelihood framework beyond the commonly used Department for International Development (DFID) sustainable livelihood analysis framework. We therefore adopt Bebbington’s [42] conceptualisation of livelihoods as encompassing the full extent of economic activities undertaken by people within their social and environmental contexts to assess whether JVs have produced perceptible socio-economic benefits for emerging farmers in the Lower Sundays River valley and the Great Fish River catchments in the Eastern Cape of South Africa. This framework allows us to assess JVs and their impact on livelihoods in a broader context that considers the interaction between different capital assets, farmers’ vulnerability context, and the policies, institutions, and processes that influence farmers’ access to these capital assets and livelihood outcomes that result from these interdependencies. The broader objective of this analysis is to distil whether the socio-economic benefits derived by emerging farmers in JVs can be useful in informing government and institutional arrangements aimed at achieving equity imperatives. The analysis uses an understanding of the five capital assets in viewing interview responses to distil whether emerging farmers in JVs perceive themselves to have benefited from being a part of such arrangements. This approach aligns with the assertion made by [43] that people, whether poor or not, are agents with assets and capabilities who act in pursuit of their own livelihood goals and not mere passive recipients of external aid and government policies. Our study contributes to academic and policy debates on the benefits or otherwise of equity-focused reforms in the South African agricultural landscape.

2. Methodology

2.1. Study Area

This research was conducted in two Eastern Cape catchment areas with significant but contrasting histories of WAR implementation and agricultural water: the Lower Sundays River catchment, with extensive past and present WAR initiatives through JVs, and the Great Fish River Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme, with WAR initialisation but limited establishment. While this study presents two vastly different areas, the intention of the study is not to provide a comparison but to present an illustration of JVs in two different contexts as case studies.

2.1.1. The Lower Sundays River Catchment

The Lower Sundays River valley is approximately 40 km north of Port Elizabeth (now Gqeberha) within the Sundays River Valley Municipality (SRVM) (Figure 1). The area features extensive intensive irrigated agriculture regulated by the Lower Sundays River Water Users Association. The climate is characterised by spatial variability in rainfall, with mountainous regions receiving above 1100 mm annually while the coastal area averages only 400 mm. The rain is mostly cyclonic and thunderstorms are rare. Mean minimum temperatures range from 5 °C in July to a mean maximum of 30 °C in January. Irrigated soils are predominantly alluvial and colluvial, with Dundee, Oakleaf, and Valsrivier as dominant soil forms [44].

Agriculture in the valley centres on citrus production (navel and Valencia oranges, lemons, and other loose-skinned varieties), with secondary production of lucerne and potatoes. Limited livestock (sheep and cattle) and game farming also occur. The current water allocation system heavily favours commercial agriculture, which receives approximately 90% of allocated water, while municipal domestic and industrial uses receive only 4% [45]. This marked water allocation disparity reflects historical inequities that WAR policies aim to address. Despite government interventions (3000 hectares of land with water allocation rights attached set aside for local WAR and numerous JVs past and present), unemployment remains widespread, with commercial farming and tourism (ecotourism and hunting) being the primary economic activities [46].

Figure 1. Map of the Lower Sundays River Valley Municipality in South Africa. (Source: [47]).

Figure 1. Map of the Lower Sundays River Valley Municipality in South Africa. (Source: [47]).

2.1.2. Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme

The Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme, established in 1983 during the homeland era, is located on the northern bank of the lower Fish River, approximately 35 km east of Makhanda. The scheme was one of six major smallholder irrigation schemes established in the province [48]. The area faces significant agricultural challenges, including low rainfall (475 mm annually, 40% coefficient of variation) and high evaporation rates (2100 mm annually), and severe soil erosion culminating in a degraded natural resource base [49]. The area is densely populated with five settlements, classified as villages, (Ndlambe, Pikoli, Kaliken, Ndwayana, and Glenmore) (Figure 2) stretching along approximately 25 km of the river. The area’s biophysical conditions significantly constrain and limit agricultural potential, making subsistence farming difficult but more moderately suited to extensive and semi-intensive livestock production than cultivation [50]. Where farming was taking place, the land was not utilised to its optimal capacity. Despite evidence of overcrowding in some areas of the Eastern Cape, much of the land remains unutilised [49]. These multiple biophysical and socio-economic challenges make the Tyefu an important site to explore the potential of JVs in supporting emerging farmer livelihoods in resource-constrained environments.

3. Data Collection and Analysis Methods

3.1. Data Collection

We conducted semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 34 participants across the two study sites between October 2023 and February 2024 (

Table 2. Distribution of all interviews conducted.

	Catchment Area	Joint Venture (JV) (Y/N)	Interview Type
Number Interviews	28 Lower Sundays 6 Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme	11 in JVs 23 not in JVs	8 Key informants 3 Commercial farmers 23 Emerging farmers

). Participants included emerging farmers (in and out of JVs), commercial farmers (in and out of JVs), and key institutional actors across the land–water–agricultural nexus. Participants were identified through policy documents and websites, existing networks, previous project stakeholder lists (e.g., through engagement with members of the local Catchment Management Forum (CMF), and snowball sampling [51]. Most interviews were conducted face-to-face, with some conducted online via Zoom when in-person meetings were not possible. Interviews ranged between 50 and 180 min and were recorded with participants’ consent. Where interviewees felt more comfortable engaging in their mother tongue, interviews were conducted in isi-Xhosa with translation assistance from a project member. Interviews were transcribed and translated into English where necessary. Ethical approval was obtained from the Rhodes University Human Ethics Committee (approval number: 2023-764-7948).

