An Analysis of the Religious Solidarity Discourses Regarding the Syrian Refugees in Türkiye

Abstract

Following the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, a massive migration of Syrian nationals to Türkiye has been a significant phenomenon. This situation has become a problematic issue, as the massive presence of Syrian refugees in Türkiye has become an important part of the domestic political agenda. The politicization of the refugee issue has long since presented a duality of conflicting opinions among the Turkish society, whereas it has led to political debates between pro-government and opposition groups. In light of these developments, Turkish government elites have produced discourses of religious solidarity with the aim of providing tolerance and social acceptance for Syrian refugees and thus legitimizing the open door policy of the government toward these refugees. The aim of this study is to analyze and categorize the themes that constitute the basis of the discourses of religious solidarity regarding Syrian refugees in Türkiye. In this context, a second aim is to demonstrate how these themes have been welcomed in a positive manner by their adoption and recognition by Turkish society. To these aims, governmental discourses of religious solidarity and a sample consisting of 980 posts on the digital platform X have been analyzed by using the critical discourse analysis technique and have been categorized under two discursive themes, namely the ensar–muhacir analogy and the emphases on the Ottoman legacy. The conformity between these discourses and the government’s ideological orientation and the degree to which these discourses have been welcomed and adopted by the Turkish society have been discussed in detail.

1. Introduction

Migration has been a very significant phenomenon throughout mankind’s history. Since the earliest beginnings of social and political organization in human communities, migration waves have taken place due to a variety of reasons emanating from changing political, economic, social or environmental conditions. In our modern day world, it has especially been political and economic conditions sparked such migration waves on a global scale, and the resulting changes in the ethno-demographic balance of host societies have many times led to serious problems for many host states.

Türkiye1 as a nation state has been one of the host countries that h received various migration waves during its history, since the earliest years of its foundation. During the mutual population exchange with Greece in 1924, more than 300,000 ethnic Turks were received by the Turkish government (Çağaptay 2006). Other following migration waves during the 20th century have possessed the characteristics of forced migration, as members of ethnic groups with a Turkish or Muslim identity sought refuge in Türkiye, escaping cultural assimilation or warfare conditions that prevailed in their home countries. Following the foundation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after the Second World War, 240,000 ethnic Turks and Muslim Bosniaks who were dissatisfied with the restrictive cultural policies of the regime migrated to Türkiye in various periodical waves (Memic 2016). Similarly, more than 300,000 Bulgarian Turks migrated to Türkiye, escaping the assimilationist policies of the Bulgarian government (Coşkun 2001). Similar forced migration events took place during the 1990s, with 20,000 Muslim Bosniaks and 15,000 Kosovan Albanians migrating to Türkiye due to the warfare conditions in Bosnia and Kosovo (Ülker and Efe 2021).

At the beginning of the 2010s, political developments in the Arab world led to a series of events that eventually challenged the decades-long experience of the Turkish state in dealing with international migration. Massive protest movements against the government, which broke out in Tunisia in 2010, ignited a transboundary sociopolitical movement that, in a short while, spread to other Arab countries like Libya, Egypt and Yemen. These protest movements, named the Arab Spring, condemned the oppressive regimes in their countries and demanded a political change, resulted in the overthrow of the governments in these countries. However, the situation in Syria, another country influenced by the Arab Spring, did not result in the same way. The struggle between the Syrian government forces and various opposition groups evolved into a multi-party civil war, as armed opposition groups began to fight with each other as well (Saylan and Aknur 2023).

While the single-party government in Türkiye, constituted by the Justice and Development Party (AKP)2, had adopted a policy of “zero problems with neighbors” within its foreign politics agenda, they forsook this policy in light of the developments in Syria. After a series of memorandums to the Syrian government demanding the termination of state violence against civilians, the Turkish government terminated its diplomatic relations with Syria and began to openly support the Syrian National Council, which was the main representative organ of the Syrian opposition (Salmaşur and Şahin 2020).

The civil war in Syria not only altered the foreign policy balance of the Turkish state but also led to a massive migration wave that deeply affected both the Turkish state and its society. Following the beginning of the events in Syria, a massive migration of asylum- seeking Syrian citizens into Turkish territories began to take place. What started with only 300 Syrian citizens in April 2011 grew to enormous numbers very quickly (Şahin and Aydemir 2018). As the number of Syrian asylum seekers reached levels measured in the hundreds of thousands, and their duration of stay remained unclear, the AKP government, which had adopted an open door policy toward the Syrians, began to face public criticism from various segments of Turkish society.

In fact, the AKP government had welcomed the migration of Syrians with the assumption that the events in Syria would soon settle with the overthrow of the Assad regime and that the Syrian asylum seekers would return to their country. This assumption was based on the previous governmental changes in Tunisia and Egypt during the Arab Spring, which had resolved in a short period of time (Doğanoğlu 2022). However, as the following events proved that the Assad government would not easily give up, the temporariness of the Syrians’ stay in Türkiye emerged as an issue questioned in Turkish public opinion. A second issue was the fact that Türkiye had never received such a massive migrant population before in its history. Finally, there was the problem of identification for the Syrians on legal and official grounds. Due to the geographical limitations of the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951 on the legal status of refugees recognized by the Turkish state as a signatory party, the question of how these Syrians would officially be identified emerged. The Turkish government, until resolving this legal issue by initiating new regulations, referred to the Syrians in Türkiye as “guests”, a term that had no legal validity but possessed a deep cultural meaning for Turkish society. As hospitality and tolerance towards guests is a traditional cultural norm, which, in Durkheimian terms, is regarded as a sacred pattern of behavior by Turkish society, the use of the term “guest” at this earlier stage was a pragmatic move in convincing the Turkish public that the Syrians’ stay in Türkiye was temporary and that, during their stay, they should be regarded and treated as guests in conformity with the dominant cultural codes of the society.

The use of the term “guest” in identifying Syrian refugees soon proved insufficient to appease public concerns about their presence in Türkiye. In this respect, the AKP leadership developed new discourses based on religious concepts and historical traditions. These discourses included religious and historical elements emphasizing religious solidarity, particularly addressing the conservative segments of the Turkish society who constituted the core electorate of the AKP.

The massive migration of Syrians to Türkiye, while altering the domestic political, economic, social and ethno-demographic balances in the country, also provided a rich source of research for academics. This situation can be realized in the increasing number of academic studies regarding Syrian refugees in Türkiye. Among these studies, discourses on Turkish public opinion regarding Syrian refugees have been a significant research topic and a rising academic trend since the earliest beginnings of the Syrian refugee issue in Türkiye. The samples used in these discourse-based studies consist of speeches by political elites (Devran and Özcan 2016; Saylan and Aknur 2023), news in print media (Göker and Keskin 2015; Efe 2015; Doğanay and Keneş 2016) and posts by individuals (Yıldırım and Tekdemir 2015; Özdemir and Öner-Özkan 2016; Erdoğan-Öztürk and Işık-Güler 2020) on various social media platforms. Regarding the analysis of religious solidarity discourses in particular, Polat’s (2018) research, based on presidential speeches and parliamentary debates, is a significant study.

