The European Muslim Crisis and the Post-October 7 Escalation

Abstract

Israel’s war on Gaza following 7 October 2023 has given birth to several political and social changes in European nations. According to the United Nations Report of the Special Rapporteur, Israel has used this moment to “distort” international humanitarian law principles “in an attempt to legitimize genocidal violence against the Palestinian people.” In the European context, this has led to European Muslims and non-Muslims, including organizations, institutions, as well as individual academics, politicians, and activists mobilizing and voicing their condemnation and demand their governments to do more towards peaceful and equitable solutions. However, this has been met with a strong reaction from European governing bodies. This paper situates this reaction within wider discourses on the European Muslim crisis. It begins with a systematic literature review on the so-called European Muslim crisis, followed by case studies on the United Kingdom and Germany on their respective changes to policies impacting Muslims in the post-October 7 contexa Regarding the literature review, this paper illustrates how this concept has three distinct, yet intersecting meanings: the crisis of European identity; the crisis of foundational ideologies of Europe; and an internal Muslim crisis that often leads to radicalization. Through the British and German case studies, this paper illustrates that October 7 has reinforced and strengthened the shift towards values-based citizenship and integration. This paper argues that through branding pro-Palestine protesters and organizations as extremists in the British context, and adding questions related to antisemitism and Israel in the citizenship tests in the German context, the Israel/Palestine issue has now become yet another yardstick to demarcate the European, civilized “us” vs. the Muslim “other.” In doing so, October 7 has escalated elements already present within the wider discourses of the European Muslim crisis.

1. Introduction

The world was taken aback by news from the Middle East on 7 October 2023: Hamas had planned an attack on Israel, hitting many kibbutzim and a music festival, among other targets. More than 1000 Israelis and foreigners lost their lives as a result, and Hamas kidnapped more than 200 hostages and took them to Gaza. Following the Hamas strike, Israel launched intense military operations in Gaza. According to the United Nations Report of the Special Rapporteur, Israel has used this moment to “distort” international humanitarian law principles “in an attempt to legitimize genocidal violence against the Palestinian people” (UNHRC 2024, p. 1). In the European context, this has led to European Muslims and non-Muslims, including organizations and institutions, as well as individual academics, politicians, and activists mobilizing and voicing their condemnation and demand their governments to do more towards peaceful and equitable solutions. Several political and social shifts have occurred in European countries as a result of Israel’s war on Gaza that began on 7 October 2023. Academics, politicians, activists, and organizations representing both Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe have mobilized in response to the Israeli state’s flagrant contempt for international humanitarian law. Nonetheless, this has sparked a strong response from European authorities.

This paper situates these reactions within the wider discourse of the European Muslim crisis. It begins with a comprehensive, systematic academic literature review that provides an in-depth overview of how the European Muslim crisis has hitherto been conceptualized, discussed, and debated. This is then followed by case studies on the United Kingdom and Germany on their respective changes to policies impacting Muslims in the post-October 7 context. Regarding the literature review, this paper illustrates how this concept has had three distinct, yet intersecting meanings: first, the crisis of European identity that results in shifting boundaries of “us” vs. “them”, where “the other” is often Muslim; second, the crisis or the failure of foundational ideologies of Europe, such as secularism, liberalism, and multiculturalism, where Muslims are either the symptom or the cause; and lastly, an internal Muslim crisis due to the perceived incoherence of Islamic and European values that often leads to radicalization. Through the British and German case studies, this paper illustrates that October 7 has reinforced and strengthened the shift towards values-based citizenship and integration. This paper argues that through branding pro-Palestine protesters and organizations as extremists in the British context, and adding questions related to antisemitism and Israel in the citizenship tests in the German context, the Israel/Palestine issue has now become yet another yardstick to demarcate the European, civilized “us” vs. the Muslim “other”. In doing so, October 7 has escalated elements already present within the wider discourses of the European Muslim crisis.

2. Methodology

2.1. Systematic Literature Review

For this study, we began with a systematic literature review to explore the multiple dimensions of the European Muslim crisis. A systematic literature review is considered a high standard for reviews due to its comprehensive and robust methods (Nightingale 2009). It is a structured process, guided by the PRISMA protocols, that yields an extensive overview that minimizes bias that is used in both natural and social sciences (Cochrane et al. 2024; Amin et al. 2023; Al-Jayyousi et al. 2023). We conducted an initial search using two databases, Scopus and Web of Science, which are both well-established academic platforms that index peer-reviewed journals using the search strings outlined in

Table 1. Search strings.

Database	Search Scope	Search String
Scopus	Abstract, title, and keywords	“Europe*” AND “Muslim” AND “Crisis”
Web of Science	In all fields

.

After the initial search and download of records, duplicates were removed followed by the first two authors screening the abstracts using the inclusion and exclusion criteria outlined in

Table 2. Inclusion and exclusion criteria.

Criteria	Inclusion	Exclusion
Publication type	Journal articles, book chapters, books	Conference proceedings, social media, government documents, briefs, patents, and news and blog posts.
Location	Europe including the crisis occurring in Europe but impacting outside of Europe	Crisis occurring elsewhere with no connection to the crisis in Europe.
Time	Any up until 3 May 2024 when the search was conducted	N/A.
Language	English	Any other language.
Key terms and focus	Any discussion related to some form of real or perceived European Muslim crisis.	Crisis, such as the economic financial crisis or the refugee crisis referred to as only background or context but not a direct engagement with the actual impact of the crisis that includes Islam/Muslims and Europe (majority of excluded studies fell into this category), e.g., (Goalwin 2018; Ahmed 2018; Ragkos et al. 2016). Crises that are not directly related to European Muslim crisis such as the BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy) crisis or Islamic financial services and the economic crisis, e.g., (Bergeaud-Blackler 2007; Sobol 2015); literary or fiction, e.g., (Berg-Sørensen 2017; Calamita 2020).

.

At this stage, we found a few texts where only the abstract was in English, but the remainder was in a different language—these were also removed. Any conflicts between the two researchers were discussed and agreed upon. Next, the third author downloaded the selected texts as outlined in Figure 1. The final number of texts that was included in this review was 74.

