Providing Security for Flash Loan System Using Cryptocurrency Wallets Supported by XSalsa20 in a Blockchain Environment
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- Mainframe computers and early software: Mainframe computers were developed in the 1950s and 60s, which paved the way for the automation of basic calculations and massive data storage. Early software was used to automate tasks like credit checks and loan application processing.
- Requirements for efficiency: As loan demand rose, lenders found it challenging to keep up with manual processing. Faster processing speeds promised by automation enabled them to handle more applications and preserve their competitiveness.
- Accuracy and reduced errors: Manual data entry and calculations were prone to errors. Automation made it possible to process loans with more accuracy and less chance of error.
1.1. Traditional Security Techniques for Lending Systems
- Data security: The following methods are used to maintain data security traditionally and previously.
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- Encryption: Using powerful algorithms like AES Advanced Encryption Standard, borrower data, including Social Security numbers, salary details, and credit reports, were encrypted both during transmission and while they were being stored [5].
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- Access controls: Based on user roles and responsibilities, access to borrower data was limited. An additional degree of protection was added to sensitive system access with multifactor authentication (MFA).
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- Data solitude: The most important data were isolated from the less important data and stored apart from them. This step was taken to minimize the impact of intrusion [6].
- User training and awareness: In such systems, the issue of security is a critical issue: not only should the people and staff that work on the system be aware of this issue but even the people who benefit from the system and customers as well [7].
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- Staff education: Workers who have access to private data received training on security best practices, such as choosing secure passwords and recognizing phishing scams [8].
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- Payers’ education: Payers received instructions on how to safeguard their data and identify con artists. These tactics, when used correctly, offered a strong foundation for the security of lending systems [6]. But they were not without limitations. It took constant effort and close attention to detail to keep up a solid security posture. Furthermore, because loan systems stored data centrally, they were vulnerable to intentional attacks.
1.2. Security in Blockchain-Based Lending Systems
1.3. Main Contributions
- We speed up the total time required to process the loan and deliver it to the payee as quickly as possible through our use of preprepared codes that greatly accelerate the work.
- We give great flexibility to the loan system in general by increasing the number of loans processed and added per second, which serves customers and gives profit to both the payee and the payer.
- The focus of our system is not limited to providing loans only, but rather on giving great importance to the payers and returning their money as quickly as possible after fulfilling our preprepared conditions to guarantee their rights and not cause them any financial losses or waste of time.
- We raise the level of security through our usage of the XSalsa20 algorithm as an encryption algorithm to protect the data after they are saved in the smart wallets.
2. Literature Assessment on the Security of the Lending System
3. The Core Concepts of Loans
3.1. Loan Types
3.2. Flash Loans
3.3. Flash Loan Attacks
- Big Borrowing: The attacker starts a flash loan by taking out a sizable cryptocurrency loan.
- Market Manipulation: The attacker manipulates the price of a certain cryptocurrency or asset by using borrowed funds.
- Code Seize: Attackers may occasionally take advantage of the code vulnerabilities to take money straight out of the system.
- Profit and Disappear: After the manipulation or exploit is finished, the attacker repays the initial loan in the same transaction using the remaining funds from the flash loan. This quick payback and execution are critical to the attack as a whole.
4. Mechanisms of Our Proposed Protocol
4.1. XSalsa20 Algorithm
Algorithm 1 XSalsa20 steps. |
Input: 256-bit key 64-bit nonce 64-bit counter 256-bit encryption key Output: 512-bit keystream block Start
|
- All of the output bytes of XSalsa20 depend on all of the input bytes of the key, nonce, and block counter. An attacker will find it difficult to identify any patterns or connections between the cipher’s input and output due to its properties of confusion and diffusion.
- By implementing the core function over several rounds (20 rounds in XSalsa20), the algorithm distributes any possible vulnerabilities throughout the rounds, thus resulting in a high level of security.
- By using multiple rounds of permutation, attackers are prevented from taking advantage of biases and linearity, which might be used to infer details about the plaintext or key.
