Dulia or Latria: Revisiting the Catholic Missionaries’ View on Guishen in Late Ming and Early Qing

Abstract

Angels and guishen 鬼神, as entities distinct from humans, hold great importance in Chinese and Judaeo-Christian cultures, respectively. Since they share similar roles in providing moral guidance, Jesuit missionaries attempted to identify angels with the guishen to facilitate the introduction of the Catholic cult of angels to China. However, as the Chinese reverence for guishen differed somewhat from the Catholic cult of angels, this identification posed significant doctrinal questions. This article uses the issue of reverence for guishen to review the missionaries’ different understandings and interpretations of Chinese guishen. By distinguishing three different attitudes and positions towards Chinese guishen, it shows that both sides, adhering to their respective cultural centers, are unable to resolve the debates on these spirits, whether interpreting the West through Chinese perspectives, as “Sinicizing Christianity” 以儒化耶, or interpreting China through Western perspectives, as “Christianizing Confucianism” 以耶化儒. Therefore, this article argues that although the controversies over the nature and reverence of guishen between China and the West are unavoidable, there is still common ground in their understanding of sacred existence. As demonstrated by the missionaries’ recognition, interpretation, and understanding of Chinese guishen at different times, it reveals the inherent tension between Chinese and Western cultures.

1. Introduction

Angels, as pure spiritual beings created by God, precede human beings in the order of creation. The question of how to honor angels has plagued many theologians since the early Church. St Paul the Apostle did not explicitly distinguish between the rituals to God, angels, and saints. However, during the Reformation, Protestant Christianity raised strong objections to Catholic reverence towards saints, arguing that such a cult had no basis in Scripture. To respond to the challenges of the Reformation, the Roman Catholic Church convened the Council of Trent in 1563, confirming the difference between the “worship” (latria) of God and the “veneration” (dulia) of angels and saints, while affirming the legitimacy of both practices.1 They believed that the former was a sacred worship ritual, while the latter was an ordinary religious ritual. Furthermore, the difference between the two is a fundamental distinction rather than a difference in degree. Therefore, the existence of the two rituals is not contradictory, and they can even complement each other. When Christians “venerate” saints or angels (dulia), it is not a superstitious act violating the commandments. On the contrary, they express their beliefs that the saints and angels are more closely related to one’s daily life than God.

At the end of the 16th century, the Jesuit missionaries who entered China also held this position, believing that the Chinese shangdi 上帝 was the same as the Western God, and that guishen were angels or deceased saints. While some missionaries criticized the Chinese ritual of sacrificing guishen as a superstitious religious ceremony, belonging to latria, that should be forbidden, others considered such rituals to be an ordinary religious ritual, belonging to dulia, that should be allowed. The different views among missionaries on this issue also affected the intense debate between the East and the West on liturgical issues. Unlike the one-sided theoretical discussions on the nature of ghosts and spirits by other scholars, this article attempts to understand the views and significance of Chinese guishen by examining the discussions on the veneration of ghosts and spirits by Catholic missionaries in Late Ming and Early Qing.

2. Ricci’s Adaptive Attitude to the Chinese Veneration of Guishen as Spirits or Angels

The exchange between China and the West during the Late Ming and Early Qing is considered a model of cultural interaction, with missionaries preaching Christian doctrine through the use of Confucian classics. However, during their studies, they not only discovered the basic compatibility between Confucianism and Christianity but also realized the conflicts regarding many issues. In particular, when it came to the opposing concepts of “matter” and “spirit”, it was even more difficult for both parties to reach a consensus. For missionaries, to take a stance on Aristotelian and scholastic philosophy was natural, teaching the theory of hylomorphism. For Chinese people, however, it was quite challenging due to the traditional Confucian theory of “the unity of heaven and man” (天人合一).2 As Cheng Yi 程頤 said, “Heaven, earth, and humanity, are all interconnected.” (天，地，人，只一道也。). It is believed that all things in the world follow a single principle, which Zhu Xi 朱熹 also referred to as Li 理.

The conflict between the two cultures has also extended to their views on the issue of spirits. Most missionaries acknowledged that Neo-Confucianism was influenced by Buddhism and deviated from the orthodox tradition of ancient Confucianism. Even Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), who is known for accommodating Confucianism, advocated for distinguishing between ancient Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism. He opposed the latter’s material or psychological explanations for spirits and believed that the Song Confucians’ interpretation of spirits did not align with the expressions found in ancient classics.3

