Toleration of What Is above Reason: The Impact of Leibniz’s View on Religious Belief on Experiential Matters
Round 1
Reviewer 1 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsRevise and resubmit. The paper is interesting, insightful and merits publication in some form. The analysis is not unprecedented, but the argument is generally well presented and includes some genuinely original elements along the way. The analogy between religious belief and experiential knowledge, between faith and experience (drawn from the Preliminary Discourse in the Theodicy), has as far as I know not been systematically explored before in the literature, or at least not in that manner. The paper also does an excellent job of explaining in a systematic and convincing way why Leibniz “devotes much time and attention to explaining mysteries he does not assent to.” Finally, taking the Des Bosses correspondence as the key example is the right choice for this. Generally, the paper has to strands. On the one hand, it argues that Leibniz’s understanding of the mysteries of faith (that they can have several meanings that we can and should explore, without necessarily committing to any of them) is important for his conception of toleration. On the other hand, it argues – on account of a general analogy between faith and experience drawn from the Theodicy – that Leibniz’s (tolerant) approach to the mysteries of faith spills over into his general metaphysics, in the event, into his conceptualisation of corporeal substances in the Des Bosses Correspondence. This two-stage argument is original and has something important to tell us about the way in which Leibniz was situated in the landscape of confessionalised natural philosophy at the time, although the author could do better in bringing the two strands together. E.g. when we get to p. 9 and learn that “engaging with all the different meanings that … creation opens to us might not bring us metaphysical surety, but it can lead us to a better and deeper understanding of God and his creation,” it needs to be more explicit how this is still about toleration, if indeed it is.
p. 1.: I am not sure I understand the rationale behind the title: Why “in action”? As far as I can see, the paper is mostly concerned with the epistemology of mysteries of faith as a theoretical component in Leibniz’s understanding of toleration, and how all this spills over into his metaphysics. Nothing very practical about that.
p. 1: The title has “toleration”; the abstract has “tolerance”; the paper mostly has “tolerance” (although sometimes “toleration.”) I don’t see the author making any principled distinction, and I think a choice of a single term and harmonisation of the terminology is required. Both terms are ok, I guess, but “toleration” would clearly be the better choice.
p. 1 (and note 3): despite the explicit “caveat” and (fully legitimate) unwillingness to engage in any broader discussion of what Leibniz meant by tolerance/toleration, we still need to have some sort of definition of what tolerance/toleration is, i.e. what exactly it is that Leibniz’s approach to the mysteries of faith contributes to. In particular, in what way does it contribute to tolerance/toleration as opposed to the way in which it contributes to an irenical or a latitudinarian outlook? So, we need to have a firmer notion of what exactly toleration/tolerance consists in. Is it simply a question of being accepting of diverging religious views? If so, it should be stated.
p. 2: “Most commonly counted among [the mysteries of faith], and treated extensively by Leibniz, are the Trinity (God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), Incarnation (Jesus Christ’s becoming flesh) as well as the Eucharist (bread and wine becoming flesh and blood).” On this list, one important mystery is missing, the only mystery of natural religion, namely creation (see e.g. Theodicy, § 249; and the ca. 1710 text edited in Robinet, Leibniz et Malebranche. Relations personnelles, p. 413: “Il n’y a dans cela aucun miracle absolu, à l’exception de la création des choses et de l’union de Dieu avec la première créature ; le reste se fait par les lois de la nature, à savoir par celles qui conviennent à la première créature et aux anges [...]. Je préfère dire que Dieu (sauf dans la Création et dans l’Incarnation) n’agit pas par miracle.”
p. 2: “After all, there is nothing, not even true miracles, that can go against the decreed divine order.” Related to the above: would this (otherwise correct) principle not perhaps have one exception, namely the decree itself? This speaks to the notion that creation is for Leibniz a mystery of natural theology (see above).
p. 4: “…the belief in or the rejection of any of the mysteries as such or in any particular understanding of them is not essential to the pious character of the individual.” Ok about the particular understanding, but is the embrace of some understanding (even metaphorical) of the mysteries of faith not required? Otherwise it sounds like Leibniz would maintain that we could do away with all of revealed theology and still be pious, which I think he rejects.
