Putting the Common Security and Defense Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean under Scrutiny: Türkiye’s Conflicting Role

Abstract

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new global security and economic environment (Defence budgets’ decline, imminent threats from the Gulf War and NATO’s quest for a new identity), provided a window of opportunity for establishing and designing the EU’s security institution. Thus, what was initially considered farfetched after the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, entered a new phase, which included perception transformation, to be gradually incorporated into daily discourse. Hence, the 2003 “European Security Strategy”, the 2010 “Internal Security Strategy”, and later the 2016 “Global Strategy” reflect Member States’ perception of transformation and their belief that the EU needs a Common Security and Defence Strategy approach. Given these documents that indicate determination for notable integration and institutional restructuring, this analysis delves into the impact of Europeanisation concerning the implementation of institutional reforms and the CSDP. More specifically, this analysis probes the constraints of Europeanisation concerning the EU’s real operational dynamics, especially in light of the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Sea security challenges. These challenges are examined in relation to Türkiye’s revisionist public diplomacy, public policies, and the militarization of its foreign policy (including ongoing negotiations centered on migratory flows, assertions, and constructed narratives over Greek and Cypriot islands and seas). The situation has become more pronounced following the identification of gas and oil reserves in the area in 2010. This analysis has a two-fold focus: Firstly, to investigate Europeanisation impact on the operational implementation of CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) in time of crisis, and secondly, to evaluate the behavior of Türkiye within the Europeanisation framework, as proposed by Radaelli and Violakis.

1. Introduction and Methodological Approach

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new global security and economic environment (Defence budgets’ decline, imminent threats from the Gulf War and NATO quest for a new identity) (Biscop 2008, p. 10; Violakis 2019, p. 44) provided a window of opportunity for establishing and designing the EU’s security institution1 (Weiss 2012, p. 657). Many argued that the EU should seek its own role as a “player” in the global security balance (Jones 2007, p. 79; Zwolski 2012, p. 68). Already, at that time, European Member States were experiencing a long period of peace amongst themselves, which resulted in the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize award in recognition of the EU’s contribution “to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe” (Nobel Prize Museum 2012). During these years, EU has undergone a series of changes which include the following: a new institutional environment (EU institutions), public administration, close intergovernmental relations, changes in legal structures, intergovernmental structures of representation, cognitive and normative structures and public policy transformation (Radaelli 2000).

The creation of intergovernmental structures, a key feature of Europeanization and EU’s institutional environment, fosters peace and aids in conflict resolution among member and candidate states (Kmec 2022, p. 18; Lonardo 2020, p. 23; Kettunen 2020). These structures promote regular dialogue, encourage economic interdependence, and establish shared values and norms (Hettne and Söderbaum 2005, pp. 545–50). They also provide built-in conflict mediation mechanisms, offer collective benefits, and enhance transparency2. Coupled with peer pressure and the fostering of mutual respect from consistent interactions, these structures make aggressive actions less appealing to member states, thereby promoting peace and stability. However, their efficacy also hinges on member states’ genuine engagement and commitment to shared principles.

According to Radaelli, changes in the aforementioned areas, indicate the presence of Europeanisation. Thus, Europeanisation can be viewed as a factor which facilitated the emergence and continuation of long-lasting peace in Europe andas a significant contributing factor for conflict resolution amongst Member States and candidate Member States (e.g., Türkiye).

However, the 2010 gas and oil deposits discoveries in the region, the 2011 war in Syria, the 2015 migratory crisis, the ongoing immigration flows to European territory (Greece, Cyprus, Spain, Italy), the provocations in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the external interventions in Libya raised questions regarding the effectiveness of Europeanisation and EU’s actorness as well.

This analysis objective is to investigate the impact of Europeanisation on EU’s goal to establish an international role and operational capacity to act when it comes to CSDP (Șpaiuc 2021; McArdle 2020; Violakis 2018), and identify the reasons for Türkiye’s adverse impact on Europeanisation as well as to investigate the role of Türkiye as a force for divergence amongst Member States in the process of Europeanisation (Europeanisation in Reverse Gear/De-Europeanisation) (Radaelli and Salter 2019; Violakis 2019; Radaelli 2004).

In the context of this analysis, we begin by delving into the operational implementation of CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) and subsequently assess the behavior of Türkiye within the framework of Europeanisation, as suggested by Radaelli and Violakis. (Radaelli 2004; Violakis 2019). The purpose of this separation in the assessment is to conduct a more thorough investigation into whether the inadequate implementation of CSDP is associated with endogenous factors related to Europeanisation or Türkiye’s own planning strategies.

Therefore, the analysis design commences with the introduction of the Europeanisation framework being employed. This is followed by a concise historical evaluation of Türkiye’s relationship with the EU since 2000, the impact of the 2015 migration milestone, the developments in Türkiye after 2015, and the key reactions of the EU to these changes.

Lastly, this paper will investigate the EU’s overall institutional responsiveness, including Europeanisation impact and conditionality, and CSDP implementation, and the “lessons learned” resulting from EU–Türkiye negotiations (ongoing negotiations based on migratory flows, claims, and fabricated narratives over Greek and Cypriot islands and sea).

Considering that Greece and Cyprus’s borders are also the EU’s external borders, Türkiye’s ongoing bargain-style negotiations, and claims have a profound impact both at the EU and Member-State levels, bringing into question the EU’s capacity to act and act and Europe’s institutional role. The timing of this questioning is also significant because Member States’ governments faced a significant rise in nationalism due to 2015 migration flows and energy-related issues due to the Russia-Ukraine war.

In this challenging environment, the EU’s coherency and aspiration of having a common or joint response are being tested. This struggle manifests in two main aspects: Firstly, the EU faces a challenge with its military capability resulting from the sharing and pooling of forces among member states. Secondly, some member states tend to prioritize direct negotiations with non-EU countries over collective negotiations and gains, leading to further complications.

This situation reflects the reality of the EU, which involves a delicate balance between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism3. Consequently, the theoretical framework proposed by Radaelli and Violakis seems to be the most fitting for this analysis, which will be further explored in the subsequent section.

2. Europeanisation Theoretical Framework

Radaelli’s 2004 fundamental theoretical framework and Violakis’s 2019 (Radaelli 2004; Violakis 2019) approach to Europeanisation is considered more appropriate than others because they focus on the common/joint result and highlight the importance of political rhetoric.

