Between “Jing 敬” and “Cheng 诚”: A Linguistic Study of the Internalization Process in the Pre-Qin Confucian Ethical System

Abstract

From a semantic viewpoint, “Jing 敬” emphasizes an attitude of external respect and adherence to ritual propriety, whereas “Cheng 诚” signifies the true alignment between one’s internal attitudes and external actions. An exploration of “Jing” and “Cheng” in The Analects, The Great Learning, The Doctrine of the Mean, and The Works of Mencius from a linguistic perspective reveals the following: In the ethical system of The Analects, “Jing” represents an attitude towards others, and “Cheng” is rarely mentioned, with personal morality anchored in the social order; in The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean, “Jing” is seldom discussed, while “Cheng” is emphasized as a requirement for individuals, highlighting the intrinsic nature and spontaneity of personal morality; The Works of Mencius, while inheriting Confucius’s concepts, also adopts the ideas from The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean and reinterprets “Jing” internally, achieving a unity between personal morality and social ethics. The shift from “Jing” to “Cheng” and the reinterpretation of “Jing” reflect the concentrated embodiment of the internal reconstruction of the Pre-Qin Confucian ethical system.

1. Introduction

“Jing 敬” and “Cheng 诚” are significant concepts in Pre-Qin Confucian thought, both of which point towards an individual’s sincere and respectful attitude. These are key requirements at the personal level within the Confucian ethical system. The concept of “Jing” originates from witchcraft (Angle 2005; P. Liu 2019). Later, this religiously derived emotion and attitude extended in the Zhou Dynasty to sincere reverence for elders and superiors (Li 2004; Mou 2008) and persisted throughout the development of Confucian thought (Wu et al. 2022). “Cheng” is a complex concept in ancient China, originating from the emotional and spiritual states in ancient sacrificial or religious activities (Li 1999; Sato 2005; Csikszentmihalyi 2009). It evolved into a Confucian ethical value and aesthetic concept. Over time, “Cheng Jing (诚敬) “combined to form a fundamental emotion and attitude in Confucian morality (Jia 2021). Existing research has analyzed the concepts of “respect” and “sincerity” in different classics (Y. Zhang 2009; P. Zhang 2013; Feng 2016; Q. Liu 2016; Meng 2023, etc.).

It is evident that both “Jing” and “Cheng” underwent a transformation from religious consciousness to Confucian ethical concepts. While existing research has explored the origins and evolution of these concepts, this paper focuses on how this transformation was completed in the Pre-Qin period.

A notable phenomenon is the varying degrees of attention “Jing” and “Cheng” received within the ideological frameworks of The Analects, The Great Learning, The Doctrine of the Mean, and The Works of Mencius. In Confucius’s “ren”-based ethical system established in The Analects, “Jing” plays a significant role, with Confucius frequently elucidating “Jing” while seldom discussing “Cheng”. In contrast, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean mention “Cheng” more frequently than “Jing”, underscoring the value of “Cheng” within the ethical system. However, in The Works of Mencius, “Jing” regains importance within the ethical framework, with Mencius often specifically emphasizing the value of “Jing” and reinterpreting it. The usage of “Jing” and “Cheng” in the Four Books shows significant differences, as illustrated in Figure 1:1

This phenomenon suggests that the attention and interpretation of “Jing” and “Cheng” in different Pre-Qin Confucian texts have changed. However, research on this transitional phase is relatively scarce. Therefore, we propose that by analyzing “Jing” and “Cheng” using the Four Books as a corpus, one can clearly trace the internalization of Confucian ethics during the Pre-Qin period. Methodologically, Zhuo (2023) outlined an approach for studying ancient thought based on semantic analysis, which involves exploring the ideological connotations behind ancient classics through the analysis of the semantic characteristics of words. Although sincerity and respect appear very similar in personal moral conduct, in Old Chinese, “Jing” and “Cheng” did not carry the same meanings. Typically, “Jing” focuses more on an individual’s attitude towards others (especially from those of lower status towards those of higher status), while “Cheng” emphasizes an individual’s spontaneous consciousness. This paper, from the perspectives of philology and linguistics, examines the meanings of “Jing” and “Cheng” in the Pre-Qin era and their interpretations across the Four Books. Through this analysis, one can observe the process of internal reconstruction of Confucian ethics, exploring why Pre-Qin Confucians chose this particular method to reconstruct the personal moral system.2

2. Attitudes towards Others: “Jing” in The Analects

In The Analects, the term “Jing” appears twenty times in statements by Confucius, with two additional mentions by his disciples Zixia and Zizhang. Initially focusing on Confucius’s discussions on “Jing”, within the ethical system he established, “Jing” denotes a respectful and earnest attitude demonstrated by an individual while conducting activities, particularly manifesting as one-sided respect and compliance from those of lower status towards superiors. In Confucius’s teachings, “Jing” surfaces in contexts such as national order, ritual observances, serving parents, and interactions with others, consistently representing an individual’s respectful and earnest attitude towards those of higher status. For example:

(1) The Master said of Tsze-ch’an that he had four of the characteristics of a superior man:—in his conduct of himself, he was humble; in serving his superiors, he was respectful (敬); in nourishing the people, he was kind; in ordering the people, he was just. (The Analects, Gongye Chang).3

(2) The Master said, “A minister, in serving his prince, reverently discharges (敬) his duties, and makes his emolument a secondary consideration”. (The Analects, Wei Ling Gong).

(3) The Master said, “High station filled without indulgent generosity; ceremonies performed without reverence (敬); mourning conducted without sorrow;—wherewith should I contemplate such ways?” (The Analects, Bayi).

(4) Fan Ch’ih asked what constituted wisdom. The Master said, “To give one’s self earnestly to the duties due to men, and, while respecting (敬) spiritual beings, to keep aloof from them, may be called wisdom”. (The Analects, Yongye).

(5) Tsze-yu asked what filial piety was. The Master said, “The filial piety of now-a-days means the support of one’s parents. But dogs and horses likewise are able to do something in the way of support;—without reverence (敬), what is there to distinguish the one support given from the other?” (The Analects, Weizheng).

(6) The Master said, “In serving his parents, a son may remonstrate with them, but gently; when he sees that they do not incline to follow his advice, he shows an increased degree of reverence (敬), but does not abandon his purpose; and should they punish him, he does not allow himself to murmur”. (The Analects, Liren).

(7) The Master said, “Yen P’ing knew well how to maintain friendly intercourse. The acquaintance might be long, but he showed the same respect (敬) as at first”. (The Analects, Gongye Chang).

In the examples mentioned, “Jing” is a requirement within the state order for subjects and the populace, within ceremonial contexts for those conducting rituals, and within family order for children serving their parents. Subjects towards monarchs, ritual conductors towards deities, and children towards parents all need to maintain “Jing”. This indicates that in Confucius’s ethical system, “Jing” is the appropriate attitude of those in lower social positions towards those in higher positions. Even in example (7), where Yen P’ing gains respect from others through his adeptness at social interactions, the underlying logic remains that “Jing” is an external requirement when someone is skilled at interacting with people. In this sense, Confucius’s ethical system emphasizes the demonstration of “Jing” within external requirement, especially in specific unequal social relationships.

The reason we consider “Jing” as an external requirement in Confucius’s ethical system is not only because “Jing” occurs within unequal social relationships but also because in Confucius’s system, “Jing” is required in specific behavioral contexts and carries a distinct instrumental value. In the examples provided, “Jing” is a very concrete behavioral expectation. Moreover, in Confucius’s view, whether or not one has an attitude of “Jing” in specific behavioral contexts is a criterion for judging a person. Confucius believed that “Jing” could achieve the objective of governing a state. In examples (1) through (4), Confucius fully elaborates on the value of “Jing” in state governance: he appreciates Zichan partly because of Zichan’s respect for the ruler; he directly emphasizes that “Jing” is a requirement for serving the ruler; he stresses the need to maintain a reverent attitude during ritual behaviors; example (4) also places “Jing” within the context of state governance. In Confucius’s ethical system, “Jing” is also a requirement for children serving their parents, as seen in examples (5) and (6), where Confucius uses respect for parents as a criterion to distinguish humans from animals and to judge whether children are fulfilling their filial duties, and as a tool for value judgment. Even in example (7), Confucius views the respect others show for Yen P’ing as an evaluation tool recognizing him.

Confucius particularly emphasizes the political instrumental value of “Jing” (respect). He often treats “Jing” as a requirement and criterion for an individual’s service to their ruler and governance of the state. Beyond the previously mentioned examples, Confucius frequently discusses “Jing” within the context of governance. For example:

(8) The Master said, “To rule a country of a thousand chariots, there must be reverent (敬) attention to business, and sincerity; economy in expenditure, and love for men; and the employment of the people at the proper seasons”. (The Analects, Yanyuan).

(9) Chi K’ang asked how to cause the people to reverence (敬) their ruler, to be faithful to him, and to go on to nerve themselves to virtue. The Master said, “Let him preside over them with gravity;—then they will reverence (敬) him. Let him be filial and kind to all;—then they will be faithful to him. Let him advance the good and teach the incompetent;—then they will eagerly seek to be virtuous”. (The Analects, Weizheng).