The basic aim of this study is to analyze and categorize the themes that constitute the basis of the discourses of religious solidarity regarding Syrian refugees in Türkiye. In this context, a secondary aim of this study is to demonstrate how these themes have been welcomed in a positive manner upon their adoption and recognition by Turkish society.

2. Materials and Methods

In this qualitative study, the critical discourse analysis (CDA) technique has been used to analyze the discourses of religious solidarity regarding Syrian refugees in Türkiye. Critical discourse analysis is a methodological approach developed by pioneer academics like Teun A. van Dijk, Ruth Wodak, Norman Fairclough, Theo van Leeuwen and Gunther Kress, who focused on discourses as research material. CDA aims to reveal what is meant by and hidden in the discourse itself. It is assumed by critical discourse analysts that, beneath all discourses, there is a hidden fundamental thought or ideology (Eagleton 1991). Therefore, CDA aims to disclose power and ideology through a systematic analysis of semiotic elements in written, oral and visual texts (Wodak and Meyer 2009). The mutual relationship between discourses and ideology has been deeply emphasized by van Dijk (2000) in terms of the discourses’ influence on the reproduction of ideologies and, conversely, the influence of ideologies on discourses. According to van Dijk, there are three general dimensions of discourse to be considered in CDA: the meaning implied and/or hidden in the discourse; the form in which the discourse has been presented and the action/interaction that is implied, aimed for and anticipated by the discourse itself (van Dijk 2000).

When we look at the discourse-based studies in the Turkish academic realm regarding Syrian refugees in Türkiye, there is an obvious trend towards analyzing discourses with negative responses and attitudes by political elites and the public toward Syrian refugees in most of them (Yıldırım and Tekdemir 2015; Özdemir and Öner-Özkan 2016; Doğanay and Keneş 2016; Erdoğan-Öztürk and Işık-Güler 2020; Saylan and Aknur 2023). Although, positive discursive responses and attitudes, along with negative ones, have been mentioned in various studies (Efe 2015; Göker and Keskin 2015; Devran and Özcan 2016), there is a lack of studies that only focus on positive discourses, with the exception of Polat’s (2018) study, which analyzed the positive approach toward Syrian refugees in the discourses of the AKP government equipped with elements of religious solidarity.

As stated earlier in the aims of this study, the analysis of religious solidarity themes within the discourses of the AKP government and the positive reflection of these discourses on Turkish society makes this a comprehensive study that combines data from two main sources of material, each representing the attitudes of two different universes: the government and the public. In this respect, the mutual relationship between ideology and discourse, as emphasized by van Dijk, is aimed to be revealed in the case of Syrian refugees in Türkiye. Therefore, van Dijk’s CDA model will be used in this study.

To this aim, there are two sets of data that have been collected and used in this study. The first set consists of discourses by government elites regarding Syrian refugees in their public speeches and government publications related to the Syrian refugee issue. These government publications and post-2018 speeches by various government elites constitute an original contribution following Polat’s (2018) study, which included pre-2018 speeches only. All the data emanating from these governmental sources have been gathered from the internet through searches using the necessary keywords.

The second set of data consists of social media posts by individual accounts on the social media platform X, formerly known as Twitter. The aim of integrating this second set of data is to constitute a sample that will frame the analysis of how government-based discourses of religious solidarity have been adopted by Turkish social media users. Considering the popularity and relatively more efficient role of X in political debates and opinion-making processes in Türkiye compared to other social media platforms (Kıyan and Kocager 2020), X has been chosen as the main platform for data collection. In this respect, individual posts on X including elements of religious solidarity between June 2013 (following the first initiation of religious solidarity discourses by then-Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan) and October 2023 have been collected through searches on X by using relevant keywords and hashtags like #dinkardeslerimiz (our religious fellows), #suriyelikardeslerimiz (our Syrian siblings), Suriyeliler+Osmanlı (Syrians+Ottoman), Suriyeliler+Çanakkale (Syrians+Çanakkale), #ensar and #muhacir. Out of a total number of 2112, 1132 posts have been eliminated for being posted by anonymous and/or fake accounts. The remaining 980 posts by real person accounts have thus been selected through purposive sampling.

3. Discourses of Religious Solidarity Regarding the Syrian Refugees in Türkiye

As of June 2023, there are around 3.6 million Syrians under protection in Türkiye, making it the country hosting the largest community of Syrian refugees in the world (Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Turkey 2023). Such a large number has resulted from Türkiye’s open door policy in welcoming these Syrian refugees. Faced with public criticism regarding the issue of Syrian refugees, AKP elites have developed new discourses to legitimize the government’s migration policies and practices (Doğanoğlu 2022). As Polat (2018) put it:

“Since the start of the conflict in Syria, Turkey followed an open door policy, which was accompanied by a discourse emphasizing religious solidarity and humanitarian values. This official discourse, presenting Turkey as a protector of fellow Muslims, generally resonates well with the conservative and religious segments of society. However, in a society characterized by various ethnic, sectarian and ideological cleavages, the arrival of Syrian refugees has become entangled with existing identity debates and conflicts.”

(Polat 2018)

The concepts of religious solidarity and Türkiye’s role as the protector of fellow Muslims can be categorized under two main themes that constitute the core of these discourses. According to the findings of this study, statements by government and bureaucratic elites, along with various NGOs aiding the Syrian refugees and the counterparts of these discourses among the Turkish society, read through social media, thrive around these two main themes. Although both themes are interrelated, the first theme developed relatively more about religious solidarity and tradition, while the second theme focused more on historical/religious tradition and identity. These two main discursive themes are, namely, the ensar–muhacir analogy and the Ottoman legacy.

3.1. Discursive Theme: Ensar–Muhacir Analogy

The ensar–muhacir duality is one of the oldest references in defining religious solidarity in Islamic literature. Within its literary meaning, ensar refers to “those who help” (Karagöz 2015). Muhacir, on the other hand, refers to the Muslims who migrated from Mecca to Medina in 622 A.D. (Gelişgen 2015). The religious meaning given to these two terms emanates from Islamic history. According to this, the first community of Muslims, namely the sahabi, were suffering from the cruelty and oppression by the pagan elites in Mecca. Upon God’s instructions, they decided to migrate to a safer place. The best option in this regard was the city of Yathrib, later to be named Medina, which was already home to a tiny native community of Muslim converts. After a series of agreements with the Muslims of Medina, Meccan Muslims began to migrate to Medina, thus initiating a migration phenomenon with a sacred meaning, namely hicret. Prophet Muhammad, as the leader of the Muslim community, devised a program of social coexistence for the immigrant and native Muslims based on the dual identities of ensar and muhacir. According to this, the ensar would help the muhacir Muslims by hosting them in their homes and sharing their economic resources with them, and in return, the muhacir would assist the ensar in their economic activities, such as working in their agricultural fields (Dinçer 2020).