- XSalsa20 uses both the key and the nonce in every permutation cycle to make sure that variations in either parameter produce radically different results. This feature is essential to security, because it keeps adversaries from analyzing patterns in plaintext or ciphertext to determine the key or nonce.
4.2. Cryptocurrency Wallets
- Safe Storage: Keeping people’s private keys safe is the main purpose of a cryptocurrency wallet. On the blockchain network, these keys serve as ownership proof for cryptocurrencies, much like digital signatures. People are unable to use or access the cryptocurrency without them.
- Transmitting and Obtaining Crypto: A user-friendly interface for sending and receiving different cryptocurrencies is offered by crypto wallets. They let the payee and payer create the wallet address, which is a special code on the blockchain that anybody may use to transfer anyone cryptocurrency.
- Management and Tracking: A lot of wallets include tools for keeping track of transactions and managing the individual’s cryptocurrency holdings. However, cryptocurrency wallets store the private keys, which are the passwords that are necessary to access payee and payer cryptocurrency on the blockchain, as opposed to traditional wallets that store actual cash.
Security Facilities in Cryptocurrency Wallets
4.3. Crow Search Algorithm
Design of Algorithms
- Hiding food: Crows scour the search area for locations with promise or possible solutions.
- Food theft: Crows follow one another in search of better ways to do things (improvement).
- Procedure: Crows change their positions iteratively by striking a balance between exploitation fine-tuning effective solutions and exploration discovering new places. This balance is influenced by two main factors.
- The distance a crow may cover in a single search is known as its flight length.
- The awareness probability measures the chance that a crow will be followed by another crow.
5. Proposed Lending Protocol Step-by-Step Process
- Storage or insurance: This is the stage in which all the payee’s information is stored in the wallet, from the name to the address and electronic email on the smart wallet, which are encrypted using the XSalsa20 algorithm.
- Stage of controlling lending process: This is implemented through preprepared codes that guarantee the rights of both the payee and the payer together. That is, when the conditions are met, the process is completed, and if the conditions are not met, the process ends.
- Finally, our proposed system, when the conditions are met, reaches the final stage, which is the stage of storing on the blockchain.
- Payee Application:
- The payee submits a loan request through the proposed system specifying the loan amount, repayment period, and interest.
- The loan request is encrypted using XSalsa20 with a secret key shared only between the payee and the payer.
- The encrypted loan request is stored securely on the smart wallet for transparency and immutability.
- The payee’s smart wallet address is verified to ensure they have a valid digital identity and can receive funds.
- Creditworthiness Assessment:
- Xsalsa20 is used to decrypt the loan request using the secret key.
- The crow search algorithm analyzes the payee’s financial data transaction history, smart wallet balance, and potentially anonymized credit bureau reports.
- This decentralized approach facilitates fair credit scoring without relying solely on centralized authorities.
- The algorithm outputs a credit score that reflects the payee’s ability to repay the loan.
- Loan Repayment Options:
- The loan request (excluding sensitive payee data) is broadcast to a pool of potential payers within the blockchain network.
- Investors can browse available loan requests, assess risk based on the credit score and loan details, and commit funds to the loan through their smart wallets.
- The payee selects their preferred repayment method like fixed installments, bullet payment, or early repayment with potential discounts.
- Code-Based Condition Execution:
- Once sufficient funds are pledged by payers to meet the loan amount, code-based terms are automatically deployed on the blockchain.
- The code-based terms govern the entire loan lifecycle: disbursement, repayment installments, potential penalties for late payments, and interest calculations.
- Loan Disbursement:
- Upon the term’s execution, funds are securely transferred from payees’ smart wallets to the payers’ smart wallets.
- This process is transparent and tamper-proof due to the blockchain’s characteristics.
- Loan Repayment Management:
- The code-based terms automatically schedule repayment installments based on the chosen method and loan terms.
- Payees make repayments directly to the code-based terms using their smart wallets.