3.2. Sample Selection

Of the 34 interviews, 14 were selected for in-depth analysis (

Table 3. Summary of interviews analysed for analysis of the socio-economic benefits accrued by emerging farmers in JVs.

	Catchment Area	Joint Venture (JV) (Y/N)	Interview Type
Number Interviews	12 Lower Sundays 2 Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme	10 in JVs 1 not in any kind of JV	3 Key informants 9 Emerging farmers in JVs 1 Emerging farmer not in any kind of JV

) based on relevance to our research question: respondents who offered useful insights into the social, economic, and livelihood benefits accrued by emerging farmers in JVs. Most (12 interviews) of the analysis focusses on the Lower Sundays River valley (LSRV) where respondents had a longer history and experience of JV implementation. Two respondents from the Tyefu Irrigation Scheme provided contributing and contrasting insights from their involvement in the WAR initialisation process in the area. Core interviews therefore included emerging farmers with diverse experiences in JVs and key institutional representatives (CEO of the Lower Sundays River Water Users Association, production manager for the Sundays River Citrus Company, and the Tyhefu local traditional authority representative (Chief). One interview constituted a focus group discussion with five emerging farmers, each in separate JVs with the same commercial partner. Two of the farmers classified as being in JVs were former JV participants and were included in the core samples due to their valuable insights into entry and exit dynamics of JVs. The authors note that the proportion of interviewees between the two geographical areas is unequal, making analytical comparisons difficult; however, the intention of the study is not to provide a comparison, but to present an illustration of JVs in two different contexts as case studies. In this instance, the context of the one study area (Lower Sundays River valley) is characterized by numerous JVs past and present, and the other is that of an area classified as one of numerous failed irrigation schemes across the country, namely the former Tyhefu Irrigation Scheme. The revitalisation of smallholder irrigation schemes is an example of a government strategy to support emerging farmers [52].

3.3. Data Analysis

We employed an adaptation of the sustainable livelihoods (SL) framework [42,53,54,55,56] to analyse the socio-economic benefits accrued by emerging farmers through JV participation (Figure 3). The framework guided deductive thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006) [12] focussing on five capital assets (human, natural, financial, physical, and social) and resultant livelihood outcomes (including increased income, diversification of livelihoods, reduced vulnerability, and gender and youth empowerment). In adopting the SL framework, we understand the vulnerability context of the case studies to be emerging farmers identified as historically disadvantaged individuals (HDIs) plagued by gross inequities in water and land allocation as a legacy of apartheid. Regarding policies, institutions, and processes, we consider the South African policy landscape within the land–water–agriculture nexus aimed at achieving the goal of equity through institutional arrangements and processes such as WAR as operationalised through mechanisms such as JVs in the case of the current study (Figure 3) The focus of our analysis is emerging famers’ access to the five capital assets, specifically those in JVs.

We employed a two-stage analytical process. First, we developed a structured analytical rubric to analyse, code, and extract data related to the five capital assets (

Table 4. Framework for analysing socio-economic benefits accrued by emerging/resource-poor farmers in JVs.

Livelihood Asset	Analytical Focus
Human capital	Evidence of knowledge, skills, and capacity development through JV participation. Evidence of capacity to operate independently beyond JV arrangement.
Natural capital	Water and land ownership status and resultant changes through JV involvement.
Financial capital	Evidence of, and challenges related to, financial capital access mechanisms and/or accumulation, including savings, pensions, credit, remittances, and wages, through JV participation.
Physical capital	Access to tools, technology, production equipment, and infrastructure, particularly water-related, through JV involvement.
Social capital	Network expansion, relationship and trust building, mutual support within and out of JV, and nature of decision-making participation within JV.

). This deductive thematic analysis (drawing on Clarke and Braun [57]) involved reviewing interview transcripts for evidence of how JV partnership experiences affected emerging farmer access to the different capital types. Coded data were organised in Microsoft Excel to facilitate comparative analysis across the dataset and theme identification. While the authors recognise that the sample size may be regarded as exceptionally small, based on the understanding of the value of small samples in interview-based qualitative research [58] we believe that qualitative methods ae equally rigorous and can therefore provide a valuable contribution to the understanding of the role of capital assets in the success and failure of JVs.

Following data extraction, a second stage of inductive thematic analysis was conducted to synthesise the extracted data into recurring patterns and broader themes related to our research question—to what extent have WARs such as JVs resulted in tangible socio-economic benefits for emerging farmers? The thematic analysis provided a nuanced understanding of the complexities involved in realising equity goals through WAR structures and processes.

4. Results

The results of the analysis are presented here in two segments based on the three data sources, i.e., emerging farmers in JVs, emerging farmers not in JVs, and key informants in both catchment areas. We first look at an overview of the demographic data, then the five livelihood capital assets and the themes that emerged from responses related to them. Several quotations are deliberately included throughout this section to contextualise the analytical results. We have purposefully omitted any form of identification linked to the participants to maintain their anonymity and ensure confidentiality.