2.2. Limitations for the Systematic Literature Review

Systematic literature reviews do not come without limitations. Although Scopus and Web of Science are both comprehensive and widely used academic databases, not all peer-reviewed journals are indexed on these platforms. Results from these two alone yielded more than 500 studies; therefore, it was not feasible to include more platforms. Also, there are many studies that may fall under these criteria but not specifically use the word “crisis”, or they may discuss the crisis related to a specific European country and not include the word “Europe” in the abstract or keywords resulting in not being part of the initial selection.1 That being said, in the selection process, we opted for more inclusivity than exclusivity, to include as many different insights as possible into the different facets of the European Muslim crisis.

2.3. Case Studies

The UK and Germany are both similar in that each have sizeable Muslim populations, with rising and influential far-right political parties that scapegoat Muslims, refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers from Muslim backgrounds as the root of social, cultural, and economic breakdown in their respective countries. However, Germany also has a complex past with antisemitism and Israel due to the Holocaust and its role in the historical memory and conceptualization of the modern German nation. Hence, both are interesting case studies to compare the changes in government stances and policies impacting Muslims in their respective countries that were triggered by October 7. In the UK context, the “robust new framework” for dealing with extremism is explored as well as the prime minister’s (PM) speeches, and the UK online newspaper and digital media. In the German case study, the renewal of the German citizenship test in reaction to October 7 as well as primary resource government documents and statements of politicians in the German media are analyzed.

3. Systematic Review of the European Muslim Crisis

The selected studies can be divided into three distinct, yet interconnected categories: the crisis of European identity; the breakdown of foundational ideology such as Western liberalism, democracy, and multiculturalism; and the internal Muslim crisis. This is summarized in Figure 2, followed by a more detailed exploration of the studies and their linkages. All studies cited below were selected from the systematic review process. Many articles could be placed in multiple categories. Categorization was based on the most salient features of each article (such as key points in the introduction/conclusion), and possible linkages between articles are highlighted to paint a bigger picture of the trends and themes in the literature.

3.1. European Identity Crisis

One major theme that arose from the literature was the crisis of European identity, which led to the continuous and discursive construction of boundaries of the European “us” verses “them”. This construction took on many forms; the four sub-themes are summarized in Figure 3.

3.1.1. Secular Christian Europe

The first salient sub-theme has been the rise of a new form of Christian identity. Tracing the debates on religion, nationalism, and migration policies in Denmark and Sweden, Karacoç Dora and Erdoğan (2021, p. 540) illustrate that although atheism is higher than in other parts of the world, “Christianity has turned into a matter of identity rather than being a religion”. Likewise, Merabishvili (2023) shows how in Hungary, Viktor Orbán justified his building of a fence on the southern border to protect from the “Muslim invasion of Christian Europe”; the border was reimagined as a physical manifestation of Christian civilizational defense. Others spoke about the emergence of an imagined Christian community (Krzyzowski and Nowicka 2021) and European Christian culture (Müller 2018) and the formation of the national self-image as both Christian and secular (Giuliani 2016; Solarz 2020) juxtaposed specifically against the Muslim “other”, which had begun before the refugee crisis (Triandafyllidou et al. 2011).

3.1.2. Civilized “Us”

The construction of core “European values”, usually around gender egalitarianism, sexual liberation, and rationality, is a key part of this boundary-making. Muslims in particular are defined against these values questioning their ability to integrate within Europe (Rommel 2017). Hervik (2012) discusses the shift in Denmark to “the end of tolerance strategy” and values-based politics where too many migrants are perceived to threaten Danish values. As an illustrative example, he cites the Danish People Party—a right-wing political group—that claims that these people are “poor because their culture denies progress, innovative thinking, science…[and] they will never succeed in improving their lives, if they do not follow our culture’s path” (p. 212).2 Scheibelhofer (2016, p. 295) describes how “dangerous Muslim traditions, oppressed migrant women… and homophobic migrant men” are used to draw boundaries between “a sexually liberated Europe and repressed, backward, migrant others”. In the French context, since 2011, the naturalization process includes a test as to whether he or she adheres to the “values of the French Republic”, which, Fargues et al. (2023, p. 1) argue, fuels the moralization and culturalization of citizenship that deliberately “nourishes ethnocultural stereotypes against Muslims”. Questions included are around gender equality and sexual tolerance—both of which have “increasingly become markers of national cultures and European values… [and] play an important role in the construction of a social imaginary based on cultural antagonism between ‘us’ (the nation) and ‘them’ (Muslims)” (Yilmaz 2015, p. 37). Many of these studies explain how the construction of national values is usually a response to the backdrop of a so-called crisis of multiculturalism (Yilmaz 2011) or even with sports figures with Muslim backgrounds (Amara 2013).

3.1.3. Dangerous “Them”

The Muslim “other” is often described and perceived as threatening, dangerous, radical, and sexually violent, which leads to heightened securitization and surveillance (Eskelinen et al. 2023; Rexhepi 2018; Taras 2013; Wigger 2019). These security concerns are given priority over human rights (M. S. Abbas 2019). Studies spoke specifically about the securitization and the usage of the politics of fear during the refugee crisis (Beck 2021; Bolonyai and Campolong 2017) resulting in the dehumanization of Muslims (Bruneau et al. 2018; Doboš 2023), and hierarchies of refugees where Muslims were at the bottom (Kovář 2022). M. S. Abbas (2019) links dehumanization and securitization using racial terror and Concentrationary Gothic as a framework to describe how Muslims are deemed as “unprogressive and barbaric with backwards religious beliefs incompatible with modern Britain” in contrast to the civilized European self. One study empirically illustrated how this fear of migrants and an increase in terrorist attacks was unwarranted (Treistman and Gomez 2021).

The refugee crisis, some argued, led to the construction of European borders, identity, and general panic that revealed a deeper unresolved racial crisis within Europe (De Genova 2018). Continuing the gothic and haunting metaphor discussed above, Giuliani (2016, p. 2) argues that racial division is not a recent phenomenon and that since its inception, Western modernity operates in a system that identifies itself as superior and White where “Whiteness” is not a skin color but a “system of values, interpretations and practices”. The other, non-White is “impossible to assimilate within Western rationalized modernity” and has “become a monster” (Giuliani 2016, p. 2). Likewise, Sharma and Nijjar (2024, p. 275) discuss how predictive policing that is perceived as race-neutral with algorithmic logic yet still solidifies racial division is the result of Europe being “haunted by a profound sense of racialized dread”.

