Jeong Hagok on Emotions and the Korean Four-Seven Debate: A Confucian, Comparative, and Contemporary Interpretation

Abstract

This article presents Jeong Jedu (Hagok; 1649–1736) on the topic of emotions and its comparative and contemporary relevance. It discusses this leading neo-Confucian thinker’s thought-provoking Four-Seven thesis and its vital implication for self-cultivation and ethics. This important topic has not been discussed in current scholarship on Korean Confucianism. The article begins with the Confucian notion of emotions (jeong/qing, 情), according to its textual and philosophical background in the Chinese tradition, and then covers key issues regarding the “Four Beginnings” of virtue, the “Seven Emotions”, and leading neo-Confucian perspectives by Zhu Xi (1130–1200) and Wang Yangming (1472–1529). The article also provides a brief comparative analysis of Toegye’s and Yulgok’s leading Korean opinions on the nature, role, and problem of emotions. The third section focuses on Hagok’s interpretation in the same context. The fourth section discusses Hagok’s ethics and spirituality of emotions in terms of the mind’s original essence (bonche/benti) and innate knowledge (of good) (yangji/liangzhi) in connection to Wang Yangming’s doctrines. The final section concludes by considering the originality and distinctiveness of Hagok’s holistic interpretation. It also presents my contemporary reflections to articulate how Hagok’s groundbreaking insights compare with certain Western theories of emotions and why they offer a worthwhile resource for comparative philosophy, religion, and ethics.

1. Introduction

This article1 presents Jeong Jedu 鄭齊斗 (Hagok, 霞谷; 1649–1736) on the topic of emotions and its comparative and contemporary relevance.2 It discusses how this leading Korean neo-Confucian thinker developed a holistic, thought-provoking interpretation of the so-called Four-Seven debate.3 Hagok is as important as Korea’s three most eminent Confucians, Yi Hwang李滉 (Toegye, 退溪; 1501–1570), Yi I李珥 (Yulgok, 栗谷; 1536–1584), and Jeong Yagyong丁若鏞 (Dasan, 茶山; 1762–1836). Hagok’s Four-Seven thesis is an interesting and engaging topic that has not been discussed in Korean or Western scholarship on Korean Confucianism in general or on Hagok’s thought in particular.4 I have articulated similar topics on Toegye and Yulgok in my books on Korean neo-Confucian and comparative philosophy.5

The first section presents the Confucian notion of emotions (jeong/qing, 情) according to its textual, philosophical, and ethical background in the Chinese tradition, a necessary section on key questions of ambiguity regarding the “Seven Emotions” (seven feelings, or chiljeong/qiqing 七情), such as anger and desire, as well as the “Four Beginnings” of virtue (four roots; sadan/siduan, 四端), including compassion. It discusses Confucian classics and leading neo-Confucian perspectives by Zhu Xi (朱熹; 1130–1200) and Wang Yangming (王陽明; 1472–1529). The second section outlines the general Korean background of the Four-Seven debate, providing a comparative analysis of leading perspectives by Toegye and Yulgok with respect to the nature, role, and problem of emotions in terms of human nature, good and evil, and self-cultivation. It discusses how they also developed new interpretations in relation to Zhu Xi’s Four-Seven statements in terms of i/li (理; principle/ground of being; pattern) and gi/qi (氣; vital/physical energy; material force). The third section presents Hagok’s original interpretation in the same context. It also compares him with Toegye and Yulgok in this regard, while articulating the extent to which Hagok critically dealt with the Korean Zhu Xi school’s mainstream theories and, especially, Toegye’s interpretation. The fourth section presents Hagok’s ethics of emotions as unique in terms of the mind’s original essence (bonche/benti, 本體) and innate knowledge (of good) (yangji/liangzhi, 良知) in connection to the Mencian and Yangming doctrines.

The final section considers the originality and distinctiveness of Hagok’s Four-Seven interpretation by presenting its holistic and engaging system of Korean thought that emphasizes practical action. Since its insights resonate with certain Western theories of emotions, I offer contemporary reflections on their groundbreaking dimension and also develop comparative perspectives in relation to Western philosophers and scholars.

2. Textual, Philosophical, and Ethical Background: The Chinese Tradition

The Chinese Confucian notion of emotions (feelings; jeong/qing, 情)6 is mainly mentioned in terms of the Four Beginnings (of virtue) (or four roots; sadan/siduan) and the Seven Emotions (seven feelings; chiljeong/qiqing). Since the 16th-century in Joseon Korea, Toegye and Yulgok, their debaters, and later generations, such as that of Hagok, discussed this topic.

2.1. Seven Emotions

The locus classicus for the Confucian term “Seven Emotions” is the Book of Rites:

Pleasure (hui/xi 喜), anger (no/nu怒), sorrow (ae/ai 哀), fear (gu/ju 懼), love (affection; ae/ai 愛), hatred (disapproval; o/wu 惡), and desire (yok/yu 欲)… are not acquired through learning from the outside.

(Legge 1970, vol. 1, p. 379)

In other words, the Seven are basic human emotions because nobody learns them externally or “acquires” them from external things or phenomena. As Korean neo-Confucians confirmed, they are therefore innately associated with the physical and psychological dimension of human nature.

Since the list of the Seven is somewhat lengthy, the Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong 中庸; Chap. 1) abbreviates it by paying attention to the first three of these emotions and adding “joy” (rak/le) as follows:

Before [the emotions of] pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy (rak/le 樂) are aroused (bal/fa發), it is called centrality (equilibrium or the Mean; jung/zhong 中). After they are aroused and each and all attain due measure and degree, it is called harmony (hwa/he 和). Centrality is the great foundation of the world, and harmony is its universal Way....7

In other words, the Seven belong to the natural feelings and emotions that represent the aroused state (bal/fa, 發) of the mind (and body) in response to external things or phenomena.8 According to the Doctrine of the Mean,9 self-cultivation therefore requires a measure of self-control over the Seven: it is to attain the state of “harmony” “after they are aroused (bal/fa).” As I discussed elsewhere, this topic became a key issue in the Korean Four-Seven debates on the mind and emotions.10

The Book of Rites and the Doctrine of the Mean confirm that human emotions arise from within the self. The Seven refer to common physical–psychological emotions as the “aroused” states of the mind. The ethics of emotions requires daily self-cultivation and action by attaining the state of emotional “harmony,” a key topic rigorously discussed by Toegye and Yulgok.

And how should the Seven be understood in terms of the heart–mind (sim/xin, 心), and in terms of their difference or relation to the Four Beginnings? The Korean Four-Seven debates rigorously discussed these key questions and issues as well as their implication for self-cultivation and ethics.