4.1. Overview of Demographic Profiles of Emerging Farmers Interviewed for the Study

Results indicated that the gender profile of emerging farmers who were interviewed skewed towards male farmers, with 64% of participants being male while 36% were female. Race distribution results presented a predominantly black population, where 91% of all emerging farmers were black with only 1 out of the 11 farmers (9%) classified as Indian. Regarding education, the dominant (55%) level of education amongst emerging farmers was secondary education, followed by 36% of farmers who had obtained some form of tertiary education (in disciplines other than agriculture) and 9% who had primary education as their highest educational level. Results showed that 91% of emerging farmers interviewed had no formal training in agriculture and only 1 out of the 11 (9%) had obtained formal agricultural training in the form of short-course certification.

Participants, however, mostly regarded their training in agriculture informal by virtue of experience gained through growing up on a farm or working as farm labourers for a substantial number of years. This was illustrated through the range of years of farming experience indicated by participants, where 45% had more than 15 years of experience (this included farmers who had over 40 years of experience), 36% had between 0 and 5 years of experience, 9% had 6–10 years of experience, and 9% had between 11 and 15 years of experience. Lastly, results showed that the gross annual income from farming amongst participants started from ZAR 0 (27%) in instances where the farmers had not yet begun producing on the land which the JV is associated with; and ranged from ZAR 35,001 to above ZAR 25,000. Results revealed only 1 out of 11 (9%) emerging farmers earned farming incomes that were above ZAR 25,000, followed by 36% who earned between ZAR 15,001 and ZAR 25,000, which was the second highest income bracket. Results are summarised in Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6 below.

4.2. The Five Capital Assets

The data relating to capital assets are summarised in

Table 5. Five capital types’ framework analysis of joint venture participation for emerging farmers.

Capital Type	Summary Statement	Enabling Factors	Constraining Factors
Human Capital	Variable access to skills and knowledge development with limited evidence of capacity to operate independently	• Structured training programs (supervision, management); Access to high-level expertise; Business skills acquisition; On-the-job learning opportunities; Succession planning in some JVs	• Inconsistent and untargeted training programs; Limited skills transfer for independent operation; Continued dependence on commercial partners; Power differentials limiting decision-making; Knowledge concentrated in technical operations
Natural Capital	Primary contribution from emerging farmers is water rights, but with limited control over these resources	• Access to water rights; Formal land ownership/lease arrangements; Legitimised ownership through title deeds; Integration of land and water into business structure	• Climate variability threatening viability; Water rights not paired with operational control; “Fronting” practices to access water rights; Land ownership without financial capacity to develop; Vulnerability to losing water rights due to payment challenges; Community land ownership deterring investment
Financial Capital	Limited financial capital accumulation with persistent dependency on commercial partners and external funding	• Initial financial support for land purchase; Access to payroll assistance; Loans and grants from industry bodies; Connection to financial institutions through JV partners; Equipment provision through state support	• Inability to access commercial bank loans independently; Inequitable financial arrangements; High operational costs without proportionate returns; Complex profit-sharing that prioritises reinvestment; Water tariffs during non-productive establishment phase; Accumulation of debt; Limited understanding of agricultural business cycles
Physical Capital	Improved access to infrastructure and equipment but often without ownership or control	• Access to handling facilities; Borehole development and maintenance; Infrastructure support from government; Equipment provision (tractors, tools); Access to commercial partners’ facilities (packhouses); Solar power installation	• Non-functional or insufficient equipment; Cable theft affecting operations; High costs of renting equipment; Lack of bulk infrastructure connections; Energy disruptions from load shedding; Inconsistent government support; Asset improvements increasing JV value without benefiting emerging farmers
Social Capital	Expanded networks but with limited decision-making influence within these networks	• Group training programs; Access to farmers’ associations; Industry workshops and summits; Family and community support networks; Connections to extension services; Relationships with research institutions for business planning; Community cohesion for addressing challenges (e.g., theft)	• Differential access compared to non-JV farmers; Limited transparency about partner activities; Exclusion from industry decision-making; Divisive relationships with extension services; Commercial partners leveraging emerging farmers’ status without shared benefits; "Fronting" practices in accessing networks; Limited bargaining power within associations

below to display an integrated picture of the influence of JVs on capital assets and resultant livelihood benefits and disbenefits. Thereafter, a brief narrative for each capital asset is presented with a selection of key quotes for each.