It is noteworthy that one out of the selected studies spoke positively about the media during the refugee crisis and its framing of Muslims. In the UK, Spain, and Norway, Luengo and Ihlebæk (2019) found that newspapers constructed an “idealized civil sphere that exists beyond race, nationality or religion”.

3.1.4. Shifting Boundaries of “Us” and “Them”

Notwithstanding the above, studies point out how the “other” is not always “Muslim” but can be internal groups within Europe. This links back to the second major theme of the crisis of Europe itself including core foundational ideologies. For example, Sata (2023) discusses Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán’s promotion of illiberal democracy and multiple “other” groups such as the European socialist elite. Another example is Himmel and Baptista (2020), who explored the construction of Europeanness during the refugee crisis by print media in Germany and Portugal and found that being European was set against the standard “Muslim, refugee, other” but, surprisingly, it also meant a rejection of far-right xenophobic groups. Polynczuk-Alenius’s (2021) study highlights the complexity of “us” vs. “them” as they explore antisemitism and wider Jewish conspiracy narratives connected to the Muslim migrants.

3.2. Crisis of European Foundations

The second major theme that arose from the selected literature was the crisis around Europe as a whole and its foundational ideologies: liberalism, multiculturalism, and secularism. Figure 4 summarizes the two major sub-themes.

3.2.1. Crisis of Foundational Ideologies

Some studies outlined the historical construction of these ideologies and argue that the Muslim presence in Europe is not the cause of the crisis, but their cases bring to light the inherent problems constructed within these ideologies. Mondal (2016) similarly looks at the multicultural “crisis” in liberal democracies, particularly the relationship between freedom of expression and freedom of religion, spurred by the presence of Muslim communities. Taking a historical lens, he argues that the priority of freedom of expression over the freedom of religion was the result of a long process of secularization that impacts current jurisprudence and legislation. He concludes with calling for a “fundamental re-evaluation of what liberty is for, and its relationship to (in)equality and social solidarity” (Mondal 2016, p. 22).3 Also taking a historical approach by analyzing the freedom of press and speech, Khiabany and Williamson (2015, p. 1) argue that it is not that “liberal democracy has been corrupted or impaired… [but the] historical conditions that gave rise to it [meant that it was always] shaped by class interests of an economic elite”. Related to the historical construction of Europe, some argue that the presence of Muslim migrants and refugees make visible Europe’s colonial past that are reproduced in the present in complex ways (Loftsdóttir 2019), which paves the way for more conversations about how to move forward and create a “decolonial present” (Knudsen et al. 2022).

Other studies argue that core European ideologies have either not been successful (real or perceived failure) or are currently being transformed through the Muslim question. An example of the former is Triandafyllidou (2022) who traces the history of multiculturalism in different European countries and documents how most European politicians have claimed that multiculturalism has failed. This backlash, she states, has risen through popular debates surrounding the accommodation of Muslim traditions and practices, the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, and the influx of mainly Muslim refugees. However, she cautiously concludes that there is a difference between rhetoric and policies and there has thus not been a complete dismantlement of multiculturalism in all European states. An example of the latter (European ideologies being transformed) is Wodak (2019), who argues that there is a shift towards the normalization of illiberal democracy, neo-authoritarianism, and the “post-shame” era. This is when politicians spread fear and lies fear and undermine democratic institutions and principles such as free speech, free press, and human rights organizations (Wodak 2019). This turn towards neo-authoritarianism is not only for refugees or new migrants, but also for “undesirable” citizens from migrant backgrounds where the state is stripping away their citizenship rights as part of “national security” (Williamson and Khiabany 2024). Another related key shift has been from multicultural to assimilative integration, where recognition of difference is increasingly being replaced with affirming European values and loyalty (Habti 2014).

As for the way forward, many of these studies argue for a reconceptualization of European ideologies. This is either through “fixing” the inherent issues and genuinely making these ideologies liberal or adapting them to our current multi-ethnic and mobile world (Amiraux 2012). Another solution to get away from what Frunză (2017) calls this “European nightmare” is to take inspiration from the American dream model. Taking a more practical approach, Liebert et al. (2020) compare European Muslim integration with their counterparts in North America and argue that Europe has stronger equitable employment laws as well as public campaigns against Islamophobia for social inclusion. On the other hand, Rudling (2006), writing in the heat of the Danish cartoon crisis, argues that what is needed is a stronger commitment and affirmation to assimilation and liberal democracy, which, he says, are the cornerstones of the European project, as opposed to more multicultural policies that have alienated and fractured societies.

3.2.2. Crisis of the European Project

In other studies, European Muslim migrants and Muslim refugees are one of the causes of decline of Europe as a whole. Kirchick (2017), in his book entitled The End of Europe, paints an ominous picture claiming that Europe is in its deepest crisis since World War II. He argues that “Europe today is breaking apart; it is increasingly undemocratic, economically stagnant, threatened by extremists of all stripes from the illiberal left to the authoritarian right, and slowly heading down the once unfathomable path to war” (Kirchick 2017, pp. 1–2). There are external threats, such as Russia, but stronger internal, domestic threats. The latter are mainly the lack of social cohesion due to the rise of the far right, xenophobia and racism, as well as migration, mainly of Arab Muslims, who he describes as bringing with them antisemitic values and gender norms that at times lead to assaults.

In the breakdown of Europe, some point to the deep fault lines occurring between post-communist eastern and central Europe on the one hand and western Europe on the other due to the formers’ different historical narratives, politics, and memory (Ghodsee 2008; Dora 2020; Narkowicz 2018). One example is Henderson (2017), who looks at Slovakia but says this is similar for the other Visegrad states: Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. He argues that the response of these states to the refugee crisis relative to other western European states was deeply problematic, Islamophobic, and overall anti-immigration. This, he claims is due to the difference in historical formation and party politics, mainly the missing social democratic left, which allows for the rise of more Euroskeptic parties that could potentially dismantle the wider European integration project.

