A Proposal for Rapid Assessment of Long-Distance Oil and Gas Pipelines After Earthquakes

Abstract

A substantial proportion of long-distance oil and gas pipelines in China traverse active faults and high-risk areas characterised by intricate topographic and geological environments. These pipelines are susceptible to a range of safety concerns, exacerbated by the increasing frequency of strong earthquakes in recent years. To address this issue, a comprehensive risk investigation framework has been proposed for long-distance oil and gas pipelines following seismic events. This initiative aims to ensure the safety of pipeline transportation. In this paper, the elements of pipeline safety evaluation under the influence of coseismic hazards are first organized, followed by a construction of post-earthquake pipeline safety rapid assessment theoretical framework based on the seismic geological disaster risk evaluation system. Each method in the system is then introduced one by one. Unlike existing studies that predominantly focus on localized fault activity or static risk assessment, our framework introduces three key innovations: (1) a hierarchical integration of multi-source monitoring data (SCADA, UAV-AI, and numerous monitoring devices) into a unified GIS platform, overcoming the fragmentation of existing systems; (2) a dynamic four-step evaluation process (susceptibility → hazard → risk → safety) that incorporates both pre-earthquake geological conditions and post-earthquake real-time triggers (e.g., PGA, rainfall); (3) a novel risk matrix mechanism for pipeline safety, which dynamically updates risk levels based on field monitoring data rather than relying solely on probabilistic models. This study provides a novel theoretical framework for assessing the safety of pipelines after earthquakes, which can provide a timely basis for pipeline management decisions and reduce the potential damage to pipelines caused by earthquakes. It is important to note that this framework is still in a preliminary stage and needs to be continuously deepened and optimised.

1. Introduction

Long-distance oil and gas pipelines, as the most economical and efficient means of transporting crude oil, refined products, and natural gas, hold irreplaceable strategic significance in energy supply [1,2]. Their operational safety is vital to national economic development, social welfare, and defence security, thus being classified as “national lifeline projects” alongside transportation, power grids, and water supply systems. As of now, China’s long-distance pipeline network spans 190,000 km, with trunk pipelines exceeding 100,000 km, and the national natural gas grid achieves a daily supply capacity of over 1 billion cubic meters [3,4].

However, pipeline routing inevitably traverses active faults and geologically complex high-risk zones [5,6]. For instance, the second and third lines of the west–east gas transmission pipeline and the newly built fourth line of the pipeline under the jurisdiction of PipeChina cross a number of seismic fracture zones in Xinjiang and Gansu. The region through which the pipeline passes has active crustal activity, with frequent large and small earthquakes. First, active fault misalignment can directly threaten pipeline safety; in addition, unlike ground shaking parameters that can directly cause damage to buildings [7,8,9,10], the probability of buried oil and gas pipelines being affected by ground shaking is relatively small, and more indirectly, seismic geological hazards can threaten pipeline safety. Moreover, the Yunnan section of the China–Myanmar pipeline intersects three fault zones that historically generated earthquakes above Ms 7, with 18 active faults identified in the vicinity, posing latent risks of surface dislocation triggered by strong seismic events [11,12,13]. Historical cases, such as the 1976 Tangshan earthquake, caused multiple ruptures in the Qinjing oil pipeline, resulting in tens of thousands of tons of crude oil leakage and severe ecological damage [14,15]. These incidents underscore the critical need for rapid post-earthquake safety assessment and emergency response to mitigate disaster impacts.

Currently, pipeline operators in China primarily rely on supervisory control and data acquisition system (SCADA) to monitor operational pressure in real time, with automatic shutdown protocols activated upon anomaly detection [16,17]. However, such systems can only identify direct physical damage caused by earthquakes, failing to assess latent risks from seismic wave impacts, ground displacement, or secondary geohazards (e.g., landslides, bridge collapses) [18]. Existing research predominantly focuses on fault activity and pipeline stress monitoring [13,19], leaving safety evaluation gaps in non-fault zones (e.g., plains, mountainous areas) and lacking a comprehensive post-earthquake assessment framework for entire pipeline networks.

In this paper, the elements of pipeline safety evaluation under the influence of coseismic disaster are firstly established, and then the post-earthquake pipeline safety rapid evaluation system based on the coseismic and geological disaster risk evaluation system is constructed, with each method in the system being introduced in turn. The system constructed in this paper can provide a reference for the construction of oil and gas pipeline safety rapid evaluation system under the influence of earthquake disaster or extreme weather.

