Sage-King Naming Theory: A New Perspective on Understanding Xunzi’s Doctrine of the Rectification of Names

Abstract

By focusing on Xunzi’s concept of the sage-king and the sage-king naming theory, a new interpretive perspective can be applied to Xunzi’s doctrine of the rectification of names. During the Warring States period, mainstream views among Confucian and Daoist scholars tended to interpret the sage-king as the bearer of Heaven or Dao. However, Xunzi follows the principle of the division between Heaven and humanity, asserting that the sage-king is entirely subordinate to the realm of humans, embodying the ideal order of Confucian community. In light of this concept of the sage-king, this paper aims to address two questions: first, where the legitimacy of the sage-king naming prerogative comes from, and second, how the sage-king, as the master-signifier, quilts all floating signifiers to ensure the publicity and normativity of names. Moral norms emerge from the sage-king’s projection of intentions and emotions onto external objects. Sage-king naming theory provides the prerequisite for the superassertibility of moral norms, limiting the potential arbitrariness and private interpretations of names and norms, which ensures the public and authoritative nature of the social discourse system, thereby endowing the sage-kings with legitimacy. As the quilting point and stopping point, the sage-king performs the totalization and prohibition by means of which the floating names and norms are fixed and become parts of the structured Confucian discourse of meaning.

1. Introduction

In exploring Xunzi’s Rectification of Names theory, my aim is not to rehash the abundant scholarly work already existing but to shed light on a less scrutinized element: the role of the “sage-king (shengwang 圣王)”, the subject in Xunzi’s prescribed naming practices. This aspect is often overlooked, with the sage-king typically viewed merely as part of the backdrop of absolutist monarchy or as an unchallenged presupposition. I propose, however, that the sage-king might serve a more nuanced and crucial role in Xunzi’s theory, acting as a hidden pivot with a significant structural function. Therefore, the objective of this study is not to provide a comprehensive and precise exposition of Xunzi’s views but to probe deeper into the interpretive depths of Xunzi’s philosophy of naming through the lens of analytical philosophy.

Xunzi’s conceptualization of the sage-king stands out among the diverse Sage Creation Theories of the Pre-Qin era. Eschewing any foundational essentialist metaphysical presuppositions, Xunzi confines the sage-king concept strictly within the human domain of community life, positing it as the paramount source of authority. This distinctive approach underpins Xunzi’s formulation of the Rectification of Names theory. This paper will be divided into four main parts. The first and second parts will conduct a historical examination of the Sage Creation Theory and the concept of the sage-king in the late Warring States period. Based on this examination, it will elucidate how Xunzi’s disconnected cosmology and the concept of sage-king differ from other philosophers. The third part will employ tools from meta-ethics to analyze the quasi-realistic tendency in Xunzi’s theory of the sage-king naming theory, demonstrating the legitimacy of sage-king’s prerogative. The fourth part will discuss the role played by the sage-king as a quilting and stopping point in the overall coherence of the Confucian discourse system.

2. The Sage Creation Tradition in Pre-Qin Philosophy

To fully understand Xunzi’s perspective on the sage-king’s authority in naming, it is essential to consider the Sage Creation Theory (shengchuanglun 圣创论) as a key intellectual context in Pre-Qin philosophy. The intricate and unique community life of humanity forms the bedrock of civilization. Each major civilization reflects deeply on the origins of its community order. In this regard, the Sage Creation Theory, formulated and elaborated by Pre-Qin philosophers, stands as a notably distinguished and influential interpretation of societal origin in Chinese history. This theory deviates from the traditional pre-modern belief in spontaneous evolution, suggesting instead that the formation of communities and their order is the result of deliberate, rational actions by sage-kings rather than a natural outgrowth of human nature. Furthermore, it contrasts with the Social Contract Theory of modern Western thought. Although both theories acknowledge an artificial aspect of society, the Sage Creation Theory uniquely emphasizes “sages (shengren 圣人)” or “sage-kings (shengwang 圣王)” as indispensable and foundational in shaping communities, not just agreements among individuals (Wang 2022, pp. 53, 64–68).

Wang Zhongjiang 王中江, in his analysis of the Sage Creation Theory, identifies a core pattern: prior to the sage-kings’ establishment of social order, humanity existed in a state of chaos and violence, which was driven by scarcity. The sages crafted all the essentials for a civilized existence. First, sage-kings created the basic tools and material living conditions needed for human survival. Second, they founded families, ethical values, and societal norms. Third, they created monarchies ruled by wise sovereigns. Finally, they established legal systems, punitive measures, and military forces for governance (Wang 2022, pp. 61–63). Xunzi’s Sage Creation Theory corresponds well with the overarching concept of the theory:

• He concurs with the idea of an initially chaotic and violent natural state in human societies (Hutton 2014, pp. 201, 204);
• He argues that the sage-king established the hierarchical order (li礼), social divisions (fen 分), and moral norms (yi 义) (Hutton 2014, p. 248). This framework not only guarantees basic survival rights for individuals but also facilitates the prosperity and stability of the community (Hutton 2014, p. 201).

However, this is not the entirety of Xunzi’s version of the theory of sage creation. Expanding upon this framework, Xunzi places considerable emphasis on the doctrine of rectification of names, particularly in terms of naming and standardizing practices. He retrospectively constructs a process wherein the sage-kings initially name everything, thus determining linguistic truths and moral norms, and uses this as a foundation to build a hierarchical social order. Put differently, Xunzi’s theory does not simply imagine an ancient scenario where the sage-kings establish community order. It delves into the philosophical aspect of how the sage-king leverages language to shape both the order of the community and its moral norms.

