1. Introduction
Thailand serves as a destination for many migrant workers from neighboring countries. Notably, Myanmar migrant workers constitute 68% of the total migrant worker population. These workers make a significant contribution to Thailand’s economy, representing more than 10% of the country’s workforce and 4.3–6.6% of the country’s GDP before 2020. Furthermore, they remit substantial sums to their countries of origin, with an estimated USD 2.8 billion transmitted annually through formal channels to Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. However, they encounter numerous challenges, including health risks, exploitation, and a lack of legal protection. Notably, Myanmar migrant workers in Thailand face significant vulnerability in both their country of origin and Thailand (
Suwanvanichkij 2008;
Jirattikorn 2017). They frequently lack legal status, social protection, and access to essential services (3). Despite the challenges they experience daily in Thailand, many options remain indefinite due to the ongoing instability and economic hardship in their homeland (
Jirattikorn 2017;
Mon 2010).
The 2021 military coup in Myanmar caused a severe humanitarian crisis, leading to significant displacement and migration through regular and irregular channels. On the other hand, research shows that asylum seekers and refugees who have been forced to flee their homes due to war, persecution, and other forms of violence and have sought refuge in neighboring countries face several challenges, such as public discrimination and limited access to education, healthcare, housing, and employment (
Song and Teichholtz 2019;
Szaflarski and Bauldry 2019;
Ziersch et al. 2020;
Chuah et al. 2018;
World Health Organization 2023). Furthermore, the Thai government characterized individuals fleeing Myanmar into Thailand as “employment seekers”, suggesting that they exploited their country’s unrest as a pretext to find work in Thailand. Consequently, many individuals have been detained and deported to Myanmar (
Radio Free Asia 2024).
Drawing on the existing literature and media reports, this paper explores how Myanmar’s military government exerts its power and leverage over citizens even while they are living outside of the country through its ID/passport system; how Myanmar’s military extracts unwilling support from its overseas citizens through conscription law, taxation, and remittance practices; how state-to-state agreements/relationships between Myanmar and Thailand relating to the regularization of migrant workers bypass the protection needs of those at risk of persecution and forced conscription; and how people are pushed into irregularity despite the policy initiatives to regularize them.
2. Unfolding Humanitarian Crisis in Myanmar Post-Coup D’état 2021
Myanmar’s February 2021 military coup caused significant economic instability, marked by extreme unemployment, business closures, widespread human rights violations, and deteriorating living conditions. This situation has led to increased unemployment, with the International Labour Organization reporting a staggering 1.6 million job losses in 2021 alone due to the closure of several factories following international sanctions (
International Labour Organization 2022). The severe unemployment crisis and extensive business shutdowns have worsened the living conditions, leading to unparalleled humanitarian emergencies. The United Nations has reported that over 18.6 million people require urgent assistance (12). Concurrently, approximately 25% of Myanmar’s population, equating to approximately 13.3 million individuals, is categorized as facing either crisis (Phase 3) or emergency (Phase 4) levels of food insecurity (
OCHA 2024). This classification is based on the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) five-tier system, which delineates varying degrees of urgency and necessity for humanitarian assistance.
According to a World Bank survey report in May 2023, 48% of farming households in Myanmar were concerned about food insecurity, an increase of approximately 26% from May 2022 (
World Bank 2023). The survey indicated a significant reduction in the consumption of nutrient-dense foods such as milk, meat, fish, and eggs. This dire situation is attributed to several factors, including ongoing conflict and instability, which have intensified the existing vulnerabilities, resulting in widespread displacement, disruption to farming activities, and a loss of income sources. Additionally, economic decline and rising inflation have caused essential goods prices to soar, making it increasingly challenging for households to procure necessities.
Aid organizations and relief agencies grappling with this emergency encounter substantial monetary limitations that drastically reduce their ability to offer comprehensive assistance to all affected individuals. A United Nations report indicated that only 28% of the US
$ 994 million funding required for humanitarian operations was received in Myanmar (
OCHA 2024). Moreover, these organizations are significantly hindered by the military’s restrictive policies and ongoing conflict, which affects the delivery of humanitarian aid (
Human Rights Watch 2021). Consequently, many areas remain out of reach for aid workers, making it difficult for them to deliver crucial supplies, such as medical care, COVID-19 vaccines, and food, to displaced populations (
Khai 2022,
2023c).
