Autocephaly Reconsidered: Civil Authorities as Autocephaly-Making Factors

Abstract

Contemporary scholars share a common vision of the phenomenon of autocephaly as a virtue empowering a local Orthodox church independently to elect its supreme hierarch and run its domestic affairs without the endorsement of another church leader. While the academic discussion on this subject is concentrated on the canonical and theological aspects of autocephaly, the presented study shifts the focus to the involvement of civil authorities in the promotion and abolishment of this ecclesiastical status. It challenges the conventional perception of such interventions as something incidental or a feature of particular political formations. It aims to reveal that civil authorities have been a constant factor in the establishment of new autocephalies since the recognition of Christianity as an official religion in the Roman Empire. For this purpose, the focus falls on the Chalcedonian Eastern Orthodox churches which have centuries-old traditions in autocephaly-related practices from the Edict of Milan (313) to the end of the Cold War. It also takes into account the different legal frameworks within which civil authorities used to validate new autocephalies. On the grounds of this analysis, the concluding remarks reflect on the impact of this experience on the autocephaly-building process in post-atheist areas.

1. Introduction

Contemporary scholars share a common vision of the phenomenon of autocephaly as a virtue empowering an Orthodox church independently to elect its supreme hierarch (patriarch, archbishop, metropolitan) and to run its domestic affairs without the endorsement of another church leader (Erickson 1991, pp. 91–92). What divides them is the issue of the bestowal of this ecclesiastical status and the methods of its recognition. In this regard, researchers need to cope not only with the absence of clear canonical criteria and procedures for the adoption, recognition, and abolishment of autocephaly but also with the evolution of the respective practices and concepts throughout time and space. For this reason, the introduction pays particular attention to the different views of autocephaly debated in the scientific literature, while the main part of this article is focused on the role of civil authorities in the promotion of this ecclesiastical status.

This article employs “civil authorities” as an overarching term for the different political entities with which the Orthodox churches have interacted throughout the centuries. Some of them, like Byzantium and the Ottoman Empire, were religiously bound, while others, like the nation states, were secular, and even antireligious in the case of the former communist states. What they have in common is their ability as power structures to exert influence on church affairs in the case of Eastern Orthodoxy. In this regard, it is also necessary to point out that most analyses of autocephaly as a subject of church–state relations in Eastern Orthodoxy give priority to its theological aspects. As a result, the role of civil authorities in the grant of this ecclesiastical status, including its non-canonical recognition through the means of civil legislation, is generally neglected.

Furthermore, due to the uneven advancement in the study of the different Eastern Orthodox churches, some cases are better known than others. To achieve a better balance between the well-studied cases of Byzantium and imperial Russia, on the one hand, and the underexplored ones, on the other, a priority is given to the latter. In this way, this article offers a fuller vision of the intervention of civil authorities in the autocephaly-building process in time and space, thus providing sound arguments for the advanced thesis of their constant involvement in the promotion and abolishment of the commented ecclesiastical status. It is also necessary to clarify that this article is focused on the Chalcedonian Eastern Orthodox churches that have centuries-old traditions in autocephaly-related practices. Also, due to the constraints of the format of a journal article, the present study does not comment on the less explored cases of non-realized autocephaly projects like the Hungarian one (Kalkandjieva 2014, pp. 285–94) and the Dodecanese one (Bido 2021, pp. 131–34), though they also provide evidence in support of the thesis of a continuous involvement of civil authorities in the arrangement of this ecclesiastical status.

Although autocephaly was unknown to the early Christian Church, the normal functioning of its presbyterium-centered communities, established in various cultural, social, and political environments and associated with different episcopal sees, required some domestic autonomy. In this regard, bishops, as successors of the Holy Apostles, played a dual role. On the one hand, they operated as visible centers of “the unity of the eucharistic community” (Zizioulas 1985, pp. 250–53). On the other hand, each bishop enjoyed a degree of independence necessary for the exercise of his spiritual authority within his own diocese (a territorial ecclesiastical unit also known as “eparchy” in Eastern Orthodoxy). In this regard, the early practice of electing the bishop by the clergy and laity from his diocese is seen as a precursor of the later phenomenon of autocephaly (Getcha 2023, p. 997).

However, the recognition of Christianity as the official religion in the Roman Empire in the fourth century induced an alignment of the Church’s diocesan structure with the civil provinces. As a result, the bishops of major metropolises were elevated in the rank of metropolitan. Though spiritually equal with the other church hierarchs, metropolitans received the privilege to exercise jurisdictional authority over those bishops whose dioceses occurred in the respective civil provinces. Correspondingly, new norms were adopted. As a result, the metropolitan’s elections “became the exclusive privilege of the bishops” located in his province (Getcha 2023, p. 998). These post-Constantinian developments brought to life the so-called metropolitan system allowing the province-compliant metropolitanates to include more than one diocese. As a result, ordinary bishops became less autonomous than metropolitans.

The independence of such complex metropolitanates has become a highly debatable issue. Metropolitan John Zizioulas of Pergamon defines them as autonomous rather than autocephalous. In his view, “the principle of autocephaly is based on the modern concept of nation” (Zizioulas 1985, p. 235). Among the main arguments for this standpoint is the absence of the word “autocephaly” in the texts of church canons (Heith-Stade 2024, p. 409). Yet, most scholars are of different opinion. They point out that the fifth-century origins of the term “αὑτοκέφαλον” when it was used to signify separate ecclesiastical units (Kisić and Jović 2023, p. 369). Initially associated with ecclesial-administrative units within the empire, at a later stage, it also began to be applied to church structures outside Byzantium. In this regard, Rev. John Erickson expands further the chronological gamut of the notion of autocephaly. Like Metropolitan Job Getcha, he comments on the existence of de facto autocephalous ecclesiastical structures before the recognition of Christianity in the Roman Empire and speaks of “autocephaly by custom”. Erickson concludes that there was a category of early churches that “did not become autocephalous, they were autocephalous” (Erickson 2016, p. 95).

In this regard, especially notorious is the case of the Church of Cyprus. In 431, its bishops petitioned the Council of Ephesus to secure the independence of their local Church from the Patriarch of Antioch. Although the island was included in a civil diocese whose capital was the city of Antioch, where the See of the Patriarch of Antioch was located, the request was satisfied. It seems that this decision was facilitated by a set of additional factors: the ancient custom of self-governance of the Cypriote Church, the distance of the island from the mainland, and the spread of Arianism which caused a schism in the Church of Antioch (Farrugia 2023, pp. 265–67). Under these circumstances, the Council of Ephesus adopted a special canon in defense of the right of the bishops of the Church of Cyprus to ordain independently their metropolitan, thus producing the earliest formula of the principle of autocephaly. Besides, the same Canon VIII “drew up for the first time the difference between an autocephalous church which is also at the same time a patriarchate, and an autocephalous church which is not” (Farrugia 2023, p. 270). Yet, this canonical decision was not enough to prevent the Antiochian interference in the domestic affairs of the Cypriots. Thus, in 488, Emperor Zeno confirmed the autocephalous status of their Church (Farrugia 2023, pp. 268–73; Morini 2023, pp. 680–81).