2.2. Four Beginnings of Virtue

The Doctrine of the Mean deals more with emotional control and harmony—as I discussed above—but the Mencian ethics of emotions focuses on a theory of original human goodness and moral practice. The locus classicus of the Four is a famous passage in the Mencius (2A: 6). This passage was frequently quoted by leading Korean neo-Confucians, such as Toegye and Yulgok, and then by others, such as Hagok and Dasan, in the 18th century. It reads:

The heart-mind (sim/xin心) of compassion (cheugeun/ceyin 惻隱) is the beginning of human-heartedness (injidan/renzhiduan 仁之端); the heart-mind of shame and dislike (suo/xiuwu 羞惡) is the beginning of righteousness (euijidan/ yizhiduan 義之端); the heart-mind of courtesy and modesty (sayang/cirang 辭讓) is the beginning of propriety (yejidan/ lizhiduan 禮之端); and the heart-mind of [discernment of] right and wrong (sibi/shifei是非) is the beginning of wisdom (jijidan/zhizhidaun 智之端). All human beings have these Four Beginnings [of virtue] just as they have their four limbs.11

Compassion, shame and aversion, courtesy and modesty, and discernment of right and wrong do not come from the outside because these moral intuitions and emotions are originally innate in the heart–mind. Mencius referred to these “Four Beginnings [roots]” (sadan/siduan, 四端) as the fourfold foundation of what Confucius emphasized as the cardinal virtues of human-heartedness (benevolence), righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom.

For Mencius, then, the heart–mind (sim/xin心) of compassion and three other beginnings are indeed moral emotions (jeong/qing 情) as well. They are the origin of human goodness and the starting point of our innate moral virtues. The following passage from the Mencius (6A: 6) articulates the same point further:

Regarding what is genuine in our emotions and feelings (jeong/qing 情), we are capable of being good. This is what I mean by [saying human nature is] good…. All human beings have the heart-mind of compassion, the heart-mind of shame and aversion, the heart-mind of courtesy and modesty, and the heart-mind of right and wrong…. Human-heartedness, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom…. originally exist in me [my nature].12

This famous Mencian theory of original human goodness (seongseon ji seong/xingshan zhi xing, 性善之性) emphasizes universal access to the virtuous practice of innate intuitions and emotions such as compassion (Mencius, 2A: 6; 6A: 6). This central doctrine means the foundation of natural moral knowledge and action, insofar as Mencius spoke of moral “emotions” in terms of the human “heart-mind”. It is a debatable ontological claim on the innate goodness of human beings in the heart–mind which, according to Mencius, universally justifies self-cultivation and self-perfection for everyone, as mandated by Heaven.

Each and every person naturally possesses “the heart-mind of compassion” toward fellow human beings that “cannot see the suffering of others” (Mencius, 2A:6). With this moral–spiritual heart–mind (sim/xin), all human beings spontaneously feel compassion to save “a little child who was on the verge of falling into a well” (Mencius, 2A:6). For Mencius, the “original goodness of human nature”, consisting of the Four, should therefore be “fully developed” for self-cultivation: “neglecting your own potentials is to destroy yourself.” (Mencius, 2A: 6).13

Leading Chinese neo-Confucians, such as Zhu Xi and the eminent Korean thinker Yi Toegye, discussed self-cultivation by frequently quoting the Mencian doctrine of original human goodness.14 Korean thinkers confirmed that the Four, including compassion, are indeed innate moral emotions in the heart–mind for self-cultivation and our ethical life.

In Ming China, Wang Yangming (1472–1529), the founder of the school of mind (simhak/xinxue, 心學), cherished and elaborated on the Mencian teaching that the Four as virtuous emotions confirm “innate knowledge [of good]” (yangji/liangzhi, 良知) and “innate ability [to do good]” (yangneung/liangneng, 良能).15 In Korea, Hagok, in particular, articulated that this bold moral claim is also backed up by the Mencian doctrine of “the original heart-mind” (bonsim/benxin, 本心) and innate pure heart–mind (yangsim/liangxin, 良心).

Without making any clear or strict distinction between feeling (emotion) and thinking (reason), Mencius intended to mean that the Four are our natural moral emotions as well as one’s innate “knowledge” and “ability” to do good based on some level of cognitive awareness and judgments regarding one’s discernment of right (good) and wrong (evil).

2.3. Zhu Xi’s Four-Seven Statements

Song Chinese neo-Confucians transmitted and expanded the Confucian and Mencian line of classical Confucianism. They also developed new metaphysical and ethical ideas partly in competition with Daoist and Buddhist influence. The idea of jeong/qing (emotions and feelings) continued to be discussed on an advanced level.

The great neo-Confucian synthesizer Zhu Xi briefly commented on Mencius’s notion of the Four (Mencius, 2A: 6) as follows:

Compassion, shame and aversion, courtesy and modesty, and [discernment of] right and wrong are emotions (jeong/qing 情). Human-heartedness (benevolence; in/ren 仁), righteousness (eui/yi 義), propriety (ye/li 義), wisdom (gi/zhi 智) are human nature (seong/xing 性).16

In other words, the Four represent our innate moral “emotions” aroused from human nature. Zhu Xi did not articulate the Four and the Seven specifically. His Zhuzi yulei (classified conversations of Master Zhu) provided a brief statement in terms of their origins:

“The Seven Emotions cannot be separated from the Four Beginnings,” and “the Four Beginnings can be understood from the standpoint of the Seven Emotions.”17

Therefore, Zhu Xi probably meant that the Four do not belong to an entirely independent group of human emotions (jeong/qing). Interestingly, Toegye, Yulgok, and others in Korea did not quote these two statements at all in their Four-Seven philosophies.

Zhu Xi also mentioned the Four and the Seven briefly in terms of his philosophical system of i/li (理; principle/ground of being; pattern) and gi/qi (氣; vital/physical energy; material force)18, without explaining the Four-Seven relationship clearly: “The Four Beginnings are manifestations of i/li; the Seven Emotions are manifestations of gi/qi,”19 which can also be translated as follows: “The Four Beginnings are aroused by i/li; the Seven Emotions are aroused by gi/qi.”

Does this unexplained statement by Zhu Xi imply some ontological and conceptual distinction between the Four and the Seven? This question was rigorously debated by Korean scholars such as Toegye, Yulgok, and others, including Hagok.

2.4. Wang Yangming on Emotions, Original Essence, and Innate Knowledge

In his most famous work, Chuanxi lu (傳習錄, instructions for practical living),20 Wang Yangming addresses emotions (jeong/qing) more specifically than Zhu Xi did. This is a unique and more detailed Four-Seven interpretation in terms of the mind, innate knowledge, and simhak/xinxue (心學; mind cultivation; learning of the mind), which is a key to understanding his entire neo-Confucianism.

