Manipulating Traditional Korean Confucianism: The Impact of Japanese Colonial Rule and Its Aftermath

Abstract

Confucian values are widely recognized as integral to traditional Korean culture. However, some aspects of this culture were significantly altered during Japanese colonial rule. This study explored how Japanese colonial policies reshaped Korean Confucianism and their lasting impacts on contemporary practices. It employed a historical analysis of colonial regulations, newspaper articles, and primary historical documents. This approach helped to trace the changes in Confucian practices and ideologies during and after the colonial period. The study found that Japanese authorities utilized Confucian values, such as loyalty and filial piety, to promote assimilation into the imperial state, redirecting these concepts toward the Japanese emperor and government. Efforts to democratize Confucianism included repurposing traditional sites for non-traditional uses, which were parts of a broader strategy to embed imperial ideology in Korean society. Despite Korea’s liberation, some aspects of this altered Confucianism continued to influence Korean politics and society. Understanding the transformation of Korean Confucianism during the colonial era is crucial for grasping the evolution of contemporary Confucian practices in Korea. This study provides insight into the origins and motivations behind cultural practices that are often misinterpreted as “traditional”.

1. Introduction

Korea, due to its geographical proximity to China, engaged with Confucian thought from an early period. The adoption and development of Confucianism in Korea can be broadly divided into four stages. During the Three Kingdoms Period (4th–7th century), which included Goguryeo, Baekje, and Silla, the philosophy of the Five Classics from the Han dynasty was introduced. This prompted the establishment of state-sponsored Confucian educational institutions and the prioritization of Confucian ethical codes. From the 9th to the 10th century, Confucian ideas from the Sui and Tang dynasties entered Korea, profoundly influencing Korean literature and cultural practices and solidifying Confucianism as a central ideological framework. In the late 13th century, the establishment of the Joseon Dynasty, which explicitly adopted Confucianism as its founding principle, marked a critical turning point. During this era, Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucianism profoundly transformed Korea’s intellectual and cultural landscape. Finally, from the late 17th to the 18th century, the Practical Learning (實學) philosophy of the Qing dynasty was introduced. Qing intellectual trends, which challenged the orthodoxy of Song and Ming Neo-Confucianism while incorporating elements of emerging Western modernity, promoted an empirical and pragmatic scholarly ethos. This transition catalyzed the decline of Neo-Confucianism’s dominance and the rise of Practical Learning within Korea (Ryu 2008, pp. 12–13).

The sustained development of Confucianism in the Korean Peninsula over centuries also reshaped its relationships with other religious systems, such as Buddhism and shamanism. For instance, the Joseon Dynasty (1392–1897), often described as a “Confucian state”, actively suppressed Buddhism to dismantle the aristocratic power structures associated with the preceding Goryeo Dynasty. This suppression was ideologically underpinned by a commitment to Confucian principles as the foundation for national governance (Cho 2008, p. 177). Consequently, Buddhism, once central to state administration, transitioned into the realm of personal spirituality. This shift is exemplified by King Sejong’s personal devotion to Buddhism (Cho 2011, p. 312). A similar dynamic is observed in the interaction between Confucianism and shamanism. While Confucianism functioned as the official state ideology supported by governmental authority, shamanism persisted as a form of folk religion, maintaining its role in private and communal spheres (Choe 2002, p. 254).

Regarding the cultural significance of Confucianism in Korea, the eminent scholar Geum Jang-tae observed, “Confucianism has been intimately interwoven with our nation’s culture and long history. Its ubiquity renders it as unnoticeable as air” (Geum 1999, p. 7). He further emphasized, “Confucianism has exerted an uninterrupted influence on Korean intellectual history from its inception to the present, embedding itself deeply in all domains of life as a traditional philosophy” (Geum 2002, p. 9). Consequently, contemporary Koreans perceive life norms and rituals rooted in Confucianism as intrinsic elements of Korea’s “traditional” heritage.

Confucianism, which has been both an ideological foundation and, at times, a religious belief system, continues to exert a profound philosophical influence in South Korea. The lasting impact of Confucian values is also symbolized by the prominent statue of Admiral Yi in Gwanghwamun Square, often referred to as the “heart of the nation”, situated at the cultural, economic, and political center of Seoul (Korea Tourism Organization 2024) (see Figure 1).

Yi Sun-shin, a devout follower of Confucianism during the Joseon Dynasty, is renowned for his pivotal role in defending the nation against the Japanese invasions during the Imjin War (1592~1598). He continues to elicit profound respect and admiration among contemporary South Koreans, being revered as one of the nation’s foremost figures. Surrounding his statue are 35 monuments bearing excerpts from his diary, Nanjung Ilgi (亂中日記), chronicling his wartime experiences, all of which emphasize the themes of loyalty (忠) and piety (孝). Notably, one inscription recounts, “I shed tears as I thought about the country and spent sleepless nights as I thought about my 80-year-old ill mother” (1 January 1595), underscoring his iconic stature as a paragon of Confucian virtues such as loyalty and filial piety.