Amidst the urgent humanitarian crisis due to intensive conflict across the country, Myanmar implemented a military conscription law on 10 February 2024, which now applies to 14 million youths, who comprise 26% of the nation’s population. This law mandates that all men aged 18–35 and women aged 18–27 must serve in the military for a minimum of two years (
Irrawaddy 2025). Additionally, the law was expanded to include men aged 25–65 years. This expansion of compulsory military service and recruitment laws has sparked considerable anxiety among Myanmar’s population, who view conscription as a death sentence during the nation’s ongoing turmoil and armed conflict (
Kelly Ng 2024). Notably, these inexperienced and inadequately trained recruits are sent into battle against Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). The PDFs were formed after the coup in 2021 in response to the military’s violent suppression of nonviolent demonstrations.
According to a UNICEF report of July 2024, 3.2 million people were internally displaced and forced to flee their homes due to escalation (
UNICEF 2024). The military’s indiscriminate attacks on civilian infrastructure, including homes, hospitals, and schools, have not only caused immediate displacement but have also disrupted essential services and social structures. For instance, Data for Myanmar organizations have documented that nearly 90,000 homes were destroyed by arson attacks carried out by Myanmar’s miliary between February 2021 and April 2024 (
DVD 2024). On 28 March 2025, a significant earthquake occurred in central Myanmar with a magnitude of 7.7 occurred in central Myanmar. The epicenter was located 17 km southeast of Mandalay. This seismic event had a profound impact on the Sagaing and Mandalay regions, affecting at least 5 million residents, and many locations are hard to reach due to the military restriction of emergency relief severs and aid distribution (
UNDP 2025). This has led to widespread internal displacement and significant economic instability, leaving millions of people without the means to meet their basic needs.
3. Precarious Situation: Exploitation, Deportation, and Military Conscription
Political turmoil in Myanmar following the military coup in 2021 led to a significant humanitarian crisis, resulting in the mass exodus of its citizens. In December 2022, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that an estimated 40,000 Myanmar people were leaving the country or migrating abroad each month (
International Organization for Migration 2022). This large-scale displacement has had a profound impact on neighboring countries, particularly Thailand, which has emerged as a primary destination for those seeking asylum protection.
The United Nations Development Program report in 2023 estimates that Thailand currently hosts between 3 and 5 million undocumented migrants, with a substantial portion comprising political asylum seekers from Myanmar (
UNDP 2023). From 1 February 2021 to 12 May 2023, over 34,800 Myanmar asylum seekers were registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Thailand (
UNHCR 2023). In addition, the number of Myanmar asylum seekers who have been unable to register with the UNHCR in the three countries seems high, despite the absence of reliable statistical data. Experts predict a significant increase in this statistic by 2024, which is primarily attributed to Myanmar’s recently implemented compulsory military service legislation and its ongoing political and economic instability. The influx of Myanmar’s population, predominantly young individuals, plays a crucial role in addressing Thailand’s labor market demands, particularly in sectors such as agriculture, construction, and manufacturing.
Migrant workers from Myanmar in Thailand are mainly regulated through agreements such as the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) process (
Khai 2023a). Conversely, refugees and asylum seekers are not officially acknowledged under Thai law because Thailand has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol, which codified the principle of non-refoulement. However, despite not being a party to these treaties, Thailand is still bound by customary international law, which includes the principle of non-refoulement. This principle prohibits states from returning individuals to countries where they may face torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishments. Hence, refugees and asylum seekers are deprived of formal legal protections and encounter substantial obstacles in accessing employment and healthcare. Consequently, individuals seeking asylum were categorized as either irregular or undocumented. They find themselves in a highly precarious position, including the threat of detention and deportation, despite fleeing conflicts in their home countries. These groups are particularly susceptible to exploitation, being pressured for bribes, and being coerced to purchase unofficial police documentation to stay in specific areas of Thailand. Unfortunately, these documents do not provide genuine protection against such detention (
Khai 2023b;
Khai and Asaduzzaman 2022). These communities live with a constant fear of being confined to Thai immigration detention facilities, where they face the risk of abuse and forced return to Myanmar (
FIDH 2024). For example, official reports from August 2024 indicated that over a three-month period, Thai authorities sent back more than 144,000 undocumented migrants to Myanmar (
Radio Free Asia 2024).
