Power Plant Construction Projects Risk Assessment: A Proposed Method for Temporary Systems of Commissioning
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
3. Materials and Methods
4. Results and Discussion
- A reactive response of the utility sector to the adoption and adequation of the systems and standards commonly used in other industries of reference in this field was detected. The sector incorporates the improvements and updates that are led by other industrial sectors in this field, slowly and not always adequately. An example is the HAZOP technique incorporated some years late.
- Incorporation of inherently safer design practices at the early stages of the project is an improvement area to be considered. Although the design of the areas of the plant considers the selection of inherently safer designs, it is not implemented as a prioritized and mandatory design, so there are no justifications or specific studies to this objective. A specific study that deals with these relevant subjects for the process safety could be incorporated.
- It would be convenient to implement Human Factor Analysis (HFA) to review the risks and problems related to human factors in relation to ergonomic, potential human errors, and problems such as alarm prioritization, tagging, signaling, noise, and lighting. The incorporation, as a standard practice, of the preparation of specific studies, SIS/SIL and ESD, is highly recommended. This would simplify and clarify the application and compliance with the IEC standards.
- Critical issue. It has been confirmed that construction companies do not perform process risk analysis and HAZOP for the temporary systems usually installed during commissioning and start-up. This can result in accidents during commissioning.
4.1. Temporary Systems for Commissioning
- Process and mechanical systems:
- Chemical cleaning.;
- Cleaning with air, water, or other products.
- Steam blowing of piping.
- Piping and temporary installations of liquid or gaseous fuels.
- Inertization of piping and equipment.
- Electrical systems:
- Temporary power supply with diesel generators.
- Temporary interconnections.
- Provisional power supply and distribution.
- Uninterrupted and backup temporary power supply.
- Electrical systems in operation without the final protection settings, and therefore with temporary settings that can produce hazards and risks that are not present under normal operating conditions.
- Instrumentation and control systems:
- Protection systems with preliminary settings, since the plant is not operating under normal conditions.
- Temporary control logics necessary for performance of certain tests.
- Non-operative alarms or alarms with preliminary settings, because the construction is not completely finalized.
- Disconnected signals or incomplete control loops, which require modifications in the control logics until the erection is finalized.
4.2. Selection of the Methodology
- Initial stage for evaluation of the documentation and state of the installation;
- Hazard identification and risk analysis on the process and activities considered on the temporary facilities to be evaluated.
- Scenario-based;
- Non-scenario-based.
- Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA);
- Safety Review (SR);
- Relative Ranking (RR);
- Checklist.
- What-If Analysis.
- What-If Analysis/Checklist.
- Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP);
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA);
- Fault Tree Analysis (FTA);
- Event Tree Analysis (ETA);
- Cause–Consequence Analysis (CCA) and bow tie analysis.
- Checklists.
- Application of SWIFT (Structured What-If Technique) with preselected guide words.
- Application of techniques of HAZOP applied to procedures, using questions related to incorrect operations or non-executed operations.
4.3. Description of the Methodology
4.4. Procedure
- Preparing for the review, including the scope of the review and the necessary documentation.
- Performing the review, establishing the basic rules for the review, and the preselected guide words.
- Documenting the results of the review adequately.
4.4.1. Preparing for the Review and Necessary Documentation
- Detailed scope of the system, including lists with battery limits and system tie-ins.
- Description of the process, base of the temporary system to be implemented.
- Flow diagrams and P & IDs of the system.
- Lists and data sheets of the chemical products that will be used in the process of the temporary system. Safety data sheets of the products (SDS). Preferably, the SDS of the products will be provided in the official format of the country where the project takes place, or in the format of international organizations, always in accordance with the normal practices of the product supplier.
- Lists and data sheets of the equipment comprising the systems.
- Layout drawings of the equipment and general arrangement where the location and layout of the equipment and components of the temporary system are shown.
- Isometric drawings and/or piping plan drawings of the system. It is important that this documentation show the scope of the temporary system and the interconnection with the permanent installation.
- List of the material parts of the temporary system: data sheets of piping and/or components in case these include any not forecasted for the project. It is recommended to list the requirements of the equipment comprising part of the permanent installation when required. This facilitates the identification of mistakes in the design conditions of the equipment, components, and others and facilitates the review.
- Procedure for the execution of the system. The following points, as a minimum, shall be included:
- Procedure for filling the system. Considering the initial conditions of the system.