The reason for choosing the theoretical representation of Radaelli and Violakis over others pertains to the fact that their representation, although containing elements of European Integration, differentiates from European Integration theories. Moreover, the definition provided by Radaelli and Violakis is a dynamic evolution of the Europeanization theory as it incorporates elements from other earlier academics who have worked on the subject of Europeanization. Specifically, Radaelli’s definition includes elements from other definitions, such as that of Ladrech, concerning the incorporation of EU political and economic elements into national policies (Ladrech 1994, p. 17), Börzel’s on linking local politics with EU policies (Börzel 1999, p. 574), Risse and others on distinct governance structures at a European level (Risse et al. 2001) Héritier on the dynamic influence of the EU on the structures of member states (Héritier 2001, p. 3), Buller and Gamble on distinct situations of European governance and the transformation of national structures, Olsen and Gualini on political integration, unification, and parallel evolution at a European level and local structures (Olsen 2002; Gualini 2003), and Salgado and Wool on a multi-directional response to Europe (Salgado and Woll 2004).

Europeanisation follows a different path than European integration: European integration is related to the political and policy development at the supranational level, while Europeanisation is related to the results of this process (Bulmer and Lequesne 2005, p. 12). Thus, Europeanisation’s success is based on the fact that it links domestic politics to the process of European integration, “without assuming that the balance of power between the state and European institutions is being tilted in one direction or another” (Radaelli 2004, pp. 3–4). This aspect is significant, especially for the Member States that face a post-migratory crisis related to the rise of nationalism and the energy crisis.

Member States’ belief and support to achieve common or joint results, constituting Europeanisation, remains a precondition for the EU’s continuation. In this process, the political rhetoric, as it will be analyzed later, is an essential factor. According to Radaelli, “Europeanisation consists of processes of construction, diffusion, and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse” (Radaelli 2004, pp. 3–4). This approach seems realized at various levels amongst EU Member States, per each government’s political agenda and priorities. Indeed, Europeanisation can be characterized as a dynamic process while also playing a role as a facilitator. It operates as both a cause and an effect, acting as both a dependent and independent variable in different contexts facilitating change. Knill and Lehmkuhl’s research relate Europeanisation to change while distinguishing between three types of Europeanisation mechanisms: positive integration, negative integration and framing (Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Radaelli and Exadaktylos 2010, p. 200). In the same spirit, Bulmer and Radaelli identified certain key patterns of EU governance which interact with policies to produce different mechanisms of Europeanisation: governance by negotiation, governance by hierarchy and facilitated coordination (Bulmer and Radaelli 2013). One of these mechanisms is the Europeanisation-learning-pattern of adjustment (Bulmer and Radaelli 2013, pp. 369–71). The learning-pattern-of-adjustment seems to have an important impact (Bulmer and Radaelli 2013, pp. 368–69) for compliance and conditionality, on setting goals, guidelines and timetables of national and regional action plans. This holds particular significance for candidate countries, as they are required to fulfill their commitments and make satisfactory progress in implementing EU legislation, including meeting any benchmark requirements set by the Committee (European Commission 2016b). Nonetheless, it’s worth noting that candidate member states’ voluntary adherence to these institutional changes is tied to the cumulative advantages of both candidacy and eventual full membership. Therefore, this setup embodies all the traits of an institutional environment that encourages transformation via the learning-change process of Europeanisation4.

Europeanisation is considered to be a powerful instrument of change, particularly concerning its learning policy towards candidate countries, which is predominantly seen as a “bargaining process” between the EU and candidate countries, where the extent of rewards and promises offered by the EU influences the likelihood of compliance with the imposed criteria (Sadriu 2019, p. 33). In this context, the “bargaining process” or the concept of “conditionality”, acts as a gate-keeping mechanism, granting access to the upper stages of the association and integration process based on satisfactory performance (Sadriu 2019, p. 33).

Conzelmann emphasizes the significance of policy learning processes, particularly in cross-border policy and change (Conzelmann 1998, pp. 9–10). On the other hand, Radaelli views learning as a distinct force that drives Europeanisation (Radaelli 2008, p. 240). Bulmer and Radaelli identify Europeanisation as an ongoing process, lacking a single pattern and reliant on reciprocity among Member States, making it challenging to measure or model (Bulmer and Radaelli 2013, pp. 360–61). As a result, the differences in conceptualizing cross-border security between the EU and a candidate country, such as Türkiye, will determine the time and extent of reciprocity required for Europeanisation to occur (Ozcurumez and Şenses 2011, p. 247).

Moreover, Europeanisation is not a simple ad hoc procedure, leading to more complexities in research and intense debates. The debate on Europeanisation gained momentum in the mid-1990s (Ladrech 2010, pp. 12–13) eventually leading to a more concrete definition of the concept (Quaglia et al. 2007, pp. 406–7; Radaelli 2004). It revealed Europeanisation as a multidimensional, interactive, ongoing but observable process (Bale 2008, pp. 4–5), yet its investigation faces three methodological challenges, as identified by Saurugger in her analysis of the relationship between Europeanisation and interest groups: complex interdependence, distinguishing between European and domestic variables, and measuring change (Saurugger 2005, pp. 291–92).

Flockhart argues that Europeanisation encompasses the process of change, wherein EU ideas, values, policies, culture, and organizational principles are transferred to member states (Flockhart 2006, p. 86). Hence, as Flockhart emphasizes, a prerequisite for Europeanisation is the development of a common consciousness related to a “European identity and a European idea set” (Flockhart 2006, p. 89). These aspects define the EU’s “way of doing things”, constituting the EU’s Strategic Culture.

However, during this process, the candidate country may encounter historical legacies, including historical narratives and other cultural legacies, which could contradict the desired changes and potentially weaken or slow down institutional developments (Cirtautas and Schimmerlfennig 2010). These historical and cultural legacies can also fuel opposition to the proposed reforms (resistance), leading to Euro-skepticism and even anti-European sentiments. This becomes evident when the change is related with disproportionate number of tasks and policies requested from the candidate or neighboring country, creating in return, more opposition and greater misfit (Qadim 2015). Consequently, there may be politically exploitation for specific purposes, such as identity building. As Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig argue that the fundamental cultural predisposition plays a crucial role in the process of democratization and potentially influences the dynamics of the relationship between neighboring countries and the EU (Cirtautas and Schimmerlfennig 2010, p. 438). Their argument explicitly establishes a correlation between the consequences of the Europeanisation process, the drive for change, and the political will and rhetoric focused on the EU.