p. 5: “despite the fact that Leibniz, as a Protestant, is not required to provide such an account at all.” I think this requires a bit of qualification because it could lead an unsuspecting reader to think that, qua Lutheran, Leibniz saw no real mystery at all to explain in the Eucharist. But that would be misleading. Leibniz is neither a Calvinist nor a Zwinglian. He is in principle a Melanchthon-style Lutheran, ostensibly committed to the Augsburg Confession. And Lutherans in principle subscribe to the real mystery of consubstantiation, and in any case were not satisfied with Calvinist symbolism. Still, what Leibniz’s position exactly is, is not that clear. The whole passage quoted reads: “there is no place for either the transubstantiation or consubstantiation of the bread, but only that Christ’s body is perceived at the same time that the bread is received, so that the presence alone of Christ’s body must be explained.” The last phrase suggests that, even on Leibniz's own confessed view, something still remains to be explained, but he also here seems to diverge from his otherwise explicitly adopted Confession (i.e. the Augsburg one). He possibly leaned toward the doctrine called “comperception” which is somewhere between Lutheranism and moderate Calvinism.
p. 6: “this correspondence also features the much-maligned notion of a vinculum substantiale, which, for the purpose of this paper, is a feature of this correspondence rather than a bug in Leibniz’s thought.” As stated, the alternative is strange. It should be either “a feature rather than a bug of this correspondence” or “a feature or a bug of Leibniz's thought at this point.”
p. 7-8. An exact account of the debates about the vinculum substantiale and the problem of corporeal substance is not required for the overall argument of the paper, and does indeed need to be short. But as it stands, the account is so compressed and elliptic that I don’t think anyone not familiar with the book by Brandon Look in particular will find it understandable. The author needs to help the unsuspecting reader a bit more in explaining what it is about, and what is at stake (on the one hand: accounting for transubstantiation as the transposition of the substantial bonds pertaining to the bonded aggregate of Christ to the un-bonded aggregate of bread, but without changing the monads involved, or their perceptions; on the other hand, consider what substantial bonds imply metaphysically more generally for the unity unum per se of living beings; the existence of corporeal substances; and the unity of mind and body).
p. 7: “Surprisingly, it is Des Bosses who concedes that this explanation would agree with the beliefs of his congregation and of himself.” Des Bosses was a Jesuit. You can hardly call the Society of Jesus a congregation: it is neither a loose association of religious people, nor a meeting of cardinals. It is a religious order.
p. 7: “What we know with certainty to be true, i.e., what is in accordance with preestablished harmony and monadological metaphysics.” This is just one of several places in the paper where the author suggests that, for Leibniz, the monadological metaphysics is known to be true with “certainty” (see also p. 9: “what we can know with certainty”; “within the parameters set by our certain knowledge”; “We can know that God exists and created the best or that our soul is immortal,” etc.). That doesn’t sound right to me. In any case, the kind of certainty in question would have to be specified – at best we are dealing with a hypothesis that we can assert with moral certainty to be true. Same with the proof of God and so on. Perhaps the author is too quick in identifying what we know “with reason” to what we know “with certainty”.
p. 7: “We can deliberate what we know with certainty.” Strange phrase, it is not clear what is meant. Is something other than “deliberation” (i.e. weighing pros and cons before taking a decision) meant here? It doesn’t seem to make sense to weigh the pros and cons of, or deliberate about what is certain.
Comments on the Quality of English Languagep. 5: “…or even why I do not take refuge to many of them.” I suspect what is meant is “I do not take recourse to…”
p. 9: “surety” should be “certainty”.
note 1: “eruditeness” should be “erudition”.
Author Response
Thank you for your careful reading and insightful comments!
Comment 1: This two-stage argument is original and has something important to tell us about the way in which Leibniz was situated in the landscape of confessionalised natural philosophy at the time, although the author could do better in bringing the two strands together. E.g. when we get to p. 9 and learn that “engaging with all the different meanings that … creation opens to us might not bring us metaphysical surety, but it can lead us to a better and deeper understanding of God and his creation,” it needs to be more explicit how this is still about toleration, if indeed it is.