According to a report by Gallup Korea, one of the most authoritative polling organizations in the country, which surveyed the religious practices and beliefs of Koreans in 2004, the inclination of Koreans to embrace Confucian values has shown a gradual decline. Nonetheless, the survey revealed that followers of Buddhism, Christianity, and Catholicism—three of South Korea’s most prominent religions—continue to uphold certain aspects of Confucian values (Gallup Korea 2004, p. 165). This underscores the enduring influence of Confucianism in contemporary Korean society. Moreover, as it is often said that “the Confucian cultural tradition embodies the spirit of Korea”, Confucianism is widely regarded as a long-standing component of the nation’s cultural “tradition” (Hyun 1991, p. 7).

Nonetheless, contrary to the prevailing belief among Koreans, the authors of this article argue that the elements of Confucian culture that are considered an integral part of the Korean cultural tradition are not as ancient as commonly assumed and were formulated and disseminated during the Japanese colonial rule (Ryu 2008, pp. 84–110). Although Confucianism was already established in Korean society during the Japanese occupation, Japan altered the Confucian system and simplified several daily ceremonies. Japan presented these actions as part of an effort to develop Confucianism and enhance the nation’s adherence to its teachings. However, this was, in reality, another facet of its colonial policies. In fact, the beliefs, teachings, and ceremonies imposed by imperial Japan did not dissipate with the end of their rule but became deeply ingrained in the Korean society. Therefore, this study delves into the intricate issues surrounding Confucianism in modern Korea.

2. Rule and the Transformation of Traditional Confucian Education in Joseon

The Joseon Dynasty (1392–1897) governed the nation, based on traditional Confucianism, before Japanese colonial rule. Thus, only those who rigorously studied and practiced Confucianism were eligible to take the government’s official examination. Consequently, these officials had a strong influence on Joseon.

The Joseon Dynasty established two types of educational institutions in 1398. One was Seonggyungwan (成均館), where future central government officials were educated; the other included Hyanggyo (鄕校) or local education centers. Private teaching centers such as Seowon (書院) and Seodang (書堂) also provided Confucianism-based teachings. The central government recognized these two kinds of private schools as official institutions. During the Joseon Dynasty, institutions like Seonggyungwan and Hyanggyo served not only as educational centers for central bureaucrats, but also as venues for biannual ancestral rites honoring Confucius, a pivotal figure in Confucianism, and for the dissemination of Confucian teachings. The ancestral ceremony was held at a place called Munmyo (文廟).

Following the annexation of Korea in 1910, Japan instituted the Government-General of Joseon to administer the peninsula and promptly undertook a systematic effort to develop an extensive educational policy targeting the Korean population. This laid the groundwork for ruling the Joseon peninsula (Government-General of Joseon 1935, p. 167). However, even before the annexation, Japan had been taking the necessary measures to organize the existing educational institutions in Joseon. It also needed to produce government officials taught under the Japan-led educational system and established peaceful relations with Confucianists in the Joseon area (Hwanseong Shinmun 1909). Japan could not simply ignore such Confucianists or introduce the Japanese-style educational system in Joseon without their assistance.

However, under colonial rule, the Government-General of Joseon systematically reduced the prominence of traditional Confucian educational centers, culminating in the closure of Seonggyungwan in September 1911, once an epitome of the previous dynasty’s educational excellence. Subsequently, the Government-General promulgated the Joseon Education Ordinance after nearly a year of development, instituting modern educational facilities under its direct administration (Joseonchongdogbu Gwanbo 1911a).

Remarkably, the Government-General of Joseon established Gyeonghagwon (經學院), a novel institution tasked with assuming certain Confucian functions following the dissolution of Seonggyungwan (Joseonchongdogbu Gwanbo 1911b). Nevertheless, the instructional curriculum from Seonggyungwan did not transition to Gyeonghagwon. The colonial government only allowed paying tribute to Confucius or his followers through ritual performances or lectures in local communities. Most Gyeonghagwon employees were Yangban (兩班), the traditional ruling class or gentry of the Joseon Dynasty, who were bureaucrats who had worked for the central government before Joseon became a Japanese colony. The Government-General of Joseon hired regional leaders as employees of Gyeonghagwon and granted them status to use their influence (Taiyō 1910, p. 341). It was also their strategy to convince people that abolishing Seonggyungwan did not mean prohibiting Confucianism. In essence, despite alterations to the Confucian-based social hierarchy during colonial rule, Japan endeavored to convey the illusion of its preservation to the Korean populace.

3. Confucianism’s Popularization and Emphasis on Loyalty and Filial Piety

The government sought the assistance of the Yangban employed at Gyeonghagwon to transmit official policy in the capital and local regions. Gyeonghagwon primarily propagated the policy enforced by the Government-General of Joseon in local areas across the country (Rhyu 2004). Gyeonghagwon also mediated between the Yangban and Government-General of Joseon (Rhyu 2004, pp. 105–32; Jung 2007, pp. 59–85).