This becomes more apparent when simplifying Radaelli’s approach, which outlines five essential steps required for Europeanisation to occur: (i) decision-making at the EU level; (ii) incorporation of domestic political rhetoric; (iii) creation of legal framework/laws; (iv) creation of infrastructures; and (v) incorporation into domestic discourse (Violakis 2019, p. 65). Especially, steps from two to five (ii, iii, iv and v), may be viewed as a means to implement an EU identity related to learning. However, political rhetoric (i) is critical for realizing and attributing benefits-gains to the EU. On the contrary, the absence of clear attribution of gains and benefits resulting from EU participation in political rhetoric indicates a distinct learning process, which could lead to a different outcome. Specifically, if people fail to grasp the benefits of EU involvement, it may lead to a situation where they opt out of certain EU initiatives and, in extreme cases, even consider leaving the EU altogether (EU-Exit). (Such as UK Brexit and Türkiye’s distance from EU values).

Saurugger, based on the work of Knill, Lehmkuhl, and Caparaso, recognizes learning as “one of the main mechanisms of Europeanisation” (Saurugger 2005, p. 297). Sabatier and Smith emphasize that external events can significantly enhance learning (Sabatier 1988). Such events could be incidents or crises within or outside Europe that would test the EU’s aspirations. Levy argues that ‘simple’ learning of new information leads to a change in means but not goals, while complex learning leads to a conflict of values and a modification of goals and means’ (Levy 1994, p. 286). These arguments and Radaelli’s definition explain why simple European-related learning is weak compared to complex learning based on sudden change, fear, anger, and hate speech (Romero-Rodríguez et al. 2023, pp. 110–12).

Indeed, the factors contributing to the lack of gains-benefits attribution and potential EU-Exit scenarios could be influenced by various elements. These may include the impact of migration influx, which can lead to fear and anger concerning narratives surrounding the lives of “Muslim brothers” worldwide (Wodak 2020). Additionally, the cultivation of an anti-Western climate, characterized by intense emotions, may further exacerbate sentiments that undermine support for EU participation and integration (Times of Israel 2014; Taş 2018, p. 4; March and Olsen 1984, p. 734; Hazır 2022; Samaras 2020). Bennet and Howlett link the need for change and its associated policies with learning by identifying governments as the driving force (Bennet and Howlett 1992, p. 277). In this light, learning is linked to understanding & perception, while understanding enables -but not ensures- further learning. Hall links the learning process to external changes coming from society (social learning) and the political arena (ideas in politics) (Hall 1993, pp. 288–89). Accordingly, external political changes and ideas, such as the events of the early 1990s, constitute a learning process linked to understanding and perception.

Indeed, over the past three decades, there has been significant advancement in the measurement of the Europeanisation process, as evidenced by its conceptualization and the identification of its mechanisms. The catalyst for this progress is believed to be events from the early 1990s, which led to a shift away from cold-war defense paradigms and NATO’s dominant security role. While mainstream European integration theory had previously overlooked cooperation in security and defense, Øhrgaard’s viewpoint, as cited by Bickerton, Irondelle, and Menon, suggests this exclusion (Bickerton et al. 2011, p. 8). Jacobs adds that studies focusing on the Europeanisation of the CSDP administration have been scant (Jacobs 2012, p. 468). However, the gradual implementation of CSDP by EU member states, could be seen as being both politically and militarily active (Chappell 2012, p. 73).

This is reflected on the ESS, EU GS, and ISS documents, which provide deeper insights into CSDP’s Europeanisation progress. They serve as key references, portraying the CSDP as a tool for crisis management (Jegen and Mérand 2014, p. 195). Collectively, these documents provide a comprehensive understanding of Member States’ perception of threats and offer guidelines for the CSDP’s structures, mechanisms, and administration.

In his 2018 book, Violakis critically examines the Europeanisation progress in relation to the CSDP implementation (Violakis 2018). He identifies a rising acknowledgment of the Europeanisation process within the CSDP, pointing towards the European Union becoming more proactive both politically and militarily (Violakis 2018, p. 49). The 2003 ESS stands out for accentuating the EU’s pivotal role in European integration, while the other documents offer a comprehensive framework to understand the perceptions of EU Member States towards threats, along with the evolution of CSDP structures and strategies (Violakis 2018, pp. 53–58, 60–83, 92–96). Yet, despite the positive trend in Europeanisation, these documents also spotlight moments of stagnation or minimal change. Europeanisation occasionally clashes with domestic systems, underscoring the EU’s distinctive nature and the intricate dynamics of its development.

Distinctively, the EU as a political entity has set precedence in its approach to sovereignty and the formation of unique institutions, differentiating it from traditional state frameworks. While there’s a debate on whether the EU defense policy has profoundly influenced national defense strategies, official EU documents consistently reveal the establishment of a shared conceptualization and ongoing growth in the CSDP. The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), for instance, adopted a comprehensive approach to security, addressing a spectrum of threats with a blend of military and civilian tools (Biscop 2012, p. 1304). Later documents, such as the EU GS 2016, marked a significant shift, proposing structured agendas for execution and evaluation. Nevertheless, the ESS and subsequent versions were not without criticism, particularly concerning their vagueness in intervention strategies and a potential inclination towards non-military solutions (Smith 2017, p. 516).

On the other hand, we cannot overlook that the CSDP is anchored on soft-framing horizontal Europeanisation, with its hallmark being the voluntary collaboration and resource-sharing among member states (Radaelli 2003, p. 43). The ESS (2003) epitomizes a foundational consensus among Member States regarding security and defense, marking the first attempt to institute a permanent structure for the CSDP. Radaelli describes this nascent stage as the “Framing or modelling process phase”, characterized by the lack of an existing framework. Yet, subsequent documents like the 2008 European Security Strategy and 2010 Internal Security Strategy, and especially the EU GS reports from 2016 and 2017, set clearer targets and signal the birth of a distinct EU CSDP model, separating itself from former European alliances.