These introductory remarks reveal the complexity of autocephaly as a phenomenon involving not only ecclesiastical but also political dimensions. While the first ones have been an object of multiple scholarly analyses, the second ones have remained on the periphery of scientific research. Similarly, there is little attention paid to the fact that autocephaly concerns the terrestrial organisation of the Church rather than its faith and beliefs. Although this specificity facilitates the involvement of civil authorities in the promotion, as well as the abolishment, of autocephaly in Eastern Orthodoxy, it has not been systematically explored. In practice, the information on this subject is scattered throughout various historical accounts dealing with one or another Orthodox church. As a result, it is widely considered that the intervention of civil authorities is something incidental or a peculiar feature of one or another political formation. In this regard, on the grounds of their previous research, the author seeks to demonstrate that civil authorities have been a constant factor in the establishment of new autocephalies since the recognition of Christianity by the Edict of Milan (313).

To a great degree, this role is an outcome of the peculiar relationship established between the Eastern Roman Emperor, who became also known as basileus, and the Christian Church. Byzantine political theology considered him as God’s vicar whose main duty was to guard Christianity and the Church in the terrestrial world. Therefore, he legislated not only in the sphere of civil affairs but also in the ecclesiastical one. In particular, the basileus decreed the rights and duties of the clergy, elevated ordinary episcopal sees into metropolitanates, transferred episcopal dioceses from one metropolitan to another, validated the decisions of ecumenical councils, including those granting autocephaly-like status, and granted autocephaly to a given church between the councils (Morini 2023, pp. 673, 682–83). From this perspective, the post-Constantinian autocephalous churches can be also seen as “products of the holy royalty” (Morini 2023, p. 679). Indeed, the emancipation of the Roman Pope from the imperial power of Byzantium led to the disappearance of autocephaly as a church-building mechanism in Western Christianity, while surviving in Byzantium and the Medieval polities of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Muscovy.

Undermined by the Ottoman conquest of Southeastern Europe and the Middle East, autocephaly received a new impulse in the age of nationalism. Under the new conditions, this Orthodox phenomenon intertwined with the state-building process in South Eastern Europe, thus giving shape to the contemporary decentralization of the Orthodox Church in the region. Similar developments took place after the collapse of the Russian Empire as well (Kalkandjieva 2023b). More recently, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Tito’s Yugoslavia gave a new stimulus to autocephaly as a concept and practice (Denysenko 2023; Radić and Kalkandjieva 2023; Saggau 2024). The establishment of the autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine in 2019 and the autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church—Archbishopric of Ohrid in 2022 revealed not only the disagreement among the Orthodox churches on the respective ecclesiastical procedures but also a deficiency of knowledge about the role of the state in the establishment of new autocephalous churches.

Inspired to cast light on this underexplored subject, this study offers an overview of the involvement of civil authorities in the attainment of this ecclesiastical status throughout the centuries as well as on the impact of the different types of legislation on autocephaly-related practices. The text is organized into several parts associated with key periods in the evolution of autocephaly. Each of them deals with a different historical period and discusses the then-existing, established, or abolished autocephalies. The first part analyzes the promotion of autocephaly in Byzantium and the Medieval polities of Georgia, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Muscovy. The next one discussing the involvement of civil authorities in the non-Orthodox empires of the Ottomans and the Habsburg monarchy is followed by an overview of the better-studied state interventions in securing an autocephalous status in the age of nationalism. In its turn, the last part deals with the role of the Soviet authorities in the autocephaly building process. Finally, the concluding remarks reflect on the impact of this legacy on the autocephaly-building process in the post-atheist areas.

2. Autocephaly in the Byzantine Era

2.1. Autocephaly in the Byzantium

The recognition of Christianity as the religion of the Roman Empire opened an opportunity for Constantine the Great and his successors to play a significant role in the arrangement of the Church’s life. In this regard, the concept of the Byzantine basileus (βασιλεύς) as the vicar of Christ responsible for God’s Kingdom on earth (βασιλεία) empowered the Eastern Roman emperor to act as an overarching authority regarding the Church (Dagron 1996). His right to convoke and preside on ecumenical councils allowed an indirect intervention in the arrangement of the autocephalous status of one or another church. Under his chairmanship, the ecumenical councils acknowledged the right of certain churches, on the grounds of “ancient customs,” to independently elect their supreme hierarchs (Erickson 1991, p. 94). Besides, the territorial jurisdiction of such churches and their changes were subjects of canonical decisions. To enter into force, however, the same decisions needed the basileus’s sanction. This fact found expression in the common reference to the ancient patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem as “Melkites”. The Semitic origins of this word signify the royalist nature of the mentioned churches and their dependence on the Eastern Roman Emperor (Noble 2023, p. 123). From a historical perspective, the Archbishopric of Cyprus is also linked with this group of custom-based autocephalies as its canonical status, though arranged by a church council, was sealed by the Byzantine basileus.

Furthermore, the Byzantine history reveals other types of autocephaly. Once Christianity was recognized by the Milan Edict (313), the decrees of the Eastern Roman emperors regarding the borders of civil provinces had a direct effect on the Church’s map. In particular, the elevation of certain cities into metropolises and the downgrading of others caused changes in the status of the episcopal sees in the respective areas (Geanakoplos 1965, pp. 388–89). In this respect, especially crucial was the decision of Constantine the Great to move the capital of his empire from Rome to Constantinople. As a result, the local bishop, then subjected to the Metropolitan of Heraclea, was promoted to a higher position. The proximity of his See with the new center of political power conditioned the acquisition of a unique ecclesiastical status. The Bishop of Constantinople was not only elevated to the rank of metropolitan but also was granted a prerogative of honor after that of Rome because Constantinople had become a New Rome (Canon III of the Second Ecumenical Council (381); Canon XXVIII of the Fourth Ecumenical Council (451)). During the reign of Justinian (527–565), the exceptional status of the Patriarch of Constantinople was additionally enhanced. The emperor forbade all bishops to visit his capital city without his order or the permission of the Patriarch of Constantinople (Miller and Sarris 2018, p. 808). In parallel, the Patriarch obtained the title “ecumenical” which underlined the location of his See in the capital of the ruler of the Christian world, known as oikoumene (οικουμένη).

Finally, in addition to the commented indirect involvement in the autocephaly-building process, the Byzantine ruler had the authority to intervene directly as well. As a result, some autocephalous churches were established solely by the basileus. Taking advantage of their authority as God’s vicar, Byzantine rulers used to establish new autocephalous churches like those of Justiniana Prima and Ravenna. Besides, they used to abolish this status if deemed necessary (Erickson 1991, pp. 99–100). In this regard, especially important were Justinian’s legal acts known as novelas. Making dispositions on the administration and privileges of the Christian patriarchates, metropolitanates, and bishoprics as well as the rights and duties of bishops, clerics, and monks (Miller and Sarris 2018, p. 808), these civil enactments left an enormous impact on the Church’s structure in Eastern Christianity. Also, they laid the foundation for Byzantine legislation and determined the legal norms of later established Christian polities like Bulgaria, Serbia, and Russia where the Kormchaya kniga, a Slavic language compilation of Byzantine nomocanons, was widely used. Besides, the above-discussed practice can be also discovered in the acts of Basil II. After the conquest of Bulgaria in 1018, he downgraded its Ohrid-based patriarchate to that of an Archbishopric. Yet, the See of Ohrid was not subjected to the Patriarch of Constantinople. Instead, Basil II granted autocephaly to the new archbishopric thus making it accountable before the Byzantine rulers (Prinzing 2021; Nikolov 2021).

