How Does Multiverse Proposal Affect the Design Argument?

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

This article makes a  small point in a very complicated way.  The basic thrust of the article is that under certain scenarios/assumptions the multiverse can support the Design Argument (DA) for the existence of God, rather than be a naturalistic challenge to the existence of God. But the argument seems circular.

The author states "

1. a theistic multiverse is more  probable than a naturalistic multiverse 

2. God has reasons not to create multiverse.

The author then proceeds to show how these assumptions can be incorporated into a formula which ends up increasing the strength of the multiverse DA for God.    Since the article seems be exclusively focused on the significance of these scenarios for the DA, these should be unpacked.  The first one seems trivial. Obviously assuming that would make the DA stronger.  There are reasons why the multiverse needs additional fine tuning so that argument--covered very briefly--should be expanded. The second one seems ambiguous.  What are these "reasons" God would have NOT to create a multiverse? Are they significant?  Are they greater or less than the reasons God would have TO create a multiverse?    My second concern relates to the use of Francis Collins as a reference. Collins training is entirely in the biological sciences.  He has no special insights in either theology or cosmology and speaks as a Christian layperson in those fields.  I recommend getting a reference like John Polkinghorne or Robert Russell with scholarly credentials in relevant areas.  

Author Response

Thanks for the comments. I have expanded the introduction section to describe more about the multiverse proposal. More references have been added. Also, more details and descriptions in prose form have been added to illustrate the two scenarios presented. The reference Francis Collins has been deleted as suggested. Many more references have been added, including the one from the cosmologist Luke Barnes. The revised content is highlighted for easy reference. 

Reviewer 2 Report

The English text needs minor editing

Author Response

Thanks for the comments. Editing of English has been done.

Reviewer 3 Report

"How does the multiverse proposal affect the design argument?" examines the standard contention that the multiverse hypothesis would undermine the fine tuning version of the design argument for the existence of God. The fine tuning argument starts from the existence of a small set of constants in our current best versions of what are taken to be the fundamental laws of physics. It has been shown that if the values for these constants varied even a small amount, then the resulting laws of nature would preclude basic elements -- like the formation of stable atoms -- needed for the universe to be capable of sustaining life. These values, according to our current best understanding, arise with a degree of randomness in symmetry-breaking events early in the history of the universe. The chances that these values lie in the Goldilocks zone (not too much, not too little, but just right) is quite small. Hence, the argument concludes that the hypothesis that the universe was designed by an intelligent Creator is more likely than the chance that it arose randomly.

A naturalistic objection to the fine tuning argument comes from a recent cosmological hypothesis -- the multiverse hypothesis or bubble bath hypothesis -- wherein the big bang that launched our universe is not unique, but happened many many times giving rise to a whole host of universes (like bubbles in a bubble bath) each of which break-symmetry in their own way, creating a range of universes each governed by different laws. The overwhelming majority of these will be incapable of supporting matter, much less life. But, if you play the lottery long enough, the argument goes, you will eventually be holding the winning numbers. As bubble universes pop up and work themselves out, eventually, you will hit one (or more) in the Goldilocks zone. So, we can accept that the odds of a given universe being able to support life is infinitesmally tiny, but still posit a naturalistic explanation why this one has us in it. We get life in a fine tuned universe with no need for a supernatural Creator.

This paper seeks to argue that the bubble bath cosmological picture does not necessarily do what its naturalistic advocates claim. The multiverse does not necessarily eliminate the place of a Creator. Just as the multiverse argument advocates begin by accepting the premises of the design argument advocates, so too this author begins by accepting the premises of the multiverse argument against fine tuning. The contention is that the argument is well-grounded, but is not valid, viz., the premises do not undermine fine tuning as advertised. The claim is not that either side deductively proves the existence or non-existence of God, but rather, that we can provide a conceptual framework whose narrative about Creation would include both the multiverse and a Divine Creator. Moreover (and this is the important part that is the heart of this paper), when we take a Bayesian approach to scientific evidence, the new narrative framework in which God created a multiverse can be seen to positively effect the posterior probability of having our universe come into being.

Note that the result in this paper is an intentionally weak one. This is not meant to denigrate the paper. I am not saying the argument is weak, but rather that the conclusion is quite proscribed. The author is only arguing that the naturalistic multiverse objection fails to make the case that the naturalistic hypothesis is necessarily more likely than the supernaturalistic one. The author only needs to show that it is possible for the design hypothesis to be more likely given the premises inherent in the multiverse objection.

This is necessary because it is radically unclear -- as the author correctly points out -- how one could go about assigning values to the relevant prior probabilities. All the author needs is that under a reasonable assignment of what could be a perfectly possible set of valuations, Bayes' theorem provides us with a higher probability in the case of a Divine Creator. Again, the author is not contending that the multiverse objection completely fails against the design argument, rather that there is the possibility that the multiverse theory along with a particular supernaturalistic narrative could, in some cases, be more likely.  Showing that means that the naturalistic multiverse objection is not a knock-down argument.

In this limited goal, the author is successful. With a straightforward derivation of the effects of dependent factors as we have in this case, the result is a posterior probability that might be increased by the possibility of a supernatural Creator. This, of course, would not impress the naturalistic objectors who would contend that the case painted is concocted to have the result derived. But the argument, again, is a weak one. The argument is not contending that this is or is likely to be the case, but if it were, it would have results that would be uncomfortable for the naturalist. In that, the author succeeds.

I recommend this article be published in the current form.

Author Response

Thanks for the positive comments. I have added more content to describe my ideas explicitly. 

Round 2

Reviewer 1 Report

The additional text has greatly improved this articles.  I suggest one addition.  Instead of simply saying "infinity does not imply all options as we can see from the infinity of odd numbers that does not give us an even number"  (my paraphrase) I would add something empirically based.  For example "If there is a constraint on the charge of an electron that keeps it always ten times greater than its present value, we can have an infinity of different universes but none will have the electron charge in the goldilocks zone."  

Author Response

Thanks for the suggestion. I have added the suggested example in the article (the sentences highlighted).