However, Biscop argues that the 2016 EU GS introduces significant challenges, especially when a Member State decides to leave the union (Biscop 2016). Despite the EU’s unchanged priorities, such a decision poses potential risks to its functionality, possibly compromising both its soft and hard power capabilities. The resultant redirection of focus and essential resources could undermine the EU’s influential foreign policy in a world becoming more multi-polar (Smith 2017, p. 516). The 2017 EU GS report, along with following developments, indicates a methodical approach to tackle this formidable challenge. It emphasizes noteworthy progress in security and defense, such as the inception of the European Defence Fund in 2017, which aims for more efficient defense expenditure and greater cost-effectiveness. Simultaneously, a Reflection Paper detailing the future prospects for European Defence by 2025 was introduced, with significant progress noted in EU-NATO partnerships (European External Action Service 2017).

3. The Case of Türkiye

In Turkey’s case, the advantages gained from EU candidacy appear to be more significant than those derived from full EU membership. This claim reflects a transactional leadership period for Türkiye (2000–2010) linked to economic prosperity, during which people enjoyed the rewards of being an EU candidate Member State, such as customs union (European Commission 1995). This is further supported by the fact that only 24.4% of the public in Türkiye considered European identity a priority, and a mere 15.3% of Turkish opinion believed that the EU treats Türkiye’s candidacy fairly (Atlı 2016). One could deduce that for Türkiye, EU-Turkish relations are primarily driven by economic interests, as the figures indicating low support for EU identity building suggest that it may not be a top priority on President Erdogan’s agenda, despite the country’s aspiration to join the EU. The 2021–2022 survey indicated an increase in trust in the EU (from 40.4% was raised to 47.7%) and in the EU Court of Human Rights (from 32% was raised to 39.4%) (Ünlühisarcıklı et al. 2022). Regarding Türkiye’s EU membership, the percentage who viewed it as positive for Türkiye increased from 55.9% to 58.6%, with a significant positive impact of 72.8% on the younger population aged 18–24 (Ünlühisarcıklı et al. 2022).

Before the 2016 coup, the Turkish approach appeared to move away from Europeanisation and prioritize building an alternative narrative and identity; however, the latest 2022 data shows growing opposition to the government’s approach, with an increasing percentage favoring the EU. Yet, this circumstance could also stem from the skyrocketing inflation between 2021 and 2023, the plummeting Turkish currency, and the re-election of President Erdogan (Askew 2022; Akin 2023).

Radaelli argues that such cases reflect a situation where Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation happen simultaneously (Radaelli and Salter 2019). Hence, although Türkiye initially appeared to adopt a Europeanisation rhetoric in its international relations and EU relations, it has increasingly developed an internal rhetoric characterized by anti-European and anti-Western sentiments, leading to a growing distance from EU values and the normative framework (Middle East Policy 2023; Stockholm Center for Freedom 2018; Kaliber and Kaliber 2019, pp. 12–13; Hazır 2022). Indeed, it is paradoxical that from 2000 to 2010, Türkiye’s narrative of prosperity and success was closely tied to its EU candidacy, with various contributing factors such as the 1995 customs union, which fostered proximity and cost reduction for goods and services, Western investments, IMF stabilization programs, and EU-related reforms (Jarosiewicz 2013).

The EU’s success is undoubtedly tied to European integration, Europeanisation, and other crucial elements, guided by the principle that overall gains should outweigh losses (Ojanen 2006). Hence, the degree of compatibility or incompatibility between structural and constructed legacies of the candidate country and EU rules and policy objectives will significantly influence compliance outcomes (Cirtautas and Schimmerlfennig 2010, p. 438).

However, this principle does not justify a candidate Member State exploiting its existing access to certain EU benefits for unfair advantage or misuse of the relationship.

This concept becomes clearer when we take into account that the EC and subsequently the EU were initially established on the basis of economic cooperation (EUROPA 2022), with the aim of fostering a “liberal interdependent” approach to political and economic intergovernmental negotiations. Economic incentives are considered equally important as security in educating the role of force amongst states (Keohane and Nye 1987, p. 730). In the realm of finance, these incentives are attained through the concept of “economies of scale5”, leading to the realization of “gains of scale”. The EU’s institutional environment is designed to promote and facilitate this type of cooperation among Member States, prioritizing EU collaboration’s “gains of scale” over individual national gains. Consequently, EU Member States would experience a higher level of interdependence. However, this hypothesis might present challenges for small Member States, like Greece and Cyprus, in their relations with Türkiye. Since its pre-candidacy and during its candidacy time, Türkiye aimed to harvest significant financial and political opportunities (including economies of scale) and continue the westernization and modernization process of the country, when applying for EU candidacy (Onis 1999). Hence, in candidate countries like Türkiye, national decision-makers and elites function as rational actors, reacting to the incentives presented by the EU. They carefully assess the costs and benefits of EU membership, rejecting conditions that result in net costs and striving to maximize their overall benefits (Nikić et al. 2022, p. 33). Consequently, if the credibility of EU enlargement is perceived to be low, these countries may be discouraged from pursuing membership, as the required reforms would generate net costs, while the potential benefits of full membership remain uncertain (Nikić et al. 2022, p. 33). This argument elucidates Türkiye’s shift in attitude and divergence from the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) concerning other neighboring states, while still preserving the advantages of the customs union. But why should Türkiye follow the EU’s CFSP?

3.1. The Initial Good Climate

The answer can be summarized simply: A country that actively seeks candidate status is expected to embrace and adopt the EU’s idea set, the “EU way of doing things”, and gradually align with EU values and policies during the candidacy period, which should be reflected in their political rhetoric. President Tayyip Erdogan’s statement (Oxford in May 2004) reflected this approach: “the Greek-Turkish rapprochement was based on common ground on which common perceptions are generated more accurately. This common ground is the EU” (University of Oxford 2004). This good climate between the EU and Türkiye was also verified by the Eurobarometer (Eurobarometer 2004, p. 5) and by the Commission’s 2003 report, which recorded significant progress (Commission of the European Communities 2003). During that time Türkiye already “complied with most of the CFSP acquis voluntarily” indicating that the prospects for EU membership and Europeanisation played a certain role in this process (Aydin and Acikmese 2009, p. 87).