2. Analysis of Pipeline Safety Assessment Elements Under Seismic Impacts

2.1. Relationship Between Post-Earthquake Hazards and Pipelines

Seismic impacts on long-distance pipelines can be categorized into direct and indirect mechanisms (Figure 1). Direct damage primarily involves shear/compression failures caused by fault displacement, with severity dependent on the pipeline–fault intersection angle [19]. Cyclic ground motions induced by seismic waves (P- and S-waves) generate abrupt stress concentrations at pipeline joints (flanges, welded connections), leading to structural failure. Indirect effects arise from seismic-induced geotechnical instability: in mountainous areas, ground shaking reduces soil cohesion and internal friction angles or promotes rock fracture propagation, ultimately triggering landslides and collapses. These hazards may bury pipelines, induce suspended spans, or impose excessive lateral pressures, escalating post-event deformation risks. Additionally, seismic damage to ancillary structures (e.g., bridges, tunnels) can propagate to pipelines—for instance, bridge displacements exceeding the tolerance of pipeline expansion joints may cause tensile fractures [5]. Studies indicate that fault activity and seismic landslides dominate pipeline safety risks [19], with other factors posing relatively minor threats.

2.2. Pipeline Monitoring Device System Sorting

In recent years, the management of long-distance oil and gas pipelines, represented by the National Pipeline Group, has paid more and more attention to the geological safety of pipelines. The SCADA system can monitor the pipeline transport pressure for a long time and can provide automatic warning and decision-making on stopping transmission according to abnormal pressure conditions. Meanwhile, according to the relevant specification [20], the pipeline management will hire a professional team to carry out a geo-disaster survey on the pipeline once every 3–8 years and will deploy monitoring equipment or carry out treatment at the verified geological disaster hidden spots (unstable slopes, active faults, etc.).

The monitoring systems can be categorised as internal or external based on the interrelationship of the monitoring data with the pipe (

Table 1. Monitoring elements along the pipeline. (Modified from [20]).

The Interrelationship of the Monitoring Data with the Pipeline	Monitoring Content
Internal monitoring	Pipeline corrosion monitoring
	Transport pressure monitoring
External monitoring	Pipe deformation monitoring	Pipe stress/strain
		Pipe displacement
	Pipeline collateral monitoring	Accompanying fibre optic cable temperature
		Accompanying fibre optic cable strains
	Natural disaster monitoring	Surface displacement
		Deep displacement
		Surface crack monitoring
		Others
	Structural monitoring of prevention engineering	Deformation of buildings and structures
		Structural cracks.
		Others
	Pipe–soil interaction monitoring

). Internal monitoring focuses on pipeline corrosion and operational pressure, with the former mitigating chemical leakage risks and the latter enabling real-time anomaly alerts and shutdown protocols via SCADA systems. External monitoring is mainly divided according to the monitoring objects, namely, pipeline deformation monitoring, pipeline appurtenant monitoring, disaster point monitoring, control engineering structure monitoring, and pipe–soil interaction monitoring. In addition, the pipeline management is equipped with tools such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which can perform automated inspections along the pipeline on a daily basis, thereby identifying anomalies such as third-party engineering activities.

It should be noted that Table 1 primarily presents the monitoring equipment system under the framework of daily pipeline safety management. For the rapid evaluation of pipeline safety under the influence of earthquakes, greater attention should be paid to the monitoring system that can reflect the direct and indirect safety of pipelines in time. Therefore, based on Table 1 and the actual pipeline management monitoring content, the monitoring system division for rapid evaluation of pipeline safety under earthquake disaster (shown in Figure 2) is constructed. First, according to the monitoring scope, it can be divided into whole-line monitoring and single point monitoring. Here, there are two types of whole-line monitoring, SCADA and UAV monitoring, which can be used to quickly identify, locate, and alarm the pipe damage and surface disaster in the whole line of the seismic area. In addition, single point monitoring can be divided into monitoring of geological-disaster points, monitoring of engineering activities, and monitoring of deformation of ancillary structures. The first two types are required to monitor the stability of the geotechnical body and the pipeline body, i.e., early warning for the direct safety of the pipeline, as well as the pipeline deformation. The first two types are required to carry out geotechnical stability monitoring and pipe body monitoring, which provide early warnings for the direct safety of the pipelines, as well as for potential indirect impact on pipeline safety due to geotechnical hazards.