The sage-king’s naming authority is a fundamental aspect of the Sage Creation Theory. Ancient thinkers posited that naming was not a mere human cognitive activity but rather a process where names themselves defined and distinguished things, creating order and serving as the foundation for understanding the world. Xu Fuguan 徐复观 notes that early humans revered language, leading to the emergence of forms like oaths and spells, believed to influence reality, thereby elevating language to a metaphysical entity with tangible effects (Xu 1984, p. 204). Shangshu 尚书 (The Book of Documents) chronicles the sage-king Yu 禹, paralleling his flood management with naming geographical features, underscoring the act of naming’s importance and sanctity. However, initial texts like Shangshu and Shijing 诗经 (The Book of Poetry) did not primarily credit the ancient sage-kings with establishing order through naming. Cao Feng points out that in the late Warring States period, philosophers began to perceive ancient sages as omnipotent and mystical figures, thereby elevating the act of naming as a key method for sage-kings to impose order on the world, turning it into a vital element in creating community structures. Philosophers started to assert that only sages with exceptional wisdom and virtue possessed the privilege of naming (Cao 2017, pp. 47–50).

In developing this concept, Confucianism and Daoism diverged in their approaches. Certain Confucian scholars emphasized that sage-kings inherently knew all truths from birth, endowing them with unique wisdom and virtue that made them thereby capable of founding civilizations and establishing community order. They rewrote the genealogy of ancient sage-kings (as seen in Liji 礼记: “Ji Fa 祭法” and Dadai Liji 大戴礼记: “Wu Di De 五帝德”), meticulously recording each sage-king’s achievements. Huangdi 黄帝, for instance, was depicted as a sage-king versed in all knowledge, his primary feat being the naming of things to enlighten the populace and distribute wealth. They also portrayed Huangdi as possessing extraordinary capabilities from birth, articulate in his youth, insightful in his early years, and growing up to be a sage of unmatched wisdom and integrity. This narrative imbued the Confucian version of the Sage Creation Theory and the sage-king’s naming authority with a heightened sense of historical legitimacy and sacredness.

Daoism and its derivative, Legalism, accentuated the unique capacity of the sage-king to harmonize with the “Dao 道” (the Way), crafting and governing the tangible, named world through an innate grasp and observance of the intangible, formless Dao. This notion is encapsulated in Guanzi 管子: “XinShu 心术”, asserting, “Things have fixed forms; forms have fixed names. He who makes names fit realities is called a sage. Therefore one must understand the unspoken word and be nonassertive in affairs. Thereafter one may come to know the Way’s guidelines” (Rickett 1998, p. 74). Daoist thought in naming underscores that the sage-king’s creations align naturally with Daoist principles, embodying an inherent order. In these philosophical discourses, the intrinsic attributes of names are secondary; the primary focus is the sage-king’s method of creating and managing names.

Thus, by the late Warring States period, both Confucianism and Daoism had embraced a trend toward mystifying and empowering the sage-king, which was in tune with the emerging absolutist monarchical regime. The sanctity and authority of the sage-king were presupposed, rendering the legitimacy of their naming authority unquestioned. For these Confucian scholars, the legitimacy derived from the sage-king’s dynastic authenticity and innate divinity. For Daoist thinkers, it was rooted in the ruler’s exclusive ability to resonate with the Dao. Common to both was the assumption that the sage-king innately possessed a direct insight into truths, bypassing the empirical cognition necessary for ordinary people. Consequently, the sage-king was believed to possess a mystical knowledge of all true names, bestowing them upon the world.

While Xunzi was immersed in the intellectual milieu of the Sage Creation Theory, his conception of the sage-king and the sage-king’s naming authority significantly deviates from most late Warring States period philosophers. First and foremost, Xunzi perceives that the sage-king does not possess a sacredness beyond ordinary people in human nature. He states: “In every aspect of human nature, the nature of Yao and Shun was one and the same as that of Jie and Robber Zhi. The nature of the gentleman is one and the same as that of the petty man” (Hutton 2014, p. 253). Thus, he dismisses the notion of the sage-king possessing mystical, innate cognitive abilities, asserting instead, “For everyone, the ability to know comes from human nature, and what can be known are the underlying patterns of things” (Hutton 2014, p. 233). Therefore, he rejects the tendency of some Confucian scholars to fabricate a mystical lineage of sage-kings. Simultaneously, he also rejects the approach of the Huang-Lao school, which deifies the sage-king as the master of the Dao. It is these differences that make Xunzi’s version of the theory of sage creation and the Sage-King Naming Authority Theory noteworthy.

3. Xunzi’s Interpretation of the Sage-King under the Disconnected Cosmology

The key to understanding Xunzi’s concept of the sage lies in comprehending his theory of the division between Heaven and humanity, which can be summarized as the disconnected cosmology. Xunzi believes,

There is a constancy to the activities of Heaven. They do not persist because of Yao. They do not perish because of Jie. If you respond to them with order, then you will have good fortune. If you respond to them with chaos, then you will have misfortune. … One who understands clearly the respective allotments of Heaven and humankind can be called a person of utmost achievement.