3.2.3. Other

Other studies in this larger second theme of the crisis of European foundations include how this is impacting the Chinese political imagination, confirming their negative perception of Western liberal democracy as well as encouraging similar European right-wing xenophobic tendencies in their own context (Guo and Hu 2019; Zhang 2020). Lastly, a few discussed the crisis of European sciences and phenomenology and the possibility of Islamic interventions as ways forward (Harvey 2023).

3.3. Internal Muslim Crisis

The last major theme that emerged from the systematic literature review was the internal Muslim crisis. This can be divided into three sub-categories, outlined in Figure 5 and xplored in more detail below.

3.3.1. Perceived Crisis Leading to Moral Panics

Some studies focused on the moral panic and perceived internal crisis within European Muslims. One example is Lynch (2013, p. 2), who explores how Muslims in the UK have moved from ethnic minorities with socioeconomic and race-related issues to national security concerns. Alienation, parallel communities, and intergenerational conflict, she argues, are now seen as strong determinants to the radicalization of particularly male Muslim youth. She however normalizes shifts in generation, identity, and culture and argues that this is a general feature of UK Muslims and, with only a few exceptions, not linked to violence and radicalism. She found how British Muslims are embracing “the qualities of Britishness in a unique way…through expressions of their faith they are increasingly incorporating a British identity, both personally and communally” with stability (Lynch 2013, p. 257). Gest (2015), also through a critique of post-modern conceptions of identity formation, debunks the myth of the unstable, volatile, and defiant Muslim stereotype who is undermining hegemonic constructions of national or religious identity. Rather, similar to Clycq (2021), he discusses how migrants simultaneously hold multiple identities and desire a sense of collective belonging rather than seeking subversion.

3.3.2. Real Crisis Leading to Radicalization

In contrast, others argue that there is an identity crisis spurring inside European Muslims that is a security threat. Kosárová and Usiak (2017) state that radical Islamist ideology and a crisis of Muslim identity are the “roots of Muslim rage and the emergence of a terrorist threat” where the Europe in the main target. Gadzhimuradova (2020) claims that Muslims are torn between “European” and “Islamic” values that results in a crisis of identity due to their incompatibility. In a book entitled Haunted Presents, Nachmani (2017) says Muslims are torn between the secular culture of their host country and the heritage of their home country leading to “disconnect, frustration and animosity” that in turn generates specifically antisemitic violence. The concept of “haunting” is a recurrent cross-cutting theme and will be discussed in more detail below.

3.3.3. Dual Crisis

The concept of a dual crisis, where the internal Muslim crisis is linked to other issues within the wider European identity crisis (the third major theme), is another key sub-theme. Wharton (2008), for example, ties together an internal Muslim crisis due to social exclusion to the crisis of European identity through the erosion of the nation state. Both sides, he concludes, must engage in meaningful and mutually respectful dialogue and develop as “social and cultural partners” (Wharton 2008, p. 57). Also emphasizing that integration needs to be a two-way process, Kaya (2022) discusses the co-radicalization of European Muslim and far right native youths as they both grapple with the “perils of modernisation and globalisation…[that makes their environment] alienating, and even humiliating” (Kaya 2022, pp. 53–54). This dual crisis, Andre and Harris-Hogan (2015) argue, stems from the lack of adaption of the European project (the second major theme). In a similar vein, Ramadan (2013) argues that four reasons have contributed to a multidimensional identity crisis of Western society that has in turn caused challenges for Muslims in Europe and in the world: globalization, immigration, the emergence of a new kind of citizen, and social and terrorist violence. To move forward, he calls for meaningful and mutually respectful dialogue, embracement of plurality, and a socially responsible media that will assuage people’s fear and doubt and solidify mutual trust and confidence.

3.3.4. Other

The remaining studies in this internal Muslim crisis theme do not fit as neatly together as the ones above. However, one loose thread that binds some is how different types of “crises” are causing internal changes, or at least some form of rethinking, within European Muslim family structures (Piwko 2023) and Islamic organizations (Amghar and Khadiyatoulah 2017) and communities (Nielsen 2010). One study spoke about the lack of changes and adaption of Muslim organizations despite multiple issues (Mazlum 2023). Lastly, one study was on the epistemological crisis of knowledge amongst Muslims due to European secularism, materialism, and universalism where Islamic theories could be possible remedies (Aljunied 2022).

4. UK Case Study

The governance of Islam and Muslims is an aged but persistent tension in the United Kingdom. The events of 7 October 2023 have escalated this tension. The ruling Conservative government has strengthened the existing security measures in the UK in the face of a large cohort of British citizens, especially university students’ activism and protests, against Israel’s war on Gaza. The government called the security measures “a new robust framework” for governing the country, identifying the UK as a “patriotic, liberal, democratic” country and 7 October 2023 as “the third deadliest terror attack in the world since 1970” (Sunak 2024); the other two being the 9/11 and the 2 July 2005 London bombings. Since many Muslim names and organizations were traced to be affiliated with these events by the UK government, British Muslims tend to be one of the main loci of the new governance policies.

The Muslim population in the UK is now four million, which is 6.0% of the total UK population. The largest Muslim population lives in London, which is 15% of the country’s Muslim population. While migration has contributed to the growth of the Muslim population in the UK since World War II, the main contributor is now the natural process: Muslims hold both birthright and citizenship in the UK (Brown 2000). Muslims have long been integrated into British society and continue to contribute to the growth of the nation. Nevertheless, whatever ways Muslims arrive, survive, or thrive in the UK, they remain “aliens”, “the Other’‘, and “the danger within” (Ahmad and Sardar 2012, pp. 1–3). Specifically, following the Rushdie affair, Islamophobia, anti-Muslim racism, and the minority “Muslim” problem have emerged and cumulatively escalated in the UK’s popular, press, scholarly, and policy discourses.