Nevertheless, Ricci chose to accept the ancient Chinese belief in guishen, believing that this could help the Chinese people better understand some Christian concepts such as the immortality of the soul and the Last Judgment.4 However, Ricci did not fully accept Chinese guishen but attempted to reinterpret them through Western traditions and to make them conform to Christian beliefs.5 In The True Meaning of The Lord of Heaven 天主實義 (1603), Ricci mentioned guishen more than 50 times, with abundant quotes from Chinese literature to prove the ancient belief in the existence of guishen and the ancient belief in theism. He believed that in ancient China, “there was no one who did not worship guishen, especially for important matters concerning the emperor and the nobles.” (無不以祭祀鬼神，為天子諸侯重事) (Ricci 2016, p. 143). Furthermore, in the chart called “Diagram of the Kind of Beings” 物宗圖類, Ricci showed the Chinese people that all things were created by God, dividing them into “accident” 依賴者 and “substance” 自立者 and further dividing the “substance” into “those things that have a body “有形物 and “those things that are pure forms” 無形物 with two categories under “pure forms”: 1. “good things, such as pertaining to the heavenly spirits” (或善如天神屬) and 2. “evil things, such as pertaining to the evil spirits” (或惡如魔鬼屬) (Ricci 2016, p. 158). Clearly, Ricci wanted to use Chinese culture to introduce the Christian doctrine of angels and demons. According to his explanation, guishen are equivalent to angels and demons in Christianity, with shen 神 referring to tianshen 天神, specifically meaning “good angels”, and gui 鬼 referring to mogui 魔鬼, meaning “fallen angels”.

However, Ricci’s approach led to many problems, the most difficult of which was how to legitimize the behavior of ancient Chinese people sacrificing to guishen (including deceased relatives and some Confucian sages). In addition, it is well-known that the Chinese have had the custom of ancestor worship since the Shang dynasty, and it can even be said that this belief in ancestor spirits as the object of worship has been a key link in maintaining the patriarchal social system of ancient China for thousands of years.6 For Ricci, to show respect to guishen is unambiguous: “to be loyal, that is, not to have a second (lord in their mind)” (忠也者，無二之謂也) (Ricci 2016, p. 32), believing that the only true god who rules over heaven, earth, and all things is the Christian God. Therefore, he accepted the Chinese people’s reverence for guishen. However, this reverence cannot be equated with the “worship” (latria) of the divine nature of God but can only be an ordinary religious “veneration” (dulia). Although Ricci did not specifically distinguish between different forms of rituals, his emphasis on the supreme position of God indicates a special reverence for God.

Ricci’s adaptation strategy, which sought common ground while respecting differences, effectively grasped the tension between Chinese and Western cultures and played a crucial role in the early spread of Catholicism in China. However, perhaps due to an excessive compromise with Chinese culture, Ricci’s strategy may also lead to the deviation of Christianity to some extent during the Late Ming and Early Qing. This change has even been considered by many researchers as a departure from the purpose of Christianity, which some scholars have referred to as “Confucian Monotheism”7 儒家一神論, pointing out that the core faith of Chinese Christians in Late Ming and Early Qing ignored important Catholic doctrines. However, we still need to note that Ricci was not neglectful in discussing other Catholic doctrines. Such choices were the inevitable results of the process of transmission and adaptation between different cultures. Regarding Catholic concepts that were challenging within the Chinese intellectual tradition, such as the Trinity, Ricci employed a gradual strategy. He initially focused on the common values and ethical principles of Christianity, engaging deeply in philosophical and religious discussions with Chinese scholars. Once the Chinese scholars accepted the basic tenets of Christianity and showed a willingness to delve deeper into doctrinal matters, Ricci gradually introduced more profound theological concepts. This approach not only demonstrated Ricci’s respect and understanding of Chinese culture but also showcased his strategic wisdom in cultural dialogue. Likewise, it allowed Christianity to integrate to some extent into local culture in China, marking an important chapter in the history of Christianity’s development in China.

3. Pantoja and Vagnone’s Distinction between Guishen and Shengui 神鬼 as Angels

Diego de Pantoja (1571–1618) and Alfonso Vagnone (1566–1640) agreed with Ricci’s comparison of Chinese guishen with Christian angels. They, respectively, wrote Shengui yuanshi 神鬼原始 (1610–1618) and Shengui zhengji 神鬼正紀 (1633), which further explored the similarities between the two. Nonetheless, they also noticed the differences between guishen and angels. Pantoja coined the term shengui 神鬼 to distinguish angels from Chinese spirits. This change was also accepted by the Jesuits who came after, such as Vagnone who used it in Shengui zhengji. Similarly, Ludovico Buglio (1606–1682) also used this translation in his book Chaoxing xueyao 超性學要 (1676), referring to angels as both shengui and tianshen 天神 (Buglio 2017, p. 487).

