2. The Meaning and Future of Catholic Church–State Relations in Transitions
It is becoming increasingly clear that transitions in Catholic Church–State relations are happening for a variety of reasons that are both negative and often beyond the institution’s control. Demographers point out the influence of population growth and movements, as well as a loss of Church membership in states historically considered as Catholic strongholds. The Pew Research Center reports that, in 2010, 24% of all Catholics resided in Europe, 39% lived in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the rest were spread unevenly around the world (
Liu 2013). But, significantly, their statistics a decade later show that by 2020 the share of the entire populace identifying as Catholic had declined and that the largest shift in regional population growth occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, the Asia-Pacific region, and North America (Ibid.).
While these demographic shifts reflect potential transitions in Catholic Church–State relations, they also represent new challenges and opportunities to create different inter-actions between the sacred and the secular in the future. These include the need for the Church to counter the civil, social, and political values that compete with its moral teachings and doctrines, especially on matters such as abortion and traditional marriage in areas where it has been the only major actor in the past. At the same time, changing demographics also represent positive opportunities for the Church to pursue greater religious outreach in new geographic regions to gain converts and to evangelize for moral policies such as peace and social justice. Thus, demographics can potentially play either a transformative or negative role in Church–State relations if the Church pursues a more vigorous type of political engagement in states where it is encountering waning religious and social influence. By doing this, Catholicism could also have the moral potential to impact areas such as India, China, and especially Africa, as mentioned in the article by Iheanacho about the South African hierarchy in this journal.
Another cause for a transition in Catholic Church–State relations has occurred in the twenty-first century due to challenges from materialism, pluralism, and multiculturalism. The Church has recognized these movements as a major competitor for moral relevance and social power in the world, especially since new secular activism places a modern emphasis on human rights, diversity, and inclusion. These are issues where the Church has often been late to adapt and inculcate its theology into support for modern approaches to advance needed changes in political policies and practices for the marginalized. The papers by Mott and Madera highlight the challenges of LGBTQ+ peoples as well as the struggles of divorced and re-married Catholics. Although ideological challenges from liberalism and new notions of progressivism were seminal Church concerns when Pope Benedict XVI was elected to the highest Church office in 2005, he recounted in his memoirs that when he came into the Papacy, he was concerned with modern crises in faith, trust, liberalism, a shattered catechesis, and a lack of confidence in the morality proposed by the Church (for examples, see:
Ratzinger and Messori 1966;
Benedict and Seewald 1997). He attempted to confront these issues during his tenure as Pope, but these and other subsequent Church actions have not yet been sufficient to stem the tide of secular social and political gains being made around the world, often to the detriment of advancing Catholic moral guidance.
Researchers have also maintained that the reason for the transition in Church state relations is due to the devastation of the Church’s reputation resulting from the civil investigations and the festering effects of clerical sexual abuse. In 2002, when the scandal broke in the United States, it appeared to the Vatican that the matter was simply an aberration of priestly behavior and a grave
sin. However, early warnings by certain religious investigators proved that it was neither a national, transitory, nor moral transgression. They claimed that clerical sexual abuse would not disappear over time, and that it would eventually cost the Church millions of dollars in financial settlements (
Doyle et al. 1985; For further information see:
Formicola 2014). Meanwhile, civil investigations also revealed other aspects of the
criminal nature of predatory priestly behavior and called for Church transparency, accountability, and changes in civil law to adjudicate clergy. Thus, distrust among Church adherents, civil authorities, and the public continue to play a part in calling for a transition of Catholic Church–State relations to protect children. This is still the case, as pointed out in the article by Zambrana-Tévar.
These warnings went unheeded by John Paul II, the Pope at the time. Joaquin Navarro Valls, the Pope’s official spokesman, revealed after the pontiff’s death that he did not recognize either the nature or scope of the tragedy (
McElwee 2014). Instead, under his leadership, and that of subsequent popes and members of the hierarchy, Church authorities continued to treat clerical sexual abuse as a sin of impurity rather than a civil crime (
Final Communique 2002). This religious interpretation of predatory priestly behavior as a moral transgression encouraged Church leaders to implement a variety of religious responses to quell the global demands for the civil punishment of predatory priests and instances of hierarchical cover-ups (
Formicola 2004).