Often, race and religion are thought of as two separate categories while discussion surrounding the migration and minority issues ensues in diaspora discourses. Abbas reveals an intersectionality between Islam and ethnically and racially different and diverse Muslim minorities in the UK and identifies “Islamophobia as racialized biopolitics” (p. 497). Using the experience of the Muslims in the UK as a test case, he argues that Muslims are often considered undesirable and unassimilable for three reasons: (1) for their embodiment of the most extreme “other”, (2) for posing risk to the national security because of their inherent inclination and legacy to radicalization, and (3) for remaining untrustworthy even when they voice resistance. Such logos is all-pervasive, and it not only subscribes to racialized and biased identity politics but also provides an Islamophobic lens to migration and the citizen potentiality of Muslims. Due to such perspectives, Muslimness becomes something that eventually evolves towards the dangerous tendency to “Islamification” (T. Abbas 2019, 2020, pp. 497–99). The same viewpoint also presents Muslims as those with “little appreciation of good old British values such as freedom of expression” (Ahmad and Sardar 2012, p. 2); Muslim men are often produced, circulated, and merchandised as Islamic “rage boys” with untidy beards, wild visages, and zombie-like bodies (Morey and Amina 2011, pp. 22–27) and Muslim women as oppressed, in need of the West to save from their oppressed cultures and religion (Abu-Lughod 2002, pp. 738–84). Thus, a perceived and constructed Otherness is imposed on Muslims and Islam, which demeans the religion and demonizes Muslims.

The event of 7 October 2023 and the post-October 7 anti-Muslim and anti-Jew violence further brought this perceived Otherness into the purview, raising questions about who Muslims/pro-Palestinian protestors are and what Islam and Islamism are. The PM’s address on extremism on 1 March 2024 can be taken as an important document in this regard. In his address, the PM says:

The faith of Islam, peacefully practised by millions of our fellow citizens, is emphatically not the same thing as the extremist political ideology of Islamism which aims to separate Muslims from the rest of society. Islamist extremists and far rights groups are spreading a poison, that poison is extremism. It aims to drain us of our confidence in ourselves as a people, and in our shared future.

This clarifies that the government views Islam through a bifurcated lens: Islam as a peaceful faith and Islamism as an extremist ideology; those who follow the first are good Muslims, whereas the latter is a handful who systematically and intentionally practice violence to unsettle British democratic values. While this bifurcation is much better than the former tendency to image Islam as a solid category,4 this installs the former discourse of “the enemies within” in the UK in the post-October 7 context (Foster 2024).

This discourse differentiates civil disobedience and peaceful protests from what the pro-Palestinian protesters do: processions, campaigns, and encampments. These protesters have now become “terrorist sympathisers” who carry out “hate marches” on the streets of London. They are labelled “un-British” (Foster 2024), as they disrupt the ideals of the UK’s liberal and inclusive society where “You can be a practising Hindu and a proud Briton as I am. Or a devout Muslim and a patriotic citizen like so many. Or a committed Jewish person and the heart of your local community” (Sunak 2024). This standpoint of the government and their negative portrayals of the pro-Palestinian protesters link to the discourse of freezing frames (Sardar and Davies 2010, p. 239), good Muslim versus bad Muslim dichotomy (Mamdani 2002), and Islam as a peaceful faith versus Islam as Islamism binary. Since the boundaries between the freedom of expression and rights to protest and resistance are often fuzzy and the ruling and the ruled often see them differently, the renewal of the othering process as we/them is again current in the UK’s social landscapes.

Moreover, the Conservative government redefined and updated the definition of extremism in a press release on 14 March 2024. According to the release, in 2011, extremism was defined rather narrowly based only on violent organizational principles, behaviors, and activities promoted and propagated by Islamists and right-wing parties. It then did not recognize that non-violent Islamist extremism should be challenged and countered to tackle the causes of radicalization and to respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism. Therefore, the current definition goes as follows:

Extremism is the promotion or advancement of an ideology based on violence, hatred, or intolerance that aims to (1) negate or destroy the fundamental rights and freedoms of others; (2) undermine, overturn, or replace the UK’s system of liberal parliamentary democracy and democratic rights; or (3) intentionally create a permissive environment for others to achieve the results in (1) or (2).

(Corporate Authors 2024)

This redefinition of extremism is related to the government’s concerns that the pro-Palestinian protestors have transformed anti-Zionism into antisemitism (Harpin 2024). Although many Jews and Jewish organizations in the UK actively supported and joined the Palestine solidarity movements (Haugbølle 2024), the government considered that speaking against Israel’s bombardment on Gaza; wearing a keffiyeh [Palestinian scarf] or watermelon earrings or badges; hoisting Palestinian flags; and chanting “From the River to the Sea” and “Intifada” means the desire to demolish Israel. Sunak (2024), describing the marches, said:

Since October 7, we have seen something else that echoes further afield an appalling rise in antisemitism, a painful reminder…that anti-Zionism all too often morphs into antisemitism. Those who chant “from the river to the sea” are either useful idiots who do not understand what they are saying…or, worse, people who wish to wipe the Jewish state from the map.

This equating of anti-Zionism with antisemitism is a clear revoking of the older paradigm of suppressing and demonizing the Palestinian cause, portraying the dissenters in orientalist words.

Hence, the government’s robust new framework comprises commands and warnings directed to the police, counter-terrorism forces, the Home Office, and its citizens. For example, the government warned its citizens of the extremist ideologies that stem from Islamist terrorists, extreme right-wing terrorism, and left-wing, anarchist, and single-issue terrorism (GOV.UK 2024). It dispensed rejuvenated power to the counter-terrorism department to investigate the Muslim celebratory reactions and the fund-raising activities after October 7 and sanctioned individuals, proscribed Islamic organizations, and stopped/paused funding to suspected organizations, including well-established grassroots organizations like The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) (Home Office 2024). It also offered extra funding to safeguard Jewish children, schools, and synagogues and declared the redoubling of the Prevent Program to stop radicalization and not to leave any space “ungoverned” (Sunak 2024).

The government also attempted to control and contain the protests and activism by bestowing the police the power either to “manage” the protests or “police” them so that none could hijack British democratic values and tear the country apart (Sunak 2024). The PM called the police chiefs to use their power to the fullest to control the mob. He identified the protests outside MP’s house as intimidating and asked the police to respond to such situations instantly (Foster 2024). The government also identified university-wide pro-Palestinian activism as “extremist activities” and called on the universities to stop them. On the same note, it also commanded the Home Office to take measures to prevent those young people from entering the UK as students who will aim to undermine British values as well as warned that “those [who are] on visas choose [who] to spew hate on protests or seek to intimidate people we will remove their right to be here” (Sunak 2024). They identified the training that students received about colonialism, capitalism, genocide, and protest as something wrong and the zeal of young minds, as the debates between Suella Braverman and Fiona Lali reveal (Chapman 2024).