(Hutton 2014, p. 175)

Hutton translates tianren zhi fen 天人之分 as the respective allotments of Heaven and humankind, indicating that he is aware that fen 分 not only refers to the difference between the natural domain of Heaven and the artificial domain of humanity but also suggests that Heaven and humanity have distinct allotments and roles. These two aspects run in parallel, and the Way of Humanity should not imitate the Way of Heaven or seek guidance or assistance from the Heaven. The realm of humanity has its own operational logic. One who can recognize this distinction between Heaven and humanity and accurately grasp the essence of the Way of Humanity is termed by Xunzi as the zhiren 至人 (person of utmost achievement). The term zhiren here can be understood as an individual who can fully embody and actualize the Way of Humanity (rendao 人道). In Xunzi’s context, this evidently refers to the sage-king. In his insightful study of the “Tian Lun 天论”, Machle points out that Xunzi is thinking of natural action as summed up in Tian, and human action summed up in the Sage, as hierarchical thinking tends to take the top as in some way including the whole (Machle 1993, pp. 87–88). Therefore, in Xunzi’s perception, the sage-king is not merely the perfect exemplar in terms of morality and knowledge within the Confucian tradition but also the embodiment of the ideal order for the human community, as he states: “Thus, Heaven is the ultimate in height, Earth is the ultimate in depth, the boundless is the ultimate in breadth, and the sage is the ultimate in the Way” (Hutton 2014, p. 206). In Xunzi’s view, what the sage-king can achieve is to utilize their cognitive and rational thinking abilities to establish normative values and corresponding social distinctions, thereby realizing a just political order belonging to the Way of Humanity. This is what a sage should pursue in “understanding Heaven”, namely, understanding the distinct allotments and roles of Heaven and humanity.

Xunzi’s introduction of the separation between heaven and humanity is essentially intended to elevate the status of the sage-king within the late Warring States period’s hierarchical structure of Heaven and humanity. This serves as a rebuttal to the prevailing perspectives of Daoism and Confucianism during that era. He argues:

• That which is accomplished without anyone’s doing it and which is obtained without anyone’s seeking it is called the work of Heaven.
• With respect to what is like this, even though he thinks deeply, a proper person does not try to ponder it. Even though he is mighty, he does not try to augment it by his own abilities. Even though he is expertly refined, he does not try to make it more keenly honed.
• This is called not competing with Heaven’s work.
• When Heaven has its proper seasons, Earth has its proper resources, And humankind has its proper order,—this is called being able to form a triad. To neglect that whereby we form a triad and wish instead for those things to which we stand as the third is a state of confusion (Hutton 2014, pp. 175–76).

The phrase “accomplished without anyone’s doing it” (buwei ercheng 不为而成) and “obtained without anyone’s seeking it” (buqiu erde 不求而得) mentioned in the cited passage [1] is likely a response to the statement from the Dao De Jing 道德经, “the sage walks not, yet knows, sees not, yet names; acts not on things, yet they are completed” (Ryden 2008, p. 99) The Daoists consider wuwei as the highest political virtue and governing principle. They believe that the sage should emulate the operation of the Dao in governance, refraining from intentional control or interference to achieve optimal governance results. In Xunzi’s view, wuwei evidently cannot serve as a political virtue and governing principle because it fundamentally belongs to the domain of heaven, where artificial intervention and control are both impossible and inappropriate. The terms “deeply” (shen 深) “refined” (jing 精) and “mighty/great” (da 大) in the cited passage [2] are also commonly found in the descriptions of the state of Dao in Dao De Jing, such as “abstruse life force is deep, far-reaching”, “there is essence within it”, and “I force myself to name her Great”. In this passage, Xunzi employs a contrastive clause to convey a clear refutation. He argues that the states of “profound”, “refined”, and “mighty” on the heavenly level are beyond human reach and should not be the realms that a sage-king should aspire to attain. In the cited passage [3], Xunzi employs a strongly emphasized clause, stating fushizhiwei 夫是之谓, to express the viewpoint that the sage-king should not overstep the boundary between Heaven and humanity, vying for work and allotments exclusive to the Heaven realm. In the conclusion of “Tian Lun 天论”, Xunzi criticizes Laozi for recognizing the value of yielding but not recognizing the value of exerting oneself (Hutton 2014, p. 181), which implies that Laozi acknowledges the strategic value of principles like “wuwei” (non-action) in governance, understanding how to turn weakness into strength, but neglects the need for the sage-king’s intentional efforts in establishing communal order. In the chapter of “Jie Bi 解蔽”, Xunzi critiques Zhuangzi for being “fixated on the Heavenly and did not understand the value of the human” (Hutton 2014, p. 227), similarly condemning Daoism’s overemphasis on the Heaven while neglecting the importance of human order. Xunzi’s central criticism of Daoism lies in the emphasis on the impossibility of a “natural” emergence of communal order; the establishment and maintenance of communal order require the active political practice of the sage-king.

In the cited passage [4], Xunzi appears to be targeting Zhong Yong 中庸, the influential work of the Si-Meng School 思孟学派. According to Zhong Yong,

In the world only someone of perfect cheng 诚 is considered able to complete his nature. Someone who is able to complete his nature is then able to complete the natures of others. Someone who is able to complete the natures of others is then able to complete the natures of things. Someone who is able to complete the natures of things can then assist the transforming and nourishing [functions] of Heaven and Earth. Someone who can assist the transforming and nourishing [functions] of Heaven and Earth can then join with Heaven and Earth as a triad.