Using the Japanese officials at Gyeonghagwon or by inviting famous Confucian scholars and Chinese literature experts from mainland Japan, the Government-General held public lectures under the themes of Confucianism’s popularization and Confucianism’s development. The authorities argued that Confucian teachings in Joseon should be made more practical to popularize Confucianism. During this process, the Confucian values of loyalty (忠) and filial piety (孝) were highlighted as crucial.

Loyalty and filial piety were the key components of original Confucianism. Loyalty represents the foundational Confucian principle of serving one’s sovereign, which, in Joseon, meant serving the Joseon king. Filial piety refers to serving one’s parents. Furthermore, in Eastern ethics, the family is regarded as a microcosm of the world, so loyalty to one’s ruler is often equated with filial piety toward one’s parents. However, these values were emphasized to an extreme by the Gyeonghagwon under Japanese rule. Japan imposed a very concrete and practical code of conduct, requiring people to be loyal to the Japanese Empire and respectful to the Emperor of Japan. For example, during a Gyeonghagwon lecture, a popular Japanese scholar of Chinese literature named Uno Tetsuto harshly criticized Confucianism in Joseon and its neglect by the public owing to its non-practical teachings (Passage 1):

(1) However, contemporary individuals striving for outstanding contributions often dismiss the ideas of Confucianism as being advocated by those who stubbornly adhere to the past, and they pay no heed to them. Therefore, those of us who study Confucianism must recognize the necessity of incorporating numerous fresh perspectives and interpreting it in a modern context. Figures like Zhu Xi guided the hearts of their generation by applying new interpretations to the Confucianism of their time.

Since truth is eternally novel, my intention is to elucidate the spirit of Confucianism by discarding minor differences and focusing on commonalities, thereby serving the hearts of people in society and contributing to the national prosperity. This is indeed the responsibility of those who study Confucianism, and I earnestly hope that you will join me with the same spirit in this endeavor.

(Uno 1922, pp. 64–65)

Uno asserted that updating Confucianism with new ideas could contribute to national prosperity and help integrate its values into public life more effectively. He claimed this approach was aligned with Confucius’s original intentions. However, the “national prosperity” Uno referred to was not for Joseon but for Japan. While claiming to promote and develop Confucianism, the Japanese colonial authorities had already dismantled core institutions such as Seonggyungwan, Joseon’s main center for Confucian education. This contradiction highlights the colonial agenda: reframing Confucianism as a tool for controlling Joseon society under the guise of modernization.

This reinterpretation and adaptation of Confucianism by the colonial government inevitably led to significant shifts in its perception and role within Joseon society. Confucianism in Joseon had indeed been exclusive to the privileged Yangban class and largely inaccessible to the general population. Additionally, some modern-educated youths in Joseon, influenced by the Government-General’s education policies, were critical of traditional Joseon Confucianism (Dong-A Ilbo 1922). Nevertheless, Uno’s remarks reflect the perspective of a colonial conqueror.

As Japanese colonial rule extended for longer than anticipated, Joseon society experienced shifts that eroded the ideological foundation of conventional Confucianism. Various groups, instead of resisting fervently, sought to adapt to the reality by compromising with the colonial rulers (Rhyu 2005, pp. 177–81). Some even merged Confucianism with theories of civilization or the Asian alliance (Kim 2013, pp. 243–44). Original Joseon Confucianism, once the ideological backbone of the Yangban class, gradually faded and survived only as a legacy acknowledged by a few.

4. Japan’s Confucianism Popularization Projects and the Transformation of a Traditional Ancestral Rite (Seokjeon Memorial Ceremony)

As mentioned above, the Government-General of Joseon used Confucianism as a policymaking tool to colonize Joseon, and Gyeonghagwon was at the center of this policy. As a first step, Japan streamlined the existing Confucian ceremonies and opened Gyeonghagwon to the public. One of the main targets was the Seokjeon memorial ceremony (釋奠大祭), an ancestral rite.

The Seokjeon ceremony dates to the Chinese Zhou Dynasty (1046 BC–771 BC) and was implemented until the end of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912). It mainly honored Confucius and his followers, although the honorees could change. China no longer held the ceremony, but Korea has continued to practice it since BC 372; thus, this tradition has endured longer in Korea than in any other country. Although Japan banned the Confucian education that Joseon had inherited by closing Seonggyungwan and establishing Gyeonghagwon, the government still allowed the Seokjeon ceremony to be held because it recognized that the rite had substantial value and authority. However, the ceremony’s scene under Japanese rule was quite different from before.

The Seokjeon ceremony was an important national event, although the king did not always attend it and left the central government officials to lead it. Since Japan’s occupation, Japanese officials occupied important government positions, and the governor of the Government-General of Joseon replaced the roles previously held by the King of Joseon (Rhyu 2004, pp. 121–26). For instance, as observed in the postcard depicted in Figure 2, the throne upon which the Joseon Dynasty kings sat during the Seokjeon ceremony came to be occupied by the Governor-General of Joseon.