When discussing angels in Shengui yuanshi, Pantoja largely avoided direct reference to the Chinese spirits. Instead, he chose to introduce a completely different concept of angels and demons to the Chinese people, distinct from traditional Chinese beliefs. For example, within the twenty questions discussing angels in the text, he did not mention Chinese traditional beliefs about guishen (Pantoja 2014, p. 293). There are five questions specifically discussing guardian angels, in which he implicitly distinguished them from traditional Chinese spirits by discussing their origin, the conflict between angelic guardianship and the omnipotence of God, the relationship between angelic guardianship and human suffering, and how human beings should venerate angels. Pantoja began by saying, “God created heaven and earth; the most spiritual among the invisible beings is called angels, and the most spiritual among all the visible beings is called human beings”. (天主造成天地，萬匯中無形之最靈曰神，有形之最靈曰人) (Pantoja 2014, p. 293). He pointed out that angels, like humans, were created by God, clearly defining the nature of angels as created beings. Then, he said: “Between heaven and earth, both minor details and major events are under God’s control. If God desires to conceal subtle matters to show people, or to manifest extraordinary signs, He assigns celestial spirits to carry out His will, adjusting their actions according to the urgency and significance of the matter. These spirits vary in rank, from higher to lower”. （蓋覆載之間，無日無處不藉神功，至如天主或欲以隱埋微事示人，或現為非常顯異，則分命天神，奉行其旨，據事小大緩急所使，其神亦上下品之不等也） (Pantoja 2014, p. 296). This explains that angels are entrusted by God to protect humanity, and therefore they are lower in rank than God but higher than humans. In the fifth question, when asked how humans should venerate angels, Pantoja replied, “All the merits of guarding and protecting humans are only to be offered to God according to His command”. (神守之功種種，如是惟以奉天主命耳) (Pantoja 2014, p. 300). He attributed the achievements of guarding and protecting humans to God, implying His supreme position. Therefore, Pantoja pointed out that humans should “serve God with a loving heart, believe in the words of God, follow the commandments of God, pray for the blessings of God, and give thanks for the grace of God”. (以愛慕之心奉事天主，實信主言，恪遵主戒，祈望主祐，答謝主恩) (Pantoja 2014, p. 300), so as to repay the grace and protection of God. Through Pantoja’s introduction, not only is it clear that angels, like humans, are essentially created beings, but he also explains why people show reverence to angels, which is fundamentally due to gratitude for God’s grace.

Compared to the Shengui yuanshi, Vagnone’s Shengui zhengji contains a more detailed introduction to Christian angelology.8 The book is divided into four volumes and twenty-five chapters. In the very beginning of the first volume, Vagnone emphasizes the non-material attributes of angels in their essence, stating: “The so-called shengui are formless and colorless, with no beginning or end, and their entire substance is spiritual”. (所謂神鬼者，乃無形無色，有始無終，靈明全體也) (Vagnone 2014, p. 169). Unlike Pantoja, Vagnone’s primary goal was to explicitly distinguish Christian angels from the guishen under the Neo-Confucianism Theory of Qi 气. Therefore, he pointed out: “Those who regard spirits as the Qi of Yin 阴 and Yang 阳, as well as the manifestations of creation (造化之跡), have yet to grasp the true nature of spirits. For Qi and Ji 迹 are both stagnant and lack vitality. How can they be worthy of the names of shengui, and how can they exhibit the effects of spiritual enlightenment? Furthermore, it is known among the ignorant that ‘when a person dies, the soul transforms into a shen or gui’, but this is not the case. For the nature of humans and guishen are vastly different, how then can they transform into one another?” (凡以神鬼為陰陽之氣，造化之跡諸說，皆未獲神鬼之正義者也。蓋氣與跡，均滯而不靈，焉能神鬼之名號，且施靈明之效耶？又知愚俗所雲 ‘人亡則靈魂變神變鬼者’，非也。蓋人與神鬼二性，既大相懸，安能相變以致？) (Vagnone 2014, p. 170). By criticizing the Song Confucians’ explanation of guishen based on qi, Vagnone opposes the spiritual angels of the West to the material guishen of China. This view is obviously influenced by some Jesuit predecessors, such as Ricci, who once pointed out: “The so-called ‘two primary forces, yin and yang’, ‘innate ability’, ‘traces of the production of things’, ‘contractions and extensions of qi氣 are not the spiritual beings referred to in the canonical writings”. (所謂二氣良能，造化之跡，氣之屈伸，非諸經所指之鬼神也) (Ricci 2016, p. 120). Vagnone believed that explaining guishen with Qi deviates from the original intention of ancient Confucianism.

After clarifying that angels are spiritual entities, Vagnone began systematically introducing the functions of the Western angels. In Chapter 7 in vol. 4, he mentioned the topic of honoring angels and pointed out that since people are protected by angels, they should not only physically honor the angels but also deeply appreciate their blessings from the bottom of their hearts. (以心虔誠信愛，以言篤實稱譽，以行恭慤敬事，無間無怠) (Vagnone 2014, pp. 287–89).