4.2.1. Human Capital

Regarding evidence of education, knowledge, and skills acquired through JVs, there are varying degrees of learning and capacity development that have occurred through emerging farmer participation in JVs and other farming activities. While skills acquisition through structured training has been beneficial for some, there is however a lack of consistency in capacity development across all JVs as one key informant highlighted “…training programmes have not been consistent or targeted enough”. This was reflected by the sentiments of the emerging farmers who would commonly express a need and desire for specific training, “I think I still need farm management… so I can know what to do.” “When it comes to production, finances, everything about the farm… I know nothing.” Despite this expressed desire, the data also revealed that not all emerging farmers have the same drive to learn. This reality and frustration were evidenced through key informants representing the commercial partner entities: “You can’t force someone to come to training if they don’t want to come.” There is evidence of capacity development growth, but the emerging farmers interviewed expressed limited capacity to operate their agricultural business independently. There is still heavy reliance on the JV partner for prolonged mentorship as shown in this farmer’s statement: “…if ever those guys (the SRCC1) decide tomorrow, let’s take our things and go out we will be left stranded, in 20 years, because we know nothing.” In stark contrast to instances where the commercial partner provides critical skills and human resources, some of the JV operations are managed predominantly by external expertise, with little intentional mentorship and capacity development of emerging farmer partners, as seen from the viewpoint of one commercial partner: "We need people who are experienced and can guide us… not just one person running everything.” Lastly, the JV partnerships analysed demonstrate clear power differentials which have implications for emerging farmer decision-making power and ultimately widen knowledge gaps: “I have to wait on his side to approve things… because he’s got the financial money.”

4.2.2. Natural Capital

Emerging farmers participating in JVs have different statuses of land ownership and access to water, often shaped by historical agreements and systemic challenges. Land is a highly contentious issue in the South African context, and this is reflected in the limited private ownership of land amongst emerging farmers interviewed. In a few instances, data revealed that emerging farmers would lease government-owned land: “We don’t own the land, it’s government land”. However, the main value that emerging farmers appear to bring to a JV arrangement with a commercial farmer is water rights. Water rights2 are not paired with land ownership, which limits the viability and perpetuates power differentials in some JVs: “But what they have got out of me is what they wanted, which was the water rights. Now that they’ve got out of me what they wanted, I’m of no value to them… Water rights are worth a lot of money. Currently they are valued between 500 to 700,000 Rand a hectare”.

In instances where emerging farmers have land ownership, e.g., the community owned land in the Tyefu Irrigation Scheme, the lack of financial capital to maintain water rights constrained JV viability. Here JV investment partners were reluctant to finance a JV where they lacked control of the land:

“The land belongs to the community. And now, the joint ventures–which are the investors–they see that as a threat to becoming part of such an arrangement. What they would encourage is to just rent that land, do everything else, and just pay the rentals to the community, other than being in partnership… so, (they were concerned that) there would be bullying of some sort in the process… they don’t want that.”

Without the financial capital invested by commercial partners in a joint venture, emerging farmer viability is at high risk. There is a clear sense of fragility in emerging farmers becoming sustainable and independent, particularly for those lacking substantial financial capital. Struggling emerging farmers who in rare instances own land with water rights are vulnerable to being bought out by commercial farmers with greater financial muscle, an unintended consequence of the water and land allocation reform policy intentions. Despite having some form of land ownership and access to water, climate variability remains a threat to production viability, and this is further compounded by emerging farmer vulnerability at the hands of those deemed custodians of water. This is highlighted in the following quote from an emerging farmer in the Sundays River valley, which is predominantly under citrus production: “Now we’ve got water rights. And we have to pay the water taxes and that sort of thing. In the circumstances where there is a climate that is not conducive to successful farming, which is what we find at the moment, you then find that the Lower Sunday’s River Irrigation Scheme, then withdraws water, and you can’t do citrus farming without water. Our access to water rights are under threat…without water—we won’t be able to farm at all”.

4.2.3. Financial Capital

Loans from commercial banks are typically not accessible to emerging farmers looking to establish independently, thus necessitating commercial partner reliance. One farmer explains their options:

“… the funding is subject to what is called the National Credit Act….Which means you cannot give money to someone who can’t pay it back. Neither can you give money to someone who does not have the collateral for the debt. That means, by default, commercial banks cannot fund 100% black projects like ours, because, one, we are not yet operating, meaning that there is no cash flow that they can fund from. And secondly, we don’t have the collateral that they need to fund. That now forces us to use a different funding stream. That funding stream is to go to another white person who has all of those, and say, “look, can you become our partner?”

Apart from access to financial loans, the primary form of assistance provided by the state has been in the form of equipment and production supplies. For instance, one emerging farmer who is a farm manager on a JV farm shared, "We got two new tractors… from the Jobs Fund. However, some emerging farmers expressed their concern that these government aids only place them in further financial constraints: “Because whatever infrastructure or implements that the government is giving to us, is putting up the value of the company, which means it’s making the 25% more expensive. And the other thing that strikes my mind is that: whatever government is giving us, even if there’s nothing that we, as (the) workers trust is getting, except us people, who are working in the business, (are) getting paid every month, but for other reasons, there is nothing that we are getting out of the farm.”

Data showed that emerging farmers in JVs are disgruntled by the awareness of the inequity of the financial arrangement of the partnerships:

“… you take 85 + 50 versus 40 (million), ne? And then (the commercial partner) still wants me to pay for the land, and for the development costs, ne? Out of that 10%, the Community Trust must eat. Out of 10%, ne? And then it gets split, and they still benefit there. But here is where they’re making the money on their own farms, ok. And that is why we said this is fronting. It’s a scam.”