Furthermore, all procedures were streamlined and bore little resemblance to those of the Joseon period. For example, in 1937, under the Japanese administrative policy, the solar calendar replaced the lunar calendar for the memorial ceremonies. According to Maeil Sinbo, the official newspaper of the Government-General of Joseon, the dates for these ceremonies were fixed as 15 April for spring and 15 October for autumn. This adjustment was presented as a measure to align with modernization efforts and the objectives of Gyeonghagwon. Maeil Sinbo quoted statements from the responsible administrative officer at the time and published the following (Passage 2):

(2) As reported earlier, starting this year, Gyeonghagwon and local Munmyo Seokjeon ceremonies have been changed to the solar calendar, with the dates set as 15 April for spring and 15 October for autumn. These ceremonies are now conducted on a larger scale and more publicly. In response to these changes, Director Buyeong (富永) issued the following statement on the 15th of the month:

The reason for reforming the Seokjeon ceremony this time is not only to align with the original purpose of Gyeonghagwon, which seeks to achieve results for the enlightenment of society but also to adapt to the direction of the times. Additionally, this change eliminates the disadvantages of using the lunar calendar and can be seen as a strengthening measure for the social education movement. Regarding the ceremonies in local Munmyo, notices have already been sent to various regional administrative officers, and efforts have been made to thoroughly inform the general public.

(Maeil Sinbo 1937a)

Additionally, Rhyu (2007, pp. 311–15) analyzed the transition of the ceremonial times from the night hours to 10 a.m. or 1 p.m., interpreting it as a strategy to gather influential local leaders more effectively. This shift facilitated the dissemination of the Government-General’s policies during these gatherings. While officially justified as a means to enhance public understanding and engagement with Confucian practices, such changes also served the broader administrative goals of the colonial government. These procedural and temporal changes were accompanied by another significant transformation in the Government-General’s approach to Confucian rituals: the opening of sacred Confucian spaces to the public.

As another change, the Government-General opened Hyanggyo and Munmyo to the public. Munmyo was the most sacred of all Confucian spaces, serving as a place to pay tribute to Confucius and his followers. Previously, only scholars and royal figures representing Confucianism were allowed to enter Munmyo, making it virtually impossible for the ordinary people to attend the rites. However, the Government-General opened the Seokjeon ceremony and Munmyo to the public. Consequently, the ceremony lost its sacred quality and become a public attraction (Rhyu 2010, pp. 103–30). Later, the Government-General gradually opened Munmyo’s rituals to the public, starting at the center and extending to the provinces. By 1937, all Munmyo’s rituals were open to the general public.

5. Transformation of Gyeonghagwon into a Wedding Venue Under Japanese Rule

In 1937, Gyeonghagwon and Hyanggyo, opened to the public by the Government-General of Joseon, were further transformed. They became places for holding traditional wedding ceremonies.

Before Japanese rule, people held weddings in their homes. In 1937, the Government-General established wedding venues at Gyeonghagwon and local Munmyos, installing new facilities and equipment. According to the government authorities, it was reasonable to open Gyeonghagwon to activate the simjeongaebal (心田開發, the Mind Development movement) and move toward a new Confucian era by establishing distance from theoretical worship. Japan particularly wanted to indoctrinate rural residents under the Mind Development policy with the help of Gyeonghagwon. One of their projects focused on establishing Confucian churches;1 another was the wedding hall business (Maeil Sinbo 1937b).

Gyeonghagwon started offering services such as renting traditional costumes free to brides and grooms for their wedding ceremonies. Furthermore, anyone wanting to celebrate the wedding couple could enter the hall, and the ceremony was substantially simplified. This type of wedding formed part of a campaign to eradicate too much formality and vanity. However, it was also part of a broader economic policy aimed at concentrating all economic resources on the war effort during the Second Sino-Japanese War, preventing unnecessary consumption of goods within Joseon society. Later, Japan established a strict policy controlling daily rituals related to coming of age, marriage, and death. In other words, the wedding hall business at Gyeonghagwon constituted a small step by the colonial Japanese administration to ultimately oppress the Joseon people.

The first wedding inside Gyeonghagwon was held on 3 July 1937 (see Figure 3). The bridegroom was Yi Jong-guk, the son of one of the officials of the Government-General named Yi Cheol-jae. The bride was Sin Tae-hee, the daughter of a former Chungcheongnam-do governor, Sin Seok-rin (Maeil Sinbo 1937c). Given that the fathers of the two families were Government-General officials, their wedding was meant to exemplify a traditional wedding at Gyeonghagwon.

Maeil Sinbo (每日申報) published the following article (Passage 3) along with photographs of the wedding ceremony.

(3) Recently, there has been a surge in individuals rejecting Eastern ethical principles in favor of embracing Western trends, resulting in a gradual erosion of the rituals crafted by ancient sages. To rekindle traditional ethics, Gyeonghagwon has established a Ritual Department, opening it to the public as a wedding venue. Furthermore, those who choose to conduct their ceremonies there are mandated to adhere to traditional Joseon customs rooted in the Family Ritual of Zhu (朱子家禮). The groom is required to don the Samogwandae (official cap and robe), while the bride must attire herself in the hwarot (wedding overcoat) and the jokduri (woman’s ceremonial coronet). This event signifies the inaugural instance of a wedding ceremony faithfully adhering to these Confucian traditions held at Gyeonghagwon.