State investigations, rather than internal scrutiny by the Churches themselves, brought out the truth of the severity of the crisis, the lack of Vatican transparency, and the need for the Church to accept accountability for criminal, predatory priestly behavior. As a result, a massive distrust of Church officials by civil authorities, the Catholic laity, and the public occurred. Their subsequent demands for the protection of children over the reputation of the Church has since led to the Vatican’s loss of moral credibility and its ability to serve as a moral guide in the geopolitical arena (
Formicola 2019, pp. 129–59).
While there are many other reasons to explain the transition between Catholic Church–State relations, lagging changes and reforms of canon law coupled with ineffective papal directives have also hampered the development of a new paradigm in the legal constructs and jurisprudence between civil and ecclesiastical law. The history of these changes has been well-documented here by Eichbauer and show the continued need for change and reform. Around the world, the increasing influence and power of civil authorities over the leadership and policies of the popes and the Holy See have been compromised by the rejection of religious exemptions and privileges granted to the Catholic Church over the management and supervision of its clergy for the last two millennia.
This includes the Church’s historical right to maintain the personnel records of the clergy and the disposition of their religious information. It also requires the Church to adapt its theology and social doctrines to a new legal model that incorporates a collegial, secular, and progressive managerial system to supervise and sanction the religious responsibilities of the clergy without the right of the Church to be involved in the criminal procedures and punishments for their clerical sexual abuse.
These reasons for transitions in Catholic Church–State relations, generally then, reflect secular challenges from materialism, pluralism, and multiculturalism. The Church has seen its major competitor for relevance and power from new progressive movements that emphasize human rights, social justice, diversity, and inclusion—issues that have both moral and political implications. They require the Church to adapt its theology and social doctrines to a new paradigm that is becoming increasingly secular and progressive, with specific social demands that deal with life and death issues, marriage, education, immigration, social justice needs, human rights, and international affairs. These matters have, therefore, tilted the human as well as the political equation between Church and State, one in which the historical dynamic between the traditionally powerful, institutional, Catholic political influence is being challenged by activists with overwhelming and new civil concerns. The hope for the Church to answer these concerns in a positive way, however, can be seen in the article by Radwan and Alfani, who argue that sacred communications can help to solve this problem.
A synthesis of developing trends in Catholic Church–State relations reveals specific movements that can shed light on the transition that is occurring. The first is the significance of the growing supremacy of civil law over ecclesiastical law around the globe. This shows shifts in the power equation between civil and ecclesiastical law and reflects the Church’s loss of control over vital aspects of its governance in many countries it once dominated. A second theme is the urgent need for the Church to adapt and incorporate papal priorities and values into renewed pastoral agendas and policies. They must recognize social and political realities, or the Church will face a policy paralysis and inability to rebuild its former religious and political influence. A third trend is the need for the Catholic leadership to provide more vigorous attention and respect to often over-looked minorities. New types of activism, writings, and challenges must be recognized and answered. Fourth, there is an ever-growing need to provide greater pastoral and political outreach to new regions of the world, to counter corruption, and provide activism for democracy and hope for peace.
New insights into how these secular challenges to religious doctrines around the world are at the base of an increasing international, political transition in Catholic Church–State relations can also lead to new questions. For example, how can the Church reposition itself to regain its moral integrity in the world and, in turn, provide greater political influence as a global advocate for peace, social justice, and human rights? The answers are beyond difficult, and perhaps there are only proximate solutions to insolvable problems as Reinhold Niebuhr, the American theologian and ethicist, wrote when examining democratic governance, politics, and public affairs (
Niebuhr 1944).
A first step, however, for the Catholic Church to regain its moral and political credibility in Church–State relations would be to recognize its precarious geopolitical position and the role that reform of its own internal organization can play in re-creating trust in its institutions. Pope Benedict XVI recognized this almost three decades ago. He wrote:
Catholic faith reduced to mere baggage, to a collection of rules and prohibitions, to fragmented devotional practices, to selective and partial adherence to the truths of the faith, to occasional participation in some sacraments, to the repetition of doctrinal principles, to bland or nervous moralizing, that does not convert the life of the baptized [and] would not withstand the trials of time. Our greatest danger is the gray pragmatism of the daily life of the church in which everything apparently continues normally, but [is] in reality, being consumed and falling into meanness.
These admonitions, however, went largely unheeded until now. Pope Francis is keenly aware of this, but has had only mixed success in trying to implement needed bureaucratic changes that could set the stage for improved administrative attitudes by members of the Holy See. In his first Christmas address to the hierarchy (
Francis 2014), Pope Francis criticized the ecclesiastical establishment for its “warped pathology” of clerical power, for succumbing to the temptations of its positions, and yielding to a spiritual type of Alzheimer’s disease. This was the beginning of his emphasis on the need to change the ingrained attitude of hierarchical superiority into one based on humility and healing.