Deported individuals are particularly susceptible to exploitation and forced-military recruitment. Their precarious situation is exacerbated by a lack of financial resources, which makes them prime targets for military recruitment under the conscription laws. For example, the Thai authorities deported more than 150 Myanmar nationals in July 2024 and an additional 120 in August from Ranong Prison to Myanmar’s southernmost port, Kawthoung (
RFA Burmese 2024a). Following their deportation, more than 70 of these individuals were immediately apprehended by the military authorities upon re-entering Myanmar. The military’s practice of offering the option to pay substantial bribes to avoid conscription further underscores the exploitation that these deportees face. Bribe amounts range from 500,000 kyats (US
$240) to an astounding 50 million kyats (US
$23,830) (
RFA Burmese 2024a). Those without financial means were left with no choice but to submit to the military. This system not only perpetuates a cycle of poverty and exploitation but also raises serious concerns about human rights violations and the ethical implications of forced military service.
4. The Junta’s Revenue Generation Strategies: Financial Pressures and Irregular Migration
Three years after the coup, the military faced not only a shortage of personnel, but also significant financial constraints due to international sanctions and rising inflation. In response, the junta began to impose taxes on migrant workers abroad to generate additional revenue. This includes the enactment of the Myanmar Union Taxation Law of 2023 (effective October 2023), which imposes a 2% tax on the earnings of regular migrant workers abroad and prohibits their migration from Myanmar. The Burmese military insists that only those workers who have paid the tax will receive a crucial certificate necessary for passport renewals, labor ID card applications, and other official paperwork, which are necessary to retain regular status. For instance, with an estimated five million Myanmar nationals employed in Thailand, the military stands to gain close to 750 million baht (US
$22 million) monthly, at a rate of 150 baht per worker (
RFA Burmese 2024b). Many migrant workers resisted this taxation scheme because they understood that Myanmar’s military would use revenue for human rights violations against civilians rather than for their benefit.
Regular migrant workers must send a minimum of 25% of their earnings back to Myanmar through the national banking system within the preceding three months to be eligible for work permit renewal after completing their initial four-year contract. To continue working in Thailand for an additional two years under the “MoU U-turn” arrangement with Thailand, they must transfer 6000-baht, equivalent to 25% of their basic three-month salary to banks in Myanmar (
Bangkok Post 2024a). This combined pressure of taxation and compulsory remittances exacerbates their financial challenges and likely propels more individuals towards irregular migration, as they attempt to evade these obligations.
The situation is likely to worsen not only for regular migrant worker populations but also for Myanmar students in Thailand. In September 2024, Myanmar’s junta issued an order in which students studying in Thailand on short-term education visas would no longer be able to renew their passports in their embassy in Bangkok for a consulate in Chiang Mai (
RFA Burmese 2024c). This action is widely perceived as a tactic to increase military enlistment by forcing the military-aged citizens to return to Myanmar. Consequently, it is anticipated that there will be an increase in the number of Myanmar nationals with irregular status in Thailand, as they are frightened about returning to their home country.
5. Discussions and Policy Recommendations
The arrival of Myanmar’s citizens poses both humanitarian dilemmas and prospects for Thailand, as it contends with the intricacies of offering assistance and assimilation to an expanding community of displaced persons. The Thai government recently announced a cabinet resolution to issue pink identification cards for irregular workers in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Loas (
Bangkok Post 2024b). This pink card registration creates a feasible route to legal status for irregular migrants, offering two-year residences and work permits obtained until 13 February 2025, which will be extended for an additional two years. Moreover, the cabinet endorsed a policy to confer Thai citizenship on more than 483,000 migrants and individuals from ethnic minorities who had resided in Thailand for an extended period or were born in Thailand (
Hutasingh 2024). The announcement of the pink card and Thai citizenship initiative represents a potentially positive step towards the challenges faced by Myanmar’s citizens in Thailand. However, its effectiveness remains uncertain due to ongoing political unrest in Myanmar and bureaucratic obstacles. To address these challenges, the Thai government must streamline the application process, ensure accessibility to all eligible individuals, and provide language support to overcome the communication barriers. To enhance accessibility, particularly for irregular migrant workers in rural and remote areas, it is imperative to establish registration counters for all districts. Furthermore, application forms should be made available in local languages such as Myanmar, and interpretation services should be offered to mitigate language barriers.