(10) Chung-kung said, “If a man cherish in himself a reverential (敬) feeling of the necessity of attention to business, though he may be easy in small matters in his government of the people, that may be allowed. But if he cherish in himself that easy feeling, and also carry it out in his practice, is not such an easy mode of procedure excessive?” (The Analects, Yongye).

(11) Fan Ch’ih having gone out, the Master said, “A small man, indeed, is Fan Hsu! If a superior love propriety, the people will not dare not to be reverent (敬). If he love righteousness, the people will not dare not to submit to his example. If he love good faith, the people will not dare not to be sincere. Now, when these things obtain, the people from all quarters will come to him, bearing their children on their backs;—what need has he of a knowledge of husbandry?” (The Analects, Zilu).

(12) Tsze-chang asked how a man should conduct himself, so as to be everywhere appreciated. The Master said, “Let his words be sincere and truthful, and his actions honourable and careful (敬);—such conduct may be practised among the rude tribes of the South or the North. If his words be not sincere and truthful and his actions not honourable and careful, will he, with such conduct, be appreciated, even in his neighborhood? When he is standing, let him see those two things, as it were, fronting him. When he is in a carriage, let him see them attached to the yoke. Then may he subsequently carry them into practice”. Tsze-chang wrote these counsels on the end of his sash”. (The Analects, Wei Ling Gong).

(13) Tsze-lu asked what constituted the superior man. The Master said, “The cultivation of himself in reverential carefulness (敬)”. “And is this all?” said Tsze-lu. “He cultivates himself so as to give rest to others”, was the reply. “And is this all?” again asked Tsze-lu. The Master said, “He cultivates himself so as to give rest to all the people. He cultivates himself so as to give rest to all the people:—even Yao and Shun were still solicitous about this”. (The Analects, Xian Wen).

In Confucius’s view, in example (8), ministers respecting the ruler is a necessary requirement for governing the state; in examples (9), (10), and (11), making the populace respect the leaders is a means of state governance; in example (12), if a person can be thoroughly sincere and respectful, they can achieve greater understanding and effectiveness. In example (13), Confucius considers “Jing” as an intrinsic requirement for a gentleman and points out that the ultimate purpose of “Jing” is to govern the state and bring peace to the people. Thus, in Confucius’s political logic, the fundamental reason for individuals to maintain respect for the ruler is to establish a stable social order and achieve effective governance of the state and its people.

It is important to note that the core of Confucius’s ethical system is undoubtedly “Ren” and Confucius considers “Jing” as one of the requirements for achieving “Ren”:

(14) Fan Ch’ih asked about perfect virtue. The Master said, “It is, in retirement, to be sedately grave; in the management of business, to be reverently attentive (敬); in intercourse with others, to be strictly sincere. Though a man go among rude, uncultivated tribes, these qualities may not be neglected”. (The Analects, Zilu).

In this discussion, Confucius emphasizes the importance of the qualities “respectfulness”, “reverence”, and “loyalty” as core to achieving benevolence. These qualities are typically expected from those of lower status towards those of higher status, indicating Confucius’s belief that an individual’s attitude towards others is foundational to moral orientation.4

Why does “Jing”, this attitude towards others, occupy such an important position in Confucius’s ethical system? The reason is related to the background in which the concept of “Jing” originated.

From an etymological perspective, “Jing” shares roots with “jing” (警, vigilance) and “jing” (惊, to startle), all three words sharing the same initial and final sounds. The meaning of “jing” is to be startled, “jing” means to be vigilant, and “Jing” means to be serious and earnest. Being startled leads to vigilance, and being vigilant to avoid mistakes is “Jing”; these three words are interconnected in meaning (L. Wang 2015, p. 1301). Sun Yuwen (Sun 2015, p. 902) believes that “Jing” arises from vigilance. (Hong 2018, p. 247) considers “Jing” as showing respect and politeness to people or being serious and careful about matters. From the logic of the etymology, it can be seen that in ancient people’s cognition, the reason humans develop an attitude of “respect” is essentially because they are startled and thus become vigilant, requiring a serious and earnest attitude in actions. That is, “Jing” is an attitude choice made by an individual after reflecting on external shocks, aimed at avoiding potential risks.

The concept of “Jing” originates from witchcraft (Angle 2005; P. Liu 2019). During the Zhou Dynasty, “Jing” extended from a religious spirit to reverence for elders and superiors (Li 2004; Mou 2008). The ritualization of “Jing” likely began in the early Zhou Dynasty. (Xu 2014, pp. 19–24) believes that the humanistic spirit of the Zhou Dynasty fundamentally differed from the religious spirit of the Shang dynasty. The early rulers of the Zhou Dynasty demonstrated a pronounced sense of anxiety and striving will. The Book of Documents, Against Luxurious Ease 《尚书·无逸》 records:

(15) Zhou Gong said, “Ah! From the Middle Ancestor of Yin to King Gao, to King Zu Jia, to our King Wen of Zhou, these four kings led with wisdom. Someone told them, ‘The common people resent and curse you.’ They then became even more cautious and respectful in their conduct (敬德); when their faults were pointed out, they said, ‘Our faults indeed are as described.’ They did not dare harbor anger. If not heeded, people might deceive and confuse each other. If someone says the common people resent and curse you and you believe it, you will act like this: not consider the laws of the state for long, not broaden your own mind, unjustly punish the innocent, kill those without guilt. Once the resentment of the common people accumulates, it will converge upon you”.