Establishing a new commercial farm requires an environmental impact assessment as well as obtaining a water licence, both of which are lengthy processes to complete. Up until recently (referring to the intervention of the revised raw water pricing strategy in 20243), the water tariff has been activated as soon as the water licence has been allocated, regardless of whether agricultural production has commenced or not. This has been a significant financial constraint for establishing emerging farmers, as documented in the response below:

“But you see the saddest part is that immediately (after) you are granted that water (license), the tariffs go up, you need to pay. The water bill just starts. Remember, you have a virgin land. (Although the emerging farmer may have the water (water rights), but they lack the financial capital to pay for tariffs therefore still heavily reliant on the established farmer. So, you have to do that EIA… I’m hearing that it takes a year. I already paid 750K now, and I haven’t even planted a thing. I haven’t even de-bushed. Imagine, I don’t have a partner that is financial, what will happen to me? You see, we are doomed. Doomed, doomed, doomed! I was going to sit with that negative, year one, because my EIA is still on…. I think at least there must be a free phase, or while maybe the EIA is being done. It’s being in process because its scope after scope, phase after phase. While that time…, at least DWS (Dept of Water and Sanitation) gives you a gap, or cuts your tariffs in half. I’m not saying they must write it off and then wait until the EIA is done.”

The lack of sustained financial support for emerging farmers to become profitable and overcome the initial high input costs to sustain agricultural operations, as well as seasonal disruptions (e.g., drought) affecting production, has resulted in many of these farms going into debt: “We’ve got (have had) two consecutive very difficult years in the citrus industry, for everyone. So it’s not looking good, but now I must go and knock at the government’s doors, looking for grants, for—to boost us for three to five years, we cannot get into more debt, in operating the farm.”

Data showed many of the JV arrangements require significant financial, management, and operational input from the commercial partner to maintain viability. In some instances, the commercial partner wears two hats, as a shareholder and as a contracted operational manager. This results in limited financial gain for the emerging farmer partners at this stage of the JV lifespan. There is a varied understanding of the true production costs of citrus farming amongst the emerging farmers involved in the JVs, leading to misplaced expectations and disgruntlement: “If there’s profits, we first take out 50%. As the company, for the operations of the next season. And then, we will take the other 50%, and distribute, and share it: 25/75 (split). And then out of the 75, we will share it as dividends amongst the 47 (beneficiaries/members). Which sometimes now is creating a problem amongst us. As the workers’ trust. Because some/most of the people feel like the other partner is double dipping, because we are getting their 25% share. But every month they are getting fees… You are told that there is no money. There is no dividend, you don’t get any, not even one rand out of it, but the farm must just continue again next year. And some of our people don’t even understand these grant things. And now, you said there’s no money”.

4.2.4. Physical Capital

The data indicate that emerging farmers have some access to water infrastructure, but persistent challenges remain. Many emerging farmers face difficulties related to boreholes, access to bulk water for irrigation, and theft. One farmer explained, “I extract underground water through boreholes…it’s about ten. But not all are working. It’s only two that are working.” Another respondent highlighted the effects of theft on operations: “One of the major challenges is cable theft that is affecting the functioning of the boreholes”. The lack of functional equipment significantly hampers productivity and reliance on renting equipment, which quickly cuts into potential profits. One farmer explained, “The tractors which were necessary were already breaking up; the harvesting machines were not working well”. Another added, “To prepare the land on your 1 hectare is costing you R900…Rent a tractor R900…the costs are high!”. A complete lack of or limited foundational infrastructure hinders emerging farmer establishment. One farmer referred to systemic barriers: “The first thing you must demonstrate to them is that you have land…then you must prove that you can connect your farm to the bulk infrastructure”.

Energy shortages, exacerbated by load shedding, significantly disrupt farming activities, particularly irrigation. “When it goes to stage 4, it’s fine, but when it’s four hours twice a day, it’s a nightmare.” Solar power has provided some relief, but currently its application is often limited to specific uses: “They put a solar system for the pump to pump the water out”. Data showed that there is evidence of adoption of innovation and technology amongst some emerging farmers despite resource constraints. These farmers are seeking to innovate to keep up with export market standards. For instance, one farmer spoke of importing specialised machinery: "And they specifically want that. So, we are looking at importing now a machine, because we imported a machine to do the trimming of the hemp.” Another noted the benefits of technology for security, using “robo guards” to protect assets:

“We do have ‘robo guards’, outside, that are motion detectors…It’s like a beam, that it picks up motion. It’s a motion sensor, so as soon as somebody walks past, it triggers and then it goes off and alarm goes off in our house. So, we can see in which zone the person is in.”

4.2.5. Social Capital

Data showed evidence of numerous learning, information sharing, and agricultural development networks available to emerging farmers both within and across JVs in the respective case study sites. These exist in the form of group training programs arranged by the commercial partners; “The SRCC provides general group training for emerging farmers”, independent farmers’ association specifically for black farmers like the Sunday River Valley Black farmers association, and educational material presented on radio and television: “Sometimes other skills I learn when I listen to the radio sometimes, also I like to watch TV, then I see a bit of the how they do some things…Let’s say vaccinations, dipping…Things like that…”.

Emerging farmers also make use of family networks for advice and learning: “I’ve got my cousin… my cousin is farming by there, but they have everything, and the government is pushing them, is giving them everything they want.” That’s when I spoke with her about these papers and she said, “Start here. If you start here, then everything will work”. These family networks are sometimes used as sources of labour when there is insufficient capital to pay staff for labour: “We can’t employ. How are we going to pay them? Because what we do, we’re using our family members just to help.”