(Johnston and Wang 2012, p. 463)

Zhong Yong maintains that the sage can fully realize the inherent nature through the virtue of “sincerity” (cheng 诚), thereby assisting in the nurturing of Heaven and Earth and achieving a state as a triad with them. Mencius also believes that “to be sincere is the Way of Heaven, and to think about sincerity is the human Way” (Bloom 2009, p. 80). The Wu Xing Chapter 五行篇of the Mawangdui Boshu 马王堆帛书 (the Mawangdui Silk Manuscripts) distinctly perpetuates this tradition, articulating, “There are five forms of virtue; harmony is termed virtue, and when manifested in four forms, it is called goodness. Goodness represents the human way; virtue, the heavenly way”. The text also states, “The sage understands the way of heaven”. The purpose of the Si-Meng School is to argue that the virtues have a cosmological foundation derived from Heaven. These virtues are considered moral entities bestowed by Heaven upon human nature, and the sage can recognize and realize them through “sincerity”. This perspective establishes “Heaven” as a moral reality independent of human practices, serving as the authoritative and objective basis for morality. In their view, the principles constructing the community are not in a hierarchical order (li 礼) or normative values (yi 义) but intrinsic moral norms directly bestowed by Heaven. The legitimacy of the sage-king’s rule derives directly from the mysterious connection between Heaven and humanity, and the realization of the community order relies on the natural imitation and obedience of the people to the sage. In Xunzi’s view, the term “form a triad (with Heaven and Earth)” merely refers to each entity fulfilling its respective duties, and the attempt to “assist the transforming and nourishing [functions] of Heaven and Earth” as described in Zhong Yong is just confusion. In Fei Shi Er Zi 非十二子, Xunzi’s critique of the Si-Meng School is primarily focused on the theory of the “Five Conducts Doctrine (Wuxing Shuo 五行说)”. He challenges Zisi and Mencius for creating new doctrines based on reinterpretations of ancient teachings. His critique targets two primary aspects:

• “It is murky and has no proper arguments. It is esoteric and has no proper explanation” (Hutton 2014, p. 41). He portrays the Five Conducts Doctrine as a mystically inclined, closed system, challenging for ordinary individuals to understand with standard cognitive approaches.
• “This doctrine is extremely deviant and does not accord with the proper categories of things” (Hutton 2014, p. 41). Here, “proper categories” refer to the sage-king’s “tonglei 统类”, encompassing the appropriate social hierarchy and rituals. Xunzi contends that the Five Conducts Doctrine fails to adequately comprehend and construct rites and righteousness, overlooking their essential role in community construction (see Huang 1990).

Similar to his criticism of Daoism, Xunzi emphasizes that the order within a community is the intentional construction of the sage-king, opposing the notion of attributing it to the extension of a natural order of Heaven.

Xunzi’s concept of the division between Heaven and humanity can be understood as a form of a disconnected cosmology, with his criticism directed toward the perspective of the correlative cosmology. Benjamin I. Schwartz was the first to introduce the term “correlative cosmology” (Schwartz 1985, p. 350), and A.C. Graham believes that correlative cosmology is, on the one hand, a continuation of the Mandate Heaven thought since the Western Zhou period and, on the other hand, a metaphysical response to the disintegration of this thought during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods (Graham 1989, pp. 3–7). Both Daoism and the Si-Meng School emphasize the continuity between Heaven and humanity, asserting that there is no clear demarcation between the internal mind and the external world. In both perspectives, both the internal and external realms are governed by the same underlying principle or spirit. The distinction lies in the emphasis: Daoism underscores the idea that individuals should conform to Heaven or Dao, “not to use the mind to fend off the Course, not to use the human to try to help out the Heavenly” (Ziporyn 2020, p. 54), while Confucianism holds that through internal spiritual cultivation, one can influence the external world and even achieve unity with it. Xunzi’s uniqueness lies in his refusal to return to the correlative cosmology. He rejects presupposing the cosmological origins of moral concepts detached from human communal life. In the view of Xunzi, “the Way is not the way of Heaven, nor is it the way of Earth. It is that whereby humans make their way, and that which the gentleman takes as his way” (Hutton 2014, p. 55). Therefore, the sage-kings do not discover morality or rituals from the works of Heaven or nature; instead, these are discovered and established within communal life, giving rise to divisions of labor, hierarchical order, and moral norms. As Xunzi notes, “the sage is one who completely carries out the proper relations, and the true king is one who completely carries out the proper regulations. One in whom these two are complete can be the ultimate standard for all under Heaven” (Hutton 2014, p. 234).

To summarize, Xunzi’s concept of the sage-king embodies the following key aspects:

• Xunzi supports absolute monarchical rule but rejects the creation of fictitious ancestral histories for sage-kings and denies them supernatural cognitive abilities. Sage-kings share the same human nature and cognitive abilities with all ordinary people.
• In line with the disconnected cosmology, the sage-king neither seeks to comprehend nor control natural forces like heaven or Dao, belonging wholly to the human realm, specifically the political domain of community life.
• The sage-king is the embodiment of the ideal order for the human community, surpassing ordinary people through the exceptional ability to create normative values and hierarchical structures, organizing people into a cohesive political entity.
• The sage-king must engage in active political and moral practices, unlike the Daoist sage, who adheres to a principle of “non-action” merely aligning with nature, or the Si-Meng School sage, who relies on internal moral cultivation to influence the people and establish communal order.