Aydin and Acikmese highlight the Europeanisation framework’s role in explaining Türkiye’s foreign policy shifts from 2000–2010 but emphasize the presence of other crucial influencing factors (Aydin and Acikmese 2009, p. 75). Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy also emphasize how Europeanisation has influenced Türkiye’s foreign policy, leading to a greater reliance on diplomatic and economic strategies towards Syria and Iraq instead of military measures (Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy 2010, p. 421).

In their foreign policy approach, new member states encountered conditions centered on adopting and executing the CFSP acquis, grounded in either legally binding international treaties or political pledges under the CFSP umbrella, encompassing alignment with EU directives and the imposition of sanctions as required (Aydin and Acikmese 2009, p. 79). The EU uses a top-down approach to shape candidate countries, but their foreign policy changes are influenced not only by their eagerness to join and the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) but also by a mix of domestic political elites, domestic events and global politics (Kaminska 2007, pp. 19–20). This mix is critical in the overall process and is also related to political rhetoric.

In evaluating the impact of different conditionality types on Türkiye, it’s evident that compliance with political standards, both formal and informal, especially those related to democratization and EU zone security/stability (like ties with Greece or Cyprus), has had a more significant influence on Türkiye’s Foreign Policy (TFP) than aligning with the EU’s CFSP, which primarily concerns relations with regions outside the EU (Aydin and Acikmese 2009, p. 87). The significance of this approach is dual: it suggests that candidate states have the ability to influence Europeanisation, and thereby potentially reducing its impact. These findings underscore the beginning stages of institutional overhaul, political endorsement, and public approval for such reforms, while also reveal the limitations of this process, which are influenced by domestic politics, specific events, and international factors in the context of national benefits. Noteworthy is that during that period of 1995–2010, Türkiye had already been reaping considerable financial advantages as a candidate nation, having been a part of a customs union with the EU since 1995 (Ülgen 2018). Up to that point, Europeanisation appeared to play a pivotal role in normalizing relations between Greece and Türkiye, two nations historically marked by tensions. However, in later years, Türkiye rejected EU values, normative and legal frameworks, and the establishment of common perceptions (Butler and Dadouch 2019).

3.2. The Turning Point

But what prompted Türkiye to change its attitude since that time? The onset and migration fallout of the 2011 Syrian Civil War offer a more nuanced understanding, given its significant influence on Türkiye’s domestic occurrences and regional political landscape. Even though the migration issue was not new for Türkiye, the 2015 refugee influx was the biggest since the Syrian crisis began in 2011. As a result, by 2015, Türkiye had already spent approximately $8 billion to host 2.1 million Syrian refugees (Akmehmet 2015). Thus, the initial anticipation of a positive impact of migration labor on growth was premature; migrant inflows led to increased unemployment and suspension of existing wages (Del Carpio and Wagner 2015). Furthermore, the ongoing Syrian war, and Türkiye’s deeper engagement in this war, resulted in the significant 2015 refugee influx, which seems to have reversed Türkiye’s Europeanisation progress in security and illegal migration (Kaya 2021). The situation deteriorated through Erdogan’s initial unwillingness to control migration flows to Europe, with hundreds of thousands of immigrants entering Greek territory to reach Germany and other northern Member States. This situation and the humanitarian crisis that followed, triggered a huge discussion regarding politics, ethics, morality, hospitality, and also about the pull over/push/push back6 aspects of the migratory flows, including the aspect of hybrid warfare between Türkiye and Greece7 (Qadim et al. 2021; Hall et al. 2021; İrdem and Raychev 2021). However, the causal analysis of the migration crisis and the humanitarian crisis analysis that followed, are out of the scope of this research. Still, it is noteworthy to mention the instrumentalization and export of the internal migratory crisis from Türkiye to EU, in a wider “bargain process” related to the candidacy reforms (Macdonald and Hogg 2015). One central point emerges from Türkiye’s behavior in the period prior to the Joint-Action Plan: Türkiye’s initial unwillingness to control migratory flows may be seen as a Turkish negotiations’ ploy (Korteweg 2016) to capture benefits of €6 billion to support the refugee camps and to eliminate Visa requirements for the entry of Turkish citizens into the EU. After the 2016 EU-Türkiye agreement, the EU-Türkiye relationship could be summarized by the involvement of two main mechanisms: (i) a top-down and asymmetrical accession conditionality, where Türkiye must comply with EU criteria to achieve long-term accession rewards, and (ii) leverage-based migration diplomacy, which involves bargaining between the EU and Türkiye to attain rewards based on specific issue linkages (Demiryontar 2020, p. 11).

Furthermore, Türkiye’s unwillingness to control migratory flows had a significantly negative impact on the relations amongst EU member states. Consequently, despite the EU Commission’s ten-point action plan (European Commission 2015), each member state took independent actions on this crucial safety and security issue (Kingsley 2015b; Scrutton and Pollard 2015).

The divergence among EU Member States in their approach towards the migration issue can be attributed to several reasons. First, some Member States chose to tackle the matter independently by closing their borders unilaterally (e.g., Hungary built a fence at its border with Serbia (UNHCR 2015), Austria and Germany increased controls at their borders (Alison Smale 2015)). Second, certain Member States maintained strong economic, trade, and investment relations with Türkiye—some of which persist till now (such as Germany, Spain and Italy) (Inat 2016; Toygür 2020; Ekim and Bilotta 2020). Third, some Member States were not significantly affected by the migratory flows, as they were not the primary destinations for migrants (Pew Research Center 2017). Lastly, certain Member States saw migrants as a potential support to their economy.

However, despite the smoothening of this climate after the activation of the EU-Türkiye Joint-Action Plan until 2019–2020, the issue came to the forefront again with the emergence of migratory flows from various regions in Türkiye attempting unsuccessfully to cross into Greece through Evros, which represents Greece’s external land borders with Türkiye (European Committee 2020).

The continuous incidents of “weaponizing migration” were perceived as hybrid warfare operations targeting at Greece e (Tsailas 2020; Bärwaldt 2020; Berzins 2022; Hall et al. 2021).