Despite the PM’s declaration that he allocated funds to assure Muslim safety, these decisions raised existential questions and questions of equality and justice regarding Muslim causes. London Mayor Sadik Khan questions the current situation, saying:

When there is any incident of antisemitism, we say that it is wrong and antisemitic. We also condemn misogyny and sexism. Then why is it that when Pakistani-origin Britons and Muslims are attacked, nobody says that it is Islamophobic and anti-Muslim?

(Rehman 2024)

He also expressed his deep anguish over the recent rise of anti-Jew and anti-Muslim racist attacks in London since October 7, with 139 anti-Jewish incidents and 2010 Islamophobic incidents. He said that hate crime has a “chilling effect” on all and is “heartbreaking”, even when you are not a direct victim. When people feel scared to leave their homes, you feel it (Patel and Café 2024). Taj Ali, co-editor of Tribune Magazine, also criticized the PM for his attitudes towards Muslims, saying:

Rishi Sunak is talking about division, about nasty politics. What we’ve seen from his party is the demonization of British Muslims who are disproportionately working class; they care about housing, NHS, child poverty, which is 40pc in places like Rochdale”.

(Rehman 2024)

Moreover, Tom Southerden, Amnesty International British law and human rights director, finds the dispensation of “sweeping power” to the police as alarming, as it “risks delegitimizing the rights of peaceful protest” (Foster 2024).

To summarise, since October 7, two key escalations in the UK politics surrounding Muslims and Islam can be discerned: first, the good/bad Muslim binary has been reinstalled, continuing the othering process and securitization narrative, and second, the redefinition of extremism conflates any criticism of Israel into antisemitism. These escalations reveal the ideational discrepancy between the ruled and the ruling and necessitated rethinking occupation, genocide, freedom of expression, rights to resistance, British values, and democracy. While rethinking these issues, the institutionalization of the “war against Israel-related antisemitism” appears to speak to the Muslim minority crises as well as the European crises through an interplay between identity politics, domestic insecurity, and the geopolitical pressures faced by European states in recent decades. It is clearly seen that on the face of the rise of the pro-Palestine movement, the UK, aligned with the U.S.–Israeli geopolitical axis, has attempted to assert their normative European identity and liberal democratic values. The UK tends to take up the role of the moral arbiter in the international crisis, aiming to atone for the sins of the past in Holocaust, while reclaiming their commitment to human rights, even if that means repressive management of the domestic tension and stifling of the domestic measures. Moreover, the current demographic shift in the UK due to Muslim migration and birthrates causes a wide range of overt and covert tensions. From this perspective, the fight against antisemitism and the domestic repressive measures can be considered a proxy for defending European liberal democracy against both real and perceived external and internal threats.

5. Germany Case Study

On 2 November 2023, the vice-chancellor of Germany, Robert Habeck, spoke about the increased antisemitic hate crimes and antisemitism in general in Germany since October 7. In his speech, he demanded Muslim communities to distance themselves from antisemitism and the actions of Hamas. He noted that “the scale of the Islamist demonstrations in Berlin and other cities in Germany is unacceptable and needs a tough political response”. He also referred to the rights of Muslims living in Germany to protection from right-wing extremist violence and used it as a two-trade argument supporting his demand, emphasizing that:

“Whoever lives here does so according to the rules of this country. And whoever comes here must know that this is how it is and that this will be enforced (…) This means that burning Israeli flags is a criminal offense, as is praising Hamas terror. Any German citizen who does this will have to answer for such offenses in court; those who are not German citizens will also risk their residency status. Anyone who does not yet have a residence permit will have provided a reason to be deported”.

(Habeck 2023)

The German values-based identity that Habeck reproduces in his speech relates to the history of the Holocaust that started in Nazi Germany. The historical responsibility the German state and the public feel for the Holocaust is linked to a special responsibility to protect not only contemporary Jewish life in Germany but also to ensure that the State of Israel can exist without a threat. It is “part of the German raison d’etat”, as was also communicated by the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz during his visit to Tel Aviv in the immediate aftermath of October 7 (Tagesschau 2023). However, Habeck’s speech also exemplifies the value-based discursive frame of the Muslim Crisis in Europe, as it is an official statement foregrounding the political decisions and governing measures catalyzed by October 7 to counteract what in Germany for a longer time now has been called “imported antisemitism”. The term refers to the idea that immigrants, and, in particular, Muslim immigrants, “import” antisemitism with them as they enter Germany.

The spotlight that is put on Muslims and the alleged “imported antisemitism” is not a new post-October 7 phenomenon. Numerous studies and reports have been published, partly commissioned by the German government, during the last 20 years (Özyürek 2023, pp. 78–86). One of the arguments given to this “new” Muslim antisemitism is that German Muslims with a migratory background5 or those new to the country could have been socialized as “antisemites” through popular culture from the Middle East, be it only that it was their parents or grandparents who transferred the antisemitic tropes to them from popular culture (Özyürek 2023, pp. 84–85). However, statistics from the past decade have wavered about whether antisemitism is more prevalent within migrant and Muslim communities in comparison with non-migrant and non-Muslim communities (Arnold 2023). Furthermore, there is also the possibility of antisemitic attitudes being present in the communities of migratory background and Muslim communities as a product of integration, as both Zick (2014) and Arnold (2021, p. 878) have suggested that immigrant Muslims might have merely adopted antisemitic attitudes from German society.