4. Legitimacy of the Sage-King’s Naming Prerogative

After clarifying Xunzi’s conception of the sage-king, let us delve into the discussion of legitimacy of the sage-king’s naming prerogative. Many previous studies on Xunzi’s Zhengming theory have been influenced by Hu Shi’s 胡适’s monograph “The Development of The Logical Method in Ancient China”.1 This approach correlates the doctrine of the ‘rectifcation of names’ with Western logic and language philosophy frameworks, which situates Xunzi’s doctrine within the historical trajectory of the logical method in ancient China.2 However, as pointed out by Cao Feng in his research, Xunzi’s proposal of the rectification of names theory is not aimed at seeking a certain truth about language or entities. Instead, its purpose lies in dominating language as a tool for realizing Confucian ethical ideals and establishing a Confucian political order (Cao 2017, p. 122).

Therefore, it is necessary to include the concept of the sage-king in discussing Xunzi’s theory of rectification of names. This section will focus on an important question, where the legitimacy of the sage’s naming and the rectification of names originates. Chad Hansen argues that Xunzi takes the legitimacy of the authority of the sage-king for granted, accepting the sage-king’s naming authority unquestioningly as a presupposition for his theory of rectification of names. This is seen as an example of Xunzi’s absolutist tendencies (Hansen 1992, pp. 309, 321). On the other hand, Kurtis Hagen challenges this view, arguing that naming as an exclusive privilege of the sage-king is inaccurate. He posits that “the process of zhengming is a complex negotiation between the ruler, the moral and intellectual elite, and the people”. (Hagen 2002, p. 46). Chen agrees with Hagen’s viewpoint, asserting that the sage-king, while having the privilege of naming, inevitably refers to established customs in the process of creating and rectifying names. The sage-king is required to adhere to certain principles and methods of naming, taking into consideration the purpose, utility, and effects of the names. Therefore, despite possessing the prerogative to name, the sage-king’s naming actions are far from arbitrary or unilateral (Chen 2008, p. 105). Hagen and Chen’s rebuttal is not without merit, especially when considering the naming and rectification processes of names in real-world experiences. However, Hagen and Chen’s counterargument still has some points of contention. Firstly, despite the potential involvement of elites and the masses in the naming process through advisory roles or rejecting unsuitable names, the ultimate authority in naming rests exclusively with the sage-king. Xunzi presupposes the sage-king’s ability to discern and adopt the right perspectives from these groups. Secondly, Hagen seems to disregard the widely accepted Pre-Qin intellectual assumption that the sage-king inherently holds the authority in naming. Thirdly, and most importantly, they attempt to interpret Xunzi’s theory of rectification of names in a more pragmatic manner but overlook the theoretical depth of Xunzi’s concept of the sage-king and ignore his further refinement of the Sage Creation Theory.

The primary contribution of Xunzi’s Sage Creation Theory lies in his attempt to reconstruct this theory based on his disconnected cosmology. Whether in Daoism or in the Si-Meng School, their Sage Creation Theories are premised on the continuous cosmology. The mind, the individual, and the community are all embedded in the great chain of Dao or Heaven, endowing the former with intrinsic virtues and external orders. There exists a mysterious connection and mutual influence between humanity and Heaven. And the names given by the sage-king to all these entities are not names generated through ordinary empirical cognition but foundational names, as stated in the Dao De Jing, “by names you may name, but not the Perennial Name”. This continuous cosmology underpins the moral realism of the Si-Meng School. When Xunzi opts for the discontinuous cosmology as a theoretical premise, he is unable to rely on Heaven or Dao as the cosmological guarantee for legitimacy of sage-kings. Instead, he must entirely search for new justifications within the human community.

I believe that Xunzi reconstructs the Sage Creation Theory and the sage-king naming theory based on an approach that is akin to quasi-realism. Ryan illuminates Xunzi’s doctrine of Zhengming by reference to Crispin Wright’s approach to the separability of truth and assert ability conditions. The sage-king’s naming possesses the form of assertive projections, which actually used not to state facts but rather to project various aspects of sage-kings’ intentions and affective responses (Ryan 2023, p. 10). My agreement with Ryan’s classification of Xunzi as a semi-realist is more aptly refined as quasi-realist, necessitating a deeper exploration into which facets of Xunzi’s philosophy embody this stance. Simon Blackburn is a prominent advocate of quasi-realism, drawing inspiration from Hume philosophy. He proposes a form of projectivism with evaluative characteristics, suggesting that evaluative properties are projections of our own emotions (feelings, reactions, attitudes, appreciations). In doing so, he inherits an anti-realist perspective, emphasizing that moral properties or facts do not have an independent metaphysical status. On the other hand, he acknowledges the everyday moral intuitions that realists rely on, asserting that moral discourse does indeed have a “realist surface”, meaning moral discourse always “appears as if” it has cognitive content (Blackburn 1984, p. 80). Xunzi and quasi-realists share a similar theoretical concern, emphasizing the human mind and practices in real moral life rather than the metaphysical status of moral entities.