The coining of the terms ensar and muhacir in terms of denoting these two Muslim communities with different local origins was also a move toward unifying these Muslim groups through a network of religious solidarity. Tribes were the dominant form of social organization and expression of collective identity among the Arabs of that time, and as the members of the Muslim communities possessed different tribal origins, the ensar–muhacir duality served as a unifying element or a supra-identity for the entire Muslim community (Demircan 2013). These two terms lost their practical significance after the overall Islamization of Medina and Mecca, but the solidarity between the ensar and muhacir remained as the first and most significant case of religious solidarity in Islamic literature and the collective memories of Islamic societies.

When the Turkish government began to face the problems and public criticism stemming from the rising number of Syrian refugees in Türkiye, AKP elites developed a new discourse based on the model devised by Prophet Muhammad during and after the hicret period. This discourse, which emphasized religious solidarity based on an analogy with the ensar–muhacir case, was first introduced by then-prime minister of Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, via a post on his official X3 account, which read as follows:

“This nation has been the ensar for the oppressed throughout its history. Dating back to centuries ago, we have become both muhacir and ensar under different circumstances.”

(R.T. Erdoğan 2013)

Erdoğan expressed the same ensar–muhacir analogy in his speech to the press during his visit to the tent camp for refugees in the city of Gaziantep (Türkiye Kendisine Yönelik 2014). Abdullah Gül, then-president of Türkiye, also gave a speech to the press in the city of Kilis addressing the Syrian refugees that stressed a similar solidarity theme as follows:

“We are children of the same geography, but our states are different. We have a historical tie which requires us to closely follow, take care of and embrace each other when necessary, just as it is today… I just told your Turkish brothers in Kilis: You have opened your homes to your Syrian siblings and embraced them This reminds us the case of the ensar and muhacir in Islamic history. Unfortunately, we are experiencing these events, but we are glad that there is a nation who can embrace their siblings.”

(Cumhurbaşkanı Gül’den Suriyeli Mültecilere 2013)

It can easily be noticed that Gül’s statement, along with the ensar–muhacir analogy, also emphasized another religious element by the phrase “same geography”. Here, geography is clearly mentioned not in physical terms but rather in religious terms, which places Türkiye and Syria in the same Islamic civilizational geography. It can also be claimed that, with the phrase “our states are different”, Gül indirectly drew another analogy with a slogan that is very popular among Turkish society. The slogan “one nation, two states” is especially popular among the nationalist segments of Turkish society to denote national solidarity between Türkiye and Azerbaijan (Darıcı 2020). By using this phrase, Gül seemed to draw a similar link between Syrian and Turkish people, not on grounds of ethnocultural bonds but of common religious identity.

According to van Dijk, within the meaning of a discourse, local coherence is an important characteristic. The meanings of the sentences are related in a local or global context (van Dijk 2000). In the statements above by both Erdoğan and Gül, local coherence is an obvious element in their identification of Turks and Syrians as siblings who share the same identity, as seen in Gül’s emphasis on the phrase “children of the same geography”. Through this local coherence, the issue of Syrian refugees is presented as a local phenomenon, rather than a foreign or global one, which directly interests Türkiye and should be treated as a religious/cultural responsibility.

Following Gül’s speech, Ahmet Davutoğlu, then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, also mentioned the ensar–muhacir analogy during a live speech on TV in 2014:

“If you have a big heart and see those people as your siblings, you don’t consider them as a burden… Our government has never viewed our Syrian siblings as a burden. We have welcomed them as those entrusted by God. We approached them like ensar. They are muhacir and we are ensar.”

(Arıçam 2021)

While Davutoğlu emphasized the religious solidarity theme in his statements, he also addressed the growing criticism among the Turkish society of the economic burden created by the arrival of Syrian refugees. The use of a religious solidarity theme apparently aimed to appease such criticism and foster tolerance and sympathy toward the government policies regarding Syrian refugees.

Public criticism and suspicion toward the government’s immigration policies began to grow as the Syrian refugees became an important part of the political agenda in Türkiye. With other political parties developing critical discourses against the government and, along with the economic burden, the growing dissatisfaction among the Turkish society toward the Syrian refugees, emanating from issues of public security, positive discrimination and cultural conflict, urged the AKP elites to cling to the religious-based discourses. Under this atmosphere, in which the issue of Syrian refugees turned into a politicized matter, religious solidarity themes were increasingly used by the government to address such political criticism. The concentration of the domestic political agenda around the issue of Syrian refugees has especially become apparent during general and local election campaigns since 2015. One example of such a political use can be read in the following words of Erdoğan:

“We are a nation with the consciousness of ensar. We see all our siblings coming to our country as muhacir and welcome them. We open our homes to them and share our bread… They (opposition party leaders)4 know nothing about ensar and muhacir. They don’t know how wide open our nation’s hearts are.”

(Onlar Ensar Muhacir Ne Demek Bilmezler 2015)

Another example in this context is as follows:

“Brothers, I repeat again. As long as we are in power in this country, we will not push these muhacir people back in accordance with what Mr. Kemal5 or his advocates say… We are coming from a different civilization. And in this civilization, there is ensar and muhacir. We have been raised with that ensar and muhacir culture. Therefore, we will keep protecting our brothers who fled the risk of death and sought refuge in our country just as we opened our gates to them in the first place.”

(Erdoğan: Ülkemizde Muhacir Olarak 2022)

According to van Dijk, within the meaning of a discourse, contrast is another important characteristic. Emphasizing the dialectical nature of ideologies as outcomes of conflictual interactions between different groups, van Dijk referred to the polarizing element in discourses as contrast. According to this, the distinction between the in-group and out-group elements of the discourse, which can be referred to as “us” and “them”, shapes the meaning of the discourse. For him, the strategy by establishing such a contrast is based on emphasizing the good things about “us” and the negative things about “them”, thus enabling a positive self-representation and a negative representation of the other (van Dijk 2000). The phrases of “they” and “Mr. Kemal and his advocates” by Erdoğan in his speeches expose such a contrast based on the ideological and political conflict between the AKP government and the political opposition parties, especially the Republican People’s Party (CHP) led by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. Thus, these phrases present the ideological/political conflict between the CHP, as the founding party of the Turkish Republic with a secularist ideology, and the AKP, with a conservative ideology based on religious and traditionalist elements. By positioning CHP leadership in the category of the “other” and condemning them as those who do not care much about religious solidarity, Erdoğan is, at the same time, positioning the AKP in the category of “us” and seeking public acceptance and support for their refugee policies by localizing the issue as a “Muslim” responsibility.