In the post-October 7 context, media reports of the pro-Palestinian demonstrations have contributed to the racialization of “imported antisemitism”, as the headlines are usually accompanied by pictures of people of color amongst the masses holding antisemitic signs. This racialization follows the same patterns as the Islamophobic racial public imagining of a “terrorist”, a label given to brown, Muslim, Others (Beydoun 2023, p. 287). The White, “native” actor remains at the same time unmarked, since “risk” is deemed to originate with the racial “other” (Breen-Smyth 2020, p. 90) Similarly to the privilege of whiteness of not being identified as a terrorist Other and not becoming an object of counter-terrorism measures (Martini 2023), the concept of “imported antisemitism” turns the attention to the Muslim Others, who know are subjected to more scrutiny than their White, native German fellow citizens. This has fed into the prevalent image of these demonstrations being spaces occupied by “Muslims” and especially “immigrant Muslims”, leaving largely without consideration that also so-called native Germans, i.e., phenotypically white Germans, have participated in these occasions. Habeck singles out Muslim communities in his speech. Still, he is not the only politician and leader who has discursively framed Muslim communities as one of the main scapegoats when it comes to antisemitism and demonization of the pro-Palestinian demonstrations and pro-Palestinian advocacy as part of the “problem”. Habeck’s choice of words, “Muslim communities”, thus also signals that he sees Muslims in Germany mainly as an immigrant community, adding another layer to the problematic juxtaposition of the worldview these communities are perceived to present against the worldview that is supposedly presented by the “German community”.

Some of the political decisions that have been made since October 7 follow as an escalation of the European Muslim crisis as a security issue, mimicking measures undertaken in the already existing larger context of the War on Terror. This is to say that similarly, as in the War on Terror, the violent conflict of the Middle East became a transnational security issue, affecting European Muslims’ daily lives as they became a suspect community, and the current Israel/Palestine war has translated into a security issue within German society. The securitization of Islam and Muslims has long been carved into CVE policies, such as reporting “students in danger of radicalisation” on the basis of their religious practice, deemed by their teachers or peers as “suspicious” or “extreme” (Saeed 2019). In the post October 7 context, Germany has taken measures against pro-Palestinian advocacy, such as the ban of stickers with slogans such as “free Palestine” or a map of Israel in the colors of the Palestinian flag, keffiyeh [Palestinian black and white patterned scarf], or other symbols carried by pupils in Berlin schools that according to official pose a “threat to school peace and can be understood as advocating or condoning the Hamas attack against Israel” (Ernst 2023). The symbolic meaning of the keffiyeh has been stigmatized by German media outlets as a symbol of antisemitism and hate of Jews (Kellerhoff 2023). Other measures have dealt with the operations of pro-Palestinian organizations, such as the federal ban of “HAMAS” and “Samidoun—Palestinian Solidarity Network”, following what the federal minister of interior called “celebrations” of the Hamas attack on Israel organized by Samidoun and its sister organization HIRAK e.V. (BMI 2023b).

However, a more significant measure related to the wider discourse on the European Muslim crisis and its connection to “German” values has been the foreseen renewal of the German citizenship test by including ten new questions on the topics of Jewish life in Germany, antisemitism, and the existential right of the State of Israel (Schindler 2024). It is to be noted that while already in June 2021, a resolution by the Bundestag’s Committee on Internal Affairs called for the questions on the naturalization test to be revised and expanded to include the topics of antisemitism, Israel’s right to existence, and the Jewish religion, the final revision of the questions was catalyzed by the Hamas attacks on October 7, the subsequent heightened pro-Palestinian advocacy, pro-Palestinian demonstrations, and the increased antisemitism in the country (ZDF 2024). When writing this article in June 2024, the new questions have not yet been implemented. Importantly, the federal government had already, in August 2023, adopted a draft law on the modernization of the citizenship law, including a new clause that precluded naturalization based on antisemitic acts (BMI 2023a), and the draft continued to be discussed in the Bundestag from November onwards (Deutscher Bundestag 2023). Moreover, such a legal basis against antisemitism had already been anchored in the constitutions of four German federal states as of December 2023 (Janz 2023).

One of the most prominent advocates of setting the acknowledgment of Israel’s right to existence as a prerequisite for naturalization has been the leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Friedrich Merz (Spiegel 2023), which he voiced in the aftermath of October 7. He also suggested that only those Muslim associations that recognize Israel’s right to exist could be partners in the “German Islam Conference”6 (Spiegel 2023). The CDU was in the headlines (Welt 2024) in the spring of 2024 also for their revised basic program, which stated that “Islam that does not share our values and rejects our free society does not belong to Germany” (CDU 2024, p. 38) but also that “The commitment to Israel’s right to exist is expressly part of Germany’s Leitkultur7. We invite anyone who lives according to this Leitkultur and wishes to obtain German citizenship to do so. We expect an explicit commitment to our values, principles, and rules” (CDU 2024, p. 32). Also, Philipp Peyman Engel, editor-in-chief of the Jüdische Allgemeine8, spoke of the threat of “Muslim-antisemitism”, criticizing the “German police overwhelmed by the mass of angry and often violent demonstrators, most of whom are of Arab and Turkish origin” (Peyman Engel 2023). Peyman Engel’s “Muslim-Antisemitism”, in the context of immigration and integration, is supported by statements made by researchers of Islam such as Michael Kiefer, who has claimed that “Muslim communities must acknowledge the right of existence of Israel as many Muslim (immigrants) are raised with antisemitic ideas due to antisemitism being raison d’etat in many Muslim countries” (Welt 2023). Kiefer has “recommended” that mosque communities revise the contents of their classes on religious texts offered to children and youth regarding a critical address of “antisemitic narratives” within Islamic references (Kiefer 2023).

The restriction of these additional questions about Jewish life in Germany and Israel and antisemitism reproduces the stereotypical narrative of “imported” antisemitism brought to Germany by immigrants, and, in particular, immigrants from “Muslim countries”. While citizenship tests can be seen as a prerequisite for “earned citizenship”, as they provide a thicker meaning of citizenship that reflects values that bind citizens together (O’Brien 2016, p. 94), in the context of analyzing the European Muslim Crisis in the post-October 7 discursive space, this addendum poses an attempted remedy for what German society sees as an effect of the Muslim crisis to the extent that “imported antisemitism” is considered to be an inherent characteristic of Muslim immigrants. This exemplifies the escalation of the Islamophobic securitization trope within the European Muslim crisis. Already prior to October 7, Muslims have been a target of racialized biopolitics, wherein their citizenship has been undermined due to an alleged “inherent radicalisation” (T. Abbas 2020). Furthermore, the focus on imported antisemitism discloses bias and exceptionalist thinking, claiming that German society would not have had any antisemitism problem without (Muslim) immigrants.