This warning later appeared in papal directives from Pope Francis that instituted vigorous investigations into alleged spiritual transgressions as well as greater religious scrutiny into the criminal activities of Vatican officials. The most significant of these investigations into religious, rather than civil, crimes included the re-opening of the case against Cardinal Theodore McCarrick, the highest-ranking Church official in the United States.
There had been rumors and previous allegations of his sexual abuse of seminarians leading to his eventual removal from ministry by the Archdiocese of New York. Pope Benedict also imposed sanctions on him that required McCarrick be sent to a monastery to repent for his sins. He was forbidden to say Mass in public, give lectures, or travel. However, McCarrick reappeared at the Vatican sometime later, giving advice to the new pope, Francis, and telling members of the hierarchy that he would be representing the Pope on a diplomatic mission. This was revealed by a former Church dignitary (
Archbishop Carlo Maria Vigano 2018), who claimed that Pope Francis was aware of the sanctions against McCarrick: a revelation that caused a major scandal within Vatican circles. Eventually Pope Francis excommunicated McCarrick from the Church, while the whistleblower in this case called for Francis’ resignation.
The fall-out from this case led Pope Francis to institute a probe into the entire ecclesiastical promotion process within the Catholic Church. An investigation by the Holy See (
Secretariat of State of the Holy See 2020) yielded a 425-page report that revealed serious deficiencies in the processes used to advance clerics to higher positions within the Church. These substandard and inappropriate practices included cronyism, clandestine hierarchical cover-ups of grave sins, the use of non-disclosure agreements to hide them, the selective applications of canon law, as well as inconsistencies in reports of abuse and power that were often never reported to the Pope. In short, this internal investigation verified institutionalized Church mismanagement in the promotion of members of the hierarchy and continued public distrust in the leadership of its institution.
The case of former Cardinal McCarrick was also going on during the trial of Cardinal George Pell, the highest-ranking religious leader in Australia. His case was the culmination of allegations of the inconsistent handling of financial settlements for clerical sexual abuse victims, historical charges of abuse by the Cardinal himself, and the mishandling of funds of the Vatican Bank. However, Pell was found not guilty of sexual abuse suits based on questionable testimony, but he was removed from his financial post in Rome.
Other cases continue to come to light. In a sexual abuse case in Chile, Pope Francis required a meeting with the hierarchy, received the resignation of each of its Bishops, but only accepted three retirements. Recently, there has also been a civil investigation of the German Bishops Conference revealing that over 3000 cases of clerical sexual abuse had occurred in that country. Part of the overall tragedy of the scrutiny was that the bishops themselves reported on past cover-ups, and implicated the former Pope, Benedict XVI, as being complicit in this scandal. This situation began to fester in 2018 and gained traction while Benedict was in retirement. There was growing evidence of inaction on his part for such predatory crimes when he was the Archbishop of Munich–Freising. The allegations were followed by official denials from the retired pope, then explanations, then the acceptance of his “oversight,” and finally his “heartfelt requests for forgiveness” as late as 2022 (
Benedict 2022).
These types of managerial misconducts of crises emerge daily in the press and are due to papal changes in the nature and scope of procedures carried out by Vatican judicial officials, continually facing scrutiny. The Congregation for the Defense of the Faith (CDF), for example, which deals with religious orthodoxy and sanctions for those who defy it, was reorganized during the last decade under Pope Benedict. He centralized its authority during his 25-year tenure as the Congregation’s prefect prior to his being elected Pope and modernized procedures for the trials of predatory priests. A major revision to canon law was promulgated by Pope John Paul in l983 regarding clerical sexual abuse, and in 2014, piecemeal reforms were instituted in the Church’s legal system by Pope Francis in response to an investigation of the Church’s lack of protection of minors by the United Nations (1363938 (
bishop-accountability.org, accessed on 27 January 2022) (
New Book VI of the Code of Canon Law 2021).
Just recently, however, Pope Francis promulgated
Praedicate evangelium (
Francis 2022), a constitutional reorganization of the Church’s bureaucracy, the Holy See. From a managerial perspective, it is designed to bring about a major change in the service component of that governing body: one that emphasizes the principles and criteria to carry out more focused service to the Pope, fellow bishops, hierarchical conferences, communities, and the world.