(Maeil Sinbo 1937c)

Maeil Sinbo contends that the purpose behind using Gyeonghagwon as a wedding venue was to revive the rituals crafted by ancient sages. It advocated a practical approach to conducting Joseon’s customs, which are deeply rooted in Confucian etiquette. Notably, this article recurrently employed a paradoxical argument, asserting that the traditional ceremonies of Joseon were based on Confucianism while simultaneously stipulating that hosting weddings at Gyeonghagwon revived Joseon’s indigenous traditions.

In practice, the utilization of Gyeonghagwon for wedding ceremonies carried a distinct significance. Roughly a month before the publication of the Maeil Sinbo article quoted above, Chōsen Shinbun (朝鮮新聞), primarily targeting Joseon residents in Japan, featured an article with the title “New Style of Shintō Weddings (神前結婚): Part of Gyeonghagwon’s Myeongnyundang Hall Opened, Ritual Implements Provided”, as shown in Passage 4.

(4) Acknowledging the colonial authorities’ endeavors to promote adherence to ritual norms for solemnity and cost-saving in ceremonies, Gyeonghagwon decided to introduce a new style of Shintō weddings. A section of Gyeonghagwon’s Myeongnyundang Hall was made accessible as a wedding venue, and the usage regulations for Gyeonghagwon were announced, set to be implemented starting from June 1. In accordance with these regulations, a fee of ten Won would grant access to the venue, inclusive of all necessary ritual implements. The solemn wedding ceremonies could take place in the distinguished Myeongnyundang Hall. Simultaneously, attire, makeup tools, and ritual implements for the groom and bride were prepared. After the ceremony, the newlyweds were expected to visit Munmyo together and offer their marriage before the Great Sage.

(Chōsen Shinbun 1937)

Passage 4 above defines the wedding ceremony at Gyeonghagwon as “a new style of Shintō weddings” and explains that after the ceremony, the bride and groom must seek the presence of the Great Sage of Munmyo to announce and solemnize their marriage. Notably, although the announcement was made before the Great Sage of Munmyo, and not kami (神, gods of Shintō), the Gyeonghagwon wedding ceremony could be considered as a replication of a Shintō wedding.

Shintō weddings were first introduced during the Meiji era in Japan. On 10 May 1900, the then Crown Prince Yoshihito was wed at a Shintō shrine (神社). Subsequently, Shintō shrine weddings gained popularity in Japan. A changing backdrop influenced the emergence of this wedding form in Japan, as the introduction of Western culture altered traditional practices. There was also a growing social consensus that conventional customary ceremonies were extravagant and needed improvement (Minami 1986, pp. 26–27). In this context, the Government-General of Joseon aimed to reduce expenses and eliminate unnecessary formalities. However, the authorities overlooked the traditional Joseon culture and promoted the adoption of the Japanese Shintō shrine-style ceremony.

Since the Meiji era, Japan has established a unique Shintō belief system as the foundation for establishing an imperial cult. Shintō shrines were organized across the country and were entrusted, being officially authorized sacred institutions, with a unified set of rites and rituals. The Meiji government separated Shintō from the realm of religion and granted it a position above religion (Murakami 1970, p. 1). In essence, Shintō was not a religion in the conventional sense but rather a means of venerating the Japanese imperial system. Considering this, conducting weddings at Gyeonghagwon in the same style as Japanese Shintō shrine weddings signified that Gyeonghagwon had evolved into a place serving the imperial state, no longer solely dedicated to Confucianism.

To what extent did the Shintō shrine-style weddings at Gyeonghagwon reflect the Government-General of Joseon’s imperial agenda? Regarding the significance of Shintō shrine weddings, Yamanouchi Norio, who was deeply involved not only in the management of Shintō shrines within Japan but also overseas as a Shintō priest, articulated the following (Passage 5).

(5) The union of husband and wife serves to uphold the ancestral will, establish one’s lineage, create a family, and contribute to the prosperity of the nation. In essence, it forms the foundation for achieving the ultimate purpose of humanity. … Therefore, the accompanying ritual, namely the wedding ceremony, must be conducted with utmost sanctity. … It is a humble assertion, but within the Imperial Household, this matrimonial ceremony is executed with the utmost rigor, stemming from the profound reverence for ancestors and the deep respect for etiquette. Already in 1900, the ‘Imperial Household Wedding Rites’ were established, and His Majesty proclaimed, ‘Let the Imperial Princes and Princesses follow this.’ Examining the essence of these ceremonies, ‘When His Majesty the Emperor marries, as soon as the engagement is settled, he conducts a ceremony to report the marriage at three locations: Kensho (賢所 a place within the palace where offerings are made to Amaterasu Ōmikami), Kōreiden (皇霊殿 Imperial Mausoleum, where the spirits of past Emperors are enshrined), and Shinden (神殿 where the deities of heaven and earth, as well as the Eight Great Gods, are enshrined).’… Thus, within the Imperial Household, while respecting the precedents from our nation’s history, the wedding ceremony is conducted with the utmost courtesy based on kokuhū (国風 national customs and manners). … So, where and how should our citizens conduct their ceremonies? … As previously mentioned, in order to preserve its sanctity, it is advisable to model wedding ceremonies at Shintō shrines after those of the Imperial Household. (In unavoidable cases, a shrine can be established at home, and experts can be invited to conduct the ceremony.) Moreover, we deeply believe that this is the propriety we, as descendants of the deities born in the country created by the gods, must uphold.