- Procedure for the start-up and initial start-up.
- Procedure for normal and emergency operation.
- Procedure for shutdown.
- Other procedures as necessary.
- 10.
- Risk evaluation of the system. In this point, the usual activities related to the installation and handling of chemical products, as well as the main hazards and risks associated with the operation, are included. Normally, this is approached from a perspective related to the occupational health of the workers, and not so much from the point of view of identification of hazards and risk evaluation of the process.
- 11.
- Procedures for sampling in case they are required by the system (for example, to determine certain parameters of water or steam in systems that provide a certain degree of cleanliness).
- 12.
- Inspection and test plan. It is possible that this plan, besides incorporating the inspections of the activities of the system, incorporates inspections during the manufacturing of pieces or components necessary for the system.
- 13.
- Other documentation that is considered relevant to perform the risk assessment with the required guarantees by the specialists. For example, ambient conditions for some tests, notices to the nearby population or to the authorities, etc.
4.4.2. Performing the Review. Rules and Guide Words Recommended
- That the status of the system and the documentation are acceptable to proceed with the risk evaluation; or
- That the status of the system and/or the documentation are not acceptable to allow proceeding with the risk evaluation.
- Health and safety at work issues. Special attention shall be given to the requirements of HSE and to ensure the provision of personal protection means, that communication devices are available and operative, that accessibility to the working area is adequate, that the permits to work have been issued, that Job Safety Analysis (JSA) has been performed, and that the required control and mitigation measures of the risks have been implemented.
- Emergency systems, such as fire protection and public address systems are checked.
- Issues related to the operation of the system are reviewed. Automatic and manual operations, training of the operators, and necessary temporalities required for the operation of the system are also checked. Steps of the sequences are correctly identified and the criteria for achievement of the steps are also identified.
- Initial fill of the system.
- Start-up of the system.
- Shutdown of the system.
- Normal operation.
- Emptying of the system.
4.4.3. Documenting the Results
4.5. Application of the Methodology to a Real Project: Case Study
- Chemical cleaning of boiler and steam and water mechanical systems such as boiler feedwater, condensate, and steam systems.
- Cleaning with air, water, or other products.
- Steam blowing.
- Piping and temporary installations of liquid or gaseous fuels.
- Lube oil flushing.
- –
- Installation of adequate protection devices and equipment that guarantee safety of operations.
- –
- Verification and installation of additional local interlocks, such as thermal and pressure relief valves that increase the safety level of the temporary installation.
- –
- Incorporation of additional alarms and logics in the control systems involved, reducing the risk levels of certain operations.
- –
- Issues related to operational status of the control systems during temporary operations.
- –
- Alternative solutions of system configuration are proposed to avoid dangerous situations, accidents, or failure of equipment and components that could be working out of design conditions.
- –
- Recommendations are made to guarantee the level of education and training of the operators who will be in charge of the operations.
- –
- Preparation of specific checklists is proposed.
- –
- Double verification in the field can help to increase the safety level of operations.
- –
- Other recommendations related to spare parts or industrial safety is proposed.
- Filling test and leak test.
- Initial cleaning in closed circuit.
- Chemical cleaning.
- Drainage of the system.
- Final rinsing.
5. Conclusions
- It is an agile method that allows identifying hazardous conditions and risks during specific processes in temporary systems.
- The method uses and combines techniques with proven results, such as brainstorming.
- The short execution time required allows quick and efficient implementation.
- The method is not considered itself by international standards, unlike others such as HAZOP.
- It is necessary to know the real state of the temporary installation before carrying out the risk analysis, which depends on information provided by others.
- The necessary materials must be on site for the execution of the tasks.
- Application to temporary installations in solar thermal renewable energy plants such as thermal salt storage systems, e.g., salt melting processes or salt tank filling processes, as well as specific operations for the safety of these facilities.
- Application with the necessary adaptations to plants that use hydrogen as fuel, either in installations similar to those described here, or those that are currently under development.
- Extend the application of the proposed methodology to other disciplines, such as temporary electrical systems, with the necessary adaptations as well as the selection of the most appropriate guide words and the checklists that are required based on the new proposed systems.
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A. Study Case: Application of the Methodology to a Real Power Plant
- Filling test and leak test.
- Initial cleaning in closed circuit.
- Chemical cleaning.
- Drainage of the system.
- Final rinsing.
