Does Diversity in Top Management Teams Contribute to Organizational Performance? The Response of the IBEX 35 Companies
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Conceptual Framework
Statement of Hypotheses
3. Methodology
3.1. Sample and Data
3.2. Variables
4. Analysis of Results
Hypotheses Contrast
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
References
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1 | From a population of 419 members studied, 324 are managers, and 174 are directors. The mismatch of 79 people with the 419 that make up the sample size corresponds to those who have dual roles (directors and managers who have worked in the same company for the same amount of time). Therefore, 245 are solely managers, and 95 are solely directors. |
N | MINIMUM | MAXIMUM | MEAN | DEV. TYP. | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
NET SALES (thousands) | 419 | 8166.00 | 38,372,521.00 | 5,988,817.71 | 9,494,382.64 |
EBITD (thousands) | 419 | −100,7391.00 | 5,324,107.00 | 922,335.9189 | 1,440,716.210 |
GENDER (Men) | 419 | 0 | 1 | 0.83 | 0.373 |
AGE | |||||
AGE 1 (Between 31–45) ** | 419 | 0 | 1 | 0.03 | 0.180 |
AGE 2 (Between 46–60) ** | 419 | 0 | 1 | 0.29 | 0.456 |
AGE 3 (Between 61–70) ** | 419 | 0 | 1 | 0.25 | 0.434 |
AGE 4 (+70) ** | 419 | 0 | 1 | 0.13 | 0.333 |
NATIONALITY (Spanish) | 407 | 0 | 1 | 0.85 | 0.362 |
TRAINING LEVEL | |||||
UNIVERSITY EDUCATION | 392 | 0 | 1 | 0.99 | 0.112 |
DOCTORATE | 392 | 0 | 1 | 0.14 | 0.342 |
DOUBLE DEGREE | 355 | 0 | 1 | 0.36 | 0.482 |
ECONOMIC TRAINING | 385 | 0 | 1 | 0.42 | 0.494 |
LEGAL TRAINING | 385 | 0 | 1 | 0.27 | 0.443 |
TECHNICAL FORMATION | 385 | 0 | 1 | 0.24 | 0.425 |
MASTER’S DEGREE | 301 | 0 | 1 | 0.42 | 0.494 |
LANGUAGES | |||||
NATIVE LANGUAGE + 2 O + | 327 | 0 | 1 | 0.33 | 0.471 |
OTHER TRAINING | |||||
TRAINING SUITABLE FOR THE POSTI * | 375 | 0 | 1 | 0.83 | 0.374 |
FURTHER TRAINING | 265 | 0 | 1 | 0.63 | 0.483 |
EXPERIENCE | |||||
EXPERIENCE OTHER SECTORS | 402 | 0 | 1 | 0.19 | 0.396 |
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE | 357 | 0 | 1 | 0.76 | 0.428 |
Dependents | |||
1.NSL | NET SALES (thousands) | NUMERIC | |
2.EBI | EBITDA (thousands) | NUMERIC | |
Independents | |||
1.GENDER1 | GENDER | {0, WOMAN} | {1, MAN} |
2.AGE1 | 31–45 | {0, NO} | {1, YES} |
3.AGE2 | 46–60 | {0, NO} | {1, YES} |
4.AGE3 | 61–70 | {0, NO} | {1, YES} |
5.AGE4 | +70 | {0, NO} | {1, YES} |
6.NAT1 | NATIONALITY | {0, REST N} | {1, SPANISH} |
7.TRAIN1 | UNIVERSITY TRAINING | {0, NO} | {1, YES} |
8.DOCT1 | DOCTORATE | {0, NO} | {1, YES} |
9.DOBDEG1 | DOUBLE DEGREE | {0, NO} | {1, YES} |
10.ECONTRAIN1 | ECONOMIC TRAINING | {0, NO} | {1, YES} |
11.LEGTRAIN1 | LEGAL TRAINING | {0, NO} | {1, YES} |
12.TECTRAIN1 | TECHNICAL TRAINING | {0, NO} | {1, YES} |
13.MASTER1 | MASTER TRAINING | {0, NO} | {1, YES} |
14.LANGUAGE3 | NATIVE LANGUAGE + 2 O + | {0, NO} | {1, YES} |
15.TPOST1 | TRAINING SUITABLE POST | {0, NO} | {1, YES} |
16.COMPLT1 | COMPLEM. TRAINING | {0, NO} | {1, YES} |
17.EXPOTR1 | EXPERIENCE OTHER SECTORS | {0, NO} | {1, YES} |
18.INTEXP1 | INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE | {0, NO} | {1, YES} |
Dependent Variable: EBITDA (Thousands) | ||
---|---|---|
Multiple correlation (R) 0.610 | ||
Independent variables | Β standard | Student’s T |
GENDER (Men) | −0.197 | −2.310 * |
AGE | ||
AGE 1 (31–45) | 0.110 | 1.240 |
AGE 2 (46–60) | 0.191 | 1.817 # |
AGE 3 (61–70) | 0.297 | 2.844 ** |
AGE 4 (+70) | 0.337 | 3.255 ** |
NATIONALITY (Spanish) | −0.152 | −1.878 # |
EDUCATION LEVEL | ||
UNIVERSITY EDUCATION | 0.087 | 1.042 |
DOCTORATE | 0.076 | 0.927 |
DOUBLE DEGREE | −0.046 | −0.572 |
ECONOMIC TRAINING | 0.142 | 0.848 |