Wang, like other neo-Confucians, affirmed that emotions refer to the “aroused” states of the mind in light of the Doctrine of the Mean (Chapter 1). However, Wang introduced his innovative idea of the mind-in-itself (bonche/benti, 本體; literally, original essence of the mind). The Four, including compassion (beginning of human-heartedness), represent the bonche essence (or goodness) of the mind.21 Unlike others, Wang spoke about ordinary emotions, especially those included in the Seven, such as sorrow, specifically: “Ordinary people…. bring upon themselves a great deal of sorrow [ae/ai] and grief and, in addition, confusion and self-abandonment.”22 In other words, Wang means that ordinary people’s problems require a measure of proper control over selfish emotions and cravings after their arousal.

In this regard, the problem of the Seven, including craving and sorrow, is mainly their selfish “excessiveness”: “As soon as it is excessive, it does not accord with the original essence of the heart-mind (sim ji bonche/xin zhi benti 心之本體).”23 If any of the Seven, such as anger, is excessively expressed, it needs to be controlled. Uncontrolled emotions tend to “abandon” the heart–mind’s bonche/benti.24 Accordingly, the idea of overcoming selfishness is strongly embedded in Wang’s ethics of mind and emotions.

Wang explains the nature and problem of the Seven, specifically, in contrast to the innate knowledge of good (yangji/liangzhi, 良知):

Pleasure [happiness; hui/xi], anger [no/nu], sorrow [ae/ai], fear [gu/ju], love [ae/ai], hatred [dislike; o/wu], and desire [yok/yu] are also natural to the mind. But you should understand innate knowledge [yangji/liangzhi] clearly. . . .When the seven feelings [Seven Emotions; chiljeong/qiqing]25 follow their natural courses of operation [without selfishness or excessiveness], they are all functions of innate knowledge....However, we should not have any selfish attachment to them. When there is such an attachment, they become selfish desires and obscurations to innate knowledge.26

This key passage gives a complete list of the Seven and confirms the Book of Rites’ assertion that they are indeed the “natural” human emotions that “do not learn from the outside.” However, Wang argued that the Seven can become bad when they have “any selfish attachment.” As mentioned above, anger is a natural emotion but when its “excessive” selfishness is not properly controlled by the mind, it can certainly lead to evil. It is the negative emotion of wrath deviating from the good yangji/liangzhi, i.e., the bonche/benti of the heart–mind. This is why self-cultivation is crucial.

In short, Wang’s ethics emphasize emotional control and moral practice; that is, extend the good heart–mind to others by “making the will sincere” to “do good and remove evil.”27 It justifies the Mencian doctrine of virtuous emotions as the innate knowledge and innate ability to do good.

Wang Yangming did not have a major impact on the Korean Confucian philosophy of emotions, mainly because the Yangming “school of mind” (simhak/xinxue, 心學) was effectively opposed by the only orthodox Zhu Xi school, known as Seongnihak (性理學, learning/school of human nature and principle)28, and officially persecuted by the Joseon dynasty (1392–1897) for centuries in Korea. 29 However, Hagok, arguably the founder of the Korean Yangming school, accomplished “the great synthesis of Wang Yangming No-Confucianism in Korea” (E. Y. J. Chung 2020).30 Hagok liked Wang’s philosophy of mind and articulated it further in discussing the Four-Seven topic as well as the nature and problem of emotions by integrating it with the Korean Seongnihak philosophy of i/li and gi/qi, as we will see in Section 3 and Section 4.

3. The Korean Legacy of the Four-Seven Debate before Hagok

In Joseon Korea (1392–1910), the historic Four-Seven debate on emotions powerfully contributed to the distinctive development of neo-Confucian metaphysics, ethics, and moral–spiritual practice, especially relating to Zhu Xi’s thought. Korean thinkers rigorously discussed key textual, conceptual, philosophical, psychological, and ethical issues of the Four-Seven relationship in terms of difference and separability as well as similarity and connection.

For Toegye, Yulgok, and other Korean neo-Confucians such as Hagok, one critical issue was whether the Four and the Seven are merely different “names” or, rather, two “distinctive” types of emotions with different “origins,” “meanings,” and roles. Should the Four be viewed as moral emotions, intuitions, and will, whereas the Seven are ordinary physical and psychological feelings and sensations? Why did Mencius describe the Four as “emotions” (jeong/qing) pertaining to the “heart-mind” (sim/xin)? In other words, how should the Four and the Seven be understood in terms of jeong/qing, in general, as well as in terms of the heart–mind (sim/xin)? Another rigorously debated issue focused on Zhu Xi’s philosophy of i/li and gi/qi, and of good and evil.31

All of these issues were associated with Mencius’s moral philosophy and psychology, the Zhongyong’s ethics and spirituality of emotional control, and Song Chinese neo-Confucianism. The goal of the Four-Seven debate was, therefore, to understand the implication of these issues for body–mind dynamics, self-cultivation, and daily moral practice—most of which were not explained clearly in the Chinese tradition of classics and neo-Confucian texts and commentaries.

Korean thinkers and their debaters built the constructive meaning of the Four-Seven relationship by covering various texts and ideas comprehensively and systematically. This was indeed necessary to practice the vital role of emotions in daily human life and experience. Toegye and Yulgok similarly confirmed that the Four Beginnings, including compassion, are indeed moral jeong/qing. For Mencius, the “original goodness of human nature” consisting of the Four should be fully developed for self-cultivation: “neglecting your own potentials is to destroy yourself.” (Mencius, 2A: 6).32 In the Korean tradition, the moral emotion of compassion (sympathy; empathy) is an innate virtuous feeling.

Regarding whether or not the Four and the Seven are two separate or distinctive types of jeong emotions, Toegye emphasized that the Four, including compassion and the discernment of right and wrong, definitely belong to a special and separate group of moral emotions. It is also important to note that Toegye discussed Mencius’s teaching of self-cultivation. In particular, he frequently quoted the Mencian doctrine of the Four and original human goodness, which is emphasized in Toegye’s ethics and spirituality of emotions and self-cultivation.33

By contrast, Yulgok insisted that the Seven represent the “totality” of emotions and feelings, which includes the Four as their “good side [subset].” He emphasized “the oneness of emotions” ontologically and ethically. There is a “mutual relationship” of continuum: as good moral emotions, the Four are included in the Seven.34 As Yulgok states, “Mencius selected good [moral] emotions out of the Seven Emotions, thereby calling them the Four Beginnings.”35 For example, when true love, one of the Seven, is expressed properly, then it is a moral emotion that is no different from compassion, one of the Four.36 The Four do not exist outside the Seven, the “totality” of emotions: in other words, it is impossible for the “good side” (the Four) and the “totality” (the Seven) to be divided into two kinds of emotions.37

Compassion and other moral emotions were discussed by Toegye and his supporters with admiration and care for their significance in self-cultivation and ethics. Furthermore, moral and spiritual self-cultivation not only involves the Mencian teaching of nurturing the Four as the moral essence of human nature but also has to maintain what the Zhongyong (Doctrine of the Mean) refers to as “[emotional] harmony after [the Seven such as] pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused” (Chapter 1).38 Leading Korean neo-Confucian such as Yulgok and Hagok confirmed that if the Seven are properly expressed or harmonized (according to moral principles), they are good emotions and not different from the Four. However, as Toegye emphasized, these emotions, such as anger and hatred, can lead to evil due to “selfish” cravings as well.