Vagnone pointed out that due to the protection of angels, people should show respect and reverence towards them. Not only should there be physical veneration, but also gratitude from the depths of the heart for the blessings of angels. However, this does not imply that angels have the same status as God. In Chapter 3 in vol. 4 of Vagnone’s work, the concept of fallen angels is introduced. It is explicitly stated that the angel Lucifer, due to the sin of pride, sought to enjoy equal status with God and to accept worship from humans, thus suffering punishment and being cast down to Hell.

In summary, we can see that on the one hand, Pantoja and Vagnone seem to inherit Ricci’s “adaptation strategy” of incorporating Confucianism into Christianity as they continue to seek a rational common ground between angels and guishen.9 Nonetheless, Pantoja and Vagnone keenly perceived the differences between the two, from the fundamental distinction that guishen clearly cannot be equated with angels. Therefore, Pantoja and Vagnone did not completely follow Ricci’s strategy. Compared to the traditional Chinese approach of direct conversation, they placed more emphasis on the introduction of Western learning. As pointed out by Wang Ge 王格, Pantoja and Vagnone seem to deliberately avoid discussing the Confucian belief in guishen, instead using shengui as a starting point to implant Christian angelology into Chinese tradition as being responsible for rewarding good and punishing evil to guide people’s moral life (Wang 2021, pp. 65–80). Furthermore, according to the opinions of Pantoja and Vagnone, the rationality of respecting guishen lies in equating them with Western angels. Therefore, in their view, Chinese people can venerate guishen under certain conditions (using dulia), but they cannot equate guishen with the Creator (using latria).

Indeed, Pantoja and Vagnone became more aware that the Christian angels and the Chinese guishen obey very different metaphysical systems and therefore have different functions. In Christian metaphysics, angels are creatures of God, and their function is to transmit God’s will to human beings. In contrast, the guishen are made of Qi, and their function is to manifest it.

4. The Rebuttals of Ruggieri, Longobardo, and Caballero against the Chinese Belief in Spirits

Meanwhile, there were also some missionaries who rejected views that adapted to Confucianism, such as those of Ricci, Pantoja, and Vagnone. Among the earliest Jesuit missionaries to enter China, almost concurrently with Matteo Ricci, was Michele Ruggieri (1543–1607), an Italian Jesuit. He did not differentiate between “worship” and “veneration”, instead considering the Chinese practices of sacrificing spirits, divination, and fortune-telling as disrespectful to God. He said, “Some may say: If there are so many things that are disrespectful to God, then when can one speak of disobedience? The answer is: There are four sins of disobedience. One is to venerate the heaven, earth, sun, moon, and various spirits. The second is to believe in ominous dreams and signs of good or bad luck. The third is to choose auspicious days and times for events. The fourth is to believe in divination and fortune-telling.” (或曰：不敬天主，果有幾多事情，然後謂之違誡？答曰：違誡之罪有四。敬其天地日月，及諸鬼神，罪之一也；信其夜夢不祥，而吉兇有兆，罪之二也。尋擇日辰而用事，罪之三也。信其占蔔卦術，罪之四也。) (Ruggieri 2002, pp. 69–70). He regarded Chinese rituals of sacrificing spirits and divination as superstition and idolatry, advocating for their abandonment, stating, “People may perform sacrificial rituals to gods of heaven and earth, the sun, moon, stars, wind, clouds, thunder, and rain, or they may perform sacrificial rituals to evil spirits; all these people disrespect the Lord of Heaven.” (世人或祭拜天地，日月，星辰，風雲雷雨之神，或祀邪神，皆是不敬天主。) (Ruggieri 2002, pp. 62–63). Ruggieri evidently recognized that the essential difference between “worship” and “veneration” lay in the object of reverence rather than in formalities. In his view, any worship of spirits other than God implied equating them with the Creator. Therefore, he considered worshipping spirits as applicable to neither dulia nor to latria, but rather as a form of superstition. However, in reality, in Chinese tradition, these rituals are often performed as commemorative ceremonies to express mourning for the deceased.10

Niccolò Longobardo (1565–1654) was also a prominent opponent who disagreed with Ricci’s accommodation of Confucianism. Upon assuming Ricci’s position as superior of the mission, Longobardo immediately initiated investigations into key controversies between Christianity and Confucianism. Under the title A Brief Response on the Controversies over Shangdi, Tianshen and Linghun, he wrote a report systematically refuting misunderstandings of certain core Catholic concepts by Chinese Christians influenced by the accommodation strategy. In chapters 11 and 12 of the report, Longobardo discussed the Chinese perspective on guishen. He believed that Chinese intellectuals did not actually believe in the existence of guishen but used them as a means to govern the people.