In addition, when the pipeline crossing project is located in the area where the peak ground acceleration (PGA) of basic earth tremor is 0.3 g and 0.4 g, it is appropriate to implement the stress/strain monitoring of the pipe body or the structural monitoring of the crossing project [21].

2.3. Pipeline Engineering Project Attribute Sorting

According to the different transport media, oil and gas pipelines can be divided into crude oil pipelines, refined oil pipelines, and natural gas pipelines, and there are differences in the diameters, thicknesses, materials, and other elements of pipelines for different transport media [22,23]. In addition, unlike the buried laying in the plains, the pipeline laying project in the mountainous river valley section is more complicated, considering the spatial relationship between the river valley and the pipeline direction, the pipeline laying method in the river valley area can be divided into two categories: parallel river valley direction laying and cross-cutting river valley direction laying (Figure 3). The detailed standards and schematics of the division can be referred to [5,24]. It is worth noting that there is a significant difference in the susceptibility to geological hazards considering different pipeline laying methods, where the method of pipeline cross-slope laying is the most prone to slope stability issues, whereas the method of tunnel traversing and crossing is generally free of adverse geological issues. Therefore, the pipeline engineering project situation needs to be properly considered in the pipeline seismic safety evaluation.

3. Overall Design of the Assessment Methodology Theoretical Framework

Based on the previous elements of pipeline seismic hazard evaluation, monitoring equipment along the pipeline, and pipeline engineering projects, the overall demand for pipeline safety assessment under seismic hazards, as well as the available monitoring data and pipeline engineering information, can be determined. As a result, a hierarchical diagram for the application of post-earthquake pipeline safety evaluation can be designed as shown in Figure 4, and the evaluation methods can be divided into a background layer, a data input layer, and a result output layer:

①

First of all, according to the pipeline route, it is necessary to collect basic background data such as geology, topography, geomorphology, hydrology, vegetation, roads, etc., along the pipeline route. Additionally, the project should be divided into segments based on the actual construction of the pipeline and basic information such as seismic defences should be collated. Furthermore, the laying method should be determined based on the relationship of the pipeline route and the topography and geomorphology. Lastly, information such as the location, type, and interrelationship of the monitoring equipment and pipeline should be recorded. In addition, it is also necessary to record the location, type, and interrelationship of monitoring equipment with pipelines, etc., and establish a data transmission system.

②

Then, when an earthquake occurs, the data input layer needs to receive ground vibration parameter data from the China Earthquake Networks Center (CENC), rainfall data from the China Meteorological Administration (CMA), oil and gas pressure data from the national pipeline network’s own SCADA platform, and the monitoring and warning level of the equipment along the pipeline.

③

Finally, the system needs to process the information in the background layer and the dynamic data input layer. It should quickly output information such as oil and gas pressure anomalies, fault misalignment, and the direct impact of seismic waves on pipeline safety. Additionally, the system should evaluate the indirect impact of seismic waves on geotechnical stability and secondary geological hazards caused by pipeline ancillary structures. Finally, it should provide seismic damage evaluation information for the entire pipeline in the earthquake zone in the result output layer.

In addition, in conjunction with Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4, the post-earthquake pipeline safety evaluation methods are categorized into monitoring-based and assessment-based approaches (Figure 5a). Monitoring methods directly reflect hazard occurrences through real-time data, such as SCADA pressure anomalies or UAV-detected surface cracks. Assessment methods indirectly predict risks via probabilistic models (e.g., coseismic landslide hazard analysis). Crucially, seismic events do not necessarily cause pipeline failure (e.g., landslides may only induce pipeline suspension). Thus, only the pressure anomalies monitored by the pipeline SCADA system and the pipe body monitoring and warning are the most direct indicators of pipeline safety.

Building on the monitoring-assessment classification in Figure 5a, this study proposes a five-dimensional post-earthquake pipeline safety evaluation system (Figure 5b):

(1)

SCADA Pressure Anomaly Analysis: utilizes dedicated SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems to precisely locate abnormal pipeline sections through full-network pressure data analysis, triggering automatic shutdown protocols. Limitation: only detects explicit damages, failing to assess latent threats.

(2)

Point-Specific Monitoring Alerts: generates direct/indirect safety warnings using data from installed devices (e.g., stress gauges, displacement sensors). Limitation: spatial coverage gaps exist due to uneven device distribution.

