How Did Chinese Buddhists Incorporate Indian Metaphors? A Study of Lushan Huiyuan’s Use of Firewood–Fire Metaphors in the Shadow of Indian Canons
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. The Firewood–Fire Metaphor and Pudgala in Wei-Jin Translated Buddhist Scriptures
2.1. The Firewood–Fire Metaphor Observed in the Āgamas Translated during the Wei-Jin Period
Just as when a fire is burning, [if] no more firewood is added, [it will] cease. Without firewood, the fire does not continue, this fire is said to be extinguished. 猶如然火熾,不益薪則止,無薪火不傳,此火謂之滅。(T01. 26.608c26–27)
If there is a fire kindled before me, lit due to the conditions of firewood and grass, if no more firewood is added, the fire will then extinguish forever, never to arise again... matter has already ceased and is known, sensations, perceptions, volitions, and consciousness have already ceased and are known... 若有於我前然火,薪草因緣故然,若不增薪,火則永滅,不復更起,東方、南方、西方、北方去者,是則不然……色已斷已知,受、想、行、識已斷已知…(T02. 99. 246a3–10)
[Our Buddha has] transcended all celestial beings, Asuras, dragons, and yakshas, has established the inexhaustible Dharma, and the Buddha’s work is now complete. Having achieved peace and extinction, the great compassionate one enters *nirvāṇa, like a fire going out when the firewood is exhausted, and he ultimately achieves eternal residence. 度脫諸天人,修羅龍夜叉,建立無盡法,佛事既已終。於有得寂滅,大悲入涅槃,如薪盡火滅,畢竟得常住。(T02. 99. 167c7–10)
My birth is exhausted, the pure conduct (*brahmacaryā, fanxing梵行) has been established, what had to be done has been done, and I know myself to be without future existence. 生已盡,梵行已立,所作已辦,不更受有。(T01. 26. 787b20–21)
2.2. Fire and Pudgala: How Did the Vātsīputrīyas Accept the Firewood–Fire Metaphor from Āgamas
If the Buddha’s body was always free from outflow (*anāsrava), then the *Anupamā should not arouse lust, the *Aṅgulimāla should not provoke anger, the *Garvita should not incite arrogance, and *Uruvilvākāśyapa should not stir up ignorance. Therefore, there is either lust, anger, ignorance, or arrogance present in this context, and hence, it is known that the Buddha’s body is outflowed (*āsrava). 若佛身一向無漏者,彼無喻女不應起淫意、鴦掘魔不應起瞋恚、慢高兒不應起慢、郁鞞羅迦葉不應起痴意。如此,此中或有著、或有瞋、或痴、或有慢,以是故知佛身是有漏。(T28. 1547. 463b2–6)
The indefinable (*avaktavya, *avācya) is the designation through sensation (*vedanā prajñapyte), designation through the past (*atītaḥ prajñapyte), and designation through extinction (*nirodhaḥ prajñapyte). If one does not understand the designation through sensation, through the past, and through extinction, it is termed indefinable ignorance. The designation through sensation refers to sentient beings who have already received the aggregates, spheres, and elements, reckoning one and the rest. The designation through the past refers to the past aggregates, spheres, and elements. As stated, “At that time, I was called Quxuntuo”.24 The establishment through extinction refers to the saying due to reception, as stated, “The Blessed One entered *nirvāṇa”. 不可說者,受、過去、滅施設。受施設、過去施設、滅施設,若不知者,是謂不可說不知。受施設者,眾生已受陰、界、入,計一及余。過去施設者,因過去陰、界、入說。如所說,我於爾時名瞿旬陀。滅施設者,若已滅是,因受說。如所說,世尊般涅槃。(T25. 1506. 24a29-b8)
The one who completely eradicates all afflictions, due to having realized, has a remainder. This is called “with the remainder”. Without remainder means that when this sensation of aggregates is abandoned, it does not continue like an extinguished lamp. This is *nirvāṇa without remainder. 無余者,若此受陰捨,更不相續如燈滅,是涅槃此名無余。(T25. 150. 24a26–28)
There is the person designated through dependence (*āsrayaprajñaptapudgala), the person designated through transmigration (*saṅkramaprajñaptapudgala), and the person designated through extinction (*nirodhaprajñaptapudgala). 依說人、度說人、滅說人。(T32. 1649. 466b2)