Apart from the statements by government elites, other initiatives by the AKP government in legitimizing the immigration policies of the government via the use of religious solidarity themes can also be found in certain publications by the Party organization. These publications, in the form of booklets and pamphlets, have been structured with religious-based discourses that utilize the ensar–muhacir theme. One example of these publications is the booklet titled “Fellowship Knows No Boundaries: Social Policies for International Migration and Harmonisation”, issued by the AKP Directorate of Social Policies in 2018. The emphases on religious fellowship and solidarity in the booklet can be read through the following statements:

“We have regarded solidarity with our Syrian siblings in our country as a humanitarian responsibility. We have mobilized all of our facilities and opened our gates, homes and hearts with a ensar–muhacir spirit to our Syrian siblings who escaped a violent war and found refuge in our country…

… Approximately %93 of our refugee siblings has been living in our cities in peace and security with us. We are providing them with all opportunities for their survival. This situation is the outcome of our open door policy which depends on benevolence and an understanding of ensar–muhacir6.

(Kardeşlik Sınır Tanımaz 2018)

While the AKP leadership used the ensar–muhacir analogy in various other speeches, the same theme has been emphasized in statements by various civil bureaucrats as well. The AKP, after turning the Turkish political arena into one with a dominant party regime following successive election victories, has also successfully restructured the state bureaucracy to align with the party’s political vision. Therefore, it is not surprising to see the same analogy used in speeches and statements by various state bureaucrats. Among this bureaucratic mechanism, one institution that has come to the fore due to its direct relevance in religious activities is the Presidency of Religious Affairs. This official institution, authorized for Islamic religious services, has been using the theme of religious fellowship through various communication means, including sermons in mosques, posts on its social media accounts and its visual and print media sources such as Diyanet TV and various publications. In journals published by the Presidency of Religious Affairs, phrases like “our Syrian siblings”, “our refugee siblings” and “ensar–muhacir fellowship” have frequently been mentioned concerning Syrian refugees (Ülker and Efe 2021). Among these activities including religious fellowship and solidarity themes, sermons are particularly significant, because the themes for all sermons delivered in Turkish mosques are centrally determined by the Presidency of Religious Affairs. These religious themes target not only Turkish citizens but also Syrian refugees. The Refugees Circular dated 15 September 2015 outlines the activities to be initiated by the Presidency, which includes religious, social and educational services for Syrian refugees. This circular specifies that sermons in regions with high refugee populations would be delivered in their mother tongue, ensuring accessibility and understanding. Moreover, the themes of fellowship, unity, coexistence, solidarity and peace would be systematically addressed in these sermons (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı 2015), reflecting the AKP government’s ongoing efforts to promote religious solidarity and a sense of community among both Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees.

Apart from the government and the civil bureaucracy, another category of actors that utilized the ensar–muhacir theme is the NGOs in Türkiye focused on providing aid and assistance for refugees. Numerous NGOs in Türkiye have taken on the task of helping refugees, and they can be categorized based on their purposive structure and the discourses they adopt concerning refugees (Türk 2016; Altındiş 2019). While some of these NGOs present a purely humanitarian approach regardless of the religious identities of refugees, others—specifically, faith-based organizations—incorporate religious elements into their statements and aid campaigns. One study about the role of NGOs in aiding refugees revealed that religious themes like the ensar–muhacir analogy; religious obligations like zekat and sadaka7 and references like religious fellows, siblings and mazlum8 have frequently been mentioned by these faith-based organizations (Demirdağ 2018). This situation becomes apparent in the discourses presented by these NGOs on their websites9.

The posts on X analyzed in this study reveal a high similarity with the discourses developed and used by government elites and other actors mentioned above. Of the 980 posts in the sample, 516 posts directly used phrases that emphasized religious solidarity and Muslim identity. Phrases like “our Muslim siblings”, “ensar and muhacir” and “Muslim duty” have been used in the texts in the same way they are used by governmental actors. Local coherence is highly visible in these posts, as they frequently include the pronouns “we” and “us”, which directly specify the refugee issue as a matter to be handled by Muslims, thus defining the Turkish society in the same ideological/cultural way as the AKP did. Another discourse characteristic visible in some of these posts is contrast, which can be evaluated within the context of ideological polarization in Türkiye. Of the 516 posts with references to Islamic brotherhood and solidarity, 198 posts directly included phrases that developed polarizing language and content. These 198 posts condemned the negative approach of the opposition parties and their electorate towards the Syrian refugees as a profane attitude and, on the contrary, praised the refugee policies and discourses of the AKP. This situation emerges as an obvious reflection of the political polarization in Türkiye on the Syrian refugee issue. Another possible condemnation in these posts, although not as obvious and directly presented as in the case of the government vs. opposition dimension, is the implication that, whereas those who adhere to the notions of Muslim brotherhood and solidarity and embrace the Syrian refugees are true Muslims, those who do not act in the same way are not. Such an implication is visible in some posts through phrases like “a true Muslim” and “those who don’t know about ensar and muhacir”.

3.2. Discursive Theme: The Emphases on the Ottoman Legacy

A second theme of religious solidarity evident in the discourses regarding Syrian refugees stems from the pre-republican history of Türkiye, which is directly linked to the Ottoman image preserved in both historical literature and the collective memory of Turkish society. This emphasis on the Ottoman legacy, much like the ensar–muhacir theme, draws an analogy between the protector role and attitude of Ottoman administrations toward asylum seekers and the current role and attitude of the Turkish government toward Syrian refugees. This attitude of the Ottoman monarchs has frequently been presented as a model and tradition that has ascribed a historical responsibility on the Turkish government and society of protecting and aiding refugees.

A comprehensive example of the Ottoman legacy theme can be seen in one of the speeches by then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2015, as he stated that:

“For us, those who escape cruelty and come to Turkey to save their lives and honor are all in the same status of real brothers. Throughout history, this geography has served as a refuge for all who escaped cruelty. Jews exported from Spain headed for these lands. These lands embraced all those who were oppressed in the Caucasus regardless of their religions, culture and beliefs. For all our oppressed siblings from the Balkans to Turkistan, this territory has become a home… This legacy inherited from our ancestors will be inherited to our descendants with glory.”