2.2. Autocephaly in the Medieval Polities Outside Byzantium

The establishment of polities of Georgia, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Muscovy in the limitrophe zones of Byzantium induced a new type of autocephaly. Like Constantine the Great, their rulers played a primary role in the imposition of Christianity as their state religion. Unlike him, however, they did not transform their polities into homelands of many autocephalous churches. Instead, each ruler pursued domestic autocephaly and often patriarchal dignity for his church. Besides, as it is commented below, after the Great Schism (1054), the medieval Bulgarian and Serbian kings did not abolish the autocephalous status of the Archbishopric of Ohrid which was incorporated into their realms for shorter or longer periods (Snegarov [1924] 1995, I). In this regard, it is important to clarify that the principle of one autocephalous church into one empire is a modern development introduced by the Russian emperor Alexander I (1801–1825) by the act of abolishment of the autocephalous status of the Georgian Patriarchate in 1811.

Furthermore, although the medieval states of Kartli (Georgia), Bulgaria, Serbia, and Muscovy1 emerged in areas that had been originally associated with specific patriarchs,2 the ultimate settlement of their canonical status was arranged with the consent of the Byzantine basileus. This happened in various forms commented below. At the same time, the strong cultural influence of Byzantium did not impede the development of the discussed limitrophe countries into independent political formations. In contrast to the kings in the Holy Roman Empire in Western Christianity, the Georgian and Slavic rulers acted as sovereigns independent from each other as well as from the Byzantine basileus. This specificity was also nurtured by the use of non-Greek writing systems, which allowed the local churches to train clergy without the necessity of learning the Greek or Latin languages as well as to communicate with believers in a familiar language.

Besides, an often-neglected side effect of the non-Greek alphabets was the distancing of the Georgians and the majority of Slavs from the legacy of Antiquity (Bitsilli [1940] 1993, p. 11). In parallel, the use of different scriptures stimulated a close collaboration between the local ecclesiastical and political elite. Although it looks like the Byzantine symphonia, this relationship lacks its ecumenicity. Correspondingly, the rulers of Georgia, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Muscovy only resembled the Byzantine basileus but did not become God’s vicars for the entire Christendom (Browning 1975, pp. 93–98). Their rule in the realm of church affairs was limited to the lands under their control. In 1393, Patriarch Antonius of Constantinople reminded this virtue of the Byzantine ruler in a letter to Grand Prince Vasily I of Moscow. The former criticized the prince’s ban on the liturgical commemoration of the Byzantine emperor by the Metropolitan of Moscow (Pavlov 1879, p. 45). In this regard, Antonius reminded Vasily that the emperor was not simply anointed by the Church but also ordained and consecrated as a basileus, and thus was the supreme ruler of all Christians. On these grounds, the patriarch insisted that the basileus’s laws “sanctioned what the divine canons said about the correct dogmas and the ordering of the Christian life” (Wolff 1959, p. 298).

Also, although the Georgian and Slav rulers did not have the fullness of the authority of the Byzantine basileus, they followed his example when undertaking steps for transforming the local ecclesiastical structures into autocephalous bodies. In contrast to Byzantium, where the spiritual nature of the sovereign’s power impelled a transformation of political theology into ideology (Carile 2008, X; Morini 2023, p. 667), the non-Greek polities failed to develop original political theologies. Instead, they advanced religiously connotated ideologies like the one of Moscow the Third Rome. The difference between the two is well-defined by Antonio Carile who considers that “when the spiritual character of the sovereign’s power is founded in the faith of God … the political theology is transformed into ideology, as otherwise happens when power assumes a soteriological significance” (Carile 2008, p. 667).3

A good example in this direction is Philophei’s Third Rome vision differing significantly from the concept of Constantinople as a New Rome. The first one had no immediate effect on the Moscow ruler and his church. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that Grand Prince Ivan IV did not ask the Patriarch of Constantinople to be crowned as basileus of “all the Christians” but only as “Tsar of All Rus” (Meyendorff 1991, p. 50; Stremooukhoff 1970, p. 109). Similarly, the Russian Orthodox Church remained a metropolitanate, which unilaterally proclaimed autocephaly lacked canonical recognition. In addition, elevated into patriarchate in 1589 this church did not become a new Constantinople in the context of Eastern Orthodoxy (i.e., following the pattern set up by the latter as a new Rome). From this perspective, the Georgian and Slavic autocephalies do not fit well Morini’s understanding of autocephaly as a product of holy royalty. Declared by local rulers in an attempt to demonstrate their independence from the basileus in the city of Constantinople, or New Rome, such external to Byzantium autocephalies could be defined as politically induced ones.

The earliest manifestation of this pattern occurred in Georgia. Already in the fifth century, King Vakhtang (443–502), led by an ambition to secure the political and ecclesiastical independence of his state, elevated the local church into the rank of catholicosate, i.e., a self-governing church. The very title “Catholicos” granted to the Georgian church leader means “head of the bishops” (Shurgaia 2023, p. 299). A complex of factors assisted the success of this initiative. Originally belonging to the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Antioch, the Georgians took advantage of a schism that had erupted in this church in the fifth century (Shurgaia 2023, pp. 302–7; Farrugia 2023, pp. 265–67). Besides, the Byzantine emperor, then in conflict with the Patriarch of Constantinople, had an interest in supporting Vakhtang’s adventure (Shurgaia 2023, p. 303). No less important was the location of the catholicosate outside the political and ecclesiastical control of Constantinople (Shurgaia 2023, p. 306).

In contrast to Georgia, the medieval polities of Bulgaria and Serbia were established in lands that used to be part of the Roman Empire. Besides, both Slavic states included areas that originally belonged to the Roman Pope. In the ninth century, however, with the assistance of the Byzantine basileus, the Patriarch of Constantinople succeeded in spreading his control over all Bulgarian lands, and then over the Serbian ones (Nikolov 2021, p. 143). In this way, the issue of the autocephalous status of the Balkan Slavic churches occurred in Byzantine hands. Despite the decisive role of the Bulgarian and Serbian rulers in the promotion of the autocephalous status of their churches, the consent of the Byzantine basileus was a key element in its recognition. It could take the form of his direct intervention as in the Georgian case or that of an alternative act. For example, the first Bulgarian autocephaly of 927 is attributed to a peace treaty followed by a marriage of the Bulgarian King Peter with the granddaughter of the Byzantine emperor (Nikolov 2021, p. 146). Several centuries later, a similar development took place in Muscovy whose Grand Prince Ivan III married the niece of the last Byzantine emperor. Yet, neither did he assume the title of emperor, nor did his metropolitan become patriarch.