(3)

Seismic Geohazard Risk Assessment: quantifies impacts of earthquake-induced hazards (e.g., landslides, fault displacement) on pipelines via coupled geological-seismic engineering models, representing the current dominant evaluation paradigm.

(4)

Ancillary Structure Seismic Verification: Rapidly evaluates structural safety by comparing design-based seismic fortification standards with real-time ground motion parameters (e.g., PGA). Despite deviations between design thresholds and actual failure criteria, this method provides baseline risk assessment for unmonitored segments.

(5)

UAV-AI Collaborative Recognition: employs UAV patrol systems equipped with high-resolution cameras and 5G transmission to dynamically identify geohazards (e.g., cracks, collapsed masses) in video streams through deep learning algorithms, achieving minute-level disaster detection.

In summary, the current monitoring tools for oil and gas pipelines are indeed more comprehensive, but they are mostly separate and not integrated into a structured pipeline safety assessment system. In addition, Figure 5 also shows that there is a complementary relationship between different assessment methods and monitoring tools, the simplest and most direct example being that seismic geological disaster risk assessment is more comprehensive but does not reflect the in situ monitoring data along the pipeline. Therefore, the oil and gas pipeline SCADA system can be used to provide direct feedback on pipeline safety for the entire pipeline transport pressure anomaly section, single point monitoring anomaly, and other information elements. At the same time, the data can be fed back into the follow-up process of seismic and geological disaster risk assessment, which can be adjusted or corrected for the geohazard risk, and the accuracy can be improved while ensuring the completeness of the assessment results (dotted line in Figure 5b). The final implementation is the presentation of pipeline safety assessment results based on geographical information system (GIS).

The process of post-earthquake pipeline safety evaluation is therefore constructed on the basis of pipeline seismic geological hazard risk evaluation, superimposed on multi-source monitoring data, as illustrated in Figure 6. The method comprises four constituent parts. Firstly, the relationship between historical landslide hazard points and static background elements along the pipeline is analysed. This is done in order to assess the possibility of geological hazards along the pipeline under the influence of geological conditions and human engineering activities. This is also known as the evaluation of the susceptibility to landslide geohazards. Secondly, the results of the susceptibility to geohazards are combined with the triggering factors, mainly seismic elements, to assess the possibility of seismic events. Subsequently, the results of geological disaster susceptibility are combined with the triggering factors, mainly seismic elements, to assess the possibility of seismic geological disasters under the action of seismic factors, i.e., the evaluation of seismic landslide disaster risk. Finally, the seismic geological disaster risk is combined with the vulnerability of pipeline engineering to assess the possibility of pipelines being damaged by seismic geological disasters, i.e., the evaluation of seismic geological disaster risk of pipelines is then conducted. Finally, the results of pipeline operation pressure, pipeline monitoring, disaster monitoring, structural monitoring, etc., are combined with the pipeline seismic geological disaster. The evaluation results of pipeline operation pressure, pipeline body monitoring, disaster monitoring, structural monitoring and other elements are then combined with the pipeline seismic geological hazard risk, and the risk level is adjusted to achieve the final safety assessment.

4. Post-Earthquake Pipeline Safety Assessment Based on Coseismic Landslides

As previously stated, the impact of seismic chain-generated geological hazards on pipelines is primarily reflected in the impact of seismic landslides [25,26,27,28,29]. Consequently, this paper proposes a post-earthquake pipeline safety evaluation that prioritises the assessment of pipeline risk, as influenced by multi-source monitoring data, in the context of seismic landslides.

4.1. Coseismic Landslide Susceptibility Assessment Along Pipelines

As illustrated in Figure 7, the landslide vulnerability assessment process along the pipeline is as follows. Firstly, the susceptibility of landslide geological hazards along the pipeline must be evaluated based on the previous landslide disaster points and the static factors along the pipeline (geology, topography, water system, and other elements). That is to say, the possibility of geological conditions along the pipeline and the elements of human engineering activities that will breed geological hazards must be determined. At this stage, intelligent methods such as the machine learning model [10,26,27,28,29,30,31,32] can be employed to identify disaster points, while conventional means can also be utilised. The statistical analysis models, such as the information value (IV) and weight of evidence (WOE) models, are then compared to ascertain the accuracy of the results obtained from different models (ROC, kappa, ACC, etc.). This enables a more precise determination of the susceptibility to coseismic landslides.