(Onlar Ensar Muhacir Ne Demek Bilmezler 2015)

This emphasis on Ottoman era practices regarding immigrants and refugees has frequently been utilized in various speeches by Erdoğan, even during the early years of the Syrian refugee issue in Türkiye. In 2019, the Turkish Presidency published a book titled The New Turkey Vision: The Refuge for the Oppressed, which compiled speeches given by Erdoğan at international and national meetings between 2003 and 2014. In many of these speeches, the role of Türkiye as a regional power and protector state is highlighted, along with references to its Ottoman heritage and the ensar–muhacir analogy (Yeni Türkiye Vizyonu 2019). Apart from the speeches, the title of the book also gives us clues about the utilization of religious solidarity discourses in refugee policies. The term “oppressed” in the original title is mazlum, which has a deep cultural meaning in the collective consciousness of Turkish society emanating from religious culture. The Islamic tradition of helping the oppressed, which has its roots in sources of Islamic teaching like the verses in the Holy Quran or the hadith10, and historical practices of this type of solidarity since the times of the prophet Muhammad equipped this term with a religious essence. This tradition of welcoming and protecting the oppressed was maintained by various Ottoman monarchs throughout history who received immigrants from not only Muslim but from non-Muslim communities as well.

The same emphasis on the Ottoman past and legacy is evident in a pamphlet titled “The Right to Take Refuge As a Human Right”, issued by the AKP Presidency of Human Rights in 2019 (Bir İnsan Hakkı Olarak 2019). The pamphlet, while re-mentioning the ensar–muhacir analogy, also includes various emphases on the Ottoman past. Phrases like “Our civilization is one of tolerance” and “The frontiers of our country are different from the frontiers of our hearts” refer to the Ottoman past when Syria was an Ottoman territory and the Ottoman administrations generally presented a welcoming attitude toward refugees from various regions. The term “tolerance” becomes significant to the extent that it has frequently been used as a theme to denote the treatment of refugees by the Ottomans. Such a theme of tolerance had previously been used during the celebrations of the 500th anniversary of the arrival of Sephardic Jews in Ottoman territories. The basic theme of these celebrations, that served a political purpose of bettering the international prestige of the Turkish state, was tolerance presented by the Ottoman sultans to Jewish immigrants who were expelled from the Iberian Peninsula in 1492 (Bali 2009).

The pamphlet included a final religious-based statement as “This migration issue is a test for us to prove our humanity”. Here, the term “test” can be interpreted as a reference to the traditional Islamic teaching, which states that all that a human being does and experiences in this Earthly life is a test that will determine his/her judgement and place in the afterlife. Therefore, the positive treatment of refugees is indirectly presented as a religious obligation that had also been practiced by their ancestors throughout history.

Local coherence as a characteristic of discourses is visible in these emphases on Ottoman legacy. Ottoman past, as an important element of the AKP’s conservative ideology and a cultural/historical element preserved in the collective memory of Turkish society, draws the boundaries of this local coherence in two ways. First, the historical fact that modern day territories of both Türkiye and Syria were under the rule of the former Ottoman Empire is reminded, and thus, a historical/cultural link between Turkish and Syrian societies is emphasized. Secondly, Ottoman toleration and support for refugees from any region is reminded as a historical responsibility to the Turkish society, who are considered and often referred to as “Ottoman descendants” in Turkish conservative discourse.

Placing these emphases on Ottoman legacy in a category of the religious theme may seem to be misleading for some in the first place, as it might be said that these emphases sound historical/political rather than religious in their essence. Such interpretations can be overridden if these emphases are to be read in three different contexts.

First, it should be remembered that the term “Ottoman” is an important cultural and political symbol in the collective memory of Turkish society. As a theocratic state ruled under Islamic law for centuries, Ottoman past is still owned and favored by various conservative segments of Turkish society. Dissatisfaction with the secular nation state regime has led to both cultural and political responses among some conservative and Islamist segments of Turkish society who idealize the Ottoman past in terms of its glorious and mighty times under the rule of Caliph sultans and the dominance of religion in every field of social life (Çağaptay 2006). Therefore, the term Ottoman has become associated with Islam or has become a direct symbol of Islamic sociopolitical order in the eyes of these segments that also constitute a significant part of the right wing electorate in Türkiye. The fact that the Ottoman Empire was the driving force of Islam during its historical presence also contributes to the development of such a perception. Therefore, such references to Ottoman past and legacy directly invoke a positive sense of religion.

Secondly, the sociopolitical organization of Ottoman society during its classical era was designed in accordance with religious laws and customs. Ottoman society, as a multicultural one consisting of various ethnic and religious communities, was governed under the millet system, which divided the Ottoman subjects into categories based on religious identities. According to this, Ottoman society consisted of four main millets, namely the Muslim, Orthodox, Armenian11 and Jewish millets. This system, which officially operated until the middle of the 19th century, regulated the legal, economic and political relations between the state and its subjects and granted a sort of autonomy in communal affairs and organization for each millet. Muslims, as the biggest millet in terms of population, included Muslim groups like ethnic Turks, Arabs, Albanians, Bosniaks, etc. Members of each millet were only recognized under these religious identities, regardless of their ethnic origins (Ortaylı 2006). Following the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the political elites of the new state designed a secular nation state model and initiated cultural policies to reshape the society to be unified under a common national identity fueled by the principles of Turkish nationalism. A policy of cultural assimilation with the element of Turkishness at its core was applied to citizens with ethnic origins other than that of Turkish by utilizing cultural means such as formal education, popularization of the Turkish language and an official history discourse that concentrated on Turkish history (Çağaptay 2006). Therefore, while the new republican regime was based on a secular nation state model promoting a sense of belonging evolving around a homogeneous cultural identity, former Ottoman regime was based on an Islamic model which tolerated a multi-cultural society consisting of various religious groups regardless of ethnicity. In this sense, while there was no difference between ethnic Syrians and Turks as of being a member of the same Muslim millet in the Ottoman model, in the republican model, Syrians and Turks are considered as two separate groups with different characteristics of national identity and citizenship, regardless of common religious identity.

Thirdly, the changes in the foreign policy strategies of Türkiye in the beginning of the 2000s under the AKP rule emphasized a direct connection with the Ottoman past, which put forward the phenomenon of Islamic religious identity. This change or shift in Turkish foreign policy, conceptualized under the name “neo-Ottomanism”, has constituted a significant framework for the initiation of religious solidarity discourses concerning the Syrian immigrants. As Polat (2018) put it, “Turkey’s policy towards Syrian refugees cannot be understood without reference to its foreign policy in the Middle East” (Polat 2018). This neo-Ottomanist move, as of opening a new era in Turkish foreign policy, has formed the foundations of the issue of Syrian refugees.

During the 1990s, rapprochement with Europe and membership to the European Union formed the basic priority of Turkish foreign policy for both the governments and the public opinion in Türkiye. Starting with the AKP’s second term in government since 2007, Turkish foreign policy began to undergo a shift from decades-long traditional introvert policies toward positioning Türkiye as an active regional actor in the post-Cold War era. The earliest signs of such a shift were seen in a public declaration by Emre Taner, then-Undersecretary of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), who criticized Türkiye’s traditional foreign policy and stressed the necessity for a move towards a relatively more active role in this new era. This active role was presented as a necessity regarding Türkiye’s geo-strategical location in the middle of the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East, requiring the use of political, economic and cultural means (MİT Müsteşarı Emre Taner 2007).