A notable finding in favour of emerging farmers in JVs was that farmers who were not in JVs reported not having the same level of social capital and the wealth of exposure to numerous beneficial networks that are meant to add value, as presented in the following quotation:

“No, none of that. We don’t have that, official associations. Ja, they don’t cater for us. Look, take these citrus guys, they’ve got a Citrus Growers Association which is there, you know, and then they’ve got working groups and those kinds of stuff. They’re very organized. We are not.”

Data revealed that besides water or land resources and bulk infrastructure as the prerequisites for emerging farmers to enter JVs, they additionally require a business plan. Emerging farmers mostly only have the natural capital, and therefore rely on resources available through their social networks to get assistance in developing business plans. This poses a significant barrier to entry for emerging farmers. Emerging farmers in JVs in the study showed their awareness of the need to maximise social capital assets to facilitate the acquisition of other capital assets and positive livelihood outcomes. There is therefore a strong sense of social cohesion amongst emerging farmers towards this goal. The issue of theft raised in subsequent sections is rife in communities where emerging farmers in JVs operate. The limited financial capital to invest in security results in a strong sense of community cohesion, particularly when fighting crime, as there is no functional police service (too far to be of practical value). In some instances, such as in the case study of the study area of the Thyefu Iirrigation Board in the Fish River catchment:

“If it is said that the thugs have come, we just blow a whistle and our phones, and get told to come out, get out we’ll meet on the road, come we are at a certain, place and we meet each other. Yes, the car will be set on fire. We said that we don’t have a police station, the police station is far away, the road is awkward, and there is no transport. We are wrong for taking the law into our hands, but what should we do?

Both emerging and commercial farmers derive benefit from each other’s social networks to progress. The data reveal that in the same way emerging farmers leverage the established commercial farmers’ existing networks to accelerate processes such as the completion of an environmental impact assessment (EIA), commercial farmers also optimise the existing networks that emerging farmers have access to by virtue of being classified as historically disadvantaged. Partnership with an emerging farmer is seen as a strategy to access historically disadvantaged individual (HDI)-specific relief funding. Commercial farmers in the Citrus Growers Association use the emerging farmers’ status to access government support funding:

“"here’s a white individual, entering into partnership with 100% black (owned company) who are in need. So that means for them, they are, they are hitting transformation targets.”

“The three white farmers signed the agreement on the 29th of June this year. We know nothing about it.” "a second part of fronting… using the company name to go and do business on the side, "

Data identified a lack of transparency between commercial farmers and their emerging farmers partners in this respect as a significant challenge. As the quote above illustrates, commercial farmers are leveraging partnerships to expand their business without being transparent; emerging farmers do not benefit from these additional business ventures.

The data show there is a support base for emerging farmers from extension officers in the respective case studies. However, extension services differed significantly depending on location, with some emerging farmers in JVs indicating that they found the assistance offered very useful to their farming practice and others not. Farmers not in JVs relied on this support more than emerging farmers in JVs, possibly revealing a tangible benefit of being in a JV:

“The basic burning issue is this: the extension officer has his own group of people that he was working with…”.

5. Discussion

In South Africa, joint ventures have been used as a policy tool to address historical inequities in the agricultural sector. More recently, they have also been used as a tool in water allocation reform (WAR). Due to this importance, a lot of research attention has been devoted to understanding the structure of and successes/failures of JVs [34,37,39,61,62]. While these studies are important to understanding individual ventures, they do not place as much attention on external, contextual factors that may be affecting the outcomes of JVs. The complexity of successful agrarian transformation demands project-specific institutional arrangements that are tailored to the commodity and region in which the project is situated [63]. A one-size-fits-all approach, to address land reform, should not be adopted, given the complexity of issues at hand. The literature reveals that successful JVs usually possess unique institutional arrangements [34,64,65]. This measure of success should also be regarded in the context of JVs in South Africa, and we adopt this understanding in evaluating the study findings. To address the research question to what extent have these reforms, i.e., JVs, resulted in perceptible socio-economic benefits for emerging farmers, we consider the JVs analysed in the study as case-by-case examples. We attempt to explain how the results address the research question by exploring underlying mechanisms and possible explanations for the key findings for each of the five capital assets below:

Social capital appears to be the largest benefit for emerging farmers in JVs, emerging as both an outcome and a prerequisite for successful partnerships. The findings show that emerging farmers in JVs were mostly able to expand their learning, information sharing, agricultural development networks, and relationships of trust. In this way, expanding social capital determined access to other capital forms, e.g., financial capital in the case of EIA financing, and positive livelihood outcomes. However, power dynamics significantly shape how different capital assets are accessed, accrued, and controlled [66], with elite capture [67], echoed in our findings, remaining a challenge.