In Zhou Gong’s explanation, the reason the virtuous ancestors like King Wen were serious and cautious was directly to prevent the common people from resenting and cursing them; hence, they exhibited a cautious and respectful attitude externally. It can also be seen that “Jing” is a reflective awareness born out of political crises, where monarchs continuously reflect on their own behavior and mindset to not fail in their responsibilities. Of course, in Zhou Gong’s discourse, the spirit of “Jing” is not just passively out of fear but is a subjective choice made based on reflection on potential crises. This also shows that Zhou Gong incorporated “Jing” into the political logic: the emperor’s serious and earnest attitude is a necessary choice to ensure national stability. (Chen 2009, p. 320) believes that “Jing De” refers to the cautious practice of virtue. It should not be overlooked that during this period, the rulers’ attitude of “Jing” was largely due to caution towards external factors, but it had already begun to be proposed as an inner cultivation.

From an etymological perspective, the concept of “Jing” originates from “vigilance”, emphasizing external factors. Therefore, the serious attitude of the Duke of Zhou towards Heaven and the people was due to his vigilance against the downfall of the regime. In other words, the concept of “Jing” originated from a cautious attitude towards external elements. By the time of Confucius, this “Jing” was more often described as an attitude towards those of higher status. Comparatively, while Confucius also emphasizes the political instrumental value of “Jing”, he more broadly integrates “Jing” into the ethical system, although he also highlights its political instrumental value. However, it is confirmed that whether viewed from the etymology or in the discourses of Zhou Gong and Confucius, “Jing” is an attitude displayed by an individual based on external factors.

The Analects mention “Cheng” only twice, and both times, it is used as an adverb to affirm a proposition, indicating that Confucius did not elaborate on the ethical value of “Cheng”.

3. Intrinsic True Character: “Cheng” in The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean

The Great Learning continues Confucius’s logic regarding “Jing”, treating it as the attitude of inferiors towards superiors:

(16) “In the Book of Poetry, it is said, “Profound was King Wan. With how bright and unceasing a feeling of reverence (敬) did he regard his resting places!” As a sovereign, he rested in benevolence. As a minister, he rested in reverence (敬). As a son, he rested in filial piety. As a father, he rested in kindness. In communication with his subjects, he rested in good faith”.

(17) What is meant by “The regulation of one’s family depends on the cultivation of his person” is this:-men are partial where they feel affection and love; partial where they despise and dislike; partial where they stand in awe and reverence (敬); partial where they feel sorrow and compassion; partial where they are arrogant and rude.

The so-called rectifying of one’s family by cultivating oneself means one is biased towards those they love and biased against those they despise, biased towards those they fear and respect, biased towards those they pity, and biased towards those they are lazy and negligent towards.

In the first example, The Great Learning treats “Jing” as a requirement for “subjects”; in the latter example, “Jing” is used in conjunction with “fear” and contrasted with pity, also indicating that “Jing” is the attitude of inferiors towards superiors. However, while The Analects particularly emphasizes the political instrumental value of “Jing”, where individuals’ respectful and serious treatment of superiors is a necessary norm for state governance, The Great Learning does not seem to stress this function of “Jing”. The first example discusses “knowing where to stop”, that is, “stopping at the ultimate good”; the second example discusses the key points of “self-cultivation”, both centering on personal moral cultivation.

The Great Learning ethical system’s demands on individual attitudes are predominantly manifested in the concept of “Cheng”. The Great Learning ethical system elaborately discusses two characteristics of “Cheng”:

First, “Cheng” is the internal foundation for individuals to achieve social values. When discussing the relationship between individual cultivation and state governance, The Great Learning chooses to place “Cheng” as the key to the individual spirit:

(18) Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere (诚) in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge.

After acquiring knowledge and methods through “investigating things and reaching knowledge”, displaying a sincere attitude allows one to rectify the heart, thereby improving self-cultivation and achieving state governance. This mode of explanation bridges the logical relationship between individual attitude and state governance, fully illustrating that “Cheng” is the fundamental requirement for individuals within The Great Learning ethical system.