First, Longobardo pointed out that Confucianism 儒教 actually has a dual doctrine: one layer is concealed, known only to the wise, advocating atheism; the other layer is superficial, targeting ordinary people, and characterized by religious superstition. Moreover, under this dual doctrine, the existence of guishen is also divided into two types: one pertains to the spirits governing the generation and extinction of all things; the other pertains to the spirits used for sacrificial purposes. The former are termed “philosophical spirits”, representing the natural causes of generation and destruction in the universe, while the latter are “civil spirits”, utilized by scholars to control people (Longobardo 2021, pp. 147–48). This dual doctrine is also evident in Longobardo’s interpretation of guishen. He believed that only ordinary people truly believe in the existence of guishen, while the wise merely exploit their ability to reward good and punish evil to deceive the common folk.

Furthermore, Longobardo believed that Chinese literati believed in a metaphysical principle responsible for the growth and operation of all things, which they referred to as Taiji 太極. Within Taiji, there is an inseparable relationship between Li 理 and Qi. He viewed their relationship akin to the Western tradition’s prime matter and coeval quantity. (Longobardo. A Brief Response on the Controversies over Shangdi, Tianshen and Linghun. p. 140). Additionally, Longobardo pointed out that Li and Qi play crucial roles in Chinese cosmogony: the former being the cause of all things’ generation and the latter constituting the material of all things. However, Longobardo further elucidated that Taiji, Li, and Qi all essentially represent a form of primordial Air (Longobardo 2021, p. 142), thus implying that within Chinese cosmogony, there lies an underlying atheism.

Thirdly, Longobardo pointed out that the ancient Chinese people had different ways of showing reverence to various gods (zhu 主, zhuzai 主宰, shen 神, guishen 鬼神, di 帝, or jun 君). For instance, they offered lei 酹 to Shangdi;11 performed yin 禋 to the spirits governing the four seasons, the sun, the moon, and the stars; they made wang 望 to the spirits of mountains, rivers, and streams; and they used divination bian 籩 for other spirits and ancient sages (Longobardo 2021, p. 142). Longobardo did not agree that the Chinese concept of Shangdi could be equated with the Christian notion of God, nor did he believe that Chinese guishen were equivalent to angels. He argued that Chinese guishen would return to Li and Taiji at the end of the world, emphasizing that they were merely material elements, as mentioned earlier.

In Longobardo’s view, Chinese rituals were essentially a continuation of ancient traditions, and ordinary Chinese people often did not consider the object and reason for their sacrifices. Moreover, he believed that Confucian scholars did not believe in anything apart from Li and Qi. Therefore, Longobardo praised Chinese literati for not actually believing in the existence of the gods of popular religion, asserting that they only acknowledged a primordial source, namely Li and Taiji, and that their descriptions of gods and other spirits were merely metaphorical expressions (Longobardo 2021, pp. 147–48).

Regarding the ritual of worshipping natural gods in popular religion, Longobardo believed it was merely a tool for the intellectual elite to exert control over the people. Selective worship of certain natural gods (such as those of mountains and rivers) was done for the convenience of the common people’s understanding. This was because Taiji, being the most hidden concept, was not easily comprehensible to ordinary individuals. Therefore, the rituals participated in by Chinese literati appeared more like political acts rather than religious ceremonies (Longobardo 2021, p. 160).

Apart from the challenges within the Society of Jesus, there were also differing opinions from other orders of priests who entered mainland China during the same period. Among them, the most representative figures include the Spanish Franciscan friar Antonio de Santa María Caballero (1602–1669), as well as the Spanish Dominican friars Fernández Navarrete (1610–1689) and Juan Bautista Morales (1597–1664).

In 1633, Antonio de Santa María Caballero traveled from Taiwan to Fu’an 福安 in Fujian 福建 for missionary work. Shortly after arriving in Fu’an, he engaged in discussions with a Chinese scholar, Wang Dadou 王达窦, and upon investigating Chinese funeral rituals firsthand, he immediately contacted Juan Bautista Morales, who was also engaged in missionary work in Fujian, to report to Rome about the Jesuits’ tolerance towards Chinese ancestral and Confucian rites (Li 2019, pp. 24–25).

The reports of Caballero and Morales quickly caused controversy in Rome. In 1640, Morales even traveled alone to Rome to personally present the issue of the idol worship of Confucius and ancestors by Chinese Christians. On 12 September 1654, the Sacred Congregation de Propagation Fide, based on Morales’s testimony, issued a decree titled “ For the Future Memory of the Matter” (Ad futuram rei memoriam), stating that Chinese Christians should refuse to participate in ceremonies venerating ancestors and Confucius until further notice (St. Sure and Malatesta 2001, pp. 1–8).

Although Caballero did not accompany Morales to Rome, he authored three works in Chinese, demonstrating to the Chinese people that the only entity worthy of worship is the Supreme Ruler—God. He emphasized that idol worship is futile, and he expounded on the key virtues of faith, hope, and charity in the Christian faith.12

Indeed, Caballero’s stance on Chinese tradition was complex. Initially, while he opposed the practice of Chinese Christians worshipping ancestors and Confucius, he still retained some level of support for Matteo Ricci’s strategy. For instance, in his works such as Wanwu benmo yueyan 萬物本末約言 (1650–1653), Tianru yin 天儒印 (1664), and Zhengxue liushi 正學镠石 (1698),13 Caballero upheld Ricci’s approach of collaborating with ancient Confucianism to counteract the influence of Neo-Confucianism.