If the fire (agni) becomes the firewood (indhana), there is unity between the doer (kartṛ) and the action (karmaṇaḥ). If, however, the fire is different from the firewood, then it can exist independently of the firewood. yadîndhanaṃ bhaved agnir ekatvaṃ kartṛkarmaṇoḥ, anyaś ced indhanād agnir indhanād apy ṛte bhavet. (MMK 10.1) 若燃是可燃,作作者則一;若燃異可燃,離可燃有燃。(T30. 1564. 14c4–5)
Just as a fire is understood through its firewood, so too is a person (pudgala) understood by taking up the aggregates…yathendhanam upādāyāgniḥ prajñapyate evaṃ skadhān upādāya pudgalaḥ iti… (Pradhan 1967, p. 479) 故彼所言:如依薪立火,如是依蘊立補特伽羅。(T29. 1558. 152c23–29)
2.3. Substantiality or Designation: The Pudgala of the Vātsīputrīyas
That which is dependently co-arisen, we declare to be emptiness. That is a dependent designation. That itself is the middle way. yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ sūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe, sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saîva madhyamā. (MMK 24:18) 眾因緣生法,我說即是無,亦為是假名,亦是中道義。(T30. 1564. 33b11–12)
3. The Relationship between Shen and Pudgala: How Huiyuan Accepted the Teachings and Metaphor of the Vātsīputrīyas
3.1. Unify the Five Skandhas: The Similarity between Huiyuan’s Term Shen as “Animating Things and Moved by Things, Operating under Borrowing Numerals” and the Vātsīputrīya’s Notion of Pudgala as “Designation through Sensation”
the subtle (jing 精) and the coarse (cu 粗), being of the same qi, inhabit the same dwelling throughout. When the dwelling is intact, qi gathers and there is spirit (ling 靈); when the dwelling is destroyed, qi disperses and the illumination (zhao 照) is extinguished. Once dispersed, it returns to its source in the great origin, once extinguished, it returns to nothingness. 精粗一氣始終同宅,宅全則氣聚而有靈,宅毀則氣散而照滅,散則反所受於大本,滅則復歸於無物。(T52. 2102. 31b18–21)
What is this so-called personhood? It is that which is extremely subtle and thus constitutes a spirit. Being extremely subtle, it is not something that can be depicted through hexagrams (guaxiang 卦象). Therefore, the sage describes it stimulates things (miaowu 妙物), even though those with supreme wisdom cannot ascertain its bodily form or exhaustively discuss its profound workings. This leads to widespread doubt and confusion among common people, such slander is deeply rooted. If one were to speak about it, it would indeed be speaking of the unspeakable (bukeyan 不可言). 夫神者何邪?精極而為靈者也。精極則非卦象之所圖。故聖人以妙物而為言,雖有上智猶不能定其體狀窮其幽致,而談者以常識生疑多同自亂,其為誣也,亦已深矣,將欲言之,是乃言夫不可言。(T52. 2102. 31c2–6)
Personhood is something that is fully responsive yet without a master, completely subtle yet without a name. It animates things (ganwu 感物) and moves, and it operates under borrowing numerals (jiashu 假數). 神也者圓應無主,妙盡無名,感物而動,假數而行。(T52. 2102. 31c7–9)
The spirit residing in the physical body is like the fire in a candle. If well-supported and protected, the candle can burn without being extinguished. Without the candle, the fire cannot independently travel in the void, nor can it light the candle again. The extinguished candle is akin to an old person, with falling teeth and graying hair, muscles withered and waned. The spirit can no longer nourish it, permeating inside and outside. The life force dries up and dies, just as the fire and candle both come to an end. 精神居形體,猶火之然燭矣。如善扶持,隨火而側之,可毋滅而竟燭。燭無,火亦不能獨行於虛空,又不能復然其灺。灺猶人之耆老,齒墮發白,肌肉枯臘,而精神弗為之能潤澤,內外周遍,則氣索而死,如火燭之俱盡矣。
The body needs the qi to the body, the qi needs the body to be perceived. There is no solitary burning fire under the heaven, how can there be an intangible solitary perceiving spirit in the world? 形須氣而成,氣須形而知。天下無獨燃之火,世間安得有無體獨知之精?