1 New operating principles have been put in place with new rules and structures that make up the Roman curia, specifically the Secretariat of State and other offices that serve pope, other officers of the Church, and the international community. Insisting on competence, the document outlines new procedures and regulations for relations with states and international organizations, as well as the Church diplomats who carry out such activities. Theologically, this reform is intended to provide strong Christian witness that in turn will “foster a more effective evangelization to promote a more fruitful ecumenical spirit and… encourage a more constructive dialogue with all”.
2 Evangelization, then, is to be placed at the service of the Church for its growth and collaboration with other religious institutions.
3 It is a task to be accomplished by charity and inter-religious dialogue
4 that is focused on the laity, the family, and life.
5Pragmatically, the document also discusses the intricacies of the judicial workings of the Holy See and its individual tribunals that deal with the administration of justice. This section of the constitutional changes within the Holy See clarifies the responsibilities of each agency in judging religious disputes, appeals, and discipline, as well as its role in protecting the rights of the Church.
6This internal reorganization is extremely significant because as civil investigations into many aspects of the Church’s authority have increased, they have also revealed the antiquated internal mismanagement and corruption within the Church’s infrastructure. This includes its leadership, as well as its judicial processes. This reform offers the Church an opportunity to regain trust in its authority and its commitment to transparent policies for competent accountability for religious actions.
In the past, civil investigations took the lead in scrutinizing the Church infrastructure and provided evidence for those who argued that more vigorous papal oversight, external investigations, and major attempts at internal administrative reforms. They showed that such actions were necessary to bring a sense of credibility back to the institutional Church. Now it appears as though Pope Francis has recognized this, responded, and is finally attempting to bring the antiquated institution into line with its more modern religious responsibilities.
Another step that the Church must make is toward meaningful reform within its own organizational structure to accommodate and assure the integrity of its leadership, management processes, and legal system; it must also listen, take advice, and include the secular concerns of the laity to effect meaningful change.
The people in the pews must have a say in agenda setting, policy development, and decision making within the Church that impacts their daily lives. To do this, the leadership must change from a top-down autocratic organization structure to a bottom-up democratic, inclusive system of governance, particularly one that recognizes the concerns of women, their lack of any appreciable participation in the governance of the Church, or any significant advisory role in making Church policy. New voices that represent lay activism as well as science, the humanities, medicine, politics, and other fields have also been neglected as valuable additions to the creation of papal agendas in the past must and must have the opportunity to bring innovative solutions to policy discussions and decision making. Only then will such input provide a viable means to gain acceptance of the values that will emerge from such inclusive governance.
An inclusive model was attempted, however, unsuccessfully, by Pope Francis in his early handling of the clerical sexual abuse crisis. In 2014 after a United Nations accusation
7 (
United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child 2014)of the Church’s “complicity” in such predatory actions, one of the ways that Pope Francis responded was by establishing the Papal Commission for the Protection of Minors. It was meant to deal with the on-going predatory problem and was headed by Cardinal Sean O’Malley of Boston, a vocal critic of the handling of the crisis in the United States. The Commission consisted of persons who could provide policy options for corrective action to alleviate the festering tragedy. There were members of the clergy and hierarchy on the commission as well as professional advisors, lay persons, and victims of clerical sexual abuse. There were eventually, however, complaints among members of the board about the Vatican’s resistance to accept its recommended changes, prompting the resignation and public accusations of Marie Collins, the Irish activist who had been abused by a priest herself.
After providing educational information and programs to deal with the predatory actions of the clergy, the Commission was given less responsibility. In fact, in 2019, when Pope Francis held a three-day synod of the hierarchy to discuss the still festering matter, Cardinal O’Malley was not even a speaker at the event, only a few victims were allowed to participate, and no specific new vigorous plan was put in place to deal with the protection of minors
Instead, broad religious principles were again re-visited. These included the Church’s aim to hear, watch over, protect, and care for abused, exploited, and forgotten children by rising “above the ideological disputes and journalistic practices that often exploit, for various interests, the very tragedy experienced by the little ones”. (
Francis 2019).
Without accepting any major papal responsibility for clerical sexual abuse or giving an official Church apology for it, Francis suggested, instead, that protecting children with “impeccable seriousness” was the Church’s means to deal with predatory behavior. He called on the leaders of the institution to pursue a path of purification, to continue to question how best to protect children, avoid such tragedies in the future, and bring healing and restoration to the victims. But, there were no specific processes or policies put in place to change such theoretical, theological goals into reality.