This statement was based on a theoretical framework devised by the Turkish academic Ahmet Davutoğlu in his book Strategical Depth (2001), which can be interpreted as a version of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s (1997) The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives adapted to the case of Türkiye. Davutoğlu, who would later serve as Foreign Affairs Minister and Prime Minister in the AKP government, emphasized the geopolitical location of Türkiye as a possibility for turning Türkiye into a regional power by increasing its active role in the Middle East–Balkans–Caucasus triangle through the use of historical, religious, cultural and economic ties with the countries in these regions (Davutoğlu 2001). This strategical move towards becoming a regional power, although Davutoğlu never used this term in his book, has been conceptualized by international actors and analysts as “neo-Ottomanism” (Onar 2009). The use of this term becomes meaningful considering the frontiers of the region of influence for Türkiye to act as a regional power, as these frontiers highly coincide with the former territories of the Ottoman Empire. This new strategy aimed to turn Türkiye into a more active, powerful and dominant actor in Eurasia. As Maziad and Sotiriadis (2020) put it, “Turkish Neo-Ottomanism focuses on a revival of a “greater Turkey” that renews a classical, civilizational model of the Ottoman Empire’s legacy anchored by economic, military, and political power” (Maziad and Sotiriadis 2020). In a more comprehensive analysis, the basic aims of this strategy can be read as follows:

“Although this foreign policy strategy devised by Davutoğlu was depending on a civilizational partnership based on factors like geography, history, culture and religion, the basic aim is to create a welfare space at the intersection point of Eurasia and the Middle East depending on the leadership or balancing of Türkiye. This foreign policy strategy devised by Davutoğlu, while raising Türkiye to a regional actor status who can control, shape or influence a broad geographical plane, also praises Türkiye as a key country within the Western World’s policy of opening towards the East.”

(Tüysüzoğlu 2013)

This neo-Ottomanist strategy comprised a broad geography that transcended the physical frontiers of the former Ottoman Empire and even included the Turkic states of the Central Asian region. In this sense, neo-Ottomanism can be interpreted as a civilizational project based on the strengthening of existing historical and cultural ties with the countries on this geographical plane and through developing further economic and political relations, aiming to turn Türkiye into a soft power in Eurasia.

This effort to become a regional power with soft power status included cultural initiatives in the first place. The active use of public institutions like the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) in renovating the heritage sites like the mosques on former Ottoman territories, NGO initiatives like the Yunus Emre Institute that promoted Turkish language via its language courses in many countries and education partnerships like Mevlana and Farabi exchange programs that enabled students from the Islamic world to visit Türkiye have constituted an important part of the cultural relations within this neo-Ottomanist strategy. Furthermore, increasing mutual economic, diplomatic and touristic partnerships and relations with various countries in the Eurasian region contributed to the process in which Türkiye was to become a regional soft power.

When the Arab Spring protests sprang up in Syria, Türkiye’s efforts to become a soft power evolved toward an attempt to become a hard power in the Middle East. Since the beginning of the events, the Turkish government frequently warned the Assad regime in Syria about the harsh treatment of the protesters by the regime forces and demanded a peaceful solution of this problem. As the events in Syria continued with mutual violence in the form of a civil war, the Turkish government chose the side of the Syrian opposition forces by referring to them as victims and antagonized the Assad regime by frequently condemning their actions against the opposition. Turning against the Assad regime in the process, Türkiye became an active party to the dispute, and with the initiation of the open door policy towards the Syrians who fled the civil war and sought asylum, the growing number of Syrian asylum seekers turned out to be the most visible outcome of Türkiye’s neo-Ottomanist policies in the Middle East. Therefore, it is not surprising to see the integration of neo-Ottomanist themes into the discourses of religious solidarity regarding these asylum seekers, as Syria, in the eyes of the government elites, was seen as an area of potential political influence regarding its history as a former Ottoman territory.

Although the emphasis on Ottoman legacy in the religious solidarity discourses of the Turkish government presented the brotherly treatment of Syrian asylum seekers as a historical and kind of sacred responsibility, such a deeply designed presentation was not welcomed by various political segments of the Turkish society, especially by the secular and nationalist segments of the political opposition. Faced with counter discourses evident in the speeches by the opposition leaders and in the social media posts on X, the emphasis on Ottoman legacy was reproduced with the integration of a new historical element. This element was simply the claim that Syrians had fought for the Ottomans during World War I. Even though various historians have begun to discuss about the reality of this claim since 2016, this claim, in an official way, was first expressed by Hülya Nergis, a MP of the AKP in 2022, as she stated that:

“Back in history, Syria and Iraq were Ottoman territories. The demographic structures of these societies are identical to ours. Turks, Kurda and Arabs live there too. In our southern provinces, Turks, Kurds and Arabs live together under kinship ties… Thinking in a humanitarian way, we share a historical kinship with them. There have been those who came from Aleppo, İdlib and Damascus and fought in Çanakkale. We can’t ignore them. We can’t treat them as foreigners, they are our religious fellows.”

(Türkiye Mültecilerin Cazibe Merkezi 2022)

Mentioning the Çanakkale Battle has a direct connection with the emphasis on the Ottoman legacy, since this battle was fought during World War I between the Ottomans and the joint forces of United Kingdom and France between 1915 and 1916. The Çanakkale Battle is a significant event in Turkish history, which is praised by the secular and nationalist segments of Turkish society using special sensitivity, since it was a heroic defense by the Ottoman forces in which Mustafa Kemal, the Founder of the future Turkish Republic, had served as a significant commander. Therefore, mentioning the military contributions of soldiers from Syria, which was then an Ottoman territory, aims to invoke the Ottoman past and appease the political opposition by putting forward a historical responsibility toward Syrian refugees whose ancestors had fought for this land in the past, thus stripping the Syrians of their alien image and, in a way, nationalizing them. This Çanakkale connection mentioned by Nergis thus forms a new element of local coherence in the discourses with an emphasis on Ottoman legacy.

The posts on X that have been analyzed in this study reveal a high similarity with the discourses of religious solidarity based on Ottoman legacy developed by government elites. Of the 980 posts in total, 343 posts directly used the Ottoman legacy theme. Although this number is below the 516 posts with elements of Muslim brotherhood, remaining 121 posts have used both themes. Phrases like “Ottoman territory”, “historical responsibility”, “Ottoman/Turkish hospitality” and “children of the same ummah” have frequently been used in these posts, resembling the situation in governmental discourses.