Meanwhile, the sack of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204 and the following competition for the legacy of Byzantium between its successor states made the role of the Byzantine emperor less visible. Under these circumstances, the political and church leaders of Nicaea took advantage by granting autocephaly to the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1219. It became a fact as a result of complex diplomatic negotiations involving not only the royal houses and churchmen of the respective polities but also external players like the Roman Pope and the Athonite monks (Kisić and Jović 2023, pp. 372–80). Meanwhile, the new autocephaly was beneficial not only for the Serbian political and church elite but also for the Nicaean one whose position as a full-fledged heir to old Byzantium was enhanced. Quite similar was the effect of the decision of the Church Council in Lampsacus to elevate the Orthodox Church of Tarnovo to the rank of patriarchate in 1235 (Kalkandjieva 2023a). Finally, in a bizarre way, this game of thrones sealed the autocephalous status of the Archbishopric of Ohrid, which survived till 1767 despite the sequence of integrations of its See into different political formations, Christian and Muslim (Snegarov [1924] 1995).

In 1261, however, the return of the emperor and patriarch from Nicaea to Constantinople changed the balance of powers in the Balkans. The renewed Eastern Roman Empire “saw itself as the political patron of all Orthodox”, while the Patriarch of Constantinople assumed the role of a spiritual guardian of the Orthodox commonwealth (Kisić and Jović 2023, p. 378). This policy deteriorated the relations of Byzantium with its Slavic neighbors. One of the main conflicts was caused by the decision of the Serbian King Stefan Uruš IV Dusan to convoke a church council in Skopje in 1346 for the elevation of the Archbishopric of Peć into a patriarchate (Kisić and Jović 2023, p. 384).4 This act received also the support of the Bulgarian tsar, whose Patriarch of Tarnovo, together with the Archbishop of Ohrid, played a key role in the declaration of the patriarchal dignity of the Serbian Orthodox Church. In this regard, however, there is a disagreement on the destiny of the Archbishopric of Ohrid upon the establishment of the Serbian Patriarchate. While Ivan Snegarov underlines the respect of the Serbian kings to the autocephalous status of the See of Ohrid (Snegarov [1924] 1995, I, pp. 316–30), Serbian scholars consider that the discussed archbishopric was incorporated into the newly established patriarchate (Kisić and Jović 2023, pp. 384–85).

In its turn, Kyiv Rus’ did not follow the example of the Balkan Slavs. In general, the Kyivan princes did not pursue autocephaly as a guarantee for their political independence from Byzantium. Later, however, such an ambition found fertile soil in Muscovy. It emerged when the local rulers had got the upper hand over the Golden Horde and the Byzantines were beset by the Ottomans. Like the Slavic rulers in the Balkans, the Grand Prince of Moscow took the initiative. His emancipation from Constantinople, however, was motivated by an opposition to Western Christianity rather than to the political and ecclesiastical power of Constantinople. In the eyes of the Moscow ruler, the Florentine Union (1439), which the Ecumenical Patriarch had concluded with the Roman Pope, was an act of betrayal of the true faith. Thus, the Grand Prince ordered the arrest of Metropolitan Isidor of Kyiv who had signed the act of Union. Moreover, in 1448, without asking for the permission of the Great Church of Constantinople, the Moscow Grand Prince convoked a church council for the election of a new Russian metropolitan (Pavlov 1879, pp. 47–50). In this way, the antagonism between Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism left its imprint on the justification of the Moscow autocephaly. Meanwhile, the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople made impossible any further negotiation and recognition of the Moscow Church’s independence by the Byzantine emperor. For the same reason, the reaction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate was rather soft.

3. Post-Byzantine Autocephalies

3.1. Ottoman Authorities and Autocephaly

The Ottoman conquest of Byzantium had a long-lasting impact on the Orthodox world and its ecclesiastical organization. In particular, it provoked the establishment of a new type of autocephalous churches. They came to life without the consent of the Byzantine basileus and often without the blessing of the Patriarch of Constantinople. One of their least studied aspects concerns the role of civil authorities, Orthodox and non-Orthodox ones, in granting and abolishing the autocephalous status of such Orthodox churches. The respective practices of the Ottoman sultans and the Habsburg monarchs as well as the Orthodox Slavic rulers are outlined below.

The corpus of studies on the Ottoman Empire contains ample non-systematized information about its policy toward the autocephalous churches under its rule. It seems, that the ancient patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, as well as the autocephalous Church of Cyprus, had preserved the aura of products of holy royalty in the sultan’s eyes. As a rule, the Muslim rulers respected their canonical status (Çolak 2015). Yet, they showed less interest in the patriarchates of Tarnovo and Peć. After the downfall of the medieval kingdoms of Bulgaria and Serbia, both churches lost not only their patriarchal dignity but also their politically induced autocephalies. In parallel, their flock was subjected to the Patriarch of Constantinople. Although Serbs succeeded in restoring their patriarchate in 1557 with the assistance of the Ottoman authorities,5 they lost it again in 1766 (Vetochnikov 2023, pp. 109–19). A year later, the autocephalous Archbishopric of Ohrid was also abolished.

While scholars have paid considerable attention to the Patriarchate of Constantinople as the executor of all these acts, the role of Muslim authorities remains underexplored. More recent studies indicate that the main mechanism used by the Ottomans for the regulation or validation of the status of the Orthodox structures in their empire was the so-called “berat”, an act issued by the sultan for the appointment of new patriarchs and diocesan bishops. Each berat defined the personal rights and duties of all Orthodox hierarchs in the empire and laid down the limits of the administrative authority of each of them (Çolak and Bayraktar-Tellan 2019). Indirectly, this practice had also an effect on the levels of autonomy of the respective church structure (diocese, archdiocese, patriarchate). In this sense, the berats issued for the appointment of patriarchs, as well as of some archbishops, reconfirmed the autocephaly of their churches, and sometimes its loss. A similar approach was applied to the Bulgarian church question. To resolve the conflict between the Orthodox Bulgarians and the predominantly Greek hierarchy of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, in 1870, the sultan decreed the establishment of an autonomous Bulgarian Exarchate and then started issuing berats for the appointment of its exarchs and metropolitans. When compared with the Byzantine emperor, however, the Ottoman sultans appear to give priority to indirect methods of intervention when autocephaly was at stake. This approach is well-demonstrated in the case of the Bulgarian Exarchate which received only autonomy within the framework of the autocephalous Patriarchate of Constantinople. At the same time, the existing studies do not make clear whether or to what degree the Ottoman sultans distinguished between the autocephalous status of an Orthodox church and its patriarchal dignity, e.g., in the case of the abolished and restored Serbian Patriarchate of Peć.

3.2. The Habsburg Monarchy and Autocephaly

Until recently, the impact of the Habsburg monarchy on the modern development of Orthodox church organization, and particularly on the role of civil authorities in the promotion of autocephaly has been at the periphery of scholarly investigation. As in the Ottoman lands, the Orthodox community in the Habsburg Empire was not homogenous. Its multiethnic composition brought about a complex ecclesiastical organization consisting of autonomous and autocephalous bodies (Bremer 2023; Heith-Stade 2024). Like the Ottoman sultan, the emperor in Vienna exercised supreme oversight in religious matters. Yet, acting in line with the Western church law, this Western Christian ruler spread his right to nominate Catholic bishops over the Orthodox ones as well (Bremer 2023, p. 738; Heith-Stade 2024, p. 418). At the end of the seventeenth century, when the wars with the Ottomans caused a mass influx of Orthodox Serbs in the Habsburg Empire, the monarch allowed them to autonomously organize their religious life. The revolutions of 1848–1849, however, urged him to take into account the national identities of his Orthodox subjects. As a result, two autocephalous churches were set up—the ethnically mixed Metropolitanate of Czernowitz (now Chernivtsi in Ukraine) and the predominantly Serbian Metropolitanate of Karlowitz (now Karlovci in Serbia) (Erickson 2016, p. 101). In this regard, however, there is no clarity about their canonical recognition. Besides, the motives for the grant of one or another type of ecclesiastical self-government by the House of Habsburg did not always stem from the national principle. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Austrian emperor set up also autonomous Orthodox churches: the Romanian Metropolitanate of Sibiu, the dual Metropolitanate of Bukovina and Dalmatia, and the Church of Bosnia and Herzegovina. While the first two were directly accountable to the House of Habsburgs, the latter remained under the formal jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Constantinople.