Second, “Cheng” is an intrinsic, spontaneous attitude. While Confucius places “Jing” as a requirement for individual attitude, framed by external social relationships, The Great Learning treats “Cheng” as a requirement for individual attitude, emphasizing the initiative and spontaneity of individual attitude. In discussing why one should “sincerely intend”, The Great Learning explains:

(19) What is meant by “making the thoughts sincere (诚)” is the allowing no self-deception, as when we hate a bad smell, and as when we love what is beautiful.

The Great Learning defines “Cheng” as “no self-deception” with the characteristic of “self” being internally initiated. “Cheng” is an attitude of not deceiving oneself, fully emphasizing the spontaneity of individual attitude. The subsequent discussion, “sincere internally, forming externally”, treats “Cheng” as the internal support for external behavior, essentially highlighting the consistency between individual internal attitudes and external actions.

“Jing” and “Cheng” emphasize the need for individuals to be earnest and attentive in their actions, but “Jing” mainly manifests as treating others with respect and caution, directed towards others, while “Cheng” is an internal spirit, directed towards the individual’s own attitudes’ and actions’ authenticity and consistency. Comparing The Analects and The Great Learning, one can see that “Cheng” has replaced “Jing” as the requirement for individual attitudes within the ethical system and has also replaced the political instrumental value of “Jing”. This change reflects the trend of internalization in the Confucian ethical system from The Analects to The Great Learning: individual attitudes are no longer anchored within the social order but are an internally initiated, autonomous choice.

The Doctrine of the Mean also presents changes in its elaboration of “Jing” based on the continuation of Confucian ideas, mainly manifesting as “Jing” no longer simply representing the respect of inferiors towards superiors:

(20) All who have the government of the kingdom with its states and families have nine standard rules to follow;-viz., the cultivation of their own characters; the honoring of men of virtue and talents; affection towards their relatives; respect (敬) towards the great ministers; kind and considerate treatment of the whole body of officers; dealing with the mass of the people as children; encouraging the resort of all classes of artisans; indulgent treatment of men from a distance; and the kindly cherishing of the princes of the states.

Here, “respect towards the great ministers” is one of the nine basic principles for governing a country, believed to prevent the monarch from being erratic in handling affairs. From a semantic perspective, “Jing” here means reverence, expressing the agent’s emphasis on the recipient, with the nine principles listed in the original text all aiming to emphasize the importance of the recipients in sentence structures. Therefore, compared to The Analects, which displays respect of inferiors towards superiors, “Jing” in The Doctrine of the Mean has a certain range of semantic expansion.

“Cheng” is the core concept of the cultivation theory in The Doctrine of the Mean. The basic lexical meaning of “Cheng” is truthfulness. (F. Wang 2011, p. 882) states that “Cheng” refers to inner sincerity, genuineness without deceit, purity without selfishness, or singular focus. “Cheng” originates from the heart, and its antonym is hypocrisy. (Hong 2018, p. 247) believes that “Cheng” emphasizes inner sincerity. The character “cheng” 成 (to complete) has a graphic, phonetic structure, and semantic meaning, which represent the early form of the character “cheng” 誠 (sincerity) (Jia 2021). (Meng 2023) believes that in Chinese, “Cheng”, “cheng” (成, to complete), and “ding” (丁, to fill) share roots, with the characteristic meaning being full and substantial. From a semantic perspective, the “truth” emphasized by “Cheng” is not the truth in the dimension of truthfulness versus falsehood, but the consistency between external and internal truthfulness. In Chinese, words like “true sincerity”, “honesty”, “open-heartedness”, etc., where “Cheng” is used, all emphasize the consistency between a person’s external behavior and inner thoughts.

In the ideological system of The Doctrine of the Mean, firstly, the truthfulness of “Cheng” first manifests as the consistency between natural morality and social morality. “Cheng” is the convergence point of the reflection of Heaven’s way and human relations:

(21) Sincerity (诚) is the way of Heaven. The attainment of sincerity is the way of men.

“Cheng” is an individual’s internal cultivation for handling relationships with relatives, friends, and leaders, thereby achieving the governance of the populace. The reason individuals must possess a sincere character is that the operation of nature is truthful. Because human social morality follows natural morality, it is possible to achieve a truthful state without deliberate effort. (Tan 2022) believes: “The ‘Cheng’ in ‘The Doctrine of the Mean’ still carries the meaning of being real and unpretentious, from the existence state of all things. Applied to self-cultivation, it requires the gentleman to emulate the natural flow and real unpretentiousness of Heaven and Earth... Thus, ‘Cheng’ becomes the highest standard connecting self and others, Heaven and Earth, and all things”.