(Yamanouchi 1920, pp. 190–94)

Yamanouchi’s emphasis on the sacred nature of the wedding ceremony within the imperial household highlights the centrality of the rites to Japan’s national identity. He described how the emperor’s marriage is solemnized at specific locations that are home to the venerated deities of Japan’s imperial lineage. These sites, deeply symbolic of the ancestral ties and spiritual authority of the Japanese monarchy, reinforce the ceremonial process as a demonstration of loyalty and reverence toward the emperor. Yamanouchi’s assertion that Japanese citizens should model their weddings after those of the imperial household reflects the expectation that such ceremonies would serve as an expression of allegiance to the imperial system, reinforcing national unity and respect for the imperial order.

In light of these interpretations, it can be argued that the Government-General of Joseon’s introduction of Shintō-style weddings at Gyeonghagwon was not simply a revival of Joseon’s traditional practices but a strategic attempt to integrate Korean society into the Japanese imperial framework. By framing these weddings as a continuation of Joseon’s historical customs, the colonial authorities disguised their true purpose: to promote loyalty to the Japanese imperial state and its spiritual symbols. Thus, the weddings held at Gyeonghagwon, far from preserving Korea’s cultural heritage, were effectively a tool of colonial control, aimed at aligning Korean customs with the ideology of the Japanese Empire.

6. The Second Sino-Japanese War and the Reorganization of the Confucian Order Around Japan

As the Second Sino-Japanese War endured, Japan enacted the National Mobilization Law (國家總動員法) on 1 April 1938, adapting every aspect of daily life to a wartime system. To mobilize national capabilities for war, Japan implemented a strong integration policy in its colonies, occupied territories, and mainland territories. Japan sought to co-opt Confucian organizations throughout Joseon as part of this effort. In October 1939, the Joseon Federation of Confucianism (朝鮮儒道聯合會) was created, with Gyeonghagwon as its center and local Hyanggyo as its branches; it governed various Confucian organizations. This meant that local Confucian groups, barely surviving colonization, could no longer operate autonomously.

The merging of Confucian organizations and its close connection to the Second Sino-Japanese War is evident in the statement made by Minami Jiro, the then Governor-General of Joseon, during the Seokjeon ceremony held on 15 October 1939. He stated the following (Passage 6).

(6) Every time I participate in the Seokjeon Ceremony, I am reminded that in the land of Shina, where Confucianism originated, the path has been in decline for a long time. Furthermore, since the occurrence of various incidents, the people of this land have suffered greatly under the misguided policies of the Chiang Kai-shek regime, which have led to the destruction and disrespect of Confucian shrines in various places. The people have also lost their sense of security in their daily lives, leading to a severe deterioration of their moral values. However, our nation alone stands firm, with the teachings of Confucius and Mencius thriving on a solid foundation. The Seokjeon Ceremony continues without interruption even in the midst of these tumultuous times, thanks to the boundless virtue of the Emperor. With each of these experiences, we must redouble our efforts to elucidate the true essence of Confucianism, which values the practice of ethical principles, and promote it in accordance with Japan’s kokutai 国体 (national polity). Only by doing so can we repay the immeasurable grace bestowed upon us by heaven.

(Minami 1940a, pp. 1–2)

Minami’s statement highlights the contrast between the enduring vitality of Confucianism in Joseon and its decline in China, which he attributed to the “misguided policies” of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. He emphasized the importance of Confucian principles, particularly in those turbulent times, and credited Japan’s leadership for maintaining the Confucian tradition. Notably, he attributed the continued practice of the Seokjeon ceremony in Joseon, even during wartime, to the “boundless virtue of the Emperor”, thus linking the survival of Confucian practices to the emperor’s divine leadership. In this context, his remarks sought to bolster the legitimacy of Japanese governance in Joseon, portraying it as essential for preserving Confucianism, in contrast to the perceived decay of its home in China.

The following day, on October 16th, he convened a total of 500 representatives of Confucian scholars and officials from the Government-General of Joseon, opening the National Assembly of Confucian Scholars of Joseon (全朝鮮儒林大會) (Gyeonghag-won jabji 1940, pp. 6–7) (Passage 7).

(7) The path of Confucius and Mencius inherently emphasizes benevolence, righteousness, loyalty, and filial piety, valuing their practical application. The gathering of Confucian scholars here should deeply recognize the unparalleled excellence of our national ethos on the global stage and cultivate a profound awareness that we are all loyal subjects of the imperial nation. By practicing this path, especially in these turbulent times, by wholeheartedly dedicating ourselves to serving our nation with unwavering loyalty, the true essence of Confucianism will undoubtedly flourish, aligning with the intended objectives of this assembly. I hold great expectations for the outcomes of this assembly and hope that, based on the results of our discussions today, we can cooperate mutually to supplement the state of the world, enlighten the hearts and minds of the people, first support the toils of the soldiers on the front lines of the holy war, and then contribute to the total mobilization of the national spirit on the home front.