Response 1: Added some words on this.
Comment 2: p. 1.: I am not sure I understand the rationale behind the title: Why “in action”? As far as I can see, the paper is mostly concerned with the epistemology of mysteries of faith as a theoretical component in Leibniz’s understanding of toleration, and how all this spills over into his metaphysics. Nothing very practical about that.
Response 2: I can see that is misleading and was meant differently, it is changed.
Comment 3: p. 1: The title has “toleration”; the abstract has “tolerance”; the paper mostly has “tolerance” (although sometimes “toleration.”) I don’t see the author making any principled distinction, and I think a choice of a single term and harmonisation of the terminology is required. Both terms are ok, I guess, but “toleration” would clearly be the better choice.
Response 3: Changed.
Comment 4: p. 1 (and note 3): despite the explicit “caveat” and (fully legitimate) unwillingness to engage in any broader discussion of what Leibniz meant by tolerance/toleration, we still need to have some sort of definition of what tolerance/toleration is, i.e. what exactly it is that Leibniz’s approach to the mysteries of faith contributes to. In particular, in what way does it contribute to tolerance/toleration as opposed to the way in which it contributes to an irenical or a latitudinarian outlook? So, we need to have a firmer notion of what exactly toleration/tolerance consists in. Is it simply a question of being accepting of diverging religious views? If so, it should be stated.
Response 4: I’ve added an explanation in note 3 (rather than in the text, where the explanation does not seem to fit as well) – I hope my remark is sufficient to alleviate the reviewer’s concern.
Comment 5: p. 2: “Most commonly counted among [the mysteries of faith], and treated extensively by Leibniz, are the Trinity (God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), Incarnation (Jesus Christ’s becoming flesh) as well as the Eucharist (bread and wine becoming flesh and blood).” On this list, one important mystery is missing, the only mystery of natural religion, namely creation (see e.g. Theodicy, § 249; and the ca. 1710 text edited in Robinet, Leibniz et Malebranche. Relations personnelles, p. 413: “Il n’y a dans cela aucun miracle absolu, à l’exception de la création des choses et de l’union de Dieu avec la première créature ; le reste se fait par les lois de la nature, à savoir par celles qui conviennent à la première créature et aux anges [...]. Je préfère dire que Dieu (sauf dans la Création et dans l’Incarnation) n’agit pas par miracle.”
Response 5 : That is true and it is also why I opted to say that the three specific I enumerate ones (trinity, incarnation, transubstantiation) are ‘most commonly counted among them and treated extensively by Leibniz’, because, as the reviewer rightly points to in the next comment, creation seems – given what I say in the following about mysteries – a rather odd one out. But I am not sure creation, while being a mystery, is a mystery of faith. And in this section, the latter are my concern.
Comment 6: p. 2: “After all, there is nothing, not even true miracles, that can go against the decreed divine order.” Related to the above: would this (otherwise correct) principle not perhaps have one exception, namely the decree itself? This speaks to the notion that creation is for Leibniz a mystery of natural theology (see above).
Response 6: See mainly response 5, but: I think that that there are good reasons (already in nuce in this paper, but which would require more thought and argument than I have room for here) why creation is a mystery, even though it is not a mystery of faith.
Comment 7: p. 4: “…the belief in or the rejection of any of the mysteries as such or in any particular understanding of them is not essential to the pious character of the individual.” Ok about the particular understanding, but is the embrace of some understanding (even metaphorical) of the mysteries of faith not required? Otherwise it sounds like Leibniz would maintain that we could do away with all of revealed theology and still be pious, which I think he rejects.
Response 7: I think that one is difficult, because while Leibniz definitively requires faith in order for anyone to be pious, I am not sure he requires that any mystery is to be accepted. But given that I think Leibniz is not entirely clear on this (although, granted, there are many passages where he seems to reject this view) and given that it is not required for the following, I amended the passage accordingly.