Secondly, the “Cheng” in The Doctrine of the Mean is a moral attribute that is intrinsic and original:

(22) When we have intelligence resulting from sincerity (诚), this condition is to be ascribed to nature; when we have sincerity (诚) resulting from intelligence, this condition is to be ascribed to instruction. But given the sincerity (诚), and there shall be the intelligence; given the intelligence, and there shall be the sincerity (诚).

(23) Sincerity is that whereby self-completion is effected, and its way is that by which man must direct himself.

Internal sincerity can be communicated externally; this is a natural attribute. External communication can construct internal sincerity; this is the content of teaching. In the relationship between “nature” and “condition”, it reflects that “Cheng” is an intrinsic moral. In the second example, “Cheng” is a state that one can achieve, the source for recognizing all things and constructing an ethical order centered on human relations. The purpose of “Cheng” is not only to achieve self-worth but also to accomplish external things.

It can be seen that in the ethical system of The Doctrine of the Mean, “Cheng” is an intrinsic, original, fundamental moral attribute, and this quality is the result of the unity of natural morality and social morality, the individual behavior following the natural truthfulness.

With “Jing” and “Cheng” as the core, comparing The Analects, The Great Learning, and The Doctrine of the Mean regarding individual attitude requirements, one can clearly see the internalization trend of the Confucian ethical system: in Confucius’s ethical system, the individual’s respect for superiors is the result of external social order regulations and has a distinct political instrumental value. In contrast, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean no longer emphasize the political instrumental value of “Jing”, nor treat the respect for superiors as the ethical system’s requirement for individuals. Instead, they replace it with the more intrinsically initiated “Cheng”, emphasizing the consistency between individual external behavior and internal state, social ethics, and natural morality.

From a semantic perspective, “Jing” indicates the unequal relationship between the agent and recipient, while “Cheng” indicates the consistency relationship between internal quality and external behavior. From this perspective, the so-called internalization of ethical order is not simply emphasizing the autonomy of the individual. From The Analects to The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean, the logical construction of the Confucian ethical order fundamentally shifts from a vertical hierarchical logic to an internally generated logic.

4. The Return of “Jing”: The Works of Mencius Reinterprets

In the ethical systems of The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean, the focus of personal cultivation shifted from the “Jing” of Confucius’s era to “Cheng”. Interestingly, in The Works of Mencius, “Jing” returns to the center of the ethical system, with relatively less discussion on “Cheng”.

The Works of Mencius discusses “Cheng” stemming from The Doctrine of the Mean. In the book, “Cheng” is mostly used as an adverb indicating judgment, with only two discussions as a concept, both treating “Cheng” as self-cultivation:

(24) Mencius said, ‘……There is a way to make one’s parents pleased:—if one, on turning his thoughts inwards, finds a want of sincerity (诚), he will not give pleasure to his parents. There is a way to the attainment of sincerity (诚) in one’s self:—if a man do not understand what is good, he will not attain sincerity (诚) in himself. “Therefore, sincerity is the way of Heaven. To think how to be sincere (诚) is the way of man. Never has there been one possessed of complete sincerity (诚), who did not move others. Never has there been one who had not sincerity (诚) who was able to move others”’. (Mencius, Li Lou Chapter 1).

(25) Mencius said, “All things are already complete in us. There is no greater delight than to be conscious of sincerity (诚) on self-examination. If one acts with a vigorous effort at the law of reciprocity, when he seeks for the realization of perfect virtue, nothing can be closer than his approximation to it”. (Mencius, Jin Xin Chapter 1).

The case of (24) directly uses the original text from The Doctrine of the Mean, and (25) also emphasizes that “Cheng” is an internal state. From the limited discussions on “Cheng” by Mencius, it is evident that the ethical system of The Doctrine of the Mean has a direct influence on Mencius.

Comparatively, Mencius frequently elaborates on “Jing” in his ethical system. In The Works of Mencius, some usages of “Jing” continue the practice of treating it as the attitude of inferiors towards superiors, used in the contexts of human relations such as ruler and subject, old and young, consistent with the usage in The Analects and representing the basic meaning of “Jing”:

(26) He who does not serve his sovereign as Shun served Yâo, does not respect (敬) his sovereign; and he who does not rule his people as Yâo ruled his, injures his people. (Mencius, Li Lou Chapter 1).

(27) The third was, “Respect (敬) the old, and be kind to the young. Be not forgetful of strangers and travellers. “(Mencius, Gao Zi Chapter 2).

(28) Mencius said, “To feed a scholar and not love him, is to treat him as a pig. To love him and not respect (敬) him, is to keep him as a domestic animal”. (Mencius, Jin Xin Chapter 1).

(29) If he treats others politely, and they do not return his politeness, let him turn inwards and examine his own feeling of respect (敬)”. (Mencius, Li Lou Chapter 1).