Furthermore, while little is known about the Cernivtsi Metropolitanate, the Karlovci one is a subject of many studies. In 1848, the Habsburg monarch permitted the convocation of a church council for the election of Metropolitan Josif Rajačić of Karlovci as “Patriarch and political administrator of Vojvodina” (Bremer 2023, p. 738). Enhancing the image of the Karlovci metropolitan as a successor of the abolished Patriarchate of Peć and reviving the memory of Serbs about their semi-autonomous kingdom set up by the Habsburgs in 1717 and destroyed by the Ottomans in 1739, the emperor sought to win the loyalty of Serbs in the stormy revolutionary years. Yet, when Austro-Hungary occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878, Vienna chose a different approach. It neglected the requests of the Karlovci Metropolitanate-Patriarchate to transfer the local Orthodox communities as Serbs under its jurisdiction. Instead, the Austrian emperor signed an agreement with the Patriarch of Constantinople, thus guaranteeing the full control of Vienna over the local Orthodox population and its affairs (Bremer 2023, pp. 740–41).

3.3. Post-Byzantine Slavic Autocephalies

No less remarkable were the processes in the Orthodox areas beyond Ottoman and Habsburg control. The loosened ties with the Great Church of Constantinople stimulated the independence of some local churches. Two of them deserve special attention. The first of them emerged in Muscovy, where in 1448, the Great Prince appointed a new metropolitan without the canonical permission of the Mother Church of Constantinople. Although the latter protested against this disobedience, it did not declare a schism. Moreover, after the fall of Byzantium, the patriarchs of Constantinople started paying frequent visits to Muscovy in search of alms and other support from its Orthodox rulers. In 1589, during such a trip, Patriarch Ieremias II agreed, under pressure (Kartashev 1992, II, pp. 21–26), to grant patriarchal dignity to the Church of Moscow. In practice, this was the only Orthodox Church that succeeded in gaining the canonical recognition of its self-declared autocephaly in the period 1453 to 1850.

Yet, all this happened “under circumstances that did not quite fit into the canonical norms” (Petrushko 2023, p. 421). Patriarch Jeremias II of Constantinople enthroned the Metropolitan of Moscow as a patriarch without consulting this act with his synod or the other Orthodox patriarchs. Upon his return to Istanbul, Jeremias convoked two church councils for the recognition of the patriarchal dignity of the Russian Orthodox Church. The first one, held in 1590, obliged the Moscow patriarch liturgically to commemorate the Ecumenical Patriarch, while the next one of 1593 recognized Moscow as the capital of the Orthodox Empire and granted the fifth place to the Patriarch of Moscow after those of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem (Petrushko 2023). However, there is no clarity on how the grant of the fifth place to the Moscow patriarch was justified. This decision was taken at a moment when the much older patriarchates of Georgia and Peć were still operating. Thus, it is possible to suggest that the neglect of this fact by the patriarchs of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem was due to an intervention of the Ottoman and Moscow authorities.

At the same time, the case of the Russian Orthodox Church demonstrates once more that the autocephalous status is not bound to patriarchal dignity. When Peter the Great declared his realm as an empire and abolished the Moscow patriarchate, replacing it with a Synodal government (1721), the Russian Orthodox Church did not lose its autocephaly and fifth position in the Orthodox world. In this regard, however, less attention is paid to the fact that through his church reforms, Peter abandoned the Byzantine principle “Imperium sine patriarcha non staret” which used to couple the Christian empire with a patriarchal church. Paradoxically, the Patriarchate of Moscow was restored only upon the collapse of the Russian empire in 1917. In this way, in contrast to Byzantium, the patriarchal dignity of the Russian Orthodox Church was not associated with the Russian Empire.

Finally, in 1516, another noncanonical autocephaly appeared in Zeta (Montenegro). It was an outcome of the decision of the local prince to transfer his ruler’s duties to the Metropolitan of Zeta. This act provided a strong incentive for an autocephalous positioning of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church. Until the establishment of a new ruling dynasty in 1851, its metropolitans functioned simultaneously as political leaders, general judges, and chiefs-in-command of their people (Skurat 1994, pp. 119–25). Like in the case of other post-Byzantine autocephalies, the question of its canonical arrangement and recognition remains open. Yet, in 1920, together with the Karlovci Metropolitnate-Patriarchate, the Montenegrin church joined the newly created Serbian Patriarchate, thus losing its autocephaly. As in the past, the change was initiated by civil authorities, now situated in the capital of the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

4. Autocephaly in the Age of Nationalism

4.1. Ottoman Imperial Space

The role of civil authorities in the grant of autocephaly in the age of nationalism has been a subject of multiple studies. Therefore, this section is primarily focused on those aspects that have a direct link with the acts of granting or abolishment of autocephaly. To a great degree, the studies on the encounter of Eastern Orthodoxy with nationalism determine the contemporary perception of autocephaly as an Orthodox phenomenon closely linked with modern nations and their states (Zizioulas 1985). Meanwhile, some observers go further by drawing direct parallels between the political sovereignty of the modern state and the autocephalous status of a local Orthodox church. Such a comparison, however, does not consider the incompatibility of the dogmatic teaching of the unity of the Church with the secular concepts of unity in social sciences. The mixture of both notions often leads to conflicts between church and state authorities in the contemporary debates on autocephaly.

In this regard, it is necessary to bear in mind that the establishment of new autocephalies in modern times brought about a decentralization of the Orthodox world and its terrestrial church organisation which did not exist in the past when the principles of separation of church and state and the freedom of religion and conscience were unknown. The link of autocephaly with the secular nation-state was a new development that transformed the pre-modern decentralization in the Orthodox world from a means of ecclesiastical management into an issue of political significance. Modern autocephaly became an attribute of the state sovereignty. Therefore, the autocephalous status of the churches was also integrated into national legislation either by references in constitutions and laws on religion or through the state approval of church statutes giving them the force of civil law. Under these circumstances, the interests of the Chalcedonian Eastern Orthodox churches diverged to a degree that their agreement on multiple burning issues of contemporary religious life became very difficult. Since the early twentieth century, all their attempts to gather together at a pan-Orthodox council have failed. In 2016, four Orthodox churches did not attend the Holy and Great Council in Crete.