(Minami 1940b, p. 10)

Minami’s speech stressed the essential role of Confucian values as foundational to maintaining social order and loyalty to the Japanese state. He positioned Confucianism not only as a moral guide but also as a tool for national mobilization, urging Confucian scholars to align their teachings with the objectives of the ongoing war effort. By framing allegiance to the emperor as a core principle, he reinforced the idea that Confucianism, when applied in the context of Japan’s imperial system, contributed to both the spiritual and material mobilization of Joseon’s people. This perspective redefined Confucianism, shifting it from a traditional moral framework to a more politically charged ideology aligned with Japan’s wartime goals.

Thus, Japan used the newly established Joseon Federation of Confucianism to oversee Confucian organizations across the nation, channeling both labor and resources toward the war effort. In addition, the organization served as a propaganda tool, reinforcing Japan’s claim to be the true heir of Confucianism.

In its publications and lectures, the Joseon Federation of Confucianism maintained that although Confucianism had originated in China, after the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the country no longer revered Confucianism but rather despised it and erred against Confucius’ teachings. Admittedly, this was not an entirely groundless argument. By the 1920s, Confucianism was declining in China, and in July 1930, the war between the Communists and Kuomintang resulted in the desecration of Confucius’ tomb in Qufu. This event, in particular, appalled and outraged Confucian organizations in Joseon to the point that they sent people to China to investigate the situation (Jung 2020, pp. 53–54).

Aware of the atmosphere of Joseon’s Confucian society, the Government-General advanced Takahashi Toru, a professor at Gyeongseong Imperial University who was well known among Joseon’s Confucian intellectuals, to proclaim that “China is no longer the home of Confucianism” and that “Japan is the only country that can protect and further develop Confucianism and disseminate it to the world”. He also emphasized that in the future, Confucianism should be promoted, centered on the imperial house of Japan, and that the oneness of Korean and Japanese (內鮮一體) should be strengthened to fulfill this task (Takahashi 1939, pp. 27–28). Takahashi’s statement suggests a new Confucianism centered on the Japanese imperium.

Confucian organizations in Joseon were then gradually mobilized for the war effort, providing planes and other monetary support. Not all Confucian organizations acted as minions of the Joseon government, but they had few options because their worship of Confucius was under constant surveillance.

As such, Japan utilized Confucianism to mobilize human and material resources during the Sino-Japanese War. Overtly emphasizing loyalty and filial piety among the many Confucian virtues, Japan demanded loyalty to the Japanese emperor and nation (Japan) and disseminated a reorganized Confucianism centered on Japan instead of China, using it as a strategy for colonial rule.

7. Vestiges of Colonialization

As discussed above, Japan actively revised and exploited Confucianism to solidify its colonial rule over Korea. For instance, Hyanggyo, traditionally a venue for ancestral rites and Confucian education, was repurposed as a site for wedding ceremonies. A profound consequence of these measures is that many Koreans uncritically adopted such practices even after liberation.

Korean Confucian scholars often emphasize the unbroken continuity of Confucianism in Korea, even during the colonial era. They assert that Korean Confucian traditions were preserved without significant disruption. For example, Geum Jang-tae, one of Korea’s leading Confucian scholars, expressed concern over the diminishing influence of Confucian values in contemporary Korean society and remarked:

(8) To determine the direction Korean Confucianism should pursue in the 21st century and the challenges it must address, it is essential first to reflect on its developments over the past 100 years. This will allow us to understand the paths it has taken and the strategies it employed. By examining the current environment and identifying the immediate challenges, we can then define the ideological and practical tasks required for its advancement.

(Geum 1999, p. 177)

Geum also argued that while reflecting on past Confucian practices is crucial to resolving contemporary issues, many Confucian scholars during the colonial period isolated themselves from broader societal activities by adhering rigidly to “traditional” Confucian values. At the same time, Japan weakened Confucian organizations in Korea by reducing their influence and fostering pro-Japanese factions, thereby exacerbating internal divisions and rendering them ineffective (Geum 1999, pp. 180–81). Although Geum acknowledged Japan’s role in the weakening of these organizations, he maintained that the “traditions” of Confucianism were nonetheless firmly upheld throughout the colonial period.

This perspective, however, overlooks the fact that during the colonial era, Confucianism was manipulated by Japan to serve its political objectives, leading to a significant departure from its original Korean context. Despite historical evidence of such manipulation, the Korean Confucian community, including Seonggyungwan’s officials, often ignores or denies this distortion, focusing instead on an idealized narrative of an unbroken Confucian tradition.