System | Chemical Cleaning | Risk Evaluation Project Name | Company Logo | ||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Code Number | Chapter 7.1 | ||||||||||||||||||
SubSystem | N/A | Cod/Equipment Description | Document Attached | Yes | No | ||||||||||||||
Drawing or Procedure: | Description: | Method: Structured What-If/Check List (SWIF/CL) | Doc. Type: | ||||||||||||||||
7.1.2.1.-Chemical Cleaning | Light F.O. Chemical Cleaning Procedure | Guide Words Procedure Part I.-Risk Evaluation | Not Applicable | ||||||||||||||||
Activity: 7.1.2.1.1.-Initial Filling & Leak Test | Description: Temporary Connections Flanged or Threaded and Elements to Be Removed or Replaced | ||||||||||||||||||
Step | Step Description | Omission of the Step | More Than/Less Than | Before/After | Step Exectd in a Wrong Order | Action Executed Wrongly | |||||||||||||
P | C | RISK | P | C | RISK | P | C | RISK | P | C | RISK | P | C | RISK | |||||
1.1 | Fuel tank connections preparation | ||||||||||||||||||
1.1.1 | Remove check valve internals | 3 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 9 | |||
1.1.2 | Remove valve internals | 3 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 9 | |||
1.1.3 | Prepare DN50 PN16flange connection | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 9 | |||
1.1.4 | Prepare DN100 PN16 flange connection | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 9 | |||
1.1.5 | Remove valve internals | 3 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 9 | |||
1.1.6 | Blind PSV | 3 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 9 | |||
1.1.7 | Prepare DN50 PN16flange connection | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 9 |
Value | Description | Reference Values for Estimation |
---|---|---|
1 | Highly unlikely | Extremely remote chance of occurrence (<10 −5 year) |
2 | Unlikely | Rare event. An event not likely during operations (1 × 10−4 year) |
3 | Likely | An infrequent event. An event that may occur during operations (1 × 10−3 year) |
4 | Probable | An event likely to occur in working lifetime of plant operations (10−1 to 10−1 per year). |
5 | Frequent | Happens several times per year. A common event that is likely to occur several times per year. |
Value | Description | People | Environment | Assets |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Negligible | Slight: First aid injury | Loss of containment: No escape to the environment. | Minor equipment damage: No delay in operations. |
2 | Minor | Minor injury: No irreversible effect | Loss of containment: Minor escape to the environment. | Minor equipment damage: Up to 1 day delay in operations. |
3 | Significant | Major injury: Permanent disability and health effects | Loss of containment: Significant escape to the environment. | Minor equipment damage: Several days of delay in operations. |
4 | Severe | Fatality/ies (1–2): Multiple major injuries/permanent disability | Major damage: Loss of containment with significant escape to the environment. | Major impact: Severe damage to assets. Extended loss of operations. Partial loss of plant unit. |
5 | Catastrophic | Multiple fatalities on-site and/or several major injuries off-site | Extensive damage: Major loss of containment. | Massive impact: Total loss of major plant unit and possible damage to adjacent units. |
System | Chemical Cleaning | Hazard Evaluation Project Name | Company Logo | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Code Number | Chapter 7.1 | |||||||
SubSystem | N/A | Cod/Equipment Description | Document Attached | Yes | No | |||
Drawing or Procedure: | Unit: | Method: Structured What-If/Check List | Doc. Type: | |||||
7.1.2.1.- Chemical Cleaning | Light F.O. Chemical Cleaning Procedure | Guide Words Procedure Part II | Not Applicable | |||||
Node: 7.1.2.1.1.- Initial Filling & Leak Test | Description: Temporary Connections Flanged or Threaded and Elements to Be Removed or Replaced | |||||||
Item | Deviation | Causes | Consequences | Safeguards | Recommendation | |||
1.1.1 | Remove check valve internals Case: Omission of Step Case: Action executed wrongly | Operator mistake | 1.- Damage to valve trim | 1.- Test and Inspection Plan Check List Paragh 4.2. Walkdown to check step completion | 1.- Be sure spare parts availability 2.- To Include a Task List with a specific checklist for checking that the step has been properly carried out. 3.- to define an independent field team for review correct execution of the step. On field double checking. 4.- To Incorporate a signature of the team (operator and supervisor) responsible. | |||
2.- Neccesary spare parts trim valve | ||||||||
3.- Commissioning schedule delay | ||||||||