Comment 8: p. 5: “despite the fact that Leibniz, as a Protestant, is not required to provide such an account at all.” I think this requires a bit of qualification because it could lead an unsuspecting reader to think that, qua Lutheran, Leibniz saw no real mystery at all to explain in the Eucharist. But that would be misleading. Leibniz is neither a Calvinist nor a Zwinglian. He is in principle a Melanchthon-style Lutheran, ostensibly committed to the Augsburg Confession. And Lutherans in principle subscribe to the real mystery of consubstantiation, and in any case were not satisfied with Calvinist symbolism. Still, what Leibniz’s position exactly is, is not that clear. The whole passage quoted reads: “there is no place for either the transubstantiation or consubstantiation of the bread, but only that Christ’s body is perceived at the same time that the bread is received, so that the presence alone of Christ’s body must be explained.” The last phrase suggests that, even on Leibniz's own confessed view, something still remains to be explained, but he also here seems to diverge from his otherwise explicitly adopted Confession (i.e. the Augsburg one). He possibly leaned toward the doctrine called “comperception” which is somewhere between Lutheranism and moderate Calvinism.
Response 8: That was misleadingly formulated by me – that Leibniz needs no account was meant to refer to transubstantiation rather than the Eucharist. And while I am not sure what Leibniz’s understanding of the Eucharist is, I am certain it is not transubstantiation.
Comment 9: p. 6: “this correspondence also features the much-maligned notion of a vinculum substantiale, which, for the purpose of this paper, is a feature of this correspondence rather than a bug in Leibniz’s thought.” As stated, the alternative is strange. It should be either “a feature rather than a bug of this correspondence” or “a feature or a bug of Leibniz's thought at this point.”
Response 9: Changed accordingly.
Comment 10: p. 7-8. An exact account of the debates about the vinculum substantiale and the problem of corporeal substance is not required for the overall argument of the paper, and does indeed need to be short. But as it stands, the account is so compressed and elliptic that I don’t think anyone not familiar with the book by Brandon Look in particular will find it understandable. The author needs to help the unsuspecting reader a bit more in explaining what it is about, and what is at stake (on the one hand: accounting for transubstantiation as the transposition of the substantial bonds pertaining to the bonded aggregate of Christ to the un-bonded aggregate of bread, but without changing the monads involved, or their perceptions; on the other hand, consider what substantial bonds imply metaphysically more generally for the unity unum per se of living beings; the existence of corporeal substances; and the unity of mind and body).
Response 10: That is a difficult task, but I tried my best (on page 8)
Comment 11: p. 7: “Surprisingly, it is Des Bosses who concedes that this explanation would agree with the beliefs of his congregation and of himself.” Des Bosses was a Jesuit. You can hardly call the Society of Jesus a congregation: it is neither a loose association of religious people, nor a meeting of cardinals. It is a religious order.
Response 11: Absolutely true, changed accordingly.
Comment 12: p. 7: “What we know with certainty to be true, i.e., what is in accordance with preestablished harmony and monadological metaphysics.” This is just one of several places in the paper where the author suggests that, for Leibniz, the monadological metaphysics is known to be true with “certainty” (see also p. 9: “what we can know with certainty”; “within the parameters set by our certain knowledge”; “We can know that God exists and created the best or that our soul is immortal,” etc.). That doesn’t sound right to me. In any case, the kind of certainty in question would have to be specified – at best we are dealing with a hypothesis that we can assert with moral certainty to be true. Same with the proof of God and so on. Perhaps the author is too quick in identifying what we know “with reason” to what we know “with certainty”.
Response 12: In fact, I think that Leibniz considered that we can know (well, maybe that he knows) the monadological system with moral certainty, but this is a fair point. I clarified my view on this on page 7 and have rewritten the other passages accordingly.
Comment 13: p. 7: “We can deliberate what we know with certainty.” Strange phrase, it is not clear what is meant. Is something other than “deliberation” (i.e. weighing pros and cons before taking a decision) meant here? It doesn’t seem to make sense to weigh the pros and cons of, or deliberate about what is certain.
Response 13: Yes, that is nonsensical and I have no idea what I actually wanted to write here, but it is rewritten.