- Reputation Management:
- Payees’ repayment history and loan fulfillment are recorded on the blockchain, thus enhancing their creditworthiness for future loan applications.
- Similarly, payers’ lending activity and on-time returns are tracked, thus influencing their attractiveness to the payee.
- Security Considerations:
- XSalsa20 encryption can be used to protect sensitive borrower data during initial loan request transmission.
- Secure enclaves or trusted intermediaries can be employed for decryption within a controlled environment.
- Robust key management practices are crucial to ensure the security of encryption keys.
6. Assessment of the Proposed Work
6.1. Security Assessment
6.2. Scrutiny of Performance
6.2.1. Tamarin Prover
6.2.2. Efficiency Parameters
- Loan processing speed: The meaning of loan processing speed is how long it takes for a payee to review a loan system and come to a decision on whether it needs approval or not. In other words, it defines how quickly the payee can go from logging the system to a green light or rejection and the funds arriving in the payee’s account. In a broad sense, this is the loan approval process and depends on the payee and blockchain or smart wallet. Traditional loan processes used to take a long time, but in the case of our proposed system, it is all shown in Figure 7. As clarified in Figure 7, the time of a loan to be processed in the proposed system is not more than 0.6667 milliseconds, which is a matter that gives the proposed system the characteristic of being fast.
- Effectiveness of loan repayment: Repayment is completely concerned with the efficacy of payees in fulfilling their payment obligations. In other words, it measures the efficiency of the loan system specifically: its ability to implement measures to ensure that all payments are made on time and in full. The primary indicator of loan repayment compliance is the repayment rate, which represents the proportion of payees who honor their loan obligations on time. An efficient loan system is indicated by a high repayment rate. Figure 8 shows the time required for the system to repay the loan after the predefined conditions are fulfilled, and in the case of our proposed system, this is not more than 2990 milliseconds.
- Loan system flexibility: This term refers to the system’s capacity to accommodate a growing number of loan numbers and number of payees without affecting its effectiveness or efficiency. It concerns how well the system can expand without affecting the performance of the system, as shown in Figure 9.
6.3. Encryption and Decryption Analysis
- Key generating assessment:An essential parameter to assess the performance of the proposed system is to assess the key generating in the XSalsa20 algorithm. The key generation process is considered to be the basis of security, where usually this algorithm generates the key using a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator, CSPRNG, while in the proposed method, we do not depend on the traditional generators that take a lot of time and slow the system efficiency, and we used modern embedded libraries in Java called crypto_box_keypair(); we provide a comparison between Figure 10 that shows the key generating using the traditional way using CSPRNG and Figure 11 that illustrate the key generation using crypto_box_keypair().As we can see in Figure 10, the speed of generating the key in the traditional method used in XSalsa20 was 10,000 ns, while Figure 11, clarifies the speed of the proposed system in generating the keys necessary for encryption, which did not exceed 0.17 ns and is a matter that will provide more speed to the overall execution speed of the proposed system.
- Cryptography Assessment:The security of our system depends largely on the encryption of the XSalsa20 algorithm, so the evaluation of the encryption and decryption time that this algorithm takes was considered one of the basic factors for evaluating the system as a whole. As can be seen in Figure 12, the speed of encrypting data for the whole loan system in general came out to not more than 0.00526 nanoseconds, while the decryption time came out to 0.003186 nanoseconds. Figure 12 shows these two times in detail. From this figure, we notice that the encryption time took more than the decryption time because it was added to the time of generating the key and the nonce value, but in general, both times are considered fast compared to other previous systems, as shown in Table 5. After the analysis of this parameter, we conclude that our overall system has the power of speed combined with security.