Clearly, Xunzi does not deny that names have descriptive connotations or meanings (Chen 2008, pp. 104–5). He also acknowledges the existence of objects of sensory cognition: “For everyone, the ability to know comes from human nature, and what can be known are the underlying patterns of things” (Hutton 2014, p. 233). His moral discourse also presents an appearance of cognitiveness. Significantly, Xunzi does not consider sage-kings to discover moral and ritual propriety from the heavenly or natural ways. With his distinct cosmology, he dismisses cosmo-ontological arguments for morality and community order, rejecting the assumption of an essentialist origin for moral values like goodness outside human community existence. Ryan illuminates Xunzi’s doctrine of Zhengming by reference to Crispin Wright’s approach to the separability of truth and assert ability conditions. The sage-king’s naming is essentially a series of projective statements, which actually are used not to state facts but rather to project various aspects of sage-kings’ intentions and affective responses (Ryan 2023, p. 10).

Wright proposes that in assessing the truthfulness of projective statements, we need not rely on the correspondence theory of truth, which posits that a proposition’s truthfulness is due to its alignment with a factual reality. Instead, we can deem a statement true if it adheres to the assertoric norms of a specific discourse system. This perspective effectively reverses the conventional realist approach to truth, suggesting that truth is not a pre-existing entity independent of our discursive practices, but rather what constitutes truth is determined by the norms embraced within these practices. This concept leads to Wright’s idea of superassertibility: “Elsewhere I have called this property superassertibility. A statement is superassertible, then, if and only if it is, or can be, warranted and some warrant for it would survive arbitrarily close scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrarily extensive increments to or other forms of improvement of our information”. (Wright 1992, p. 48). Superassertibility hinges on the presence of a particular discourse system, with moral norms becoming superassertible within a moral community that has an established, long-standing, and defensible discourse system.

In Xunzi’s exploration of how moral norms emerge, he focuses on validating the long-term stability and defensibility of the discourse system formulated by the sage-king. For Xunzi, morality is primarily about virtues associated with the structure of community order, symbolized by “yi 义”, rather than an inherent, transcendent morality. Xunzi’s discussions in “Li Lun 礼论” and “Xing E 性恶” outline the development of morality, or community order, as follows:

• Humans are naturally inclined to pursue individual benefit, favoring things that satisfy their sensory desires and rejecting those that are harmful (Hutton 2014, p. 248).
• If natural inclinations are left unchecked, they lead to conflicts, transgressions, and indulgence, culminating in a state of violent confrontation in community living (Hutton 2014, pp. 201, 248).
• Sage-kings, disapproving of such disorder, instituted normative values (“yi 义”), social divisions (“fen 分”), thus fulfilling basic material needs (“yang 养”) and establishing a hierarchical order (“li 礼”) through equitable distribution (Hutton 2014, pp. 201, 249–50).

Regarding (1), Xunzi diverges from Mencius’ essentialist perspective on human nature. Unlike Zisi and Mencius, who view human nature as the essence of being human, imbued with inherent virtues like benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, and thus inherently “good” as bestowed by heaven, Xunzi posits a different view. He contends that human nature is devoid of intrinsic good or evil values despite using expressions like “human nature is evil”. Xunzi sharply differentiates between the natural world, governed by heavenly principles, and the human-made world. He ascribes goodness to outcomes of “deliberate effort”, suggesting that by this logic, evil is similarly a result of such effort, with the natural world being neutral in terms of morality. Evil, according to Xunzi, does not originate from human nature but rather from the process described in point (2), which is the disruption of community life. In other words, Xunzi views goodness as representing a state of order where people adhere to normative values and form a legitimate community, whereas evil symbolizes a state of violence that ensues when people abandon this order and engage in conflict. These represent different states of community living.

In regard to (3), the sage-king’s creation of moral norms like “yi” and social norms like “li” and “fen” appears ex nihilo. This presents a substantial theoretical challenge in interpreting Xunzi’s Sage Creation Theory. I think Saul Kripke’s “sceptical solution of scepticism” may offer a valuable framework to understand this problem. Wittgenstein proposes the paradox of following rules, “this was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here”. (Wittgenstein 1958, p. 201). Kripke views this as a profound skepticism, essentially asking, “How can we show any language at all (public, private, or what-have-you) to be possible?” (Kripke 1982, p. 62). His approach involves two critical steps:

• “A sceptical solution of a sceptical philosophical problem begins on the contrary by conceding that the sceptic’s negative assertions are unanswerable” (Kripke 1982, p. 66). Kripke assumes no fact determines what language users mean, leading to a complete separation between reference and meaning.
• Thus, Kripke introduces the idea of community, “Wittgenstein’s sceptical solution to his problem depends on agreement, and on checkability-on one person’s ability to test whether another uses a term as he does” (Kripke 1982, p. 99). Here, the ascertainability of meaning depends on widespread community acceptance, and the definitiveness of norms is “only because of the brute fact that we generally agree” (Kripke 1982, p. 97).

For Xunzi, human beings inevitably engage in communal life, generating established moral norms and behaviors that deviate from propriety. This is not only an established historical reality but also a universal experience of human communal living. Xunzi regards “the ability to form community” 能群 as a distinctive advantage of humans over animals (Hutton 2014, p. 76). The fundamental awareness of the social nature of humans plays a central role in Xunzi’s construction of Sage Creation Theory. His refusal to contemplate the origin of community based on the abstract essence of human nature stems from his view that the social nature of humans is a fundamental condition for their existence. However, the actual forms of communities in reality are diverse, each with its own organizational principles and governance situations. Nevertheless, Xunzi create the ideal figure of the “sage-king” based on this reality to provide a defensible discourse system for people at his time.3 In other words, the sage-king is essentially the embodiment of the “brute fact” that there has always been a relationship of governance and obedience. The existence of the sage-king signifies that people have always been obedient and acknowledged a certain authority.