Human capital analyses showed that there were definite benefits for emerging farmers in JVs through access to skills and knowledge development opportunities in the form of targeted training programs and initiatives. Learning through formal training or informally through farmer-to-farmer relationships in communities of practice [68,69] or agricultural extension networks [70] can significantly improve capacity development, technology uptake, and agricultural productivity [71]. In our study, however, many emerging farmers failed to take full advantage of training benefits as there was evidence of variation in interest to participate. This could possibly be attributed to literacy rates and the correlation between the level at which training is pitched versus participants’ highest level of education acquired. Farmer literacy levels and educational backgrounds [72] as well as agricultural learning process design [73] all significantly influence participation rates, training completion, and technology uptake [74,75]. A key challenge reflected in the findings was the limited skills transfer for independent operation, which raises concern around the efficacy of targeted training and capacity-building initiatives to achieve the result of independent sustainable capacity for emerging farmers. Human capital development requires sustained, participatory, and contextually appropriate training and learning approaches that build upon existing knowledge systems [73]. Support from knowledge brokers as learning mediators and the intention of agricultural extension services [76] can also enable ongoing emerging farmer learning and productivity sustainability [77] but is not without its own challenges [78].

Most South African emerging farmers have limited education [79,80], low literacy levels [81], and limited experience with formal arrangements. Information asymmetries can lead to poor understanding of partnership agreement details, expectation misalignment, and inadequate communication about realistic production and output timeframes [34]. Our findings show that emerging farmers who had higher educational levels and some form of formal training in agriculture were less likely to find themselves in situations where they were unaware of the potential for the asymmetric accumulation of benefits of JV participation. The diversification of incomes by emerging farmers in JVs was more common for farmers with higher educational levels in disciplines other than agriculture, suggesting an awareness that the economic gains from such partnerships are often limited. Possession or access to other livelihood capital assets enables livelihood diversification [82] and choice [83]. The knowledge and acumen to make such decisions require higher-level thinking and exposure to the broader context of the economy, which is limited to a select few emerging farmers due to historic inequities.

Findings suggest that in the instances of these JVs, the emerging farmer partners tend to be motivated by other livelihood outcome opportunities, such as leveraging off commercial partner social networks to accelerate their own farming goals. In these cases, the JVs and the natural assets that are brought into them are viewed as tools for unlocking other capital assets in the long-term. This differs vastly from JVs where the beneficiaries that comprise the partnership have unrealistic expectations of what acquiring benefits entails without considering the long-term nature of farming, as is the case in the farming of citrus [84]. The nature of what sustainable, productive, and profitable farming looks like will vary depending on the agricultural commodity farmed [85]. Agreement clarity, expectation management, communication, and governance have all been found to be critical to sustainable agricultural partnerships [86,87]—all of which play a key role in determining the extent of socio-economic benefits accrued by emerging farmers in JVs.

Natural capital is another benefit accrued to emerging farmers in JVs, as in many instances water rights belonging to these farmers became the sole premise for entering a JV. The mutual benefit of water for land between commercial partners and emerging farmers at surface level presents a significant benefit to emerging farmers. The limited control over land and water resources, however, poses a threat to emerging farmers’ overall benefits accrued through being a part of a JV. Large-scale commercial farmers have developed strategies to ensure increasing water supply access to remain profitable, at times negating water allocation reform policy intent [88]. For instance, Kemerink et al. [59] show how white commercial farmers have maintained decision-making control of transformed Irrigation Boards to influence water infrastructure development and allocation to their benefit. The issue of “fronting” that surfaced in participant responses again raises the well-documented reality of commercial farmer exploitation of JV arrangements to their own benefit [18,34,38], defeating the objectives of equitable distribution of resources and redress.

As found by others [34,38], the accumulation of financial capital to emerging farmers in JVs remains highly limited, with persistent dependency on commercial partners and external funding. Limited emerging farmer access to formal credit, a broadly acknowledged livelihood capital barrier [89,90], deepens this dependence. This is prominently evident in the disgruntlement of emerging farmers with inequitable financial arrangements coupled with unmet expectations of benefit. One government intervention to address this challenge of financial capital shortage that has been recognised is the restructuring of water tariffs, as seen in the findings through the revision of the Pricing Strategy for Raw Water Use Charges [60]. An intervention like this recognises the limitation of the emerging farmers and attempts to relieve some of the pressure that they face in participating in the agricultural value chain. Policy intervention alone, however, is not adequate to meet the challenge of limited financial capital in its entirety. Researchers suggest that a combination of private and public sources is required. These sources include the commercial farmers, agribusinesses, public finance corporations, development finance institutions, and government departments [63]. Types of support include government grants, soft loans, infrastructure and asset sharing, provision of infrastructure and moveable assets, and direct funds from commercial partners. Each of these constitutes a form of concessional finance.

Physical assets and access to infrastructure are critical factors to agricultural productivity and profitability [90,91]. Findings show that, although there is evidence of some improved access to infrastructure and equipment, this is often without ownership or control, which limits the overall benefit. If the long-term goal of accrued benefits is to improve emerging farmers’ capacity to operate independently, access to or accumulation of physical capital becomes a challenge.

The comparison with farmers not in JVs revealed that emerging farmers who opt against partnering with commercial partners are more likely to accrue tangible capital assets and livelihood outcomes from their farming activities compared to their counterparts in JVs. Results showed that emerging farmers not in JVs had higher educational attainment than farmers in JVs. This contrast gives rise to the question of whether the strategy of JVs is effective in achieving the goal of equity and impacting the equity targets they are designed for or not. If the political imperative for this kind of WAR strategy is equity [18], then it is necessary to interrogate how equity is being operationalised in these strategies. The unhealthy co-dependency between commercial partners and emerging farmers based on natural capital in exchange for financial capital revealed in the findings presents a concerning reality where the goal of equity becomes compromised by the motives that each partner comes into the partnership with. The findings suggest that if farmers who are not in JVs are proving to be more successful, there may be merit in redirecting WAR strategies towards greater support for these farmers and the exploration of alternative approaches to meet equity imperatives.