4.2. Coseismic Landslide Hazard Assessment Along Pipelines

In light of the imperative for rapid post-earthquake pipeline safety evaluation results, it is recommended to employ the composite index method to ascertain the coseismic landslide hazard risk along the pipeline route. The composite index model constitutes a comprehensive measurement method that evaluates the values of each evaluation index (coseismic landslide susceptibility results, ground vibration parameters, rainfall, etc.) using a weighted sum to evaluate the study objectives. The composite index model is as follows:

$$G={\displaystyle \sum _{i=1}^{\mathrm{m}}{w}_i{G}_{ij}}$$

(1)

where G is the composite index of the final element; w_i is the weight value of the ith indicator; G_ij is the quantitative score of the jth subcategory of the ith indicator; m is the number of evaluation indicators.

As demonstrated in Figure 8, the utilisation of the comprehensive index model as an evaluation method necessitates the initial determination of the evaluation element indicators, which are derived from historical coseismic landslide data. Subsequently, the weights of each indicator are calculated through the application of expert scoring, the hierarchical analysis method, machine learning, and other methodologies [10,25,26,27,28,29]. The grading and quantitative scoring of the evaluation indicators assignments are then carried out, and the indicator weights and assignments are adjusted in combination with historical data to ensure they meet the accuracy requirements for subsequent evaluation. In the event of an earthquake, the real-time data are processed and combined with the weights and assignments of the indicators of each element as determined in advance. These are then brought into the comprehensive index method model for calculation to obtain the results of coseismic landslide hazard evaluation.

4.3. Pipeline Coseismic Landslide Risk Assessment

Pipeline risk assessment under the influence of the coseismic landslide needs to integrate the results of the coseismic landslide hazard and the vulnerability of the disaster carrier (long-distance oil and gas pipeline). The core risk evaluation formula is R = E × H × V, where R is the risk, E is the carrier, and V is the vulnerability.

4.3.1. Pipeline Coseismic Landslide Vulnerability Evaluation System

In this section, the vulnerability of pipelines to coseismic landslides refers to the likelihood of damage to oil and gas pipelines in mountainous areas due to coseismic landslide hazards. This is mainly defined as the likelihood of damage to the pipe itself under the influence of the pipe’s own condition and engineering protection measures, among other factors.

The evaluation of pipeline vulnerability under the influence of coseismic landslides consists of two steps (Figure 9). Firstly, the elements of the pipeline must be determined, including the transport medium, the pipe material, and the pipe diameter, in order to calculate the pipeline’s vulnerability. Furthermore, as previously mentioned (Figure 3), there are discrepancies in the pipeline engineering involved in different locations, including instances such as pipeline crossing over valley bridges and laying across slope crossings. Additionally, there are variations in the pipeline’s capacity to resist the effects of coseismic landslides in different scenarios. Consequently, the subsequent stage of vulnerability evaluation involves the consideration of the influence of pipeline engineering based on the vulnerability of the pipeline body, with the objective of obtaining the vulnerability results of the pipeline under the influence of coseismic landslides.

4.3.2. Risk Assessment Considering Pipeline Vulnerability

In order to calculate the risk for pipelines under the influence of coseismic landslides, it is necessary to assign values to the coseismic landslide hazard zone and the vulnerability of coseismic landslide pipelines in the zoning calculation. The hazard evaluation zoning results from very low hazard zone, low hazard zone, medium hazard zone, high hazard zone, and very high hazard zone are assigned as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, respectively; the vulnerability evaluation zoning results from low vulnerability zone, lower vulnerability zone, medium vulnerability zone, higher vulnerability zone, and high vulnerability zone are assigned as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, respectively, and the risk is derived by calculating the product of the hazard and vulnerability values. Finally, the results of the risk calculations are graded according to the risk matrix (Figure 10), with values of 1, 2, and 3 classified as low risk; 4 and 6 as low risk; 5, 8, and 9 as medium risk; 10, 12, and 16 as high risk; and 15, 20, and 25 as very high risk.

4.4. Pipeline Safety Assessment with Combined Elements

Comprehensive assessment of pipeline safety after an earthquake refers to the combination of the evaluation results of pipeline operating pressure, pipe monitoring, geological hazard monitoring, structural monitoring, and other elements described in the previous section with the pipeline coseismic landslide risk results to adjust the risk level (Figure 11). Using this method, it is possible to integrate multiple sources of monitoring data along the pipeline based on the pipeline coseismic landslide risk evaluation results, without affecting the safety results from a single point element, as well as to directly reflect the results of different data sources in the risk results (Figure 12). In order to comprehensively (from point to line) and realistically reflect the post-earthquake pipeline safety situation, this method helps pipeline managers make appropriate adjustments to the pipeline operation status.