(30) Filial affection for parents is the working of benevolence. Respect (敬) for elders is the working of righteousness. There is no other reason for those feelings;—they belong to all under heaven. (Mencius, Jin Xin Chapter 1).

However, The Works of Mencius differentiates its elaboration of “Jing” from Confucius’s ideas in three main aspects:

First, human hierarchical relationships are no longer the sole framework anchoring the attitude of respect, and individual attitudes have autonomy:

(31) Respect (敬) shown by inferiors to superiors is called giving to the noble the observance due to rank. Respect (敬) shown by superiors to inferiors is called giving honour to talents and virtue. The rightness in each case is the same”. (Mencius, Wang Zhang Chapter 2).

(32) Mencius said, ‘You should ask him, “Which do you respect (敬) most,—your uncle, or your younger brother?” He will answer, “My uncle”. Ask him again, “If your younger brother be personating a dead ancestor, to which do you show the greater respect (敬),—to him or to your uncle?” He will say, “To my younger brother”. You can go on, “But where is the respect (敬) due, as you said, to your uncle?” He will reply to this, “I show the respect (敬) to my younger brother, because of the position which he occupies”, and you can likewise say, “So my respect (敬) to the villager is because of the position which he occupies. Ordinarily, my respect (敬) is rendered to my elder brother; for a brief season, on occasion, it is rendered to the villager”. (Mencius, Gao Zi Chapter 1).

The respect of inferiors for superiors is framed by identity and hierarchical differences, while the respect of superiors for inferiors is referenced by cultivation and skill level. Moreover, Mencius believes these two types of respect have consistency. In different situations, the object of respect may differ, but the external order is not the sole criterion for judging whether one respects others, and the attitude of respect is an autonomous choice made by the individual based on external conditions. This autonomy’s underlying logic is that human behavior should be appropriate and fitting, reflecting the idea of “righteousness”, and this concept is influenced by The Doctrine of the Mean. The Doctrine of the Mean says “Righteousness is what is appropriate, honoring the virtuous is great”. “Righteousness” means doing what should be done, emphasizing the consistency of individual inner thoughts and actions. Interestingly, the individual autonomy and consistency of inner thoughts and actions reflected in “Jing” actually share inherent similarities with the “Cheng” elaborated in The Doctrine of the Mean.

Second, “Jing” is no longer a one-way behavioral attitude but a two-way moral requirement. When The Analects discusses “Jing”, it is always about an individual’s attitude towards others (especially those of higher status), while The Works of Mencius emphasizes that “Jing” can be a mutual treatment between individuals.

(33) He who loves others is constantly loved by them. He who respects others is constantly respected by them. (Mencius, Li Lou Chapter 2).

Respecting others is an individual’s inner recognition of the rites, and the respect between individuals and the respect others have for oneself is mutual. This indicates that “Jing” in Mencius’s system is not a reflective attitude under external order demands but a moral choice made from within; the structure of respecting others is not to achieve state governance but to gain the respect of others, constructing a two-way ethical order between individuals. Moreover, through this two-way respectful moral order, it can be seen that Mencius’s ethical system contains a certain degree of equality in “Jing”.

Third, the heart of reverence does not come from the outside but is a universal and inherent human trait.

(34) The feeling of commiseration belongs to all men; so does that of shame and dislike; and that of reverence and respect (敬); and that of approving and disapproving. (Mencius, Gao Zi Chapter 1).

Mencius believes that the feeling of reverence and respect is inherent in people, not shaped by external existence. The previous examination of the etymology and conceptual origins of “Jing” shows that the attitude of “reverence” stems from people’s vigilance towards external crises; Mencius interprets “Jing” as an innate human emotion within the theory of inherent goodness.

From Mencius’s reinterpretation of “Jing”, it is clear that he restructures the internalization of the Confucian ethical order. Mencius’s elaboration of “Jing” breaks through the original semantic limitations of “Jing”, as well as the connotations of “Jing” in Confucius’s ethical system. In The Analects, Confucius’s use of the word “Jing” and his elaboration of the concept of “Jing” are basically consistent with the lexical meaning of “Jing”, where respecting others is anchored in the socially unequal order, a one-way attitude of inferiors towards superiors, and a reflective choice made by individuals based on social factors. In The Works of Mencius, individuals respecting others is spontaneous, two-way, and inherent, no longer passive, one-way, and reflective. Furthermore, examining the differences in the interpretations of “Jing” by Confucius and Mencius reveals a shift from an attitude towards others to an attitude originating from within oneself. This does not mean that Confucius did not emphasize the cultivation of internal morality and the consistency between internal and external behavior. The core concept in Confucius’s ethical system, Ren, is an inherently ethical requirement. This indicates that Confucius did value personal internal cultivation, but he did not use “Jing” to express this emphasis. In contrast, Mencius extended and generalized the internal moral requirements and the idea of consistency between the internal and external to the interpretation of “Jing”. This shift is derived from the emphasis on “Cheng” in The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean, demonstrating the internalization of ethics from the time of Confucius to Mencius.