One significant point made by Pope Francis, however, was that the Church and others had to engage in meaningful introspection: to learn how to accuse itself, other individuals, institutions, and society, rather than blaming others for the tragedy of sexual abuse. Internally, he called for the development of a balanced process to form candidates for the priesthood with expectations that bishops would serve the Church’s rules, develop new and effective approaches for the prevention of abuse, and apply them to all institutions and in every sphere of ecclesial activity. As for victims, Pope Francis claimed that the Church had the duty to provide them with support and encouraged state authorities to apply every measure possible to contain websites that threaten human dignity, the dignity of women, and particularly the dignity of children. Finally, he reiterated the new grave religious crimes that were approved by Pope Benedict XVI in 2010, requiring sanctions for the “acquisition, possession or distribution by a cleric of pornographic images of minors,” along with the expansion of that age to increase from 14 to 16 to underscore the gravity of these deeds. And finally, going against his own advice, he blamed others and called for an end to sexual tourism.
Clearly, the Church cannot change all the causes of sexual crimes and perversions in the world itself—but it must start with itself. This is how it can begin to achieve moral credibility and to expose, preach, and implement measures that can have a moral impact on policies predicated on meaningful and moral Church–State relations.
The lesson here is that input into Church policy must be viewed from a risk–reward lens of the potential for positive social change. If it can provide hope for those who need solace and solutions to the devastating realities of their lives, then to refuse to accept new ideas or approaches only stymies the purpose of providing moral advocacy in a world where other values increasingly lack respect.
Another step to regain Church credibility and influence is the need to reprioritize the current tactics of its strategic mission. Pope Francis has attempted to do this by basing his religious agenda on the principles expounded in the
Aparecida Documents (
Benedict 2007). They were considered innovative social doctrines in the early 21st century when they were put forth by the Conference of Latin American Bishops (CELAM). At the time, the future pope served as the head of the organization and, in large part, as the author and editor of the document as well. It was a framework to move beyond the institutional mission of the Church toward a renewed spiritual means to transform people with the evangelization of missionary disciples. This invited and gave legitimacy to the outreach of the laity to bring the Christian messages to others rather than simply placing the onus on the pastoral teachings of its leaders.
The thrust of the document was to assess the challenges of modern society that CELAM recognized as having resulted from the erosion of traditions, globalization, and culture; the advances of science and technology, and those democracies without values that marginalize people. At its base, the future pope defended the option for the poor in the work of the Church and its responsibility to engage all its members in evangelization (Ibid). These broad social views have remained his paramount concern in his proposed papal leadership and outreach—a necessity, in his mind, if the Church hopes to carry out relations that will enable it to be a viable and valuable ally for political engagement with civil governments.
One of Pope Francis’ tactics for strategic change in the world could be seen in the issuance of his encyclical
Laudato Si (
Francis 2015). It addressed a broad contemporary moral and political issue that cried out for attention: the environment. He saw it as both a universal threat and challenge that would affect all people, especially the poor. In
Laudato Si, he painted a coming crisis:
We have inflicted on her [the earth] by our irresponsible use and abuse of the goods with which God has endowed her. We have come to see ourselves as her lords and masters, entitled to plunder her at will. The violence present in our hearts, wounded by sin, is also reflected in the symptoms of sickness evident in the soil, in the water, in the air and in all forms of life. This is why the earth herself, burdened and laid waste, is among the most abandoned and maltreated of our poor; she “groans in travail” (Rom 8:22). We have forgotten that we ourselves are dust of the earth (cf. Gen 2:7); our very bodies are made up of her elements, we breathe her air and we receive life and refreshment from her waters.
8
Calling for an “integral ecology,” Francis intended to raise awareness about the interrelationship of humanity’s urgent need to protect its common home, to bring the whole human family together, and to seek a sustainable and integral development.
9 Thus, he stressed critical themes: the intimate relationship between the poor and the fragility of the planet, that everything in the world is connected, the power derived from technology, ways to seek new understandings of the economy and progress, the value of every creature, and the human meaning of ecology.
For Church–State influence, however, Francis stressed the need for forthright and honest debate, that is, the serious responsibility of developing a moral international and local policy regarding the environment. Clearly this was a significant justification for religious engagement and geopolitical influence throughout the world. It showed a move toward a recognition of a universal crisis that went beyond the personal tragedy of sexual abuse and secular demands for greater freedom and tolerance to an issue that touched human concerns on many different levels. It also showed that the Church must be a forward thinker willing to forsake traditional rigidity for its own sake to protect its reputation and to center its efforts around the social and existential needs of others. It also made clear to the public and the Church that to do this, the Pope and the hierarchical organization that governs the institution must continuously re-calibrate its place in the Church–State equation so that it can balance secular concerns with theology as well as pragmatism.