1.1.2 | Remove Control valve internals Case: Omission of Step Case: Action executed wrongly | Operator mistake | 1.- Damage to valve trim | 1.- Test and Inspection Plan Check List Paragh 4.2. Walkdown to check step completion | 1.- Be sure spare parts availability 2.- To Include a Task List with a specific checklist for checking that the step has been properly carried out. 3.- to define an independent field team for review correct execution of the step. On field double checking. 4.- To Incorporate a signature of the team (operator and supervisor) responsible. | |||
2.- Neccesary spare parts trim valve | ||||||||
3.- Commissioning schedule delay |
System | Chemical Cleaning | Risk Evaluation Project Name | Company Logo | |||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Code Number | Chapter 7.1 | |||||||||||||||
SubSystem | N/A | Cod/Equipment Description | Document Attached | Yes | No | |||||||||||
Drawing or Procedure: | Description: | Method: Structured What-If/Check List (SWIF/CL) | Doc. Type: | |||||||||||||
7.1.2.1.- Chemical Cleaning | Light FO Chemical Cleaning Procedure | Guide Words Procedure Part I.- Risk Evaluation | Not Applicable | |||||||||||||
Activity: 7.1.2.1.3.- Chemical cleaning | Description: Fuel Oil Chemical cleaning | |||||||||||||||
Step | Step Description | Omission of the Step | More Than/Less Than | Before/After | Step Exectd in a Wrong Order | Action Executed Wrongly | ||||||||||
P | C | RISK | P | C | RISK | P | C | RISK | P | C | RISK | P | C | RISK | ||
3.1 | Heat up system to approximately 45 °C | |||||||||||||||
3.1.1 | Check Auxiliary boiler is ready for Operation | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
3.1.2 | Verify all connections are correctly installed. | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
3.1.3 | Start up Auxiliary Boiler. | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 12 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 |
3.1.4 | Increase load as needed | 3 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 12 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 |
3.1.5 | Open manual valve for heating header of chemical cleaning solution | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 12 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 |
3.1.6 | Control Temperature up to 45 °C of water throug local temperatura indicator | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
3.2 | Degreasing stage | |||||||||||||||
3.2.1 | surfactant 0.05% and caustic soda 0.25% | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 16 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
3.2.2 | dosing manually using temporary mixing tank | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 |
3.3 | Heat up system to 60 ± 5 °C | |||||||||||||||
3.3.1 | Heating proccess as per 3.1. up to 60 ± 5 °C | 3 | 2 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 16 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 |
3.3.2 | Temperature, Alkalinity and pH will be monitored every hour | 3 | 3 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 |
3.4 | Acid stage | |||||||||||||||
3.4.1 | When T = 60 °C close steam injection valve | 4 | 4 | 16 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 4 | 4 | 16 | 4 | 4 | 16 | 3 | 3 | 9 |
3.4.2 | Dosing citric acid 3%, ammonium bifluoride 0,3% and corrosion inhibitor0,2% | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 16 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 16 | 3 | 3 | 9 |
3.4.3 | Temperature, acidity, pH, Fe3 +, Fetot y Inhibitor efficiency will be monitored every hour | 3 | 3 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 |
3.4.4 | Check ph is between 3–4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 |
3.4.5 | Verify Fetot remain stable==> end acid stage | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 |
3.5 | Pasivation stage | |||||||||||||||
3.5.1 | Increase ph up to 7–7.5 dosing NaOH | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 16 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
3.5.2 | NaOH must be dosing slowly | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 |
3.5.3 | Inyectar Nitrito de sodio 0.3% con Ph = 7–7.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 16 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
3.5.4 | Check temperature is 30–40 °C | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
3.5.5 | Monitor each hour:Temp, pH, Fe3+ y Fetot | 3 | 3 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 |
3.5.6 | Check stability Fe3+ | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 |
System | Chemical Cleaning One Phase | Hazard Evaluation | Company Logo | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Code Number | Chapter 7.1 | Project Name | ||||||
SubSystem | N/A | Cod/Equipment | Document Attached | Yes | No | |||
Description | ||||||||
Drawing or Procedure: | Unit: | Method: Structured What-If/Check List | Doc. Type: | |||||
7.1.2.1.- Chemical Cleaning | Light F.O. Chemical Cleaning Procedure | Guide Words Procedure Part II | Not Applicable | |||||