Discursive characteristics of local coherence and contrast are highly visible in these posts. By coining the Ottoman past to modern day Türkiye, the Syrian refugee issue is to be localized and presented as “our responsibility”. In terms of contrast as a discursive element, a total of 138 posts involved phrases like “learn your history!”, “those who deny their past” and “Syrian soldiers fought in Çanakkale, did your ancestors fight in the battle?”. Thus, by integrating the Ottoman past as a discussion element, these posts possess a nature of condemning those who criticize the government’s refugee policies as people who have forgotten or denied their past, therefore not fitting in the conservative redefinition of Turkishness by AKP elites.

4. Discussion

Since the arrival of the first group in 2011, Syrian refugees have become an important issue in Turkish domestic politics. As the number of these refugees increased day by day and reached big numbers counted in the millions, the AKP government began to face a growing public criticism and displeasure mostly originating from various political opposition groups. When we have a look at the speeches by the opposition elites and the social media posts by the dissident electorate in Türkiye, displeasure about the presence of Syrian asylum seekers in Türkiye becomes evident in issues like cultural adaptation problems, increasing unemployment, increasing housing prices, criminality, changing ethno-demographic balances and positive discrimination policies of the government towards the Syrians. Under such criticism, AKP elites aimed to develop discourses with the aim of appeasing such critics and provide social acceptance for the Syrians. In this sense, two basic themes, namely religious fellowship based on the ensar–muhacir analogy and Ottoman legacy, formed the basis of these discourses.

These discourses appear to have attained a considerable public adoption when we consider the posts related to Syrian refugees and various research findings. In a study held in 2014 with 1501 participants from 18 provinces of Türkiye, while 12.1% of the participants expressed that they viewed the Syrian refugees as religious fellows, 52.9% of them expressed that the admission of them into Türkiye was a necessity of religious fellowship (M.M. Erdoğan 2014). In another research held in 2018–2019 in Gaziantep, one of the cities in Türkiye with the highest ratio of Syrian refugees, with 1316 participants, 40.7% of the participants expressed that they viewed themselves as ensar and the Syrians as muhacir (Kurçak 2023). In another research held in 2020 in Istanbul with 2284 participants, 44.74% of the participants referred to Syrians as religious fellows (Morgül et al. 2021).

In contrast with the high ratio of expressions defining Syrians as religious fellows, which conforms with the AKP government’s religious solidarity discourses, there is evident displeasure among those participants who made such expressions in these survey studies. In the first research held in 2014, while 52.9% of the participants defined the admission of Syrians as a religious responsibility, the ratio of those who expressed that Turkish economy was damaged by the burden of these asylum seekers was 70.8% (M.M. Erdoğan 2014). Similarly, in the research held in 2020, of the 44.74% of the participants who defined Syrians as religious fellows, 58.53% defined them as an economic burden and 62.3% defined them as “those with privilege granted by the government” (Morgül et al. 2021). Therefore, in the light of such displeasure even among those who defined Syrians as religious fellows and expressed that hosting them is a religious responsibility, it can be claimed that religious solidarity discourses did not only target the dissident political segments in Türkiye in terms of providing the Syrians with social acceptance but the AKP electorate as well. This claim becomes more realistic when considering the fact that such an emphasis on religious brotherhood and ensar–muhacir analogy has been frequently used in AKP’s political rallies (Tuğsuz and Yılmaz 2015).

Another possible aim in developing these religious solidarity discourses appears to be very functional when we consider the complex use of various concepts to define the Syrian asylum seekers within the process since 2011, and this aim appears to conform with the aim of providing social acceptance for the Syrians. Various uses in the media, academic literature and the public opinion to denote these people as “Syrians”, “refugees”, “immigrants”, “asylum seekers” and “guests”, which has been visible since the earliest beginnings of the Syrian issue in 2011, created a conceptual confusion. This situation emanated from the fact that Turkish authorities had not yet been able to define a legal status for these people. Due to the geographical limitations of the 1951 Refugee Convention, Syrians could not be recognized as refugees. Such a legal blank could only be overcome in 2014 with the official recognition of Syrians as “foreigners under temporary protection” (Saylan and Aknur 2023). However, under the ambiguity of this term in terms of its perception by Turkish society, expressions of religious fellowship supported by the themes of ensar–muhacir and the Ottoman past became useful in simply referring to these people as “our religious fellows”, a term that could be popularized to overcome conceptual confusions and to provide social acceptance and legitimize their presence in Türkiye.

Along with “our religious fellows”, the use of the term “muhacir” while referring to the Syrian refugees appears to be functional in providing social acceptance for these people. Apart from the ensar–muhacir analogy, muhacir refers to the Muslim people who migrated from former Ottoman territories in the Balkans and the Caucasus during the Empire’s decline period, and this term is still commonly used as a means of self-identification by the descendants of these immigrants whose number correspond to millions in contemporary Türkiye. Therefore, by popularizing a term that is used to denote a huge mass who have long ago been admitted social acceptance and been regarded as founding elements of the Turkish nation, it could be easier to normalize the presence of Syrian refugees before the Turkish citizens. Also, considering the centuries-long Ottoman tradition of receiving and protecting muhacirs, the term muhacir possesses a new meaning emanating from both the purely religious ensar–muhacir analogy and the historical/religious Ottoman legacy.

Even though this ensar–muhacir analogy integrated into the discourses of religious solidarity with Syrian refugees appears to be functional in practice, it can be said that there is a contradiction in its essence. This duality, which first originated in the first encounters between the ensar in Medina and the muhacir from Mecca during prophet Muhammad’s time, was based on the relationship between two Muslim communities, whereas the Meccan muhacir were escaping the oppression by Meccan pagans (müşrik)12. Therefore, this religious solidarity model was developed within an environment consisting of two Muslim and one non-Muslim elements. Therefore, to apply the ensar–muhacir analogy to the Turkish–Syrian elements, the third element should be a non-Muslim one. Considering that Syrian society is predominantly Muslim, Muslim refugees escaping a Muslim-dominated environment does not seem to fit with the traditional ensar–muhacir relationship. Although AKP elites never openly referred to the Syrian government as non-Muslims or müşrik, it is possible to claim that the reflection of the ensar–muhacir analogy on certain segments of Turkish society has developed in the form of vilifying the Assad regime and its forces as oppressive infidels and presenting the Syrian refugees as Muslim victims. This perception is highly apparent in posts by pro-government individuals on the social media platform X. Therefore, the ensar–muhacir analogy leads to an unintentional and indirect presentation of the Assad regime as an infidel element that finds its intentional and direct embodiment among the public.