With respect to moral virtues and emotions, the opening passage of the Analects also teaches that Confucius believed that true emotions, such as “joy” (rak/le, 樂) of learning and ‘”joy” of friendship, were essential to sincerity and virtuous human experience (1: 1; Lau 1975, p. 59). Joy is one of the Seven; in other words, basic Confucian belief is that genuine human emotions play a vital role in the process of self-cultivation.39 This insight, therefore, inspired later generations of eminent neo-Confucian thinkers.

Toegye, Yulgok, and others also argued that Zhu Xi’s ambiguous comment on the Four-Seven relationship, in terms of i/li and gi/qi, meant to be understood in terms of “[moral] purity,” and there must be moral distinction or continuum. According to Toegye, the Four and the Seven are definitely different, in terms of their origins, meanings, and roles, because Zhu Xi’s Four-Seven statement meant that the Four are aroused by universal i/li whereas the Seven are aroused by individual gi/qi. Toegye, therefore, emphasized that the Four and the Seven are different from each other ontologically, conceptually, and ethically, in terms of i/li and gi/qi, respectively.40 The Four are virtuous emotions whereas the Seven are our ordinary physical and psychological emotions.

Toegye also argued that in the arousal of the Seven “what is spoken of refers principally to gi/qi.”41 For example, anger, hatred, and desire, three of the Seven, are aroused by (originate from) gi/qi. Their origin would be gi/qi because they are not moral emotions, as compassion is. In other words, one should overcome dehumanizing tendencies, such as the potential selfishness or evil of these emotions that are stimulated by individual gi/qi in response to external phenomena; in Toegye’s view, this can be done by practicing moral virtues and emotions, such as the Four, backed up by i/li.

Yulgok and, later, Hagok, also discussed the whole issue rigorously in terms of i/li and gi/qi.42 According to Yulgok, Toegye misunderstood the Four and the Seven as two distinctive groups of human emotions.43 The Four are not independent of the Seven and in the arousal of the Four and the Seven, “gi/qi [not i/li] is what actually becomes manifested.”44 There is moral–emotive continuum between the Four and the Seven, for which reason Toegye misinterpreted them as two separate groups of feelings.45 As Yulgok states, “what is manifested is gi/qi, and the reason for its manifestation is i/li.” In the arousal of all emotions and feelings including the Four, gi/qi as active vital energy actually becomes manifested and i/li as passive metaphysical principle does not have its self-manifesting power.46

Toegye, Yulgok, and other Korean neo-Confucians such as Hagok generally confirmed the Mencian belief that the Four, including compassion, are purely good because they are backed up by the original human goodness human inherent in the heart–mind. Yulgok, in particular, argued that ordinary emotions and feelings, such as the Seven, are potentially good if they are properly expressed or harmonized according to moral principles (i/li). According to Toegye, however, ordinary emotions such as pleasure, anger, and hatred can easily become precarious or evil due to their selfish cravings that are stimulated by daily things or phenomena (E. Y. J. Chung 1995, 2021, chps. 4 and 8).

Another controversial issue of the Korean Four-Seven debate dealt with Zhu Xi’s doctrine of “original human nature” (bonyeon ji seong/benran zhi xing, 本然之性) and “physical human nature” (gijil ji seong/qizhi zhi xing, 氣質之性) in terms of i/li and gi/qi, respectively.47 This is because Zhu Xi remained silent on explaining emotions such as the Four and the Seven in this regard. Toegye and his followers generally argued that by original human nature Zhu Xi meant the Mencian notion of “original human goodness,” including innate moral virtues such as human-heartedness (benevolence) as well as moral emotions such as the Four (e.g., compassion). By contrast, the Seven belong to physical human nature that includes all ordinary physical or psychological feelings, sensations, and desires; in other words, the Seven Emotions of the physical human nature are conditioned by individual gi/qi and can, therefore, lead to good or evil.

For Yulgok, the Four and the Seven should rather be understood in terms of the oneness of human nature and jeong emotions.48 Just as the reality of the heart–mind is “one,” the wholeness of emotions and feelings is also one and not divided into the Four and the Seven. In this regard, Yulgok also criticized Toegye for dualistically misinterpreting the Four and the Seven as two distinctive groups of emotions.

4. Hagok on the Four-Seven Relationship: A New Interpretation

Hagok developed an interesting Four-Seven philosophy with respect to classical doctrines, Zhu Xi neo-Confucianism, and its Korean version known as Seongnihak (“school of human nature and principle”). As I wrote in the introduction, this interesting topic has not been discussed in Korean or Western Confucian scholarship.

Like his predecessors Toegye and Yulgok, Hagok comprehensively presented various textual, theoretical, and practical questions about emotions and rigorously discussed those regarding the Four-Seven relationship as well as its implications for self-cultivation and ethical and spiritual practice. Part of this discussion was not only to interpret the conceptual, moral, and psychological distinction or connection between the Four and the Seven, but also to provide a critical reinterpretation of Korean neo-Confucian metaphysics, ethics, and psychology in terms of i/li and gi/qi, human nature, mind, emotions (jeong/qing), and good and evil.

A major essay in the Joneon (存言, testament),49 Hagok’s most significant work, is “Sadan chiljeong seol” (四端七情說, an explanation of the Four Beginnings and Seven Emotions).50 It presents the Four-Seven topic as follows:

In regard to aroused emotions and feelings (jeong/qing), pleasure, anger, love, and joy

[Hagok’s note:] and hatred, fear, and desire51

are the emotions of human nature. [The heart-mind of] compassion and [that of] shame and dislike

[Hagok’s note:] and the heart-mind of courtesy and modesty and that of

the moral discernment of right and wrong

are human nature (seong/xing) consisting of these emotions (jeong/qing).