4. Migration-Related Threats Already in the EU Security Strategy and Internal Security

What appears peculiar in this case is that this situation was already recognized and documented in official EU documents many years before. Both the 2003 European Security Strategy and its 2008 review, as well as the 2010 Internal Security report, linked illegal migration with organized crime, terrorism, the breakdown of the legal order, societal collapse, and the potential failure of the state (Failed State). (EUROPA 2003, pp. 4–5; European Council 2008, p. 32). As noted in the 2008 review, “Such actions devalue both the rule of law and social cohesion.” Therefore, as stated by the European Council in 2008, “the main objective was to prevent and manage a possible crisis as well as to develop the capacity for early diagnosis of the crisis” (European Council 2008). According to the 2008 revision, the Mediterranean region was highlighted as an area of utmost importance due to its complex challenges related to insufficient political reformation and illegal migration (European Council 2008, p. 18).

These significant remarks in crucial EU documents verify Solana’s argument. Solana regarded the “incident-driven” approach as instrumental in identifying opportunities and challenges, from the initial framing stage to the implementation phase. Agreeing on a document is one aspect for EU Member States, while another significant challenge lies in effectively implementing the content of that document.

Therefore, successfully implementing CSDP entails the EU’s ability to address resource availability, establish joint presence with like-minded actors during agenda setting, secure access to top-level political resources due to their political standing, and access international networks. (Dijkstra 2012, pp. 457–58, 467). Consequently, even though the migratory threat had been acknowledged in important EU documents, the actual 2015 migratory flow (the incident) prompted EU Member States to adopt contrasting and individual measures, eventually culminating in an overall agreement with Türkiye at the EU level.

This case appears to have a notable adverse effect on the progress of Europeanisation, EU institutionalism, the transformation of Member States’ perceptions, and their conviction that the EU requires a Common Security and Defence Strategy approach, as outlined in the 2003 “European Security Strategy”, the 2010 “Internal Security Strategy”, and later the 2016 “Global Strategy” (European Commission 2010, 2014; European Council 2008; EUROPA 2003). Despite these documents reflecting agreements among Member States and highlighting migration-related threats on the EU agenda since 2003, they appeared ineffective in mobilizing EU governments towards the implementation phase.

5. Post-2015-Migration Türkiye

The understanding of Turkish objectives and the decision to distance itself from the EU-Western normative framework can be better grasped by considering two factors: (a) the 2015 Turkish public opinion, as previously analyzed, and (b) Türkiye’s substantial reforms, which were initiated before the 2016 coup.

However, it should be noted that after the activation of the Joint-Action Plan (EU Türkiye plan for migration control), a majority of the Turkish Public (61.8%) remained in favor of joining the EU (as compared to the 2015 figure of 47.5%), mainly due to the prospect of economic benefits (Atlı 2016). According to Europeanisation theoretical framework, EU identity building (way of doing things) has four steps: Incorporation of domestic political rhetoric; Creation of legal framework/laws; Creation of infrastructures; and Incorporation into domestic discourse8 (Violakis 2019).

However, when applying this to Türkiye, it becomes apparent that instead of engaging in EU identity building, President Erdogan acted as a transformational leader, concentrating on constructing a new-Ottoman identity, which was accompanied by substantial reforms rooted in Islam and a hostile rhetoric towards the West/EU. This became evident after the June 2016 failed coup (Cumming 2016), which seems to have accelerated Erdogan’s planning.

Therefore, Erdogan’s policy shift both before and after the coup, characterized by ongoing bargaining negotiations for managing regular flows, and his pursuit of a new political identity centered on Ottomanism, confirm the presence of an alternative plan that may not necessarily align with EU values.

The construction of an Ottoman-based shared-belief framework represents a bottom-up approach to Neo-Ottomanism, employing Public Diplomacy tools, which is further facilitated and reinforced by the pursuit of re-introduced national objectives (Turkish National Oath/1920) (Baykent 2016).

The driving force behind Turkish foreign policy is aligned with historical memories and nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire, representing an anachronism—an idea or concept that exists outside of its historical context, particularly one that emerged or existed later than the period being discussed or depicted (Cambridge Dictionary 2017).

In the early 2000s, Erdogan constructed his Neo-Ottoman anachronism through a rhetoric of hate and substantial state reforms aimed at reshaping citizens’ values and beliefs (Ergin and Karakaya 2017).

A crucial aspect of this process is that Erdogan’s audience extends beyond Türkiye and aims to use soft power to reach Turkish and Muslim communities worldwide (Pan-Turkism) in order to spread the “Great Türkiye” narrative (Tziarras 2019; Benhaim and Öktem 2015; Ekşi and Erol 2018). This behavior reflects a different reading of history, which distances from the Westphalian state and Pax-Romana in an attempt to revitalize Türkiye’s hegemony and re-establish the “Pax–Ottomana” (Violakis and Stathakopoulos 2020). This narrative is in alignment with 2016 Erdogan’s “borders of his heart” territorial claims (Aristopoulos 2020), which view the existing borders of Türkiye as an obstacle to Türkiye’s expanding needs and “living space” (Aristopoulos 2020).

In contrast to other Muslim States which embrace openness, Erdogan’s objectives utilize an Islamic belief framework enhanced through the solution of day-to-day problems, which contributed to the learning process of all citizens, creating a new state of mind (significantly different from EU/Western way of thinking), which includes: Neo-Ottoman identity, the concentration of powers, control of press/media, control of Judicial system, Muslim-Polarization rhetoric, re-introduction of Ottoman language in high schools and others (European Commission 2016a; ABC/Reuters 2016). This became evident in an Erdogan speech9 where he identified himself as the natural successor to Ottoman rulers (The Conservative Tree House 2014).

The construction of an Ottoman-shared-belief framework was further strengthened by resolving day-to-day problems, which in turn facilitated the learning process for young people. As a result, it is essential to recognize that the policy paradigm shift process is gradual and susceptible to major crises, like the 2023 earthquakes and the humanitarian crisis in Türkiye, which exposed the weaknesses and limitations of the state (Turak 2023; Özdemir and Kirby 2023).