While Pope Francis has been attempting to bring about Church–State changes primarily through Apostolic Constitutions, by which he alone can change the make-up of the congregations or offices of the Holy See,
moto proprios, which are executive directives that can quickly impose policy changes, and encyclicals, which reach the entire world, he must still do more with the enormous power at his disposal. This author has maintained in past periodicals and volumes that Pope Francis’ individual efforts and his imposed policies alone do not and cannot constitute a sufficient response to the sacred–secular transitions that are occurring now. The actions of this Pope and his successors must act more creatively and assertively to pursue a long-term pragmatic policy reset (
Formicola 2019, p. 143).
He has begun with the reorganization of the Church’s administrative structure, but it must include more than changing the number of members of the Holy See, shifting leaders to other offices, curbing ideological appointments, or creating more complicated procedures. Such a reorganization must be total and based on modern managerial principles. It must bring about the development of pragmatic processes and procedures within the Holy See that are capable of adjudicating a needed, major revision of canon law in the future as well. It must include a new emphasis on the social needs and concerns of mankind. Reforms must lead to the development of consistent and unified strategies to attain recognized, spiritual, and geopolitical goals. Elected and chosen leaders must be both dominant and collaborative as well as task-oriented.
Such changes could begin to save the Church from itself by recognizing the existential need to carry out its divine mandate and mission in more modern ways. Acceptance of this reality and a pragmatic adaptation of social needs are keys to Catholic Church–State relations in the future. This is how the Church can remain relevant, serve the common good, and positively respond to the challenges of the transitioning Church–State relations in the world. It is possible that the Church will give the world significant moral choices and positively impact a potential geopolitical search for transcendent goals such as peace, human rights, and social justice by working toward this goal.
In the last two decades, the Church has had to deal with the consequences of civil investigations and lawsuits about the leadership, liability, and accountability of the Pope, grand jury investigations of the hierarchy, and its right to subpoena the personnel records of the clergy around the globe. These challenges are evident now in the secular oversight of Church educational systems and medical establishments in Ireland and Canada, a loss of traditional exemptions and privileges regarding seminaries and hierarchical appointments in China, as well as control over financial pay-outs and bankruptcy rules that have often compromised the Church’s charitable work and decisions about how to use its donations in Australia and the United States (
Formicola 2016). Beyond this, the Church has suffered the loss of its religious influence, and attempts to stave off the legalization of abortion and gay marriage in countries such as Ireland, Brazil, Chile, Argentina and much of Western Europe. In addition, attempts to defend the sanctity of the family, the dignity of women, and environmental justice have been eroded in many other parts of the world as well.
Without pragmatic, adaptable Church–State relations in the future, then, there can be no path to reconcile the increasing transitions that are occurring between the relations of the Catholic Church and the civil States with which it interacts. As a result, the Church will no longer be able to serve as a moral guide or arbiter in the world due to its own unwillingness to accept and adapt to the progress achieved through the activism that society has provided for the common good.
This is already becoming evident in Catholic Church–State relations in China and Russia. In China, Pope Francis has already approved an agreement giving state control over the choice of candidates for the priesthood and the functioning of the Catholic seminaries that will educate them. He has negotiated a mutual agreement between the Vatican and the Chinese government over the appointment of new members of the hierarchy. The loss of those Church’s total management of the clergy is apparent and a warning that to accede to government influence in an official atheistic state can possibly lead to catastrophic future consequences.
Another current example of the loss of Vatican geopolitical influence can be seen in Pope Francis’ attempts to serve as a peace maker in the Russian–Ukraine war. He has offered to mediate a settlement, but there has been no response from President Putin for this gesture. He has condemned the war, but not blamed the Russian president, to the dismay of the west. He has questioned NATO for “barking at the door of Russia,” (
Rocca 2022) and warned of a potential nuclear war. At this point, however, none of his attempts at peace or admonitions of dire consequences appear to have had any influence.
The current state of Catholic–Church State relations, then, serves as an existential warning—the loss of the moral imperative in the geopolitical forum. If the Catholic Church is facing less influence—who can or will take up this cause? Further discussions about the broad power consequences of the social and political interactions of religion and government must continue to try to find answers to this problem. Continued study and discussions remain critical to understanding and providing solutions about the future ability and importance of Catholicism to serve as a moral advocate and viable civil partner in social, economic, and political issues around the globe.