5. Limitations and Outlook

This study constitutes an initial exploration into the intricate relationship between seismic hazards and oil and gas pipelines, the prevailing monitoring systems, and pipeline engineering attributes. It subsequently proposes a comprehensive methodology for the evaluation of pipeline safety, encompassing a novel post-earthquake evaluation technique for long-distance oil and gas pipelines. This system integrates the results of multi-source monitoring data based on pipeline seismic geological disaster risk evaluation, and it can realise risk level adjustment based on field data. However, this study is still in the preliminary construction stage; it lacks empirical validation through real-world test results or comparisons with past earthquake events, and there are still many detailed issues that need to be deepened:

①

Firstly, how to ensure the accuracy and timeliness of various types of monitoring data in the practical application of the evaluation method and how to better integrate the data from different sources.

②

The second issue pertains to the evaluation criteria for pipeline vulnerability to coseismic landslides, which is contingent on the pipeline’s laying method. The parameter determination and model optimisation in the evaluation model require additional data support and practical validation.

③

Thirdly, the application of the theoretical framework presented in this paper to regions with different geology and seismic intensity needs to be refined. For example, it is important to highlight the differences between mountains and plains, and active and inactive fault zones.

By solving the issues mentioned above, it is possible to continually refine the theoretical framework presented in this paper. A more perfect pipeline safety evaluation data platform can then be established to achieve efficient collection, transmission, storage and analysis of various types of data, providing a solid data foundation for the evaluation method. Building a rapid assessment system for oil and gas pipeline safety will further enhance the evaluation process. Concurrently, efforts should be directed towards the advancement of practical research on oil and gas pipelines in diverse regions and configuration types. This endeavour aims to facilitate the continual enhancement of the evaluation system, thereby ensuring its elevated scientific rigor and operational efficiency. These efforts are imperative to ensure optimal resilience against the threats posed by seismic hazards to the secure and reliable operation of oil and gas pipelines. Furthermore, this research is essential for safeguarding the seamless functioning of these pipelines in the presence of natural disasters such as earthquakes.

6. Conclusions

In this paper, a theoretical framework for a post-earthquake rapid evaluation method for long-distance oil and gas pipeline safety is initially constructed by sorting out the relevant elements of long-distance oil and gas pipeline engineering and seismic disasters. The main conclusions are as follows:

(1)

The elements of pipeline safety evaluation under the influence of seismic disasters are identified, and it is concluded that fault activities and coseismic landslides in seismic disasters are most likely to affect pipeline safety. There are many monitoring devices along the pipeline, but they have not yet formed a unified system, and it is not possible to realise the safety evaluation of the whole pipeline. Pipeline engineering in mountainous sections is more complicated, with varying resistance to geological disasters. Therefore, a comprehensive evaluation of post-earthquake pipeline safety is necessary.

(2)

The application level and evaluation means of the post-earthquake pipeline safety rapid evaluation system are divided, and based on this, a four-step evaluation process system of susceptibility evaluation, hazard rating, risk evaluation, and safety evaluation is proposed for the post-earthquake pipeline safety rapid evaluation, which can realise the comprehensive theoretical framework of multi-source data.

(3)

The steps and processes of the post-earthquake pipeline safety rapid evaluation method are organized and introduced, and the general structure is outlined, providing a framework for the integration of multi-source data, which can realise the rapid assessment of post-earthquake pipeline risk and the adjustment of pipeline risk level based on real-time data. This enables rapid assessment of post-earthquake pipeline risk and the adjustment of pipeline risk level based on real-time data. This, in turn, can provide timely decision-making basis for pipeline management and reduce the potential damages caused by earthquakes to the pipelines.

It is important to note that this study is still in the preliminary construction framework stage and requires continuous deepening and optimisation. The subsequent study can aim to establish a more perfect data platform for pipeline safety evaluation to achieve efficient collection, transmission, storage, processing. and analysis of various types of data, providing a more solid data foundation for the evaluation method. Concurrently, the practical application research on different regions and types of oil and gas pipelines should be strengthened to continuously optimise the evaluation system and improve its scientificity and practicality.