Node: 7.1.2.1.3.- Chemical Cleaning | Description: Light F.O. Chemical Cleaning | |||||||
Item | Deviation | Causes | Consequences | Safeguards | Recommendation | |||
3.1.3 | Auxiliary Boiler start up from Local Control Panel | Steam pressure of Auxiliary Boiler higher than set point | 1.-Overpressure in the boiler, risk of explosion. | 1.- Pressure relief valve at the boiler outlet. | 1.- To Provide detailed operating instructions for the local operation of the boiler. | |||
Case: More/Less than | 2.- High pressure trip in the boiler. Steam outlet shut-off. | 2.- To Provide a list of settings for the Auxiliary Boiler operation, trips and alarms | ||||||
Case: Action executed wrongly | 2.- Overpressure in the temporary connections to the header. Possible breaking of the temporary hoses with leakage of water at high temperature and pressure. | 3.- Shutdown of fuel and steam supply to the system. | ||||||
3.- Potential damage to the people and the environment | ||||||||
Caso: More/Less than | See more pressure | See more pressure | ||||||
3.1.4 | Increase boiler load if required | See more pressure (case 3.1.3.) | ||||||
Case: More/Less than. | ||||||||
Action executed wrongly | ||||||||
3.1.5 | Open manual valve for heating header of chemical cleaning solution | Operator open the valve more than necessary | 1.- High temperature on return main header | 1.-Local thermometer for temperature measurement. | 1.-To install an local alarm device (temperature switch) when the temperature rises above the set point. | |||
Case: More/Less temperature than expected. | 2.- Operating instructions | 2.- To install a isolation device for T > 70 °C and T = 45 °C for the heating stage. | ||||||
Case: Action executed wrongly | 2.-Possible breaking of the temporary hoses with leakage of water at high temperature and pressure. | 3.- Evaluate the installation of a protection circuit in the local panel to acting on the isolation device for item 2 when overpressure and/or over-temperature happens. | ||||||
3.- Potential damage to the people and the environment |
System | Chemical Cleaning One Phase | Hazard Evaluation | Company Logo | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Code Number | Chapter 7.1 | Project Name | ||||||
SubSystem | N/A | Cod/Equipment Description | Document Attached | Yes | No | |||
Drawing or Procedure: | Unit: | Method: Structured What-If/Check List | Doc. Type: | |||||
7.1.2.1.- Chemical Cleaning | Light F.O. Chemical Cleaning Procedure | Guide Words Procedure Part II | Not Applicable | |||||
Node: 7.1.2.1.3.- Chemical Cleaning | Description: Light F.O. Chemical Cleaning | |||||||
Item | Deviation | Causes | Consequences | Safeguards | Recommendation | |||
3.2.1 | Dosing surfactant 0.05% and caustic soda 0.25% slowly to temporary mixing tank | Operator dosing more product than required to the temporary mixing tank. | 1.- High concentration of degreasing product on the temporary mixing tank | 1.-Use of Personal Protective Equipment. | 1.- Be sure to regulate the liquid chemical feed flow with the manual pump. | |||
& | Case: More/Less than | 1.- More surfactant | 2.- For dosing of surfactant (liquid) a pneumatic pump is used. | 2.- To provide the quantities to be dosed for caustic soda in order to avoid major mistakes by the operator. Simple data to be provided. | ||||
3.2.2 | Case: Action executed wrongly | 2.- More caustic soda (sodium hydroxide) because operation is manual by emptying bags | 3.-Operating Instructions and Safety Data Sheets for chemical products (SDS) | 3.- Ensure the emptying from the mixing tank to the effluent basin to recover the degreasing solution. | ||||
4.- Be sure portable eyewash shower is installed. | ||||||||
2.- pH increasing in the mixed solution. | ||||||||
3.- Potential damage to the people and the environment depending of the concentration of the products | ||||||||
3.3.1 | Heating up in accordance with paragraph 3.1 up to 60 ± 5 °C | Operator open the manual valve more than necessary. | 1.- High temperature on return main header | 1.-Local thermometer for temperature measurement. | 1.-To install an local alarm device (temperature switch) when the temperature rises above the set point. | |||
Case: More/Less temperature than expected. | 2.-Design conditions for piping and mechanical equipments. | 2.- To install a isolation device for T > 70 °C and T = 45 °C for the heating stage. | ||||||
Case: Action executed wrongly | 2.-Possible breaking of the temporary hoses with leakage of water at high temperature and pressure. | 3.- Operating instructions | 3.- Evaluate the installation of a protection circuit in the local panel to acting on the isolation device for item 2 when overpressure and/or over-temperature happens. | |||||
3.- Potential damage to the people and the environment |
- Install pressure safety valves in the circuit to avoid pressures that lead to the failure of the temporary hoses.