Let us return to the specific field of Zhengming doctrine. Xunzi underscores two crucial aspects:

• The sage-king possess the prerogative to create names, “When the kings established names, the names were fixed, and the corresponding objects were thus distinguished. This way was followed, and the kings’ intentions were thus made understood. They then carefully led the people to adhere to these things single-mindedly.” (Hutton 2014, p. 236). The Sage-King is inevitably the “Former King (xianwang 先王)”, who has already existed from the outset of the construction of the community, creating a specific discourse system for the community and ensuring the public nature of the discourse system.
• The discourse system and moral norms initiated by the sage-king require continuous and stable evolution and adaptation by subsequent “later kings (hongwang 后王)”. Xunzi explains, “If there arose a true king, he would surely follow the old names in some cases and create new names in other cases” (Hutton 2014, p. 237). This evolution and adaptation are also seen as the sage-king’s projective responses to the practices of the human community, maintaining the efficacy of this distinct Confucian discourse system without compromising the superassertible moral norms.

In fact, I have shifted the question of legitimacy from political philosophy to linguistic philosophy, specifically addressing the issue of justifiability. In other words, I am exploring in what sense the names and discourse system established by the sage-king possess justifiability. Drawing upon the theoretical framework provided by Wright, we can summarize Xunzi’s arguments regarding the legitimacy of the sage-king as follows:

• Moral norms emerge from the sage-king’s projection of intentions and emotions onto external objects, constituting a quasi-realist tendency devoid of essentialist entity assumptions.
• The sage creation narrative aims to establish the foundation for the superassertibility of moral norms, signifying that a distinct discourse system created by the sage-king is always extant for contemporary people.
• Within the sage-king’s established discourse system, which includes rituals, a precise naming system, and proper social divisions, humans possess the ability, through rational activities or “deliberate effort”, to discern and enact these moral norms.

5. Quilting Function of Sage-Kings as the Master-Signifier

In the previous analysis, the structural role of the sage-king in Xunzi’s quasi-realist framework of rectification of names has been explored. This section shifts focus to the sage-king’s “quilting” function. By reference to Slavoj Žižek, the “quilting” performs the totalization by means of which this free floating of ideological elements is halted, fixed—that is to say, by means of which they become parts of the structured network of meaning (Žižek 1989, pp. 95–96). The master signifier, acting as a quilting point in the network of signifiers, is transcendental and functions as the signifier of signifiers. It determines and restricts the meaning of other signifiers. The master-signifier establishes the norms of discourse, making affirmations and negations in binary oppositions, thereby deciding the relationships and positions among signifiers and their oppositions. In my argument, the sage-king plays the role of the master-signifier in Xunzi’s theory of rectification of names and the entire Confucian discourse system he constructs.

In the intellectual landscape of the Warring States period, characterized by the diverse viewpoints of the Hundred Schools of Thought, the virtues and names established by the early kings and sages since the Western Zhou dynasty gradually departed from their original descriptive meanings. They transformed into “floating signifiers” with significant interpretive flexibility. In the chapter of “Jie Bi”, Xunzi delves into various cognitive errors that individuals might encounter, particularly emphasizing one significant error:

If one takes the human ability to know that comes from human nature and uses it to seek the underlying patterns of things that can be known, but one has no point at which one will stop, then even with old age and the end of one’s years, one will not be able to cover them all. Even if the things for which one has managed to string together their patterns are many millions in number, it will still not suffice to comprise all the changes of the myriad things, and so one will be the same as a foolish person. Someone who in pursuing learning becomes old with a grown son, yet who is the same as a foolish person and still does not understand his mistake—such a one is called a reckless person.

(Hutton 2014, pp. 233–34)

Xunzi critiques the reliance on individual cognitive abilities for empirical knowledge without referencing the sage-king’s established discourse system. In light of the preceding discussion on Xunzi’s argument regarding the quasi-realism of the legitimacy of the sage-king, it is plausible that Xunzi is targeting skeptics like Hui Shi 惠施and Deng Xi 邓析 who challenged the established community discourse system. They sought to transcend the sage-king’s traditional naming conventions by seeking truth and redefining naming principles through individual experience and rational thought. Xunzi argues that the purpose of individual cognition and learning, or deliberate efforts, is to assimilate into the discourse system formulated by the sage-king and adopt moral norms like li and yi. When detached from this established community discourse, they can only capture the uncertain “underlying patterns of things”, failing to unify the constantly changing world into a public, normative understanding. Xunzi believes that individual-level cognition, learning, and other deliberate efforts are aimed at aligning with the discourse system of the community and integrating into proper relations and proper regulations, which are established by sage-kings. In other words, it is the community created by sage-kings that ultimately ensures the normativity of order and regulations and the effectiveness of language. Norms and meanings inherently possess communal attributes, and any interpretations or criteria proposed by isolated individuals cannot attain objectivity and normativity.