LEGAL TRAINING | −0.031 | −0.192 |
TECHNICAL TRAINING | −0.043 | −0.293 |
MASTER’S DEGREE | −0.082 | −0.907 |
LANGUAGES | ||
NATIVE LANGUAGE + 2 O + | 0.194 | 2.217 * |
OTHER TRAINING | ||
TRAINING SUITABLE FOR THE POSITION | −0.103 | −1.141 |
FURTHER TRAINING | −0.397 | −4.515 *** |
EXPERIENCE | ||
EXPERIENCE OTHER SECTORS | 0.013 | 0.150 |
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE | −0.084 | −0.942 |
R2 0.372 | ||
F 3.487 *** |
Variable Dependent: NET SALES THOUSANDS | ||
---|---|---|
Multiple correlation (R) 0.618 | ||
Independent variables | Β standard | Student’s T |
SEXO (Men) | −0.150 | −1.770 # |
AGE | ||
AGE 1 (31–45) | 0.175 | 1.980 * |
AGE 2 (46–60) | 0.053 | 0.506 |
AGE 3 (61–70) | 0.162 | 1.566 |
AGE 4 (+70) | 0.201 | 1.960 # |
NATIONALITY (Spanish) | −0.121 | −1.507 |
EDUCATION LEVEL | ||
UNIVERSITY EDUCATION | 0.022 | 0.265 |
DOCTORATE | 0.134 | 1.659 # |
DOUBLE DEGREE | 0.025 | 0.312 |
ECONOMIC TRAINING | 0.102 | 0.614 |
LEGAL TRAINING | −0.029 | −0.183 |
TECHNICAL TRAINING | −0.100 | −0.693 |
MASTER’S DEGREE | −0.082 | −0.906 |
LANGUAGES | ||
NATIVE LANGUAGE + 2 O + | 0.120 | 1.383 |
OTHER TRAINING | ||
TRAINING SUITABLE FOR THE POSITION | 0.215 | 2.384 * |
FURTHER TRAINING | −0.456 | −5.226 *** |
EXPERIENCE | ||
EXPERIENCE OTHER SECTORS | 0.060 | 0.720 |
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE | −0.037 | −0.418 |
R2 0.381 | ||
F 3.632 *** |
Hypothesis | Result |
---|---|
H1a: The inclusion of female members in the IBEX 35 companies’ management teams positively influences sales | Supported |
H1b: The net sales of the IBEX 35 listed companies increase when members of the management team are older | Rejected |
H1c: The inclusion of various nationalities in the management teams of the IBEX 35 companies favors an increase in sales | Rejected |
H1d: The training of members of the IBEX 35 companies’ management team contributes to an increase in the companies’ sales | Rejected |
H2a: The inclusion of female members in management teams has a positive effect on the EBITDA of the IBEX 35 companies | Supported |
H2b: The final EBITDA of the IBEX 35 listed companies increases when the members of the management teams are older | Supported |
H2c: The inclusion of various nationalities in the management teams of the IBEX 35 companies favors an increase in the final EBITDA | Supported |
H2d: The training of the members of the IBEX 35 companies’ management teams contributes to an increase in the companies’ EBITDA | Rejected |
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Rodríguez-Fernández, M.; Gaspar-González, A.I.; Sánchez-Teba, E.M. Does Diversity in Top Management Teams Contribute to Organizational Performance? The Response of the IBEX 35 Companies. Soc. Sci. 2020, 9, 36. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci9040036
Rodríguez-Fernández M, Gaspar-González AI, Sánchez-Teba EM. Does Diversity in Top Management Teams Contribute to Organizational Performance? The Response of the IBEX 35 Companies. Social Sciences. 2020; 9(4):36. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci9040036
Chicago/Turabian StyleRodríguez-Fernández, Mercedes, Ana I. Gaspar-González, and Eva M. Sánchez-Teba. 2020. "Does Diversity in Top Management Teams Contribute to Organizational Performance? The Response of the IBEX 35 Companies" Social Sciences 9, no. 4: 36. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci9040036
APA StyleRodríguez-Fernández, M., Gaspar-González, A. I., & Sánchez-Teba, E. M. (2020). Does Diversity in Top Management Teams Contribute to Organizational Performance? The Response of the IBEX 35 Companies. Social Sciences, 9(4), 36. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci9040036