The discussion on the issue of guishen in Wanwu benmo yueyan mainly revolves around two points: firstly, it explicitly states that God is the creator of all things, including guishen or tianshen, emphasizing that “God is the primal source of heaven, earth, gods, humans, and all things.” (天主者，天地神人萬物之大本原也。) (Caballero 2002, p. 320). Secondly, it elucidates the essence of monotheism in Christianity, asserting that the object of worship can only be God, stating that “from the creation of heaven and earth to the present day, worship can only be directed towards the Lord of all.” (祭禮從開辟天地以至於今，獨可用之於萬有之主也。) (Caballero 2002, p. 318).

Furthermore, Caballero briefly touches upon the issue of fallen angels, mentioning that those angels who remain faithful to God reside in heaven, enjoying infinite glory and blessings, while those who are proud and turn away from God fall into hell, enduring endless suffering (Caballero 2002, p. 322). Additionally, he believes that those who do not adhere to the commandments and do not acknowledge God will suffer endless torment in hell alongside the fallen angels.

It is worth noting that Caballero rejects the traditional Chinese practice of referring to deceased individuals as gui, stating, “In this world, the deceased are called gui, but in reality, they are not. ”(今世於已死之人稱之為鬼，其實不然。) (Caballero 2013a, pp. 119–20). However, perhaps due to limitations in the text’s length, Caballero does not elaborate on the reasons for this assertion here, reserving a more detailed discussion for Zhengxue liushi.

In Tianru yin, Caballero also compares Chinese guishen with Western angels. He disagrees with the notion in the Zhongyong 中庸 that guishen possess virtue (鬼神之為德), asserting instead that gui and shen not only exist as distinct entities but also differ in their morality.14 Firstly, he states, “In general, anything that is formless and silent but possesses a spiritual body is collectively referred to as guishen.” 渾言之，凡無形無聲而具靈體者，總稱曰鬼神。) (Caballero 2013a, p. 120), clarifying that guishen are spiritual beings without physical form. He then elaborates, “When differentiated, the righteous are called shen, which are the heavenly spirits mentioned in the sacred teachings, while the evil ones are called gui, which are the demons mentioned in the sacred teachings.” (分言之，則正者謂神，即聖教所雲天神是；邪者謂鬼，即聖教所雲魔鬼是) (Caballero 2013a, p. 120). This indicates that within the category of guishen, the righteous ones are referred to as shen, akin to angels, while the evil ones are referred to as gui, akin to demons. Caballero interprets the concept of guishen in China through the lens of Christian theology regarding angels and demons, rejecting the blanket interpretation of Chinese tradition regarding guishen, stating, “Demons are demons, angels are angels; by distinguishing between good and evil, the judgment is clear, rather than mixing them together indiscriminately.” (鬼自鬼，神自神，別其邪正，則判然矣，烏容並列而混稱之也) (Caballero 2013a, p. 120). Additionally, he reiterates in the text that angels are essentially created beings and distinguishes them from God, the perfect creator, stating that although angels are the purest spiritual beings, they are still ultimately finite in nature and cannot be considered infinite (終屬有限，不可謂之盡) (Caballero 2013a, p. 120).

In Zhengxue liushi, Caballero dedicates a chapter to the debate on the worship of ancestral spirits (釋鬼神祭祀之辯), aiming to refute the Neo-Confucian view on spirits. He sees Neo-Confucian explanations of spirits as not only confused (諸論紛紜) but also fundamentally flawed (均無當焉) (Caballero 2013b, pp. 170–71). First, he counters the Neo-Confucian notion that “spirits are traces of creation.”(鬼神者，造化之跡也) (Cheng and Cheng 1981, p. 705). This idea originated from Cheng Yi’s commentary on the Zhongyong, which suggests that spirits are remnants of the universe’s creation. Caballero rejects this view, clearly stating that “spirits are also created beings” (鬼神亦屬受造者). He further asserts that “spirits are specially appointed by God to govern the movement of the heavens” (特是鬼神供命天主，使之運動諸天), suggesting that spirits, under God’s command, are responsible for the movement of celestial bodies, allowing rational beings to comprehend God’s power through the observation of celestial phenomena. (然而人不睹天主之玄妙，未始不窺天諸天之運動). Caballero explains that the significance of the term “traces of creation” (造化之迹) in Zhongyong is primarily to manifest the existence of God as the supreme being, stating, “Interpreting guishen as traces of creation is not knowing that guishen also manifest His footsteps, rather than creating a trace themselves.” (轍以鬼神為造化之跡，不知鬼神亦是彰顯其蹤，而非自創一跡也). Therefore, Caballero concludes, “Given this, there should be a debate on the Neo-Confucian assertion that spirits are traces of creation.” (釋此，而儒言鬼神便是造化者，當有辯焉), suggesting that the concept of “traces of creation” should be scrutinized and the authority of the creator behind it should be made clear (Caballero 2013b, p. 171).