From a broader historical perspective, the advent of nationalism undermined the old theocratic regimes throughout Europe. It triggered processes of disintegration within the Ottoman, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian empires, which led to the establishment of new nation-states on their territories. The discussed developments also affected the old imperial centers of Orthodox church power, namely, the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Russian Holy Synod in St. Petersburg. In their fight for political independence, the Orthodox nations in the Ottoman Empire used to perceive the Patriarch of Constantinople as a captive of an alien regime. This mood found expression in the idea of Adamantios Korais that churchmen in the free Kingdom of Greece were no longer obliged to obey the See of Constantinople (Kitromilides 2019, pp. 34–35). Building on it, he considered that churchmen and laymen in the Greek Kingdom had to elect a local Synod of bishops who independently run the local church affairs (Stamatopoulos 2014, pp. 34–65). In 1833, the royal authorities in Greece took advantage of Korais’s ideas and established a local autocephalous church without consulting this act with the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

The promotion of Greek autocephaly, however, was also influenced by international politics and Western legal thought. On the one hand, it had the support of the British and French embassies who expected such an ecclesiastical status to reduce Russia’s influence on the Orthodox Greeks (Stamatopoulos 2014, p. 34). On the other hand, scholars discern the impact of the principle Cuius regio eius religio. Commenting on it, Kitromilides refers to church–state relations in the early Kingdom of Greece as Greek Gallicanism (Kitromilides 2019, pp. 33–34). Indeed, the Church Statute of 1833, which upon the approval of state authorities obtained the force of a law, defined the king as the temporal head of the Church of Greece and integrated this ecclesiastical body into the state administration. The same principles were integrated into the Greek Constitution of 1844 (Matalas 2023, pp. 433–34, 440). In response, the Patriarch of Constantinople declared a schism over the Church in Greece, which was healed in 1850. Meanwhile, in contrast to the Byzantine tradition, no basileus was involved in the accomplishment of this act. Instead, the schism was overcome by the means of diplomacy, involving state actors as well (Matalas 2023, pp. 447–50). Another novelty was the issuance of the so-called tomos. This act certifying the rights of the newly recognized autocephalous church marked a shift from the pre-modern personal approach to an institutional one. Associated with a distinct church See in the Byzantine times and with a specific person in the case of the sultan’s berats for the appointment of patriarchs, now the principle of autocephaly was linked with a particular Orthodox church institution functioning in the territory of one or another nation-state.

The commented innovation resonated in the other nation-states which emerged in the former Ottoman territories. As in Greece, the initiative usually belonged to the state authorities. In 1864, the Romanian Prince Alexandre Cuza introduced a law promulgating the independence of the Romanian Orthodox Church from “any foreign ecclesiastical authority in matters of organization and discipline” (Schifirneţ 2013, p. 187). This act and other reforms undertaken by Cuza to secure the independence of the local Orthodox Church from the Patriarchate of Constantinople caused a new schism. To overcome it, the Romanian royal and church authorities united their efforts (Schifirneţ 2013; Leustean 2014). Finally, in 1885, the Patriarch of Constantinople issued a tomos for the autocephaly of the Romanian Orthodox Church.

The same pattern was followed by the Albanian state, though Orthodoxy was a minority religion there. Its royal authorities first declared the autocephalous status of the local Orthodox Church (1922) and then started negotiating its recognition by the ecumenical throne (1937). Its case illustrates the deep involvement of domestic and international politics in the arrangement of modern autocephalies even when the local Orthodox Church does not present the country’s majority religion (Bido 2021; Meta 2015, pp. 35–61). Among the Balkan nations, only the Serbs, though with the help of Russian diplomacy, found a smooth way to their ecclesiastical independence. When their principality became a vassal state of the Ottoman sultan (1830), they persuaded the Patriarchate of Constantinople to grant autonomy to the Metropolinate of Belgrade (1831). In a similar manner, they used the newly achieved political sovereignty of Serbia in 1878 to secure the grant of autocephaly to the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1879 (Kitromilides 2019, p. 37). At the same time, the smooth arrangement of Serbian autocephaly did not exclude the decisive role of national state authorities. The initiative for this act belonged to Serbian Prince Milan Obrenović, who together with the Metropolitan of Belgrade, referred with a request to Patriarch Joachim III of Constantinople (Bogolepov 2001, pp. 14–15).

Korais’s ideas were also attractive to the Orthodox Bulgarians. In this case, however, the revolt against the Patriarchate of Constantinople was not sponsored by a nation-state. It erupted from below when the Bulgarians still were subjects of the sultan. Under these circumstances, they took advantage of Ottoman legislation and appealed for respect for their civil rights as prescribed by the Hatti Hümayun (1856). Pointing to the requirement for the equal treatment of the sultan’s subjects regardless of their religion and ethnicity, they complained about the Hellenizing policy of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Defining it as an oppression of their linguistic and ethnic rights, the Bulgarians demanded the appointment of hierarchs able to speak their language. In this regard, they also advanced historical arguments and called for the restoration of the Patriarchate of Tarnovo and the Archbishopric of Ohrid as inherently Bulgarian churches. Finally, the Sublime Porte heard their voice. In 1870, the sultan decreed the establishment of an autonomous Bulgarian Exarchate at the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Two years later, however, the latter convoked an ecclesiastical council that declared schism over the Bulgarian Exarchate. As a result, the Orthodox Bulgarians were isolated from the canonical Orthodox churches for decades but obtained an opportunity to independently run their Exarchate as if it were autocephalous. When Bulgaria was liberated, its royal authorities followed the example of the other Balkan nation-states and took an active part in the negotiations on Bulgarian autocephaly (Kalkandjieva 2023a). This happened on 22 February 1945.

4.2. Autocephaly in Post-Imperial Russian Space

The advent of nationalism provoked autocephalist movements in the Russian Empire as well. As in the Balkan countries, autocephaly was approached by civil authorities as an issue of national identity and political sovereignty. The first steps towards autocephaly were undertaken by the Georgians, who also pursued the restoration of their ancient patriarchate. In 1811, upon the incorporation of Georgia, Emperor Alexander I (1801–1825) decreed the abolishment of their autocephalous patriarchate and its transformation into an exarchate subjected to the Russian Holy Synod (Alasania 2006, p. 126). The resistance of Catholicos-Patriarch Anton II, arguing that only the ancient patriarchs had the canonical authority to decide on the autocephaly and patriarchal dignity of his Church, had no effect (Kutateladze 2019, p. 150). As a result, the Russian ruler introduced the principle: “One empire, one autocephaly”. In 1920, it inspired the leadership of the newly established Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia to coalesce the local autocephalous churches into a unified Serbian patriarchate.

Furthermore, in the age of nationalism, like the Bulgarians in the Ottoman Empire, the Georgians demanded church services in their native language and called for the restoration of their ancient patriarchate despite the lack of their own state (Werth 2006, pp. 84–87). Though addressed to an Orthodox ruler and not to a Muslim one, however, their appeals were in vain (Alasania 2006, p. 127). The situation changed only after the abdication of Nikolay II. On 12 March 1917, the Georgians unilaterally restored their autocephalous patriarchate and launched negotiations for its recognition by the Russian Holy Synod and the Provisional Governments of Count George Lvov and Alexander Kerensky. While the talks with the former aimed to resolve the canonical aspects of this act, those with the latter were focused on legal and economic matters. In the second case, the Georgians sought to arrange the continuing payment of the salaries of Georgian bishops and clerics from the Russian state budget and the restitution of the Georgian Church’s properties taken away upon its subjection to the Russian Synod in 1811. At the same time, while the Russian church authorities delayed the decision on the Georgian church question under various pretexts, Kerensky’s government recognized the autocephalous Georgian Orthodox Church as a national religious organization without concrete territorial borders (Chumakova 2019, pp. 186–87). In this way, the non-Georgian Orthodox believers in Georgia had to remain under the jurisdiction of the Russian Synod. At the same time, the establishment of the short-lived Georgian Republic (May 1918–February 1921) boosted the support of the national state authorities for the autocephalous Georgian patriarchate (Gegenava 2018).