Regarding the Seven Emotions (chiljeong/qiqing), Hagok abbreviates their formal list as “pleasure, anger, love, and joy”, accepting the short list mentioned in many Confucian and neo-Confucian writings. Note that Hagok’s footnoted list of four additional emotions such as “love, hatred, fear, and desire” is not quite accurate, because he repeated the emotion of “love”; it should have been the emotion of “sorrow” (ae/ai, 哀) instead of love (ae/a), according to the Book of Rites.

Nobody learns these human emotions externally from things or phenomena. As Hagok states, the Seven belong to the natural feelings and emotions. According to the Doctrine of the Mean, self-cultivation therefore requires a measure of self-control over the Seven in terms of attaining “harmony... after they are aroused”. The Book of Rites and the Doctrine of the Mean confirm that human emotions arise from within the self. The Seven refer to common physical–psychological emotions as the “aroused” states (bal/fa, 發) of the mind (and body).

In this passage Hagok refers to the “heart-mind” of “compassion” and to “shame and dislike” as two of the Four Beginnings of virtue, thereby confirming the Mencian moral conviction that the Four are naturally good insofar as they are rooted in the innate heart–mind. Like Toegye and Yulgok, Hagok refers to the heart–mind of compassion and the heart–mind shame and dislike as moral emotions/feelings (jeong/qing).

Hagok cites Mencius’ claim that the “original goodness of human nature” (seongseon ji seong/xingshan zhi xing, 性善之性), consisting of the Four, should be “fully developed” for self-cultivation and universal harmony (Joneon I, Sec. 2). “All human beings have the Four Beginnings of virtue…. To neglect their potential is to destroy oneself” (Mencius, 2A: 6) (See also Lau 1970, pp. 82–83). Hagok specifically refers to the mind–heart (moral feeling) of compassion as identical to the “beginning of human-heartedness (in/ren)” (Mencius 6A: 6). He confirms Mencian ontological belief that the Four are the innate moral seeds of self-cultivation, which justifies original human goodness inherent in the heart–mind (sim/xin).

In his Four-Seven essay, Hagok also writes about the Seven in terms of i/li, 理:

There is either good or evil in [the Seven Emotions such as] pleasure, anger, love, and joy, depending on whether or not i/li (moral principles) exists in them. Compassion and shame-and-dislike are all good emotions (jeong/qing) because they are all [based on] i/li.

(Joneon I, Sec. 13)

In the same essay, Hagok also states: “Should these emotions [the Seven] originate from i/li (moral principles), they would be truly pure as the highest good” (Joneon I, Sec. 13.). Unlike Toegye, Hagok therefore argues that the Seven—including anger, love, and joy—are good emotions if they, like the Four, are aroused by (bal/fa, 發; originate from) i/li.

Hagok’s argument is indeed an interesting change. The conventional teaching is that the Seven, including anger and desire, are aroused by (originate from) gi/qi. According to Toegye, this is because the Seven are our ordinary physical and psychological feelings,52 and one should overcome the dehumanizing selfishness of these emotions and cravings stimulated by gi/qi. For Yulgok as well, gi/qi is what actually becomes manifested in the arousal of all emotions and feelings.53

In other words, Hagok seems to affirm the role of i/li in the arousal of any good emotions of the Seven. However, he takes the idea of i/li as the moral will of the mind rather than metaphysical principle or the ground of being, as understood in Zhu Xi’s metaphysics. Hagok, therefore, differs from Toegye by arguing that if the Seven are grounded in moral principles (i/li), anger or any other example of the Seven may also be a justified good emotion. Another example: When love is properly expressed and controlled, it is no different from the heart–mind of compassion, one of the Four.

Hagok’s key essay on the oneness of the mind, body, and phenomena eloquently articulates the same point as follows:

Some people [possibly such as Toegye] say that the Four Beginnings [of virtue] among our emotions and feelings come from human nature, whereas the Seven Emotions come from gi/qi氣…. Simply put, the Four and the Seven are mentioned in terms of purity, but some scholars point to the fact that i/li is mixed with gi/qi, not that i/li and gi/qi are distinguishable. If discussed in terms of i/li and gi/qi, then purity in human nature is the Four but the human nature also depends on the [reality of] gi/qi…. If the Seven are pure according to i/li, they can become the Four as well.

(Joneon III, Sec. 10)

From Hagok’s holistic perspective, the Four-and-Seven relationship is to be understood in terms of “[moral] purity”, and there ought to be moral continuum between the Four and the Seven. If anger or another example of the Seven is pure according to moral principles (i/li), we express it as a good emotion “like the Four.” That is, if any of the Seven is grounded in i/li (moral principles), it would be a justified, moral emotion as well.

If the Seven, including anger, are activated by gi/qi and remain “unbalanced and biased,” then they will not be good emotions (Joneon I, Sec. 13). As Hagok states:

It is easy for [the Seven such as] pleasure, anger, love [“sorrow” in the Zhongyong’s list], and joy to follow gi/qi and become outrageous due to the individual gi/qi of ‘selfish cravings’ (sayok/siyu)

(Joneon I, Sec. 13)

In his essay “Seonghak simhak” (聖學心學, sagely learning as mind cultivation), Hagok also comments on both the Four and the Seven, as follows:

[The Seven] emotions such as pleasure, anger, love, and joy are also human nature, so the issue of “attaining their due measure and degree” or “not attaining….” is due to our [selfish] cravings that are embedded in these emotions.

(Joneon III, Sec. 4)

Hagok basically agrees with others that self-cultivation and moral practice require a measure of control over the Seven or their related selfishness or excessiveness. In light of the Doctrine of the Mean, one can remain in a state of harmony by “attaining due measure and degree” after they are aroused. Hagok was likely aware of the fact that this topic became very important in the Korean Four-Seven debate and was discussed by Toegye, his debater Gi Gobong, and others, such as Yi Yulgok.

Hagok opposes Toegye’s “dualistic” Four-Seven theory in terms of i/li and gi/qi. However, as I discussed elsewhere (E. Y. J. Chung 1995, 2016), Toegye’s Four-Seven theory is the foundation of his moral thought; that is, the Four are always good moral emotions because they are backed up by universal moral i/li, whereas the Seven can become selfish and lead to evil because they are aroused by individual gi/qi as stimulated by external things or phenomena.

Hagok’s argument here is similar to Yulgok’s basic Four-Seven theory. According to Yulgok, the Four are the “good (moral) side” of the Seven, as selected by Mencius,54 and any of the Seven, if properly harmonized (controlled), is a good feeling like the Four.55 Our ordinary physical or mental feelings, such as the Seven, are potentially good if they are controlled and harmonized. Anger, love, and joy are natural human emotions even if they are not harmonized due to selfish cravings.