The challenge of competing interests of actors in the agricultural value chain is equally problematic to the effective implementation of WAR, as the vested interests that actors come into the arrangements with have a bearing on their attitudes towards the WAR strategies. This is evident in the variation of perceptions surrounding the benefits that emerging farmers may accrue from being in a JV. The prevalent theme of “fronting” emerged from the data, in which there is a clear exploitation of emerging farmer’s natural capital, i.e., water allocated to them by the government as a means of optimising commercial partners’ own business (often for export). This fronting mostly occurs under the guise of desiring transformation and strengthening capacity when such goals are not foremost in their production agendas. The relationships between actors such as traditional authorities, the water users’ associations, and the commercial partners raise concerns around the extent to which power differentials impact the livelihood outcomes that emerging farmers will experience.

The results presented are important for evaluating the effectiveness of WAR initiatives designed to meet equity goals in the South African agricultural sector. The evidence can inform equity-focused decision-making at strategic and operational levels in countries like South Africa characterised by gross inequities.

6. Conclusions

This study raises a fundamental practical issue with WAR arrangements aimed at addressing historical inequities in South Africa’s agricultural landscape. The study argues that governance and institutional measures attuned to the local realities and farmers’ perceptions and power differentials/dynamics at farm scale are needed. In the pursuit of achieving the goal of improving emerging farmers’ livelihoods and strengthening their capacity to contribute to the country’s agricultural economy, arrangements such as JVs are only minimally effective. The use of the SLF may prove useful in distilling why this is the case. The SLF must be used in conjunction with concepts, tools, and modes of analysis used in other fields to provide a more robust analysis. Based on the findings, three policy recommendations can be made: (1) Emerging Farmer Pre-Screening: The varied interest in participation in targeted skills and knowledge development programs may highlight the value that pre-screening of emerging farmers, to determine if they will participate in training programs or be required to participate in training programs, could create. (2) Restructuring of Water Tariffs: The challenge of being expected to finance EIAs and pay water tariffs when there is no production, and therefore profit, from the land can be viewed as an inequitable distribution of costs. Interventions like the recent revision of the Pricing Strategy for Raw Water Use Charges [60], which was approved in 2024 and waivered financial costs expected of emerging farmers, serves as evidence of the government attempting to alleviate this pressure on emerging farmers through policy intervention. (3) Grassroots-Targeted Capacity Building: Findings also highlighted a need to grow the pipeline of emerging farmers in the future. The concern of an aging population of emerging farmers is commonly cited in the literature on agriculture in the rural areas of South Africa. Most youth leave farmlands in the rural areas to seek employment in the towns [92]; this may pose a threat to sustainability, as there will not be enough farmers with suitable agricultural experience to continue the cultivation of crops in the future. This highlights the necessity for grassroots capacity building and promotion of agriculture as a livelihood option. Introducing career days at schools and community information programs to create more awareness and subsequently train young people in agriculture as a way of ensuring sustainability should be considered.

It is important to note that the findings of this study are associated with some limitations:

• The selected case studies focus on one province of South Africa. These results may not be indicative of JVs in other areas of the country.
• Data were collected at only one point in time due to challenges in accessing farms and farmers; this accounts for the small sample size, which is acknowledged. Despite this consideration, the authors believe that the data make a valuable contribution to the understanding of socio-economic benefits of JVs for emerging farmers in the politically sensitive context of the agricultural landscape of South Africa.
• One of the limitations of the SLF raised by Bebbington [42] is that it does not explicitly address differential conditions, assets, and strategies of differentiated groups; thus, additional attention must be given to implications of issues such as ethnicity, class, gender, age, and other kinds of social differentiation. For this reason, the SLF must be used in conjunction with concepts, tools, and modes of analysis used in other fields to provide a more robust analysis. Examples that could be used include gender analysis frameworks [93] and class analysis [94].

In consideration of areas for future work, the authors suggest that an adaptation of the study in different JV contexts in the country could prove useful for future research to facilitate a means of drawing comparison across JVs in South Africa with respect to livelihood capital assets accrued to emerging farmers. The methodology of in-depth interviewing is mainly aimed at determining the dimensions and aspects of the situation under investigation, as opposed to drawing analysis from its constituents and the proportionate relationships among them [58]. This methodology values “depth over quantity” [58], and is thus deemed suitable for application in the current study. It may be useful to duplicate and modify the study in two geographical contexts but instead prioritise statistical analysis to allow for such kinds of analytical comparisons.

In sum, the need to support emerging farmers in the agricultural sector remains a continued priority for addressing historic inequities. The success of WAR initiatives such as JVs is hinged on measurable livelihood outcomes and capital assets accrued to emerging farmers due to being in JVs. Understanding the vulnerability context of emerging farmers in JVs in evaluating the benefits accrued to them is highly important, and there is thus a need to couple the use of the SLF with consideration for the complexity presented by inherent interdependencies.