Although the autocephalist movement spread also in Ukraine it was accompanied by certain tensions. The reasons were complex. First and foremost, the Ukrainians did not have an autocephalous church in the past. Correspondingly, their fight was not for the restoration of a previously autocephalous church but for the establishment of a new one. Correspondingly, this enterprise faced difficult canonical questions, which resolving was additionally complicated by the alienation of the local predominantly Russian episcopate from its Ukrainian flock (Bociurkiw 1991, pp. 228–29). As a result, although the fall of the Russian monarchy and the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state gave a strong stimulus to the national autocephalist movement, the local state and church authorities disagreed on the issue of autocephaly. In contrast to the new political elite of the country calling for autocephaly, the local Orthodox episcopate supported the decision of the All-Russian Church Council for the internal autonomy of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine in September 1918 (Destivelle 2015, pp. 303–6).

In its turn, the Directory, established by the Ukrainian National Union in January 1919, resorted to civil law to promulgate the establishment of an autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine (Bociurkiw 1991, p. 230). In parallel, it undertook diplomatic steps for the recognition of the Ukrainian autocephaly by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Due to the complicated situation in postwar Turkey and the revolutionary turmoil in Russia, however, its envoy to Istanbul was not able to finalize the negotiations with the Patriarchate (Kirimli 1998). The collision between the national interests of Russian churchmen and Ukrainian laity on the one hand, and the canonical approach of the Russian episcopate to the issue of Ukrainian autocephaly and the policies of the Ukrainian state stepping on civil law, on the other, provoked further complications in the areas under Soviet control, which are discussed below.

5. Autocephaly-Making Under Atheist Rule

5.1. The Puppet Autocephalies of the Interwar Bolshevik Regime

The Bolshevik revolution (1917) caused a radical shift in the autocephaly-making process. The new masters of Russia went beyond the principles of French laïcité. They did not establish a merely secular state, but an atheist one pursuing to build an entirely godless society. From this perspective, the issue of autocephaly seems irrelevant to their plans for total annihilation of religion. Yet, an analysis of Soviet policies in the religious sphere reveals a different picture. The Bolsheviks adopted an instrumental approach to autocephaly which affected not only the Orthodox communities in the areas under their control but also those abroad. In the early 1920s, the Soviet regime started establishing puppet autocephalies. On the one hand, their mushrooming aimed to weaken the Russian Orthodox Church, especially during the tenure of Patriarch Tikhon. On the other hand, born out of artificially induced schisms such autocephalities undermined the religiosity of churchgoers, thus serving as an additional tool for the Bolshevik assault on religion. Also, this policy was employed mostly in Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus, where ethnic Russians were a minority. Moreover, considering the idea of autocephaly as a major source of Ukrainian nationalism and separatism, the Bolshevik security services tried to discredit it by devising most of the fake autocephalies precisely in Soviet Ukraine (Kalkandjieva 2023b, pp. 786–98).

5.2. The Invention of Geopolitical Autocephalies

The eruption of the Second World War incited the Stalinist regime to reconsider its approach to autocephaly. Under the new circumstances, it discovered the potential of this phenomenon as a geopolitical tool. In September 1943, Stalin boosted the autocephalous status of the Russian Orthodox Church by convening an ecclesiastical council for the election of a new Patriarch of Moscow, the first one after Tikhon’s death (1925). Two months later, the Soviet authorities also ‘arranged’ the recognition of the autocephaly of the Georgian Orthodox Church by the Moscow patriarchate (Kalkandjieva 2014, pp. 186–87). Although this act did not bring about a significant improvement in the positions of the former, it secured the support of the Orthodox Georgians for the Soviet cause in the war against the Hitlerite invasion. Furthermore, in 1944, when the Soviet Army restored its control over the western areas of Ukraine and Belarus, the local autocephalies established during their Nazi occupation were suppressed and their leaders were accused of collaborationism with the invader.

At the same time, the Kremlin adopted a different approach to the Orthodox churches in the so-called people’s democracies set up in post-war Eastern Europe. By that time, four of them enjoyed an autocephalous status bestowed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. The Serbian Orthodox Church obtained it in 1879, the Romanian—in 1885, the Polish—in 1924, and the Albanian—in 1937. The postwar changes in the local political regimes, however, left their imprint on the functioning of these autocephalies. This development had a particular impact on Poland. In the case of its local Orthodox Church, the Soviet state sustained the refusal of the Moscow patriarchate to recognize the already existing Polish autocephaly (Dudra 2015; Chibisova 2018; Kalkandjieva 2023b, pp. 801–4). According to the Soviet church leadership, the Metropolitanate of Warsaw was part of the historical legacy of the Russian Orthodox Church. On these grounds, the Moscow Patriarchate pleaded to have special rights as the mother church of the Orthodox believers in Poland and rejected Polish autocephaly previously granted by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople as unlawful. In its turn, the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church arranged the bestowal of “proper” autocephaly to the Polish Orthodox Church in the summer of 1948. In parallel, the above-mentioned Council played a similar role in preserving the autocephalous status of the post-war Albanian Orthodox Church. When the new masters of Albania beheaded this religious organization, it coordinated the promotion of new Orthodox bishops amongst priests loyal to the communist regime (Hoxha 2022, pp. 88–147).

Furthermore, the postwar intervention of Soviet authorities in the affairs of the local and foreign Orthodox churches caused significant changes in the ecclesiastical map of Europe. In this regard, the Kremlin’s efforts to devise new autocephalies closely linked with the Moscow patriarchate deserve special attention. Only the plan for the creation of an autocephalous Orthodox Church in Hungary was abandoned. The project inflamed negative attitudes toward the Moscow church center among several Orthodox churches because they were about to lose their centuries-old dioceses in that country (Kalkandjieva 2014, pp. 285–94). Meanwhile, the Soviet state succeeded in establishing two new autocephalies. Particularly indicative in this regard is the Czechoslovakian case. Like most Kremlin-induced autocephalies, it came to life with the assistance of the local communist party. This time, however, the Soviet state needed a third partner. Most Orthodox communities in Czechoslovakia belonged to the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox Church but its Holy Synod opposed their transfer to the Moscow Patriarchate. The problem was resolved with the assistance of Josip Broz Tito, whose government crushed the resistance of the Serbian episcopate (Radić 2002, pp. 249–50). Under this pressure, the Synod in Belgrade transferred its dioceses in Czechoslovakia to the Moscow Patriarchate. In parallel, the Orthodox communities in Czechoslovakia were restructured into an exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church (Kalkandjieva 2014, pp. 218–24). In 1951, under the supervision of the Soviet Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church and with the assistance of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia, the Moscow patriarchate granted autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Czechoslovakia (Kalkandjieva 2023b, pp. 808–9). On the spot, the change was assisted by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Council of the State (Havliček 2023, pp. 567–68).