5. Emotions, Innate Knowledge of Good, and Mind Cultivation: A Sagely Yangming Way

In short, compared to Toegye’s and Yulgok’s interpretations, Hagok’s ethics of emotions is unique because Hagok incorporates Wang Yangming’s neo-Confucianism, and especially its key doctrine of the heart–mind (sim/xin 心), original essence (bonche/benti 本體), and innate knowledge of good (yangji/liangzhi 良知). Hagok also emphasizes the ultimate meaning of the Four in terms of the “original essence” of the mind as well as the Mencian doctrine “innate knowledge” and “innate ability” (yangneung/liangneng 良能) (Mencius, 7A: 15). This is because Hagok, like other scholars, liked this classical teaching because its “child” metaphor of the pure heart–mind justifies the ontological and moral foundation of original human goodness.

This was a key to critically re-examining Zhu Xi and Korean neo-Confucianism through the Yangming way of mind cultivation and moral practice. In his essay on principle (i/li) and the mind (Joneon III, Sec. 3), Hagok, therefore, explains Wang’s belief in the mind’s bonche/benti (“mind-in-itself” or original essence (substance)) regarding “innate knowledge [of good].”56 Hagok’s essay “Seonghakseol” (聖學說, an explanation of sagely learning) also quotes Wang Yangming: “According to Wang, ‘the mind is principle (i/li) means innate knowledge [of good] (yangji/liangzhi), so the innate knowledge of the mind (sim ji yangji/xin zhi liangzhi 心之良知) is the essence [of mind]’” (Joneon III, Sec. 8).

Hagok continues: “The mind-heart of [discerning] right and wrong is [the virtue of] wisdom…. This is called innate knowledge and innate ability [to do good]” (Joneon I, Sec. 8). He, therefore, sees the Four Beginnings, including the heart–mind (emotion) of right and wrong, as none other than the innate knowledge of good (Joneon I, Sec. 9). On the whole, Hagok affirms that the mind’s yangji universally enables moral awakening and action.

In his Chuanxi lu (instructions for practical living), Wang emphasized the bonche/benti of the mind as well as the Mencian teaching of yangji/liangzhi and yangneung/liangneng.57 Hagok was, therefore, quite aware of the fact that Wang certainly liked Mencius’s ontological belief in original human goodness in the heart–mind of virtuous emotions. Hagok also liked Wang’s point that the Four refer to the mind-in-itself and confirm its innate knowledge of good, which universally enables moral mind cultivation (simhak, 心學) and the Confucian path to sagacity.

According to the Chuanxi lu, Wang articulated uncontrolled (“excessive”) anger as a deviation from the heart–mind’s pure essence/goodness:

When one shows a little bit of feeling of wrath, his anger is excessive, and his mind is no longer the original substance [bonche/benti 本體] that is broad and extremely impartial [quoting Cheng Hao]. Therefore, whenever one is affected by wrath to any extent, his mind will not be correct... [even though] we all feel angry in our minds at the party who is wrong.58

Here it is interesting to note that Hagok also identifies the innate knowledge of the Four with what Lu Xiangshan (1139–1193)59 and Wang call “the original mind” (bonsim/ benxin, 本心):

Mencius taught that all human beings have the Four Beginnings [of virtue]… [Mencius, 2A: 6]. We all refer to this essence [of the mind]; that’s all. Lu Xiangshan called it “the original mind”…as well as innate knowledge. For this reason, it is called…the goodness of human nature… “becoming a sage like Yao or Shun.”60

(Joneon III, Sec. 11)

This passage justifies the Four, including compassion, in light of the shared Lu-Wang insight that our “original mind” has its dynamic moral essence.61 In other words, “everyone can become a sage” by nourishing the original mind.

In his major essay “Chijiseol” (致知說, an explanation of the extension of knowledge), Hagok eloquently writes further:

Mencius taught that “the heart-mind (emotion; sim/xin 心) of [moral discernment of] right and wrong” is the knowledge (ji/zhi) that “all human beings have”…. Hence, this [moral] knowledge originally exists in the human heart-mind. It is not what we know after seeking it in things, learning from books, or remaining outside [the mind]. Simply put, this is truly what human beings innately [originally] have.... We [naturally] know to be filial to parents,…and to like good and hate evil.

(Joneon I, Sec. 9)

This statement concurs with the Mencian doctrine of the Four Beginnings that anyone “without the heart-mind of right and wrong” is “not human.”62 The fourfold seed of human-heartedness, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom already exists in the heart–mind for self-cultivation. This, therefore, means “innate human goodness” in the pure “child-like” heart–mind (sim/xin), which Wang Yangming emphasized as the “innate knowledge of good” and the original moral essence of the mind.63

According to Wang, sages all have natural human emotions. Hagok was familiar with Wang Yangming’s point that they not only control and overcome selfish emotions and desires but also perfected their heart–minds as “bright mirrors” without any “impurity” or selfishness. In other words, the sages practice virtuous emotions in harmony with the heart–mind’s bonche/benti (original essence/goodness) through their “innate knowledge [of good] as clear as a bright mirror....”64 Hagok likely appreciated this part of Yangming’s thought.

With respect to mind cultivation (simhak), Hagok, therefore, concludes his Four-Seven thesis in terms of sagely learning as follows:

The way of Confucius and Mencius was definitely as follows... It illuminated [what Mencius called] the “original goodness of human nature” by discussing the Four Beginnings of virtue. Through this method, we can explore the [Confucian] sages’ intended teaching and also get to know sagely learning (seonghak/ shengxue 聖學).

(Joneon II, Sec. 25)65

Here, Hagok has in mind the line in the Mencius (2A: 6) that states that original human goodness consists of the fourfold foundation of human virtue. This enables anyone to pursue the universal Confucian way of sagely learning.

In developing his Four-Seven philosophy, Hagok critically examined and reinterpreted the Cheng-Zhu neo-Confucian system of metaphysics and ethics of human nature, emotions, and i/li and gi/qi, particularly by means of emphasizing the Mencian and Wang Yangming doctrines of the heart–mind, innate knowledge and ability, and moral practice.