Erdogan’s re-Ottomanization of Türkiye may be identified as an incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that Ottomanism political and economic dynamics become part of Türkiye’s organizational logic. This process officially ended Türkiye’s Europeanisation/Westernization process, which started with the 1923 establishment of the modern Turkish state. It is noteworthy that Türkiye’s westernization efforts go back several years. The first signs of Türkiye’s westernization were observed after the defeat of the Ottoman army by the Russians in 1792, with the introduction of a series of reforms known as Nizam-I Cedid (new order) (Shaw 1965, p. 292; Camyar and Tagma 2010, p. 37) as a means “to restore the purity of old institutions and practices and make them operate in the manner which had brought greatness to the empire” in the past (Shaw 1965, p. 292). The second wave of significant reforms came with the Tanzimat movement (1839–1876), aiming to “bring the Ottoman Empire fully into the modern world for the first time” (Shaw 1965, p. 292). These reforms were a means for salvaging the Ottoman Empire either through gaining foreign support or through averting foreign intervention (Zurcher 2004, p. 56). Kemal Ataturk’s (3rd wave) reforms derived from his belief that “the formation of a solid Turkish nation and state were prerequisites of Westernization” (Grigoriadis 2006, p. 148). Ataturk viewed the West as the appropriate model for Türkiye’s transformation (Aybey 2004, p. 20). Hence, Türkiye’s application for EU membership in 1987 reflected a “conscious political decision which goes back even before the foundation of the Republic of Türkiye” (Çakar 1998).

Indeed, throughout Türkiye’s history, major reforms have been implemented strategically to enhance the country’s international standing and preserve its status quo. In this context, Türkiye’s bid for EU membership might be seen as a tactical maneuver to counter Greece’s accession to the EU in 1981 (Cerami 2011, p. 19; Camyar and Tagma 2010). This project was perceived as “an integral part of the modernization process” of Türkiye (Camyar and Tagma 2010). Therefore, Türkiye’s compatibility with EU values and institutions appears to be a secondary goal rather than a strategic choice (Aybey 2004).

Consequently, President Erdogan’s policy shifted towards re-establishing the Neo-Ottoman identity, adopting a new narrative based on a non-linear interpretation of history and the Pax-Ottomanica, rather than adhering to the conventional “declining” Westphalian state concept (Uzuner 2014, pp. 139–40). Similarly, Kalin argued that Türkiye should overcome the “Eurocentric notions of history and society” and follow a new geographic imagination by producing their concepts and building new vocabulary (Kalin 2011, pp. 5–6). As anticipated, the tools for implementing the Neo-Ottoman identity, such as public diplomacy and public policy (Kalin 2011) extend to various audiences both inside and outside of Türkiye, including the large Turkish community in Germany

In light of these factors, it can be inferred that this policy represents a Neo-Ottoman learning process, reflecting President Erdogan’s efforts to reintroduce and revive Ottoman institutions and practices, along with other structural changes he has implemented. However, such institutions and behavior are incompatible with EU institutions and practices.

Indeed, Türkiye’s distinct conceptualization of border security and management, along with its moderate levels of institutional Europeanisation and revisionist behavior, point to the presence of institutional incompatibility in security and defense matters between the EU and Türkiye. This incompatibility exists even though for the EU, Türkiye is the sixth most significant trade partner, while for Türkiye EU is the largest import-export partner and investor (European Commission 2021). Therefore, it is evident that neither the economic interdependency with the EU nor the impact of Europeanisation have influenced Türkiye’s planning to prioritize an independent national defense industry, which appears to be linked with its revisionist policy (Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye 2020; Bekdil 2022; Iddon 2020). The use of Turkish drones has made it evident that they serve as a low-cost means to escalate sovereignty violations, as observed in the Aegean Sea/Greece, Syria, and Iraq (Kefalas 2022).

Likewise, this incompatibility could be linked to President Erdogan’s reluctance to accept institutional control over his powers, which is implicit in the political autonomy of EU institutions (March and Olsen 1984, p. 734).

Kramer argues that this incompatibility can be attributed, at least in part, to the overarching philosophy of Turkish foreign policy, which upholds the belief that the territorial boundaries of the republic were definitively established by the Treaty of Lausanne and should remain unaltered (Kramer 1991, p. 64).

This argument explains Erdogan’s efforts to challenge and dispute various clauses of the Lausanne Treaty (NOVINITE 2016; ekathimerini 2016a, 2016b). This has become evident through a series of sovereignty disputes involving Türkiye, Greece, Cyprus, and more recently, Libya and Egypt (Tanchum 2022) Türkiye’s persistent violations of Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Greece’s airspace, as well as the continuous threats of war, serve as evidence of this assertive stance (Kokkinidis 2022; Kouparanis 2020; Stamouli 2022; The Associated Press 2022). These disputes and threats indicate a distinct interpretation of international law and UNCLOS10, demonstrating Türkiye’s strategic decision to pursue revisionist policies through the militarization of foreign policy (Adar and Toygür 2020).

The aforementioned reforms, claims, aggressiveness, and presidential rhetoric of hostility towards the West may be seen as Türkiye’s efforts to position itself as a “great nation, a great power” with dominance in the Middle East (Fradkin and Libby 2013; Maris et al. 2023, pp. 36–37). However, Albert Einstein wisely observed: “The significant problems we face today cannot be solved at the same level of thinking we were at in which we created them” (Renesch and Chawla 1995, p. 229).

In a reversal of Einstein’s quote, Erdogan’s objectives may appear to be logical, as he seeks to recreate the same level of thinking and circumstances that once empowered the Ottoman Empire. However, these circumstances, required to fulfill Erdogan’s vision, constitute an anachronism that fosters the re-emergence of the cultural-religious collision observed in the 1500s. The provided information raises two critical questions: Firstly, to what extent can President Erdogan’s political rhetoric create a new conceptual order for Turks, potentially influencing the actions and thinking of young people globally, leading to violent reactions? Secondly, considering Erdogan’s assertions that “freedom and democracy have no value in Türkiye” (Dearden 2016) and “democracy is like a train; you get off once you have reached your destination” (The Economist 2016), could such rhetoric foster perceptual diversification and result in social distance rather than cohesion among Turkish minorities towards the cultural and ethical framework of Member States?

6. EU Union Key Reactions

The post-2015 migratory flows and revisionist behavior (Christofis et al. 2019; Maris et al. 2022) have put into test the EU’s “real operational dynamics” and revealed limitations of the Europeanisation and EU’s capability to act, in relation to CSDP establishment and Lisbon Treaty Article 42.7.