Reviewer 2 Report
Comments and Suggestions for Authors1. Add comma after "should" on line 54.
2. I'm not sure that it's obviously true that pre-established harmony is analogous to the existence of God and the immortality of the soul in the sense that we can have genuine knowledge of all of them by proof. In the New System he merely says that pre-established harmony is "entirely possible". That doesn't strike me as the certainty he gets from the other proofs. See AG 144.
3. What does "its" refer to on line 101?
4. What is "accidental ignorance" on line 114?
5. I would suggest rewording from line 124-line 134. This bit was confusing to follow.
6. What does Leibniz mean by "created reason" on line 149? Does this undercut your claim about the mysteries being outside the scope of reason altogether such that they are worthy of tolerance? More needs to be said about the relationship about being "learned but not understood."
7. What does "them" refer to at line 153?
8. What do you mean by "necessity" on line 159? That's a pretty loaded term in Leibniz and I'm not sure how you're using it here.
9. What does "they" refer to on line 159?
10. What does "This" refer to on line 189?
11. "Leibniz" should be "Leibniz's" on line 194.
12. There's a missing word on line 201. "They cannot BE known..."
13. "Here, beliefs above reason and reason meet." on line 356 is awkward and confusing. Consider rewording.
14. Perhaps number the two prongs on line 360 for clarity.
15. What does "this" mean on line 442?
16. What does "it" refer to on line 492?
17. Most of these issues are easy to address, but there is one broader point to consider. The vast majority of what you suggest about the mysteries and toleration comes from the New Essays and the correspondence with Des Bosses. But those specific writings are written with a particular audience in mind, and I wonder whether the epistemological point is represented in Leibniz's writings beyond those texts. You can make your conclusion about toleration much stronger if you can find evidence beyond these texts. If not, the conclusion is quite narrow--based on such and such that Locke said, Leibniz has this point to make about toleration. Do we see the "above reason" elsewhere? In what context? Certainly, we see the "according to reason", and "opposition to reason" all over the place. But I wonder if "above reason" is just used in his dialectic with Locke and whether it is reserved for mysteries or if there is more going on elsewhere because, as you say early in the paper, it seems to conflict with his commitment to the utter intelligibility of the world. This is especially true given that Leibniz thinks created substances are analogous to divine substance in terms of knowledge--every substance has perceptions and knowledge of the entire universe, although some are more "confused" than others. Presumably the mysteries aren't mysteries to God, so are they mysteries to created substances merely by being "confused perceptions"?
*Great paper though. Really interesting. Can't wait to see the final draft. Keep up the good work!!!*
Author Response
Thank you for your insightful comments and careful reading of the draft.
Comment 1: 1. Add comma after "should" on line 54.
Response 1: Done.
Comment 2. I'm not sure that it's obviously true that pre-established harmony is analogous to the existence of God and the immortality of the soul in the sense that we can have genuine knowledge of all of them by proof. In the New System he merely says that pre-established harmony is "entirely possible". That doesn't strike me as the certainty he gets from the other proofs. See AG 144.
Response 2: I agree that they are different to the degree of certainty we can achieve, but I also think that he considers it to be morally certain and that it constitutes genuine knowledge. I make this point now clearer later in the text – but I also think that the New System gives an indication that Leibniz considers it to be a bit more than a hypothesis as he says in the second to last “on peut dire que c’est quelque chose de plus qu’une hypothèse”.
Comment 3. What does "its" refer to on line 101?
Response 3: Was meant to refer to ‘truth above reason’ but is rewritten.
Comment 4. What is "accidental ignorance" on line 114?
Response 4: I mean the kind of ignorance that is not necessary but rather due to circumstance, e.g. limitations on our organs of perception. I have phrased it now as ‘coincidental ignorance’ – that might be better as it might not evoke the technical notion of ‘accident’?
Comment 5. I would suggest rewording from line 124-line 134. This bit was confusing to follow.
Response 5: I tried to take it apart a bit more so it becomes clearer.