- Check the settings and the calibration certificates of the PSVs.
- Install devices for alarm and shutdown in case of too high temperatures. Modify the local panel.
- Install an interlock device in the feeding system of chemical products to the water when steam is being injected.
- Provide the exact quantities of chemical products to be dosed and devices that guarantee their feed.
- Implement checklists that assure the correct performance of the operations. The double-checking of some operations penalizes the execution time and the cost of the number of operators but assures the correct performance of the works.
- Install eye washers in the proximity of the temporary system.
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Project N. | Year | N.studies | Early Design | Basic Engineering | Detaill Engineering | Construction | Commisioning & Startup | ||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
HAZID | FSS/FEA | FHA | QRA | F&G | HAZID Det | FSS/FEA | QRA prel | LOPA SIS/SIL | HAZID Det | HAZOP | DB/PR/Flare | RAM | QRA prel | LOPA SIS/SIL | RA/MS | SIMOPS | JSA | SIMOPS | PSSRs | (PSSR) | |||
FHA | HRA | HRA | JSA | Check List | Audits | ||||||||||||||||||
SGIA/SIP | |||||||||||||||||||||||
109 | 1986 | 2 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||
105 | 1994 | 2 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||
108 | 1994 | 2 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||
502 | 1995 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||
505 | 1995 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||
106 | 1996 | 2 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||
503 | 1996 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||
504 | 1996 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||
104 | 1998 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||
107 | 1998 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||
103 | 2000 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||
110 | 2001 | 2 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||
609 | 2001 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
501 | 2002 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||
610 | 2003 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
603 | 2004 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
307 | 2004 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
611 | 2005 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
302 | 2006 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
304 | 2007 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
305 | 2007 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
612 | 2007 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
102 | 2008 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||
303 | 2008 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
306 | 2008 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
701 | 2008 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
702 | 2008 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
703 | 2008 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
704 | 2008 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
601 | 2009 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
613 | 2009 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||
801 | 2009 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||
101 | 2010 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||
301 | 2010 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||||
602 | 2010 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
705 | 2010 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
802 | 2010 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||
706 | 2011 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
803 | 2011 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||
614 | 2012 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||
606 | 2015 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||
111 | 2015 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||
616 | 2015 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||
607 | 2016 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||
615 | 2016 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||
617 | 2016 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||
201 | 2017 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||
604 | 2017 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
608 | 2017 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||
605 | 2018 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||
618 | 2018 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||
901 | 2020 | 15 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||
112 | 2021 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||
619 | 2021 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||||
113 | 2021 | 14 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||
620 | 2022 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||||||||
902 | 2023 | 15 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||
621 | 2024 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
622 | 2024 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
Method [58,59,60,61] | Description | Types | |
---|---|---|---|
Qualitative | Methods based on qualitative evaluations; they do not establish a numerical value of the analyzed phenomenon. Qualitative methods can be classified according to scenario-based and non-scenario-based hazard evaluations. | Non-Scenario-Based Hazard Evaluation Procedures | Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PreHA) |