3.2. Rejection of Annihilation Views: The Similarity between Huiyuan’s Shen in Its Function of “Postmortem Transmigration” and the Vātsīputrīya’s Pudgala as “Designation of the Past”
[Personhood] animating things sentient but is not a thing, hence things transmigrate (hua 化) but do not perish. [It] borrows numerals but is not a numeral, thus [this life’s] numerals end but it does not cease. [神]感物而非物,故物化而不滅,假數而非數,故數盡而不窮。(T52. 2102. 31c8–9)
Personhood has the function of postmortem transmigration. 神有冥移之功。(T52. 2102. 31c13)
The transmission of fire to different firewood is like the transmission of personhood to different bodies. If the preceding firewood is not the succeeding firewood, then we know the art of pointing to the end is subtle, the preceding body is not the succeeding body. 火之傳異薪,猶神之傳異形,前薪非後薪,則知指窮之術妙,前形非後形。(T52. 2102. 32a1–3)
The personhood’s dwelling in the body is like fire’s existence in wood, its birth must be concurrent, and its destruction must be simultaneous. When the body departs, the personhood disperses with nowhere to dwell, when the wood decays, the fire subsides with no support, this is the logical result. 神之處形,猶火之在木,其生必並,其毀必滅。形離則神散而罔寄,木朽則火寂而靡托,理之然矣。(T52. 2102. 31b22–24)
Those who are deluded see the body decay in one life and assume that both the personhood and emotion have completely vanished, just as they see the fire exhaust one piece of wood and assume it is completely extinguished. 惑者見形朽於一生,便以為神情具喪,猶覩火窮於一木,謂終期都盡耳。(T52. 2102. 32a4–5)
When one’s vital qi is exhausted in one lifetime (jiyu yisheng 極於一生), life ends and it dissipates, leaving no personhood, although as a wondrous thing that facilitates everything, it is the transformation of yin and yang. After transformation, it becomes life, and after another transformation, it becomes death. It gathers to begin and disperses to end. 夫稟氣極於一生,生盡則消液而同無神,雖妙物故是陰陽之化耳,既化而為生,又化而為死,既聚而為始,又散而為終。(T52. 2102. 31b15–17)
Humans are born by absorbing essence (Jingqi 精氣)39 and die when the essence is exhausted. Death, just like extinction, is like fire. When the firewood is exhausted, the fire goes out and there is no lighter. Therefore, after the fire is extinguished, no residual fire remains; and after a person dies, no soul remains. 人含氣而生,精盡而死。死,猶澌也,滅也。譬如火焉,薪盡而火滅,則無光矣。故滅火之余,無遺炎矣;人死之後,無遺魂矣。40
If one says: “The soul (*jīva) is the same as the body”, that person has no divine practice. Again, if one says: “The soul is different from the body”, that person has no divine practice. Not attached to these two extremes, one treads the middle way. 若見言:“命即是身。”彼梵行者所無有。若復見言:“命異身異。”梵行者所無有。於此二邊,心所不隨,正向中道。(T02. 99. 84c20–23)
There is a teacher who perceives that the true self is in this world as known and spoken, yet knows nothing about what happens after life ends, this is called the first teacher coming out of the world... The first teacher who perceives the true self in this world as known and spoken is called the annihilationist view. 有一師,見現在世真實是我,如所知說,而無能知命終後事,是名第一師出於世間……其第一師見現在世真實是我,如所知說者,名曰斷見。(T02. 99. 32a4–11)
The designation through the past is to control the annihilationist [view] of sentient beings. Designation through extinction is to control the eternalist [view]. 過去施設者,制眾生斷。滅施設者,制有常。(T25. 1506. 24b6)
3.3. Emotions Uncontrollable: The Similarity between Huiyuan’s Shen as “Upon Transmigration Cessation, Causes, and Conditions Cease Permanently” and the Vātsīputrīya’s Pudgala as “Designation through Extinction”
Emotion is the mother of transmigration, personhood is the root of emotion, and emotion has a way of meeting the beginning. 情為化之母,神為情之根,情有會初之道。(T52. 2102. 31c12–13)
[If one] has emotion, [one] can animate things [through] emotion; [if one] has cognition, [one] can seek to understand [through] numerals. 有情則可以物感,有識則可以數求。(T52. 2102. 31c9–10)
Emotion becomes increasingly stagnated, and entanglements grow deeper. How can the trouble it causes be asserted that it is exceptional? 情彌滯而累彌深,其為患也,焉可勝言哉?(T52. 2102. 30c6–7)