Similarly, Caballero rejects the Neo-Confucian explanation of spirits based on Qi theory, stating, “When Qi is discussed in Catholicism, it is considered one of the four elements, along with water, fire, and earth.” (天學論氣者，四元行之一，與水火土等). He considers Qi as one of the four elements that constitute everything according to Greek philosophy, viewing it as a material element. He emphasizes, “Qi is Qi, and spirits are spirits.”(氣自氣，神自神). He asserts that spirits are created before Qi, and therefore, Qi cannot be considered as spirits. This indicates the fundamental difference between material Qi and spiritual spirits, and since spirits are created before Qi, the explanation of spirits based on Qi theory cannot be valid.15 (Caballero 2013b, p. 171).

Building upon the systematic criticism of Neo-Confucian theories of spirits, Caballero reintroduces the doctrine of good and evil angels in Catholicism. Although he had extensively discussed this doctrine in Wanwu benmo yueyan, here, he further clarifies the differences between God, angels, demons, and humans, stating, “Angels are angels, demons are demons, and humans are humans; they cannot be confused.” (神自神，鬼自鬼，即人亦自人，而不可以類混也). He points out the categorical differences between these entities, which, in his view, are essential distinctions. He asserts, “The nature of angels and demons is pure spiritual essence, which cannot be annihilated, unlike the human body, which is subject to birth and death.” (神鬼之體，為純神體，義不受滅，非若人類之形體，有生有死者比也). He also considers the dissolution of the human body after death not as death but as the dispersion of Qi, stating, “When alive, there is Qi; when dead, there is no Qi.” (生則有氣，死則便無氣矣). Therefore, although souls in paradise may “associate with good spirits” (與正神為伍) or “accompany evil demons” (與邪魔為儔) in hell, they are still neither “angels” nor “demons” (Caballero 2013b, p. 173).

After the comprehensive criticism of Neo-Confucian theories of spirits, Caballero shifts his focus to traditional Chinese rituals, considering the primary task of these rituals to be “to establish the proper rites, and only one deity should be established.” (厘定祀典，只定一尊) (Caballero 2013a, p. 318). His strategy is incremental: he first exposes the error of worshipping idols and false gods in Chinese culture, then advises that the only legitimate form of worship should be directed toward God. Like Ricci, Caballero chooses the strategy of collaborating with ancient Confucianism to counteract Neo-Confucianism, asserting that Catholic rituals are consistent with the requirements and regulations of ancient Chinese rituals, stating, “If one examines the classics and the counsels of the ancient emperors, they diligently extol the service of God, which was their initial intention.”(考諸帝典王謨，兢兢以昭事上帝為言，其初意未盡失也) (Caballero 2013b, p. 182). He believes that ancient China already had reverence for shangdi (God), and it was only due to misunderstandings of ancient rituals that people began to “worship everything” (無物弗祭) and “perform indiscriminate rituals” (無事弗祭), ultimately leading to “blasphemy and disorder” (瀆亂不經) (Caballero 2013b, p. 183).

Overall, Caballero’s attitude toward traditional Chinese beliefs in these three Chinese works remains consistent with that of Ricci and other Jesuits: he chooses to establish the legitimacy of Catholicism in China by collaborating with ancient Confucianism while simultaneously criticizing Neo-Confucianism for deviating from the original teachings of ancient Confucianism.

However, Caballero’s attitude underwent a radical change after reading Longobardo’s report in 1661, leading to a rupture with Ricci’s position. In the same year, he produced a “Declaration” (Declaratio), announcing his departure from Ricci’s position. In it, Caballero once again discusses the Chinese practice of ancestor worship, but this time he emphasizes the religious nature of such rituals. He believes that the Chinese practice of ancestor worship and Confucius worship cannot be considered as mere “veneration” (dulia) but should be viewed as religious “worship” (latria) ceremonies.16 As Daniel Canaris points out, Caballero had only a superficial understanding of the Chinese rituals of ancestor worship and Confucian rites, viewing them mostly from a Catholic perspective. Furthermore, the ancestor worship rituals that Caballero observed in Muyang 穆陽 do not represent all of China. Canaris points out that Chinese rituals are complex and have rich regional characteristics in practice. For example, even during the late Ming period, the ritual guidebook Jiali 家禮 by Zhu Xi, which held authoritative status at the time, was criticized for offending some local customs (Canaris 2023, pp. 40–60).