6. Conclusions: Comparative and Contemporary Reflections

Let us now consider the distinctiveness of the Korean Four-Seven debate as well as the originality and contemporary relevance of Hagok’s interpretation. First of all, Hagok’s Four-Seven philosophy is an insightful and engaging topic; that is, a key component of his unique ethics and spirituality of emotions as well as a vital example of his innovative efforts to reconcile and integrate Wang Yangming, Zhu Xi, and the Korean Seongnihak version of Zhu Xi neo-Confucianism.66

As we know, the word “emotion(s)” pertains to the dynamic and interrelated levels of human existence, knowledge, and experience, whether we speak of Korean, Asian, Western, or cross-cultural perspectives. Various traditions of philosophy and religion developed a number of ideas and insights and each of them embodies its own context and examples of emotions. For example, the Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist traditions commonly tend to emphasize the control of the physical and psychological side of the self. Similarly, they taught against the “selfish,” “precarious,” “afflicting,” or “self-damaging” potential of ordinary feelings, desires, or attachments. Certain emotions, such as moral–spiritual virtues, are cherished and recommended, whereas many ordinary emotions are repudiated and, therefore, must be controlled or eliminated.67 In other words, it is necessary to understand or discuss the nature, role, and problem of emotions in the holistic context of rationality, emotionality, ethics, and spirituality.

In this regard, the Korean Four-Seven debates, including Hagok’s interpretation, contributed to understanding the notion of emotions (jeong/qing) and its manifold and multilevel roles and problems in self-cultivation, humanistic ethics, moral psychology, and social relationships. It championed moral emotions while criticizing the precarious “selfishness” of negative emotions and, therefore, influenced many generations of Confucian thinkers and ordinary Koreans. As a result, it has also developed its comprehensive context and scope of emotion common to human life and experience.

We cannot deny the essential influence of Chinese Confucian texts and doctrines—for example, the Book of Rites, Zhongyong, Mencius, and Zhu Xi’s ideas of i/li and gi/qi—on Korean discussion about emotions. However, it is wrong to argue simply that Korean Confucians merely copied or followed the Chinese tradition because Hagok, like Toegye and Yulgok, not only discovered the fundamental ambiguity and limitation of these Chinese texts but also creatively developed original Korean ideas, interpretations, and insights.

The unique common goal of the Korean Four-Seven debates was to explain the self rationally, psychologically, morally, and spiritually. This is why the holistic nature of Korean jeong seems to be more associated with or influenced by the Confucian tradition. Hagok and other Korean neo-Confucians comprehensively discussed this topic on emotions. In particular, they rigorously debated the Four-Seven relationship as well as its implications for self-cultivation and ethics.

Hagok, like other Korean Confucians before him, affirms that both the Four and the Seven all belong to the total reality of human emotions and feelings. They basically agreed that the Four and the Seven are different “names” (labels) for emotions. However, Hagok, like Yulgok, opposes Toegye’s dualistic view that the Four and the Seven are actually two distinctive groups of emotions with clear differences of ontological origins and conceptual and moral meanings and roles. Another key question was why Mencius described the Four as “emotions” (jeong/qing) and, especially, in terms of the “heart-mind” (sim/xin).

Hagok basically supports Yulgok’s point that Toegye incorrectly insisted that the Seven are not moral emotions, like the Four, because the Seven are potentially the “precarious” or “selfish” expressions of our physical and psychological nature as conditioned by individual gi/qi and external things. This is partly why Hagok implicitly criticized Toegye’s dualistic Four-Seven theory. In my view, however, what he, like Yulgok, failed to grasp is the heart of Toegye’s ethics and spirituality that emphasizes the transcendent and virtuous reality of i/li, representing the Four and moral principles, over the material, physical, and psychological reality of gi/qi, representing the Seven and cravings. This is what Toegye ultimately inspired, for moral and spiritual cultivation, in his disciples and many generations of followers (see E. Y. J. Chung 2010a, 2010b, 2016, 2021 for more).

Overall, Hagok’s Four-Seven philosophy emphasizes self-cultivation as moral awakening and practice; that is, the practice of “original human goodness” in the heart–mind (sim/xin). In Wang Yangming’s terminology, this means “do good and remove evil.”68 Hagok also elaborated on the Mencian–Yangming teaching of virtuous emotions as innate knowledge (yangji) and innate ability (yangneung) to “think and do good.” Hagok concluded that this moral claim is also justified by fundamental Confucian belief in “the original heart-mind” (bonsim/benxin) and “innate pure heart-mind” (yangsim/liangxin, 良心). For all human beings and especially ordinary people, Hagok seems to argue that this is the universal Confucian way of ethical action in the Yangming context that the Confucian sages originally emphasized. For Hagok, it is inclusively more productive than Zhu Xi’s philosophy and its mainstream Korean version of Seongnihak that involves the rationalist understanding or knowledge of moral principles (i/li). I also note that contemporary Koreans frequently speak about both words, bonsim and yangsim, in their daily social and emotional lives or when they are concerned with moral education, social values, and ethical practice.

Despite Hagok’s “great synthesis of Yangming Neo-Confucianism (Yangmyeonghak/ Yangmingxue 陽明學) in Korea” (E. Y. J. Chung 2020), his Yangmyeonghak did not flourish either directly or textually, insofar as the Korean Yangming school was effectively prohibited by the Zhu Xi school (Seongnihak) and continuously persecuted by the Joseon dynasty at the same time.69

In the Western tradition of philosophy, the nature of emotions was criticized for centuries. This criticism is associated with the mainstream Platonic tradition of dualism that has emphasized rationality (reason) over emotionality (emotion) and maintained the antagonism between reason and emotion, as Plato and neo-Platonism cherished thinking over feeling based on the mind–body dualism. Emotion (or passion) was claimed to be the antithesis or opponent of reason; in other words, one’s emotional tendency or inclination contradicts the intellectual enterprise of rationality. This centuries-old criticism of emotions, therefore, defended the ultimate meaning of philosophy as the “love of reasoning,” not emotional experience and knowledge.

Nevertheless, the contemporary Western ethics of emotions has challenged this dichotomy of emotion (passion) versus reason (cognition).70 In his study of emotive rationality, Ronald De Sousa (1987) notes that emotions enable our rational thinking about human life and experience (De Sousa 1987, pp. 1–20). Joel Marks’s theory of “emotions as desires” and Robert C. Solomon’s theory of emotions as “judgements” support the cognitive and rational nature of emotions: in the former case, “desiring” means knowing what to desire (Marks 1995, 2013) while the latter case affirms that judgements “need concepts,” so one’s judging engages in some level of reasoning (Solomon 1993, 1995a, 2001).