Interestingly, compared to The Analects, The Great Learning, The Doctrine of the Mean, and The Works of Mencius all reconstruct the internalization of the Confucian ethical order, all emphasizing the intrinsic and autonomous nature of individual morality, but the methods of reconstruction differ: The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean replace “Jing” with “Cheng” as the ethical system’s requirement for individuals, both placing “Cheng” in a more important position within the moral order. The Great Learning emphasizes the intrinsic foundational position of individual cultivation in the political order, The Doctrine of the Mean emphasizes the decisive intrinsic nature of individual attitudes within the logic of social morality following natural morality, and The Works of Mencius emphasizes the autonomy of individual attitudes through the method of reinterpreting “Jing”.

The final key question is as follows: since Mencius also reconstructs the ethical system internally and his thoughts are significantly influenced by The Doctrine of the Mean, why did he not choose “Cheng”, which semantically emphasizes the conscious attitude of the individual, as the requirement for individual morality like The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean, and even seldom discusses the position and value of “Cheng” in the ethical system? On the surface, choosing to reinterpret “Jing” seems uneconomical, but in fact, the lexical connotations or characteristics of “Jing” determine its inherent unity with “Cheng”: the lexical meaning of “Jing” displays an external attitude. Mencius’s interpretation only delves deeper into this connotation, completing this unity, while also giving traditional moral ethics of “Jing” a new life of internalization, which is on a trajectory of change in Confucian thought, and is a natural response to the collapse of the external ethical order (rites and music). Whether it can be called a “breakthrough” of the original connotation is worth considering.

In Mencius’s system of thought, the autonomy of individual morality and the orderliness of social morality have an inherent unity. It can also be seen that Mencius’s thoughts have direct concepts from Confucius and are deeply influenced by The Doctrine of the Mean.

5. Conclusions

Through the above analysis of “Jing” and “Cheng” in The Analects, The Great Learning, The Doctrine of the Mean, and The Works of Mencius, it is evident that although both words emphasize the need for earnest and cautious human behavior, the intrinsic lexical characteristics of the two words differ, and the choices and interpretations of these words in different texts also vary. The Analects’ discussion of “Jing” shows that its ethical system’s requirements for individual attitudes come from external social order, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean take “Cheng” to emphasize the intrinsic nature of individual morality, and The Works of Mencius emphasizes the autonomy of individual morality through the reinterpretation of “Jing”. This change is a concentrated manifestation of the internalization of the Pre-Qin Confucian ethical order.

This paper primarily uses the Four Books to illustrate a concentrated path of ethical internalization in Pre-Qin Confucianism. This change is also reflected in the “Xunzi”. Although Xunzi’s understanding of human nature seems to be the opposite of Mencius, like in the “Mencius”, the term “Jing” appears extensively in the “Xunzi”, with 54 paragraphs mentioning “Jing” 95 times. Besides continuing the usage of “Jing” as an attitude towards others (e.g., “Li means to show respect to those of high esteem and to honor the elderly”. in “Dalue 《大略》”), there are also examples of internalized interpretation (e.g., “The benevolent must respect others” in “Chendao 《臣道》”). This indicates that the internalization of “Jing” seems to be a common trend in Pre-Qin Confucian thought.

Different reconstruction methods are certainly due to the completeness and consistency of each text’s thought system, but by analyzing the semantics of “Jing” and “Cheng” and comparing the interpretations of “Jing” and “Cheng” in different texts, it can be seen that the Pre-Qin Confucian ethical system undergoes a construction process of “thesis–antithesis–synthesis”: The Analects’ treatment of “Jing” as an individual-level moral requirement, showing consistency between the ethical system and lexical meaning, is a manifestation of establishing an ethical order based on vertical hierarchical relationships; The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean replace “Jing” with “Cheng”, emphasizing individual autonomy, reconstructing the ethical order from an internal relationship; The Works of Mencius is influenced by both of these concepts, inheriting Confucius’s basic ideas and accepting the concept of internalizing personal morality, further completing the internal reconstruction of the ethical order through the reinterpretation of “Jing”.

Through the analysis of semantics, exploring the thoughts of the classics is an important method in the study of Chinese philology. With the “linguisticization” of Chinese philology in modern times, this traditional academic concept is being overlooked. Zhuo (2023) elaborates on the research method combining philology, modern linguistics, and hermeneutics, and this study is precisely an attempt to elaborate on the Pre-Qin Confucian ethical thoughts and their changes from the perspectives of philology and linguistics.