5. Conclusions

From the perspectives of those historical figures, we can elucidate the attitudes of Western missionaries who were active during the Late Ming and Early Qing towards Chinese ghosts, spirits, and rituals. Overall, these attitudes can be categorized into three stances. This difference in attitude is closely related to the development of the Catholic missionary process and is in line with what Standaert called the three phases of the eastward spread of Western learning, i.e., the spontaneous phase at the beginning (1582–1610), the systematic phase of introduction (c.1620–c.1630s), and the final subversive phase in which the missionaries attempted to replace Confucianism with the philosophy of Aristotle as the basis of the Chinese educational system (1678–1683) (Standaert 2003, p. 367). In contrast, the first stage of the eastward spread of Western angelology was dominated by the adaptive stance represented by Ricci. He advocated for understanding the Chinese guishen as Western angels and believed that Chinese guishen and Western angels shared similarities, both representing an existence beyond humanity and helping to regulate human behavior. Therefore, he did not reject the reverence shown by the Chinese towards guishen. Ricci did not interfere with Chinese rituals to ancestors and saints as he believed that the primary task of the Jesuits was to spread the Gospel in China. While the second stage of the spread was dominated by missionaries such as Pantoja and Vagnone, they represented another voice within the accommodating stance, recognizing the strategy of “Sinicizing Christianity” 以儒化耶 proposed by Ricci but also acknowledging the differences between the two cultures. Hence, they leaned more towards spreading Western knowledge rather than simply adhering to Confucianism. On the whole, the spread of angelology in these two phases remained moderate and gradual, and they were characterized, as Corsi points out, by the use or alteration of some terms from Chinese philosophy when the missionaries were spreading Western culture that had not existed in Chinese culture, so that it would be convenient enough to be acceptable to the Chinese intelligentsia (Corsi 2012, pp. 427–42).

Overall, the adaptation strategies employed by these early Jesuits still hold significant value when reassessed today. For example, during the late Qing Dynasty, Jesuit Angelo Zottoli (1826–1902) continued to use adaptation strategies in propagating Catholic doctrines. Despite adaptation no longer being the only option in his era, Zottoli’s choice echoed the early Jesuits’ method of using Confucian terminology to explain Catholic doctrines. This indicates that even nearly a century later, Confucian terminology continued to play an important role in the dissemination of Western knowledge.17

On the other hand, the views of missionaries such as Longobardo and Caballero represent a different attitude, marking a new phase in the spread of Catholicism in China, where Western culture encountered strong rejection from the local culture. Faced with this situation, they adhered to their Aristotelian philosophical background, employing a dualistic framework of “form” and “matter” to interpret Chinese traditions. They believed that the Confucian view of guishen, as presented in Song–Ming Confucianism, equated them with the materialist perspective, and considered the Chinese worship of spirits as idolatrous. These missionaries were determined to draw a clear line between themselves and Chinese Confucianism, rejecting the division between ancient and modern Confucianism and considering the Confucian view of guishen to be fundamentally materialistic. Although Longobardo’s views in some ways objectively reflected the continuity of Chinese thought, his misunderstanding of Song–Ming Confucianism and the excessive use of Aristotelianism made his theory one-sided.18

Furthermore, while missionaries held different positions on how to deal with Chinese rituals, there was no fundamental difference from the perspective of Catholic tradition. Equating guishen with angels was a result of the adaptation policy, but Longobardo’s views remind us that such an equivalence is not entirely accurate. However, Longobardo’s study of guishen also had its limitations since the question of whether shen were spiritual or material was approached from a Western perspective, and such understanding makes it difficult for both sides to achieve effective dialogue. Therefore, how should we handle the debates over guishen in the Sino–Western dialogues during the Ming and Qing dynasties? Li Tiangang offers an interesting perspective by distinguishing between the “teachings of Confucius” (周孔之教) and the “doctrine of Confucius and Mencius” (孔孟之道) in the Confucian tradition. He points out: “The former emphasizes a religious life characterized by ritual sacrifices, while the latter focuses on an ethical realm exemplified by discussions on human nature and morality. The former advocates practical implementation, while the latter is considered abstruse and empty talk. The former reaches the grassroots populace, while the latter is limited to the scholar-official class.” (Li 2017, p. 175). Building on this, Li Tiangang suggests that we should rethink the historical research on Sino–Western exchanges during the Ming and Qing dynasties. Besides focusing on the debates between scholar-officials and missionaries on philosophical principles, we should also pay attention to the dialogues between Christianity and Chinese folk beliefs. As Meynard pointed out, the debate over guishen between China and the West may not be about their essence, but rather about the roles guishen play in rituals (Mei 2018, pp. 110–15). From the debates about guishen and angels, we can still see the space and foundation for dialogue between China and the West, namely their reflections on transcendent forces.