7. Conclusions
8. Limitations
9. Future Aspirations
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
AML | Anti-money laundering |
KYC | Know Your Customer |
PoS | Proof-of-stake |
CSA | Crow search algorithm |
MFA | Multifactor authentication |
LMSs | Loan management systems |
LOSs | Loan origination systems |
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Loan Type | Description |
---|---|
Secured loans | Secured loans are ones in which the payer pledges collateral, which is an item that the payer has the right to take back if a payee does not pay back the loan. Because of the decreased risk to the payer, secured loans usually have lower interest rates. For example, consider that mortgage loans are used to buy houses. The collateral is the house itself. Used to purchase an automobile are auto loans. The vehicle acts as security. Title Loans: These take out a loan using the title of user’s car as security. |
Unsecured Loans | Loans without collateral; since there is no collateral required, payers must approve the loan based solely on the payee’s creditworthiness, which entails a higher interest rate to cover the added risk. Some instances are include emergency situations, home renovations, and debt reduction, which are are just a few uses for personal loans. There are two types of student loans: subsidized—where the government pays interest while payees are enrolled in classes—and unsubsidized—where payees pay the interest. Credit cards: These usually have the highest interest rates of all loan kinds; credit cards are revolving lines of credit that clients can use repeatedly. |
Term loans | Term loans are where the payee takes out a preset loan amount and pays it back over a predetermined period of time called the term in equal principal and interest installments. As an example, consider that mortgage loans usually have periods ranging from 15 to 30 years. For auto loans, terms range from two to seven years. |
Revolving Loans | Revolving Loans: The payee can borrow money, pay it back, and borrow it again as needed. The payee has a credit limit. Only the balance that is still owed is subject to interest. As an example, consider credit cards—a revolving credit line that requires a minimum payment each month. The Home Equity Line of Credit is a secured credit line that is secured by the equity in the payee’s house. |
Attack Type | Attack Action | Our System Faces Attacks |
---|---|---|
Flash loan attacks | In the field of decentralized finance (DeFi), flash loan assaults are a particular kind of hacking that makes use of the special features of flash loans. In these attacks, a sizable amount of money is borrowed in a single transaction, which is used to manipulate asset prices across many platforms and then is swiftly repaid in the same transaction. This makes it possible for hackers to take advantage of smart contract flaws like front running and pricing oracle manipulation to profit at the expense of other users or protocols. Attacks using flash loans have been used to carry out intricate plans, like market manipulation or arbitrage chances, thus costing DeFi platforms and their users a great deal of money. | In the case of our proposed work, we optimize this type of attack by our usage of the Xsalsa20 algorithm because of the powerful cryptography of this algorithm and the mix between the public key, private key, and the static value that are used to mix it to increase the power; this type of attacks has never affected the security of our proposed system. |
Hot wallet attack | This attack refers to the theft and illegal access to cryptocurrency funds kept in internet-connected online wallets. These wallets are convenient, but they are also more susceptible to hacking attempts because they are frequently used for regular transactions, trading, and instant access to funds. Cybercriminals can use a number of strategies, including phishing assaults, malware infections, social engineering, as well as taking advantage of security flaws in wallet services or exchange platforms to access hot wallets. The victims may suffer monetary losses when hackers shift Bitcoin cash to their own wallets once they have access to a hot wallet. | Our smart wallet usage is supported by the powerful cryptography of the XSalsa20 algorithm as a primary phase, and then it is supported by the smart contracts conditions as a secondary phase; this action gives two-authentication access to the system. |
Transaction malleability attack | This type of cyberattack exploits vulnerabilities in cryptocurrency transaction records, such as those found in Bitcoin. This attack involves modifying a transaction’s unique identification number, or transaction ID, before the transaction is confirmed on the blockchain, without affecting the transaction’s real content or nature. By altering the transaction ID, attackers may slow down or confuse the network, which could result in issues with transaction verifications and poorer network performance as a whole. This type of attack cannot be used to steal money or create new currencies, but it could result in momentary interruptions like transaction failures or delays in transaction confirmation. Transaction data have been changed for malicious purposes in the past through attacks on transaction malleability. | Our system is supported by the secured smart wallet, where all the information about the payee and the payer is encrypted and managed by code-based conditions. This action protects the system against this type of attack. |