Antagonizing the Assad regime within this religious perception leads to criticism by the opposition groups in a way that emphasizes the sectarian side of the issue. In light of the fact that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is a member of the Nusayri community, which is a sub-denomination of Shiite Islam and that the Nusayri are a dominant group in Syrian civil and military bureaucracy, the antagonism of the Assad regime by the AKP government, which represents the conservative segments of Sunnite Muslims in Türkiye, has been interpreted by various opposition groups within the context of identity politics. Even though AKP authorities never mentioned any sectarian reference to the issue, the antagonism of Assad has led to various interpretations of the issue in light of sectarian politics by people from both pro-government and opposition segments. Such an interpretation is visible on X when we consider various posts condemning Assad and his regime as Nusayri tyrants and, on the other hand, posts that blame the AKP government of playing the Sunnite card in both Middle Eastern and domestic politics and of assuming the protector role for Sunnite Syrians.

This alleged protector role for Sunnite Syrians becomes more meaningful when we consider the neo-Ottomanist discourses of the AKP government and their reflection on the Turkish society visible in social media posts. The references to Türkiye in the pamphlets mentioned before as “the refuge for the oppressed”, while emphasizing the humanitarian side of the refugee policies, also point to the historical practices by various Ottoman sultans in providing refuge and security for either Muslim or non-Muslim communities migrating from abroad. The fact that, since 1517, Ottoman sultans have possessed the title of Caliph and have been considered by the Islamic community as the leader of the ummah should be remembered in this context. Even though AKP authorities never mentioned or assumed such a title, various posts on X that refer to President Erdoğan as the leader of the ummah appear to normalize the refugee issue by linking this position of Islamic leadership to the historical and sacred status of Caliphate. Accordingly, as the Caliphs in history had always been considered as the protectors of all Muslims, the case of Erdoğan providing a refuge for the Syrians should be considered in the same way.

The policies and religious discourses of the AKP government regarding both the Syrian civil war and the Syrian refugees in Türkiye have been subject to criticism by various scholars within the context of national identity and identity politics. These critiques refer to the functionality of these discourses in contributing positively to the political and ideological efforts of the AKP government in restructuring Turkish society in accordance with the religious conservative values and ideals that make up the core of AKP’s ideological basis. According to Aktürk (2017), the reception of Syrian refugees has been useful in AKP’s efforts to restructure the Turkish society by shifting away from assimilationist and nationalist policies of the Turkish political traditions towards a new model promoting a new national identity based on the multi-ethnic Islamic model practiced during the Ottoman era (Aktürk 2017). According to Polat (2018), the role of defender and protector of all oppressed people assumed by the AKP government has been intertwined with the government’s efforts to reconstruct the Turkish nation along more Islamic lines (Polat 2018). According to Akkaya (2012), there is a positive connection between the use of religious discourses regarding the Syrian refugees and the increasing emphasis on religion by the government as the unifying element for Turkish society (Akkaya 2012). Regarding these critical statements and the discourses developed by the government elites, it can be said that the AKP government has benefited from the use of religious discourses in dealing with the Syrian refugee issue in two ways. First, these discourses have been influential on various segments of the Turkish society in providing acceptance and tolerance for the Syrian refugees. Secondly, even though such aims or attempts to reconstruct Turkish society were never openly expressed by AKP elites, promoting the elements of religious fellowship and Ottoman legacy in these discourses has contributed to the strengthening of Islamic religious identity in terms of self-identification by Turkish people as an increasing trend. Such a trend is visible in social media posts and can be connected with the sloganized concepts developed and popularized by the government, such as “New Türkiye”, which symbolizes a shift from the secular/nationalist essence of the Turkish nation state and a transition towards a powerful country status, and “Türkiyelilik”13 as a new term to denote Turkish national identity that symbolizes a shift from the term “Turkishness”, which is based on an ethnic/national essence.

One thing that can be said for sure regarding the use of these discourses of religious solidarity in the Syrian refugee issue is the fact that these discourses, while positively contributing to the policies of the government, have contributed negatively to the political polarization among Turkish society. This polarization between the pro-government and opposition segments in Türkiye has grown deeper during this process, as various opposition groups not only oppose the migration and long-lasting presence of Syrian refugees but also object to the religious discourses used in the process. The pro-government segments, on the other hand, have adopted these discourses in their debates with opposition members. Even though it cannot be claimed that all or most of the pro-government people in Türkiye have internalized the refugee issue and are satisfied with the government’s refugee policies, there is a continuing general tendency in clinging to these religious discourses to express a reactionary choice of self-identification with religious identity and to defend the ruling party they support.

It should also be noted that it is not only Syrians but also many refugees from various countries, especially from predominantly Muslim ones like Afghanistan and Iraq, that Türkiye has been hosting, and the number of these refugees are increasing day by day. However, it has become a common trend to use the word “Syrian” as a general term to denote all Muslim refugees among the Turkish public. Syrians, as of forming the largest refugee community in Türkiye, have constituted the core of the refugee phenomenon, and today, the word “Syrian” is widely used by many Turkish nationals to denote refugees or immigrants in general.

Lastly, it should be noted that, since 2022, there has been a visible decrease in the use of religious solidarity discourses among both AKP elites and the electorate that can be read through posts on X. There is a general trend among pro-government people to refer to Syrians and other refugees as “religious fellows” on social media, but this situation mostly takes place in posts as replies to other posts that criticize the government’s refugee policies and the presence of a huge refugee mass in Türkiye. Therefore, unlike direct posts supporting and promoting the government’s discourses, there is a visible trend in the use of these religious solidarity discourses in a relatively defensive manner.

5. Conclusions

As hosting the largest community of Syrian refugees and of its government has produced discourses of religious solidarity to handle this issue, Türkiye remains in a special position that formed the basis of this study. While this issue became an important part of the domestic political agenda, it also contributed to the political polarization among Turkish society. Faced with such a problematic situation, the AKP government aimed to initiate and utilize discourses based on themes of religious solidarity to appease the rising reactions among the public against their refugee policies and to legitimize these policies through these themes that they considered in the first place as unifying for Turkish society.

Two main discursive themes in these discourses, namely the ensar–muhacir analogy and the emphases on the Ottoman legacy, while aiming at a unifying action to provide general support and sympathy from the Turkish society towards the government’s refugee policies, also demonstrate the mutual relationship between ideology and discourse, which has been stressed by van Dijk (2000). The Ottoman legacy and Muslim identity, two fundamental elements of AKP’s conservative ideology, have contributed to the reproduction of this ideology through their discursive uses within the refugee issue and their adoption by certain political and cultural segments of Turkish society. As discussed above in detail, these religious solidarity discourses and their public reflections have had both positive and negative impacts on Turkish society.

Possible migration waves in the future from either Syria or other countries to Türkiye or return migrations due to a shift in the refugee policies of Turkish governments might influence the use of religious solidarity discourses in qualitative and quantitative terms. The frequency of their use might either rise or fall, or they might be revised through adapting new discursive themes. Based on the realization of such possibilities, it seems to be apparent that religious solidarity discourses and refugees might constitute the context of further studies.