For Xunzi, the sage-king is not an allusion to any historical figure, nor is he concerned with constructing a genealogy of such figures. Instead, the sage-king represents a stopping point (zhi 止), the ultimate goal or end that members of the community strive to reach through deliberate efforts (wei 伪)—namely, through learning and the cognitive capacities of the heart—in their quest for understanding linguistic meanings and moral norms:

As for investigations into hardness and whiteness, difference and sameness, things with thickness and things without thickness, it is not that these are not matters of acute investigation. However, the gentleman does not debate about such things, because he stops at such a point.

(Hutton 2014, p. 13)

Learning arrives at putting it into practice and then stops, because to put it into practice is to understand it, and to understand it is to be a sage.

(Hutton 2014, p. 64)

Learning is precisely learning to have a stopping point. Where does one stop it? I say: One stops it when one has reached utter sufficiency. What do I mean by utter sufficiency? I say: It is becoming a sage (king). The sage is one who completely carries out the proper relations, and the true king is one who completely carries out the proper regulations”.

(Hutton 2014, p. 234)

In the cited passages, Xunzi’s use of “zhi 止” (stop or end) extends beyond simple cessation, imbuing the term with connotations of purpose, endpoint, and notably, prohibition. Xunzi argues that the sage-king, along with the established rituals and classics (jing 经), not only represents the final goals of cognitive and learning processes but also acts as a boundary, prohibiting individuals from extending their cognitive and learning activities beyond these limits, which is similar to the approach of the school of name like Gongsun Long 公孙龙 and Hui Shi. The notion of the sage-king as a “stopping point” in Xunzi’s philosophy functions as a quilting point. On one hand, as the ultimate goal, the sage-king binds together significant concepts such as “li 礼”, “yi 义”, “fen 分”, “jing 经”, and “ming 名”, and consolidates these concepts into a coherent discourse system, thereby preserving its integrity. On the other hand, the sage-king, portrayed as a prohibitive “stop” by Xunzi, acts as an external authority that restricts community members from further inquiry. Xunzi calls for adherence to the sage-king’s rituals and authority, forbidding questioning of their underpinnings. Essentially, Xunzi’s portrayal of the sage-king amounts to a tautology: while the sage-king unites other essential concepts to prevent their arbitrary interpretation, the figure of the sage-king itself remains beyond scrutiny, not embodying an ultimate transcendental meaning but rather establishing its authority through a performative operation of self-reference.

However, we should not be overly critical of Xunzi. As Wittgenstein states:

On Schlick’s Ethics. Schlick says that theological ethics contains two conceptions of the essence of the Good. According to the more superficial interpretation, the Good is good because God wills it; according to the deeper interpretation, God wills the Good because it is good. I think that the first conception is the deeper one: Good is what God orders. For this cuts off the path to any and every explanation “why” it is good, while the second conception is precisely the superficial, the rationalistic one, which proceeds as if what is good could still be given some foundation. The first conception says clearly that the essence of the Good has nothing to do with facts and therefore cannot be explained by any proposition. If any proposition expresses just what I mean, it is: Good is what God orders.

(Waismann 1965, p. 15)

The practice of authority legitimizing itself through self-referential performative operations is prevalent in ethical and political realms. Despite the common belief that authority is adhered to because of its inherent legitimacy and norms are followed for their objective nature, distinguishing “inherent” from “external” authority proves complex.

To summarize, we can distill Xunzi’s stance on quilting function of sage-kings as follows:

• On one hand, Xunzi detests the increasing semantic ambiguity and arbitrariness of names during the Warring States period. On the other hand, he acknowledges the arbitrariness of names. Therefore, he chooses to designate the sage-king as the master signifier to stitch together other floating signifiers, ensuring the effectiveness and normativity of moral standards and hierarchical order.
• The sage-king, serving as a quilting point, ensures the integrity of Xunzi’s Confucian discourse system. At the same time, as a stopping point, the sage-king functions as an “external” authority, curtailing community members’ inquiries and controlling the potential arbitrariness and private interpretation of names and norms.

6. Conclusions

In conclusion, this paper has endeavored to interpret Xunzi’s theory of the sage-king’s naming theory through the lens of linguistic philosophy, thereby addressing two foundational questions initially posed: where the legitimacy of the sage-king naming prerogative comes from, and how the sage-king, as the master-signifier, quilts all floating signifiers to ensure the publicity and normativity of name. The findings can be summarized as follows:

• Xunzi’s sage-king naming authority is a philosophical reconstruction of the history of human communities, illustrating the inherent fact that individuals are always part of a publicly acknowledged discourse system.
• Moral norms emerge from the sage-king’s projection of intentions and emotions onto external objects. Sage-king naming theory provides the prerequisite for the superassertibility of moral norms, limiting the potential arbitrariness and private interpretations of names and norms, which ensures the public and authoritative nature of the social discourse system, thereby endowing the sage-kings with legitimacy.
• As the quilting point and stopping point, the sage-king performs the totalization and prohibition by means of which the floating names and norms are fixed and become parts of the structured Confucian discourse of meaning.

It is important to note that the intent of this paper is not to defend any authoritarian or conservative inclinations that might be inherent in Xunzi’s theory. As highlighted by Takahiro Nakajima in his incisive critique, the ultimate aim of Xunzi’s rectification of names may well be the silencing of dissenting voices, creating a world governed by the authoritative imposition of “correct” language (Nakajima 2022, pp. 18–19). However, a comprehensive evaluation and critique of Xunzi’s sage-king naming authority theory exceed the scope of this discussion and warrant further scholarly inquiry.