Since liberation, Gyeonghagwon has been restored to its original name, Seonggyungwan. The institution has resumed convening Confucian scholars and organizing symposiums to discuss the future direction of Confucianism. The biannual Seokjeon ceremonies have also been revived, drawing wide participation (Jayu Shinmun 1946). Korean Confucian scholars regard this continuity with great pride, with Seonggyungwan’s officials actively seeking UNESCO recognition for Parilmu (八佾舞, Eight Rows of Pantomimes), an ancestral ritual dance. However, as noted earlier, Gyeonghagwon served a fundamentally different role under Japanese rule, being used as a tool for colonial control. This raises critical questions about the actual continuity of Korean Confucianism during this period.

Even today, traditional wedding ceremonies are often held at Seonggyungwan in Seoul and Hyanggyos across localities. For instance, in 2024, the Eonyang branch of the Seonggyungwan Confucian Society announced that it would continue hosting traditional weddings at Eonyang Hyanggyo, blending traditional and modern elements. Ulsan Sinmun (Ulsan News) reported that a Japanese couple deeply interested in Korean culture described their wedding at Myeongryundang, the Hyanggyo’s traditional hall, wearing vibrant traditional Korean wedding attire, as an unforgettable experience (Kim 2024). The brides and grooms wore attire reminiscent of the Joseon dynasty. With catering services provided by wedding organizers, Seonggyungwan and Hyanggyos have become popular venues due to their convenience. These traditional weddings are now celebrated as symbols of Korean culture and attract significant interest from foreign tourists. Nevertheless, the historical transformation of traditional wedding ceremonies during the colonial period remains largely unacknowledged.

This legacy not only underscores the complexities of preserving cultural traditions under colonial rule but also invites ongoing dialogue on how Korea can reinterpret and redefine Confucianism to align with modern societal values.

8. Conclusions

This article discussed Korean Confucianism since the inception of colonial rule. Japan used Confucianism to gain assistance from influential leaders in Joseon communities and pushed for Japanese-style education, excluding traditional Confucian teachings. Instead, it criticized Joseon Confucianism as backward because only a few elites enjoyed the conceptual philosophy. Thereafter, it created a policy to popularize a heavily altered form of Confucianism.

First, the Government-General of Joseon dramatically streamlined the Seokjeon ceremony, considered the most important Confucian rite. Second, it arbitrarily changed the time and schedule of the ancestral rites according to the government’s priorities. Third, Seonggyungwan, which had been revered as a sacred educational space for Confucianism in Joseon society, was transformed into a venue for Shintō-style weddings. Finally, it redefined the idea of loyalty and filial piety as loyalty to the nation (Japan) and piety to the Japanese emperor. This was the meaning of Confucianism popularization.

Since liberation, Confucianism was utilized by subsequent authorities. Park Chung-hee, who assumed power through a military coup, strategically employed Confucianism to legitimize his regime. He emphasized the significance of loyalty and filial piety, actively promoting the popularization of Confucian values by instituting various programs at Seonggyungwan and local Hyanggyos, facilitating public access to Confucian culture. The “traditional” weddings, as devised by the Government-General of Joseon, endured. However, amid these developments, there was scarcely any discourse addressing the fact that certain cultural elements rooted in Confucianism were altered by Japan during the colonial era and thus did not genuinely represent Korean “traditional” culture.

Now Seonggyungwan and Hyanggyos are actively promoting Confucianist educational initiatives and cultural events to encourage greater participation in Confucianism. These programs encompass a wide range of offerings, including courses on loyalty and filial piety, etiquette, and calligraphy, making them accessible to individuals of all ages, from children to senior citizens. On 7 May 2004, Choe Geun-deog, the 27th Chief of Seonggyungwan, emphasized that “Innovation is a pressing imperative in contemporary Confucianism”. He asserted that Confucianists must adopt a different mindset, particularly given the rapid transformations occurring in modern industries, information technology, science, and globalization. He stressed the need for “philosophical innovation” and committed to driving change within the Confucian tradition. Choe underscored that Confucianism’s foundation lies in the belief that “everything in the world undergoes change” and lamented Korea’s colonization due to societal stagnation and self-imposed limitations. He pledged to reshape Confucianism to better adapt to forthcoming shifts, emphasizing its inclusivity beyond class boundaries and modernization, particularly concerning aspects like “wedding ceremonies and ancestral rites”. As part of this reform effort, he pledged to permit women to participate in the Confucian rites and grant women the right to vote in Hyanggyos (Yonhap News Agency 2004). These measures constituted a fervent endeavor to popularize Confucianism, a vision endorsed wholeheartedly by the authors of this paper.

However, it is incumbent upon contemporary Koreans to reevaluate the significance of certain practices, notably “wedding ceremonies and ancestral rites”, when considering the modernization of Confucianism. The wider Korean society must also question whether these wedding ceremonies authentically represent Korean tradition and delve into the profound implications of the concept of tradition.

Contemporary Confucianism in Korea does not entirely represent an erroneous practice. Nevertheless, it is imperative that we subject ideas classified as traditions to rigorous scrutiny, examining their origins and underlying rationales before embracing them. Occasionally, such traditions may merely comprise vestiges of colonial ideologies—a phenomenon that necessitates vigilance from all the stakeholders involved.