Comment 6. What does Leibniz mean by "created reason" on line 149? Does this undercut your claim about the mysteries being outside the scope of reason altogether such that they are worthy of tolerance? More needs to be said about the relationship about being "learned but not understood."
Response 6: Given the context and the phrasing, I think that understood means here ‘amenable to a priori proof’. I’ve added this now in the passage after the quote – but I also do not think that mysteries are completely outside the scope of reason and say that in this passage too – after all, we must have some understanding of them and they are accessible to some reasoning.
Comment 7. What does "them" refer to at line 153?
Response 7: Propositions of faith, clarified now
Comment 8. What do you mean by "necessity" on line 159? That's a pretty loaded term in Leibniz and I'm not sure how you're using it here.
Response 8: Leibniz seems to hold that there is a limited set of propositions of faith that we can have absolute certainty of because they admit of a priori proof – it is those that he talks about in this context. But I’ve changed the phrasing.
Comment 9. What does "they" refer to on line 159?
Response 9: Mysteries – clarified.
Comment 10. What does "This" refer to on line 189?
Response 10: Clarified by replacing ‘this means that’ with ‘thus’
Comment 11. "Leibniz" should be "Leibniz's" on line 194.
Response 11: Absolutely. Done.
Comment 12. There's a missing word on line 201. "They cannot BE known..."
Response 12: Absolutely. Done.
Comment 13. "Here, beliefs above reason and reason meet." on line 356 is awkward and confusing. Consider rewording.
Response 13: Done.
Comment 14. Perhaps number the two prongs on line 360 for clarity.
Response14: I think the second prong was never clearly spelled out, so I rectified that (along with additions asked for by the other reviewer)
Comment 15. What does "this" mean on line 442?
Response 15: Rephrased as ‘according to the view proposed here’
Comment 16. What does "it" refer to on line 492?
Response 16: Rephrased as ‘this passage’
- Most of these issues are easy to address, but there is one broader point to consider. The vast majority of what you suggest about the mysteries and toleration comes from the New Essays and the correspondence with Des Bosses. But those specific writings are written with a particular audience in mind, and I wonder whether the epistemological point is represented in Leibniz's writings beyond those texts. You can make your conclusion about toleration much stronger if you can find evidence beyond these texts. If not, the conclusion is quite narrow--based on such and such that Locke said, Leibniz has this point to make about toleration. Do we see the "above reason" elsewhere? In what context? Certainly, we see the "according to reason", and "opposition to reason" all over the place. But I wonder if "above reason" is just used in his dialectic with Locke and whether it is reserved for mysteries or if there is more going on elsewhere because, as you say early in the paper, it seems to conflict with his commitment to the utter intelligibility of the world. This is especially true given that Leibniz thinks created substances are analogous to divine substance in terms of knowledge--every substance has perceptions and knowledge of the entire universe, although some are more "confused" than others. Presumably the mysteries aren't mysteries to God, so are they mysteries to created substances merely by being "confused perceptions"?
Response 17: This is a tough one. Firstly, strictly speaking, I draw mainly from NE, Des Bosses and the Theodicy – including the Theodicy seems to me to widen significantly the possible audience. Also, and I don’t want to put too much weight on this, but I think it is worth mentioning: The discussions with Des Bosses were intended as a basis for an exposition of Leibniz’s view by Des Bosses, so I think that they were intended for a broader audience than we might be tempted to assume. I have thought about this at great length and for quite some time and I think that there is a case to be made that the limited point of this paper can be extended. But that has to do predominantly with his metaphysics and his view on composition/constitution and the epistemological considerations ensuing from these metaphysical considerations, rather than, strictly speaking, his philosophy of religion. I think this is already entailed in the paper as I argue that while the terminology of ‘above reason’ is present explicitly and in great detail predominantly in the Theodicy and the New Essays, analogous reasoning (without the words, but I think sufficiently similar to extend these terms) not only in the correspondence with Des Bosses, but also in his response to Tournemine. In fact, I think it is present in several other writings too, but discussing that would go far beyond of the scope of this paper – which indeed has a more limited claim, but – I think – also a clearer and more solid claim.