Cold wallet theft attack | This attack is used to describe the theft and illegal access to Bitcoin funds kept in offline wallets without an internet connection. Compared to hot wallets, these wallets—also referred to as cold storage wallets—are thought to be a more secure way to store digital assets, since they are less susceptible to hacking attempts. Since cold wallets are not constantly connected to online networks and are therefore less vulnerable to cyberattacks, they are often used for long-term storage or as a backup for significant quantities of cryptocurrency. Cold wallets can still be the target of skilled attackers, though, who may use internal threats, physical theft, social engineering, or other strategies to obtain private keys or recovery seeds linked to the wallet. | First, our system is supported by online usage of the smart wallet; this is the reason that our system is not affected by this asset. |
Investment scam attack | An investment scam attack is a deliberate attempt to trick the payee into giving up his/her money through a fake investment opportunity. Scammers will lure the payee with the promise of high returns and low risks, but their goal is to steal the money. | Through our usage of the smart wallet technique, all the information is saved in a matter that guarantees the rights of all parties. |
Coin age accumulation attack | A mechanism of coin accumulation attack that specifically addresses blockchains that use a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus protocol. In PoS, validators elect new blocks into the blockchain system by using their network stake. PoS typically scales a “coin age”, which reflects the validator’s stake. The coin age combines consideration of both the amount of coins held and how long they have been held. The higher the age of coins (older coin age), the greater the impact on the validation process of the blocks. An attacker earns a lot of coins and keeps them for a long while. This makes them by far the largest contributor to the stakes of the network. | As a result of our use of preprogrammed conditions to control the loan return process and the borrowing system in general, this type of attack can be confronted with ease by setting the period for each currency, which leads to not exceeding it and raising an alarm to warn the system in the case of overtaking. |
Block discarding attack | In this attack, malicious miners control the valid blocks they have mined and withhold them from being broadcast to the entire network. The attacker does not publish the block to the network but just discards it and continues to mine into the block secretly. It gives rise to a concealed fork in the blockchain. Such malicious actors may try to re-use the same coins twice by including the amount in their fork and then broadcasting a conflicting transaction to the main chain. This will lead the attacker to unjustly receive more than the fair amount of the mining pool reward while preventing the timely advancement of the overall mining progress by refusing to hand over blocks. | This type of attack in our proposed system is controlled by our preprepared conditions and controlled using a programming code so that the programming code is written to control time, that is, given a specific time limit to publish the winning block. Thus, control over time manipulation and block hiding is achieved. |
Loan Type | 2024 [25] | 2021 [26] | 2023 [14] | 2017 [27] | 2021 [28] | 2021 [29] | 2023 [30] | Proposed Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Flash loans attacks | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ||||
Hot wallet attack | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ||||
Transaction malleability Attack | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |||||
Cold wallet theft attack | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |||||
Investment scam attack | ✓ | ✓ | ||||||
Coin age accumulation attack | ✓ | ✓ | ||||||
Block discarding attack | ✓ |
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Al-Zubaidie, M.; Jebbar, W.A. Providing Security for Flash Loan System Using Cryptocurrency Wallets Supported by XSalsa20 in a Blockchain Environment. Appl. Sci. 2024, 14, 6361. https://doi.org/10.3390/app14146361
Al-Zubaidie M, Jebbar WA. Providing Security for Flash Loan System Using Cryptocurrency Wallets Supported by XSalsa20 in a Blockchain Environment. Applied Sciences. 2024; 14(14):6361. https://doi.org/10.3390/app14146361
Chicago/Turabian StyleAl-Zubaidie, Mishall, and Wid Alaa Jebbar. 2024. "Providing Security for Flash Loan System Using Cryptocurrency Wallets Supported by XSalsa20 in a Blockchain Environment" Applied Sciences 14, no. 14: 6361. https://doi.org/10.3390/app14146361
APA StyleAl-Zubaidie, M., & Jebbar, W. A. (2024). Providing Security for Flash Loan System Using Cryptocurrency Wallets Supported by XSalsa20 in a Blockchain Environment. Applied Sciences, 14(14), 6361. https://doi.org/10.3390/app14146361