Starting from the 2015 Migratory Crisis, it should be noted that the European Committee reacted immediately to the migratory crisis (20 April 2015), before the Action Plan (29 November 2015), with the introduction of the “10 Point Action Plan on Migration” (20 April 2015) (European Commission 2015). A few years later, in late response to Türkiye’s revisionist agenda against two Member States, the European Parliament Strongly Condemned Türkiye’s offensive behavior through an adopted text on 15 January 2020: For “seeking to assert power through a combination of unilateral diplomatic posturing, shifts in alliances, destabilizing activities of a primarily hybrid nature and increasing military build-ups;” For “overall destabilizing behavior, including its illegal activities within Cyprus’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ)/continental shelf, which violates international law and good unneighborly relations, and threatens peace and stability in an already fragile region” (European Parliament 2020a).

In response to Türkiye’s revisionist agenda and the aggressive disputes related to International Law and the Law of the Sea, the European Parliament issued a resolution on 14 September 2020, strongly condemning Türkiye’s dangerous escalation and its involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean: “Strongly condemns Türkiye’s illegal activities on the continental shelf and in the EEZs of Greece and Cyprus, which run counter to EU interests, and calls on the Turkish authorities to cease these activities, act in a spirit of good unneighborly relations and respect the sovereignty of Cyprus and Greece in accordance with international law; Welcomes the invitation from the Governments of the Republic of Cyprus and Greece to Türkiye to negotiate in good faith the maritime delimitation between their respective coasts; notes that both governments have proven to remain fully committed to a good faith dialogue in accordance with international law and the UNCLOS” (European Parliament 2020b).

In the 2022 report on Türkiye’s progress, the EU identifies the importance and challenging partnership with Türkiye as an ally for the US and NATO (Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations 2022, p. 126).

In the same document, the EU points out that Türkiye’s unilateral foreign policy contradicts the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) priorities, expressing concern over its endorsement of military actions in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and its non-alignment with Russia sanctions (Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations 2022, p. 126). More specifically for Libya, Türkiye despised the EU by questioning the legitimacy, purpose, and impartiality of the EUNAVFOR MED IRINI, which is operating under the EU Council’s Decision, and the UNSC Resolution, by denying eight times inspections of vessels under the Turkish flag heading to Libya (Assad 2022; The Libya Update 2022; Stribis 2022).

This situation is evident in the intensity of the geopolitical competition and tension between Türkiye and the rest of the Eastern Mediterranean actors. Additionally, the document reveals the EU’s role and limitations, highlighting that as a deterrence power, the EU is constrained to implementing institutional and economic sanctions (Council of the EU 2021; Financial Mirror 2022). This limitation is primarily attributed to the fact that the EU lacks an independent military structure separate from NATO, resulting in a restriction on Europeanisation, especially as US strategic interests shift towards the Pacific region (Litsas 2020, pp. 127, 134, 146, 184; Kamp 2013). President Erdogan strategically utilized this limitation during the 2023 NATO negotiations for Sweden’s NATO membership bid and Türkiye’s stalled candidacy for EU membership since 2018 (Liboreiro 2023). As a result, Brussels rejected Erdogan’s demand, clarifying that NATO membership and EU accession are two distinct and separate processes (Liboreiro 2023).

7. Conclusions

At this juncture, one might wonder why the Europeans didn’t grasp Türkiye’s policy shift in a timely manner. Various ongoing debates surround this issue, but financial interdependence appears to play a significant role in fostering political interdependence.

Consequently, EU Member States with economies heavily reliant on Türkiye appeared more tolerant when Turkey threatens and violates the sovereignty of other Member States (Nedos 2022). The fact that there are more than 600 Spanish and more than 7000 German companies in Türkiye11 explains some hesitation of the EU in taking more strict measures against Türkiye (Greek City Times 2021a; Mazi 2022). However, this situation started to change with the new government election in Germany (Nedos 2022).

The Neo-Ottoman approach in Türkiye’s international relations will present new challenges for Europeans, potentially prompting them to reassess the alignment of ideas and strategies (western/EU) with the actual findings and outcomes on the ground. Türkiye’s strategic decision to shift towards 20th-century politics and strategic thinking, prioritizing hard power over diplomacy, will pose significant challenges to Europeanisation and the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The EU’s institutional responsiveness is influenced not only by its own institutional characteristics, resulting in slow responses, but also by EU member states’ perception that Türkiye’s regional influence is tied to its EU perspective, which hinders their recognition of the significant strategic shifts in Türkiye’s foreign policy (Kaya and Tecmen 2011, p. 19; Klinke and Bassin 2018).

Moreover, it is essential to emphasize that Türkiye disregards EU warnings and threats as they lack hard power backing. Similarly, the EU’s institutional delays or inaction are perceived as weaknesses and opportunities for Türkiye to engage in illegal operations (DW 2019; Al Jazeera 2020). To be more specific, the EU’s inaction and inadequate policies concerning the protection of its outer borders have led to the emergence of a belief that others can exploit the situation to their advantage by controlling migratory flows. There are cases of mimicry observed in Spain, Italy, and Cyprus, where the intensification of migration has been noticed (Brito and Parra 2021; The Arab Weekly 2021; Hadjicostis 2021).

In addition, the energy crisis resulting from the Russia-Ukraine war has brought to the forefront more CSDP issues concerning energy security and the security of energy resources. These issues are challenging to tackle unilaterally, necessitating the contribution of CSDP and NATO within the framework of International Law and the Law of the Sea (Loengarov 2022; Venizelos 2011). Given that strategy revolves around prioritization, it is essential to recognize that EU Treaties will remain unchanged. However, the evolving threat landscape resulting from the Ukraine-Russian war and revisionism-related challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean, including the migration crisis currently in a “on-hold” status, demand the reassessment of strategic priorities and the adaptation of implementation plans to address these pressing issues effectively.

’This can only occur by further clarifying Lisbon Treaty Article 42.7 in terms of putting urgently a plan with a timetable which may include the formulation of volunteer military coalitions to establish a permanent military assistance mechanism for Member States in need. The Greek government employed this provision in a preventive manner to draw attention from its EU partners to an unfolding crisis and to prevent a potential escalation from Türkiye (Perot 2021, pp. 35–36). This marked the first time the provision was used in such a way. It is crucial to be aware that potential adversaries might attempt to exploit the legal weaknesses of their collective defense framework to their benefit. Therefore, a comprehensive and proactive approach is necessary to address these challenges effectively.