These contemporary endorsements of the rationalistic relevance of emotions variously resonate with Korean Four-Seven philosophy and Hagok’s Confucian ethics of emotions. Hagok, like other leading neo-Confucians, insightfully discussed whether emotions are morally good or bad (evil), human or inhuman, honorable or precarious, altruistic or selfish, and so on. He, therefore, articulated how they function in interaction with the body and heart–mind, as well as in response to external stimulus by things and phenomena. This is also why Hagok—like Toegye, Yulgok, and famous Korean Buddhist masters such as Wonhyo (617–686) and Jinul (1158–1210)—did not distinguish emotion from reason, and vice versa. They were more used to their traditional belief that the heart–mind (sim/xin, 心) is one single, integrated faculty that coordinates, “apprehends,” or “commands” rationality, emotionality, morality, and spirituality. Accordingly, Hagok affirms that emotions engage the entire holistic self, including the body, as in the case of Korean Buddhist ethics and spirituality as well.71

In my comparative view, Hagok’s interpretation is also compatible with some Western theories of emotions. For example, his view of compassion—one of the Four, as the moral “root” of benevolence (in/ren)—is similar to what the Scottish moral philosopher Adam Smith (1723–1790) saw as the moral significance of “sympathy” for “universal benevolence.”72 We can also relate it to Michael Slote’s virtue ethics of “empathy” (Slote 2007, 2010) because empathy is a “moral motivation,” and the moral virtues of “compassion and benevolence are best understood in relation to empathy” (Slote 2020, p. 61).73 Solomon’s theory of emotions as “judgements” based on “prior” knowledge or experience resembles Hagok’s insight that the moral discernment of “right and wrong,” the last of the Four, involves some level of ethical awareness through “innate knowledge of good” (yangji/liangzhi).74 Furthermore, Hagok cared about the “heart-mind of discerning right and wrong” as a moral emotion or intuition for wisdom. When properly expressed, justified anger, one of the Seven, is, indeed, a good emotion, because of its moral attention to justice. Does this not also concur with Solomon’s view that “passion for justice” is an emotional judgment that is ethically important for “the meaning of life”?75

In comparison with mainstream Korean neo-Confucianism, Hagok’s approach to Four-Seven issues is innovatively unique because he interprets emotions in the context of Yangming philosophy as well. This is a significant example of Hagok’s coherent efforts to build meaningful compatibility between Wang Yangming, Zhu Xi, and the Korean Seongnihak of Zhu Xi neo-Confucianism (E. Y. J. Chung 2020), regarding universal Confucian belief in the human foundation of virtue as the good heart–mind (yangsim/liangxin) of innate knowledge and ability to think and do good. From Hagok’s perspective, this unifying way of moral awakening and action would be universal and, therefore, more Confucian than the rationalistic Zhu Xi way or its scholastic Korean Seongnihak (e.g., Toegye). I make this point although Hagok himself did not directly articulate this idea of reconciliation and integration.

Is Hagok’s ethics of emotions relevant to us? In my view, their contemporary significance centers around the question of how “to be human” in the most genuine sense of its meaning. This affirms the holistic role of our heart–mind in cultivating the wholesome self and social wellbeing through the proper channelling and harmony of our thinking (reason), feeling (emotion), believing (belief), craving (desire), passion, and moral–spiritual dimensions of human experience. Emotions inspire the ultimate meaning in life.

On the whole, Hagok, the greatest systematizer of Yangming philosophy in Korea, developed an original Korean version of neo-Confucianism in the context of being ecumenical in theory and practical in action. Hagok’s interpretation of emotions embodies a groundbreaking tendency that developed such a distinctively Korean style of Confucian ethics and spirituality emphasizing practical action. It also offers contemporary insights into East Asian and global Confucianism as a whole. It is an engaging topic for our cross-cultural discussion of emotions.

I conclude by stating that Hagok’s thought-provoking insights offer us a holistic intellectual and ethical system of emotion and action as well as a worthwhile resource for our interdisciplinary understanding of emotions in the field of comparative philosophy, ethics, and religion.

7. Note on Transliteration, Translation, and Citation

Korean names, terms, and titles are transliterated according to the Revised Romanization of Korean (National Academy of the Korean Language, Ministry of Education); Chinese counterparts are transliterated according to the Pinyin system. In indicating Korean or Chinese names, the standard format I follow is the family name and then other names, unless otherwise designated. Furthermore, I use the literary name if it is better known nationally and internationally: e.g., “Hagok” for Jeong Jedu, and “Toegye” for Yi Hwang.

For the primary and secondary Korean sources cited, only the Korean titles are provided, as is the standard style: e.g., Hagok’s Joneon (testament]). To avoid confusion, the titles of primary Chinese sources, such as leading neo-Confucian writings, are presented in Chinese only: e.g., Wang’s Chuanxi lu (instructions for practical living). With some exceptions, the Romanized philosophical terms are provided in both languages in parentheses. I present the Korean pronunciation first, followed by the Chinese, with a slash between them: e.g., yangji/liangzhi (innate knowledge), i/li (principle), sim/xin (mind or heart–mind), and so on.

As is well known, consistency in the translation of (neo-)Confucian philosophical terms is a challenging goal due to their subtlety or flexibility of meaning, involving diverse implications according to the context. Therefore, my approach to this task is to maintain the standard English renderings of most terms as much as possible.

For example, the Confucian term jeong/qing (情) generally means “emotions” and “feelings,” engaging the body as well as the heart–mind. I therefore use two English words, “feelings” and “emotions,” interchangeably. In the West, the term “emotion” refers to “a moving, stirring, agitation and perturbation,” whereas the term “feeling” means “the sense of touch in the looser acceptance of the term, in which it includes all physical sensibility not referable to the special senses of sight, hearing, taste, and smell” (The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, 1971, s.v. “emotion”). The flexible notion of this particular term is also associated with what we refer to in English as “passion,” “sensation,” “sentiment,” “affection,” “attitude,” and so on. Emotions are what all human beings feel, experience, and/or know, universally; hence, they can be compassionate or cruel, pleased or angry, afraid or brave, joyful or sorrowful (resentful), proud or shameful, and so on.76

As for the idea of seong/xing (性), which Hagok and other neo-Confucians considered to be full of truth and goodness, I use the term “human nature”. Another key term, yangji/liangzhi (良知) is translated as “innate knowledge (of good),” the most widely accepted translation, although we can also translate it as “natural moral knowing,” “innate moral intuition,” and so on.

I also use variations when appropriate. Some key words are translated according to their different contexts. For example, the term sim/xin (心), the most important term in Wang’s and Hagok’s philosophies, is translated as “mind” or “heart-mind,” thereby using them interchangeably; in fact, this idea points to Confucian belief in the intellectual, ethical, psychological, and spiritual interaction of the mind–heart as a whole. I translate the compound term bonche/benti (本體) as “original essence (substance).” When referring to the mind (sim/xin), it also means the mind-in-itself or the fundamental goodness of the heart–mind. Lastly, see Note 17 on two key neo-Confucian concepts, i/li (理, principle, metaphysical ground of being; moral order) and gi/qi (氣, vital/physical energy; material force).