Yet, antisemitism has been virulent in Germany for centuries. It would go beyond the scope of this article to outline the history of antisemitism in Germany. However, current studies have shown how antisemitism, still 80 years after WWII, reaches deep into German society. In 2023, antisemitic hate crimes increased by 95.53%, with the most frequent bias motivation recorded being right-wing extremism (BKA 2024, pp. 11–12). Moreover, the longitudinal study by Zick and Nico (2023, pp. 69, 72) shows how antisemitic attitudes have generally grown among the German population from the previous years and that these attitudes are by 47.1% represented by individuals who would locate themselves either as extreme-right or rather-right within the political spectrum.

Habeck’s speech frames the revision of citizenship in the context of Germany seeking to present itself as a “’community of value’ in which Germans share common ideals expressed by patterns of behavior” (Anderson 2013, p. 2). The citizenship test is intended to be used by applicants for naturalization to demonstrate their knowledge of the legal and social order and living conditions in Germany. Yet, the test itself does not foresee any changes or added questions related to other forms of racism and discrimination, such as anti-Black racism, antigypsyism, or hostility toward the LGBTQI+ community, nor does it mention anti-Muslim racism in any manner. The latter deserves particular attention in the context of the post-October 7 era, as there has also been an exponential increase in anti-Muslim racist incidents in Germany. As the hate crime report by the German police shows, Islamophobic hate crimes increased in 2023 in comparison to 2022 by 140%, with right-wing extremism being the most frequent (82.72%) recorded bias motivation (BKA 2024, p. 13). At the same time, both in 2022 and in 2023, attacks against mosques were more frequent than those against synagogues (62 vs. 28 in 2023 and 70 vs. 42 in 2022, respectively (BKA 2024, p. 17). It has also been shown that more than half of the public in Germany (52%) perceive Islam as highly threatening or relatively threatening to German society (El-Menouar and Vopel 2023, p. 9). The civil society organization CLAIM recorded in the aftermath of October 7th (9 October–29 November 2023) 187 anti-Muslim racist incidents, including violent attacks, insults, threats, and discrimination, a number that already was higher than the overall number of recorded incidents in 2022 (CLAIM 2023).

With October 7 and the pro-Palestinian demonstrations having fueled the conversation on “imported antisemitism”, the changes foreseen to the citizenship test symbolize the “end point of integration”. This is also what the CDU leader Friedrich Merz has advocated while criticizing that the renewed citizenship law “allows naturalization before integration” (Spiegel 2023). Yet, as it is impossible to ensure that someone’s hypothetical antisemitic views can be resolved by a mere tick-in-a-box offered by the citizenship test, the test is thus seeking what Anderson (2013) calls “super citizenship”. While the test is usually preceded by a preparatory course according to government standards, the immigrants seeking citizenship must, through the test and the interviews connected to the naturalization process, demonstrate exceptional disapproval of antisemitism in a way that native Germans do not have to. When the citizenship test was first introduced in 2008, politicians criticized it for the level of trivia-like questions, claiming that most Germans themselves would not be able to pass the test (Stern 2008). The questions to be added to the German citizenship test thus enforce the ethnonationalism bias demonstrated in citizenship tests made of questions that supposedly prove a “nation” to be culturally and morally bound by a certain set of values (O’Brien 2016, p. 95).

From the above, we can see the framing of the “Muslim crisis” in Germany as a question of values and incompatible worldviews has been reinforced in the post-October 7 context as a heightened awareness of “imported antisemitism”. These can be seen as an escalation of the historical Islamophobic discourse of Muslims and Islam posing a threat to European values and “civilization” (Allen 2010, p. 37), thus justifying governance measures in integration. In Germany, for instance, a project dedicated to taking Middle Eastern/Muslim-background German youth to Auschwitz aimed to “transform their disposition and learn to embrace postwar German civil values such as tolerance, empathy, and democracy” (Özyürek 2023, p. 37). In the post-October 7 German context, the demonstrations and symbols used for pro-Palestinian advocacy have been, if not banned, at least framed as threatening societal peace and the peaceful life of Jewish citizens in Germany. This has also fed to enforcing the social construction of the “German identity” as being inherently connected to the country’s historical responsibility towards the State of Israel, to the extent that its right to exist is frequently named as Germany’s raison d’etat.

Finally, within this larger discourse of “imported (Muslim) antisemitism”, the renewal of the citizenship test continues the racializing anti-Muslim racist discourse of Muslims and Muslim immigrants as problematic regarding values that Germany and western Europe in general frequently have described as being representative of women’s rights, sexual violence, security, and terrorism (Mouritsen 2012; Beck 2021; Vom Bruck 2008; Wigger 2019; Amiraux 2012). The citizenship test is, in this context, a governing tool to enforce the idea that the cultural and values-based differences manifested by unassimilated Muslim migrants are a potential, if not even real, threat to the well-being of the German citizenry (O’Brien 2016, p. 97). While those seeking naturalization have already had to answer questions that subtly target Muslim immigrants, such as whether polygamy is allowed or not in Germany (BAMF 2022), the new questions singling out antisemitism as a form of anthropism increase even more the already created discourse of distrust and anti-Muslim racism based on the claim that Muslim immigrants pose a threat to the German society.

6. Conclusions

This paper began with a comprehensive overview of the multiple and intersecting themes surrounding the European Muslim crisis. It found three core themes of the European Muslim crisis: a crisis of European identity, a crisis of European foundational ideologies, and an internal Muslim crisis. It then looked closer into the political and public discourses in the UK and German context. The two countries serve as an example of the escalation post October 7 has brought about in the racialized public imagination of who constitutes a “threat to the society” in terms of values. The similarities of the discourse in both countries show transnational trends of framing the European Muslim Crisis as a problem of governance and the increasing shift to values-based politics and citizenship. These values are produced and reproduced in the narratives of what it means to be “German” or “British”, in manifestations of cultural nationalism that relies on present-day politics instead of ancient memory (T. Abbas 2004, p. 34). A person’s “Europeanness” is proved through specific, albeit changing, set of values where the Israel/Palestine issue has now solidified into another defining marker and “radical antisemitism” as another internal security threat. Hence, the question of Muslim belonging and integration, alongside the dominant securitization paradigm, has escalated in the post-October 7 context.