Myanmar asylum seekers and migrants in Thailand face significant social and psychological challenges owing to trauma, family separation, lack of support, and prejudice. Addressing these needs requires a multifaceted approach emphasizing human rights, social justice, and community support. Social work is critical for advocating for vulnerable populations, ensuring access to essential services, and promoting policies that uphold their dignity and rights. Thai authorities are encouraged to facilitate partnerships among governmental entities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and community groups to offer personalized support. This strategy includes the implementation of mentoring initiatives and community-based mental health programs that create safe spaces for individuals to access information, support services, and engage in social activities, all with a focus on trauma-informed care. Additionally, this strategy will support cultural awareness training for local communities and service providers, enhance their understanding, and reduce discrimination. By integrating these social work principles into policy advocacy and community support, Thailand can create a more inclusive environment for Myanmar’s asylum seekers and migrants by aligning with international human rights standards and promoting social justice and equity.
Myanmar asylum seekers and migrants face the constant risk of being detained and sent back to their country, as well as restricted access to essential social services. Many of them were Myanmar civil servants who joined civil disobedience movements and fled to Thailand to avoid arrest warrants and to participate in the 2021 protests. They were unable to process passport applications or access legal documentation because they were blacklisted by the military for peaceful demonstrations against the coup. The situation has worsened due to the recent implementation of military conscription laws and the junta’s recent taxes on migrant workers and mandatory remittances, which put many Myanmar people in an irregular status in Thailand. Therefore, to ensure access protection, the people of Myanmar were not forced to return, and it is imperative for Thailand to commit to fully implementing a non-refoulement policy as well as the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) to safeguard asylum seekers and irregular migrant workers from Myanmar. It is essential for Thailand to implement comprehensive legal protection at the policy level to establish pathways for legitimate work permits for migrants and asylum seekers. This would help minimize exploitation, guarantee fair wages, and secure working environments. Additionally, these measures should facilitate the incorporation of migrants and asylum seekers into Thailand’s national health system, offering affordable health coverage and culturally appropriate mental health care services.
In particular, global entities such as UN agencies, NGOs, and civil society groups need to collaborate collectively with the Thai government to protect the well-being of Myanmar citizens living in Thailand, regardless of their immigration status, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Given the severe threats facing Myanmar’s population following the military’s actions after the 2021 coup, it is imperative that the Thai government collaborates with these entities to ensure that Myanmar migrant workers receive adequate healthcare and basic needs, especially those in detention centers.
6. Limitations of the Study and Future Research Directions
This analysis is based on the existing literature and media news reports, relying on secondary data sources. Furthermore, the analysis encompasses a broad spectrum of complex issues ranging from economic impacts to human rights concerns. Despite the researcher’s awareness of the importance of collecting empirical data to enhance the robustness of this study, several challenges were encountered. These obstacles were primarily due to a lack of research funding, extended ethical considerations due to the sensitive nature of the topic, and difficulties in accessing the target population for interviews or surveys. Therefore, this study is unable to present specific aspects pertaining to the impact on vulnerable groups within the migrant population (e.g., women, children, and the older adults). This constraint highlights the crucial necessity of original empirical studies to enable a more thorough understanding of the circumstances encountered by asylum seekers and migrants from Myanmar. This research is essential for informing policy advocacy, considering policy implications, and enhancing support services.
7. Conclusions
The 2021 military coup in Myanmar exacerbated the humanitarian crisis, affecting both its population and neighboring countries such as Thailand. This coup has led to economic instability, widespread unemployment, business closures, and human rights violations. International efforts to address the crisis are hindered by the military junta’s restrictions on humanitarian aid. New conscription laws and ongoing military attacks on civilian infrastructure have led to increased displacement and irregular migration to Thailand. These populations face significant challenges in meeting their daily needs and are vulnerable to exploitation, detention, and deportation. This underscores the urgent need for comprehensive policies beyond Pin Card registration to address their vulnerabilities. Further research and policy development is necessary to address humanitarian needs, economic considerations, and regional stability. A coordinated, compassionate approach involving multiple stakeholders is essential to protecting and upholding the dignity of Myanmar’s displaced population.