From the perspective of the above-discussed cases, the Bulgarian one is more specific. Isolated for decades from the other Orthodox churches due to the schism of 1872, the Bulgarian Exarchate, found a way out after the First World War by joining the ecumenical movement. This membership allowed the Bulgarian Orthodox Church to establish eucharistic communion with most canonical autocephalous Orthodox churches between the two world wars (Zankow 1933). Still, various political and canonical reasons impeded the abolishment of the schism imposed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1872. In the last months of the Second World War, however, the Soviet authorities gave a new impetus to this endeavor. On 7 February 1945, immediately upon his election, Patriarch Alexii I of Moscow stood up as a mediator in the negotiations for resolving the Bulgarian question. Indeed, on February 22, the Ecumenical Patriarchate declared the end of the schism over the Bulgarian Exarchate and issued a tomos for its autocephaly (Kalkandjieva 2014, pp. 272–77). Similarly, in 1953, the Moscow state and church authorities endorsed the plan of the Bulgarian communist regime to restore the patriarchal dignity of the local Orthodox Church without asking the permission of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople. Only during Khrushchev’s détente, the latter agreed to recognize the patriarchal rank of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Kalkandjieva 2023a, pp. 363–65).

The described promotion of autocephalies was in tune with Stalin’s idea of transforming the Moscow patriarchate into an Orthodox Vatican (Shkarovskii 1995, pp. 28, 41). Still, the outbreak of the Cold War restricted the Kremlin’s aspirations for the subjugation of world Orthodoxy. Meanwhile, the autocephalous status of the Orthodox churches in the Soviet camp did not guarantee their normal functioning. The communist party-states controlled the episcopal consecrations in these Orthodox churches as well as the “elections” of their supreme hierarchs. Also, the discussed autocephalous churches were not free in their domestic and international activities. Upon the eruption of the Cold War, they were forced to follow the Kremlin’s foreign policy in the religious sphere. They had to support the initiatives of the Moscow Patriarchate and restrict their contacts with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Yet, if Stalin exploited the Orthodox churches from the Soviet camp mostly as weapons of his anti-western propaganda, Khrushchev’s détente opened new horizons for their worldwide usage. The Kremlin changed its attitude to the membership of this group of Orthodox churches in various international religious organizations. Now it was encouraged as a means of forcing such bodies to refrain from extreme statements on the east-west confrontation and the suppression of religious freedoms in the communist states (Fletcher 1973, pp. 129–31).

In addition, the mentioned expansion of the international activities of the Orthodox churches from the Soviet camp allowed the Kremlin to undermine the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople in intra-Orthodox affairs (Fletcher 1973, p. 113). In 1970, the Moscow Patriarchate openly contested the authority of the latter on Orthodox diaspora by granting autocephaly to the Russian Metropolitanate in North America (Fletcher 1973, p. 115). Although this autocephaly was not recognized as canonical by all Orthodox churches, its establishment was a geopolitical victory for the Kremlin. In this regard, two facts deserve special attention. The first is the timing of the bestowal of the tomos of autocephaly. This event took place on 18 May 1970, during the interregnum between the death of Patriarch Alexii I of Moscow and the election of his successor. Besides, the 40-day morning for the late patriarch was not finished. The other fact concerns the presence of the US Ambassador to the Soviet Union at the ceremony. In this regard, a suggestion is made that the appearance of Western diplomats at such a religious event in Moscow might have been linked with the start of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks in Helsinki (Kalkandjieva 2023b, p. 814).

6. Conclusions: Reflections on the Role of Civil Authorities on Autocephaly in the Post-Cold Era

The presented analytical overview reveals that civil authorities were a constant factor in the promotion of autocephaly, as well as in its abolishment, throughout the centuries. Originally spread across the entire Christian world this practice has evolved into a feature of Eastern Orthodox churches which, together with the Byzantine dogmatic teaching, liturgical tradition, and symphonic church–state relations, makes them different from those of Western Christianity.6 Besides, the outlined evolution points to a link between the legal systems of past political formations and the autocephaly-related acts of their civil authorities. At the same time, the analysis of the autocephaly-making strategies employed by the former communist regimes discloses a nexus with their atheist ideology and (geo)political interests.

From this perspective, the collapse of communism raised questions about the future of autocephaly-related practices in the context of the break with the atheist past and the post-Cold War civilizational choice of society in the former totalitarian states. In this respect, two developments deserve special attention: the search for continuity with the pre-communist past and the transition from militant atheism to full-fledged freedom of religion. Their impact on society, however, is not unequivocal. In particular, the longing for continuity has the potential to stimulate not only the revival of suppressed democratic traditions but also the spread of nationalist exceptionalism and the worship of illiberal “traditional values.” Besides, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Tito’s Yugoslavia provoked two opposite trends regarding the autocephaly issue. While Korais’s idea of this ecclesiastical status as a condition to state sovereignty does not enjoy popularity in Russia and Serbia, it has become attractive to many independent states in their neighborhood. Initially traced mainly in Ukraine and North Macedonia, whose national governments undertook steps for arranging the autocephalous status of the local Orthodox churches, this tendency is also taking ground in Montenegro (Saggau 2024) and Latvia (Cimbalo 2022). Meanwhile, the support of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow for the war launched by Putin against Ukraine has turned the issue of autocephaly into a security issue.

At the same time, the expanded freedom of religion in the former atheist states has had an unexpected effect on the local Orthodox churches. In this regard, special attention deserves the European Convention of Human Rights (Article 9) which empowers not only the Orthodox episcopate but also the same faith laymen and priests to comment freely on church affairs. Hence, the voice of lay believers and low-ranked clergy obtained a strength it had never had. The new freedoms allow the regular members of Orthodox communities to exert influence on the decision-making of their episcopate on issues linked with the local church life. Inter alia, the viewpoint of laymen and low-ranked clergy also matters in shaping public opinion on the relations of their church organization with ecclesiastical centers abroad. In this respect, the quest for autocephaly from the patriarchal Sees in Belgrade, Moscow, and Istanbul has obtained special significance not only for the respective Orthodox communities but for their national governments.

In parallel, the expanded freedom of religion in the former atheist lands has changed the role of civil authorities in the promotion of new autocephalies. In response to this challenge, the leaderships of Orthodox churches tend to interpret the mentioned liberty as an argument for the total exclusion of state authorities from the autocephaly-making process (Zadornov 2023). This approach is justified by the views of such twentieth-century Russian theologians as Sergii Troitsky and Alexander Schmemann. While the former fully rejects any involvement of the state in the establishment of new autocephalies, the latter admits such a possibility but insists that the secular authorities respect the canonical requirements for the introduction of such an ecclesiastical status (Zadornov 2023, pp. 31–33). In its turn, however, the Treaty for Establishing a Constitution for Europe (Treaty 2005) offers a different perspective. It declares that the European Union “respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States (Art. 1–52). This approach is compatible not only with the legislation of contemporary European democracies but also with the historically developed practices of civil authorities in the grant of autocephaly.