Safety Review | |||
Relative Ranking | |||
Checklist | |||
Scenario-Based Hazard Evaluation Procedures | What-If Analysis [62,63,64] | ||
Structured What-If Technique (SWIFT) [65] | |||
What-If Analysis/Checklist | |||
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study [66,67,68] | |||
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) | |||
Semi-quantitative/Hybrid | Based on the use of qualitative methodologies together with the use of indices to estimate the probability and consequences. | Index-based (Dow [69] F&EI [70], MOND [71], etc.) | |
SIL/LOPA Studies [14,48,49,72,73,74,75,76] | |||
Quantitative | Based on systematic development of numerical estimates of the expected frequency and severity of potential incidents associated with a facility based on mathematical techniques. | Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) | |
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) | |||
Cause–Consequence Analysis and Bow-Tie Analysis | |||
Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) |
Project Stage | Procedure or Study | Description | References | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Early design | Industrial safety studies | Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) | ||
Seveso Studies or “Major Hazards Reports” | [6,79] | |||
Health Risks Assessment (HRA) | ||||
Process safety studies | Hazard Identification Study (HAZID) | [80] | ||
Preliminary Quantitative Risk Analysis (prelimQRA) | [81] | |||
Engineering * | Basic Engineering | HSE Plan for Engineering | Hazardous Areas Classification, Safety Data Sheets (SDS), evacuation and escape routes, etc. | |
Detailed HAZID | Hazards included: external and environmental hazards and conditions; process hazards, commonly including from the storage of hazardous materials, pressures and temperatures of vents and leaks; hazards related to occupational health and safety, and hazards related to the project implementation. | |||
Detailed Engineering | HAZOP [75] | Two types of HAZOP: HAZOP and HAZOP/SIL. The HAZOP methodology that is applied to power plants is similar to HAZOP performed in other industrial sectors. It is common to schedule the sessions based on division of the power plant into the BOP water and steam systems, boiler and auxiliary systems, gas turbines and HRSGs for the combined cycles, steam turbines, auxiliary systems, and package units. | Examples of HAZOP can be found in [24,27,28,82] | |
EHAZOP | HAZOP applied to the design of the electrical systems. | |||
Consequence Analysis Studies | It is common to use the techniques of ETA and FTA [77,78]. The calculation tools used to calculate the effects are normally based on the use of commercial software (such as DNV [79], PHAST [80], SCRI [81]). | ETA [83] and FTA [84] DNV [85], PHAST [86], SCRI [87] | ||
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) | QRA studies provide the hazards, frequency of occurrence, and consequences of the scenarios that are credible in terms of leakages, fire, explosion, toxic clouds, and other accidents that can be severe, not only for the plant itself, but also for the surrounding area. | |||
Building Risk Assessment (BRA) | Studies hazards and potential harm to people located in buildings on process sites. In power plants, this method is commonly included as part of the QRA study or the Consequence Analysis. | |||
Hazardous Areas Classification | The hazardous area classification consists of two basic documents: the hazardous area classification and the drawings of classified areas. There are two main systems for the classification: NFPA/NEC, NFPA 70 National Electric Code, NEC [82], used mainly in the USA, and ATEX/IEC (IEC 60079) [83]. | NEC [88] ATEX/IEC (IEC 60079) [89] | ||
Other studies | SAFOP (Electrical Systems Safe Operability Review), SAFAN (Safety Analysis), SYSOP (System Security and Operability Analysis), and OPTAN (Operator Task Analysis). | |||
Construction ** | Construction HSE Plan | Requirements related to the risk evaluation for the construction and the safety and health applicable to the project are defined in a Construction HSE Plan. Qualitative methods are used. | Risk Matrix [90] Simplified qualitative method [91] | |
Job Safety Analysis (JSA) | The method divides the scope of work in stages, which are also divided into tasks and activities, in a manner so that those tasks and activities will be evaluated separately. | [92] | ||
Risk Analysis/Method Statement (RAMS) | How, when, and why the control measures identified in the risk evaluation of the JSA are to be implemented. | |||
Other studies | HAZCON. HAZCON consists of two stages, the first one being more general, where the construction team identifies with checklists the biggest risks of the project, and the second stage in which a detailed evaluation of the construction risks is provided. | [93,94] | ||
Commissioning and Start-up | ToP (Turn Over Packages) | The power plant is divided into systems that have a defined function for the plant and can be test isolated from the rest. Mechanical, electrical, and I & C systems are included in ToPs, as needed. Walk-down is included in the process to transfer ToP from the construction to commissioning organization usually to the final client of the plant. | ||
Test and start-up procedures | These procedures provide necessary requirements to develop the different activities that are necessary for the performance of the different activities and tests of the equipment, components, and systems at the installation. | |||
Functional and performance test | Mechanical and electrical functional tests are commonly used in power plants. ASME defines the performance test as “the highest level of accuracy based on current engineering knowledge, taking into account test costs and the value of information obtained from testing for manufactures and end users. | [95], ASME PTC [96] | ||
Other studies | Other techniques that allow evaluating the hazards just before the execution of the tasks are PSSR (Pre-Start up Safety Review) and Last-Minute Risk Assessment (LMRA). PSSR and LMRA have been applied in power plants very occasionally. | PSSR [97,98] (LMRA) [99] |
Safety Studies Category | Industry | Project Life Cycle Stage | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Viability Stage | Engineering Stage | Construction | Commissioning and Startup | ||||
Fron End Loading/Initial Studies | Basic Engineering | Detailed Engineering | |||||
FEL-1 (Appraise) | FEL-2 (Select) | FEL-3(Define)/FEED | |||||
Project HSE Plan | Across all Industries in the comparative study | Updated continuosly throughout project life cycle | |||||
Risk Register | |||||||
Action Tracking List | |||||||
Hazard Identification | Power Plants | Conceptual HAZID | Detailed HAZID | HAZOP | RA/MS JSA | JSA Check list | |
Oil&Gas/Petrochemical * | Preliminary HAZID | HAZID | Prelim HAZOP/What If/CheckList | HAZOP Final/What If/CheckList Safety Studies Review | JSA ORR* | Change mangmt temporally piping JSA ORR* | |
Consequence Assessments | Power Plants | QRA prelim | CCA | ||||
Oil&Gas/Petrochemical * | FSS/FEA prelim FHA prelim | FSS/FEA FHA SGIA/SIP | FSS/FEA ** FHA ** SGIA/SIP ** | ||||
Safety Assessments | Power Plants | DHM prelim HAC prelim EER | DHM HAC RAM (occasionally) EER | Audits and Inspections | SIMOPS (occasionally) | ||
Oil&Gas/Petrochemical * | Preliminary ISD | rev ISD prelim DHM prelim DB/PR/Flare prelim SVA prelim | ISD DHM HFA DB/PR/Flare RAM HAC prelim SCE EER SVA SIMOPS prelim Design Case for Safety prelim | ISD ** DHM ** HFA ** DB/PR/Flare ** RAM ** HAC ** SCE ** EER ** SVA ** SIMOPS Design Case for Safety | SIMOPS ** Audits and Inspections Operations Case for Safety | SIMOPS ** Audits | |
Risk Assessments | Power Plants | QRA preliminar | QRA | HRA | |||
Oil&Gas/Petrochemical * | CRA | CRA reviewed | QRA prelim HRA | QRA | HRA | ||
Risk Mitigation | Power Plants | HAZOP/SIL (LOPA) | Emergency Response Plan | ||||
Oil&Gas/Petrochemical * | F&G prelim ESD prelim Fire Protection prelim Emerg Response prelim | LOPA SIS/SIL F&G ESD Fire Protection Emerg Response | LOPA ** SIS/SIL ** F&G ** ESD ** Fire Protection ** Emerg Respons ** | Emergency Response ** | |||
Stage Gate Reviews | Power Plants | Design Review | Construction Review | PSSRs (occasionally) | |||
Oil&Gas/Petrochemical * | Concept Review | Selection Review | Technical Definition Review | Desing Review | Construction Review | PreStartup Safety Review (PSSR) |
Guide Word | Meaning Guide Word When Applied to a Step |
---|---|
Omission of the step | The step is not done or part of the step is not done. Some possible reasons include the operator forgot to do the step, did not understand the importance of the step, or the procedure did not include this step |
More than/Less than | Execution of the step is carried out incorrectly providing more/less amount than required. It can also be understood as an action performed by excess or by default, opening at 35% instead of 20%... in the case of 3 valves A, B and C that must be opened, only 2 open or open more than those indicated... |
Before/After | Step is performed before or after what is required in the procedure. For instance, operator must wait one minute and perform the action before the time has elapsed or after... |
Step executed in a wrong order | Step is executed in a wrong order, before or after when it is required or a subsequent step is performed at this time instead of the expected step |
Action executed wrongly | The step is not performed as intended. Some possible reasons include the operator does too much or too little of the stated task, the operator manipulates the wrong process component, or the operator reverses the order of the steps, wrong operation conditions (pressure, temperature,...) |
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Sánchez Colmenarejo, J.I.; Camprubí, F.M.; González-Gaya, C.; Sánchez-Lite, A. Power Plant Construction Projects Risk Assessment: A Proposed Method for Temporary Systems of Commissioning. Buildings 2022, 12, 1260. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings12081260
Sánchez Colmenarejo JI, Camprubí FM, González-Gaya C, Sánchez-Lite A. Power Plant Construction Projects Risk Assessment: A Proposed Method for Temporary Systems of Commissioning. Buildings. 2022; 12(8):1260. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings12081260
Chicago/Turabian StyleSánchez Colmenarejo, José Ignacio, Felipe Morales Camprubí, Cristina González-Gaya, and Alberto Sánchez-Lite. 2022. "Power Plant Construction Projects Risk Assessment: A Proposed Method for Temporary Systems of Commissioning" Buildings 12, no. 8: 1260. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings12081260