If [we] do not allow emotion to burden life, then it is possible for life to be extinguished (zeshengkemie 則生可滅). [If we] do not allow life to burden the personhood, then the personhood can be extinguished (zeshenkeming 則神可冥). When mingshen juejing 冥神絕境, it is called entering nirvāṇa. 不以情累其生,則生可滅,不以生累其神,則神可冥,冥神絕境,故謂之泥洹。(T52. 2102. 30c14–16)
Hence, Zhuangzi said: “The birth of a man is a concentration of qi. When qi is concentrated, it is life; when dispersed, it is death. What is my worry if the pains of life and death ?” Those who speak well of the Dao must have acquired it. If it is indeed so, the ultimate truth culminates in one life. It makes sense that when life ends, there is no transformation. 故莊子曰:“人之生,氣之聚,聚則為生,散則為死。若死生為彼徒苦,吾又何患?”古之善言道者,必有以得之,若果然耶,至理極於一生,生盡不化義可尋也。(T52. 2102. 31b27-c1)
The debater does not seek the argument of being born and dying (fangsheng fangsi方生方死) but is confused about the concentration and dispersion in one transmigration. He does not think about personhood’s Dao as the spirit that stimulates things but says that the subtle and the coarse end together. Is this not sad? 論者不尋方生方死之說,而惑聚散於一化,不思神道有妙物之靈,而謂精粗同盡。不亦悲乎?(T52. 2102. 31c23–25)
The Three worlds flow, with sin and suffering as their field. [If] transmigration is exhausted, then causes and conditions cease forever (huajin ze yinyuan yongxi 化盡則因緣永息). [If they continue to] flow, suffering is endless. How can this be clear? [If] life takes the body as shackles, life is from transmigration. Transmigration [is from] emotions stimulating, then the personhood stagnates at its origin (ben 本), and intellect (zhi 智) dims its illumination (zhao 照). Once it is confined, what remains is only oneself, and what is involved is only movement. Hence, the spiritual rein (lingpei 灵辔) is lost, the path of life opens daily, and it follows desire (tan’ai 贪爱) in the long stream. Can it just be experienced once? 三界流動以罪苦為場,化盡則因緣永息,流動則受苦無窮,何以明其然?夫生以形為桎梏,而生由化有,化以情感,則神滯其本,而智昏其照,介然有封,則所存唯己,所涉唯動。於是靈轡失御生塗日開,方隨貪愛於長流,豈一受而已哉。(T52. 2102. 30c4–13)
4. Conclusions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
1 | According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Chadha (2022) points out that the Sanskrit term ātman, accurately translated as “self”, represents the essence of individual humans (manuṣya) or the psychophysical complex (pudgala), which encompasses the mind, body, and sense organs. There exists a philosophical contention regarding whether this essence constitutes a substantial soul or pure consciousness, and whether such an essence exists at all. Buddhist no-self theorists refute the existence of any such essence, asserting that the psychophysical complex is entirely constitutive of what there is. |
2 | Prior research has often translated Huiyuan’s term shen as “spirit” (Fung 2018) or “soul” (Liebenthal and Hui-yüan 1950) However, considering the subsequent explanations in the text, this paper argues that the role played by Huiyuan’s shen aligns more closely with “personhood”, corresponding to the three designations attributed to the pudgala by the Vātsīputrīya School. In this context, “ling 靈” might be more suitably translated as “spirit”. Translating it as “soul” might presume that Huiyuan was unduly influenced by the substantive theories of the soul in early Daoism. If within a single sentient being, Huiyuan’s shen could be understood as a spirit, but because Huiyuan’s discussion involves multiple sentient beings within the cycle of reincarnation, which are essentially different spirits but can be assumed to have similar personhood, a more suitable concept should indeed be “personhood”. |
3 | The term referred to here as “three kinds of designations” pertains to the Vātsīputrīya school’s three reasons for explicating the concept of pudgala (person). These reasons are as follows: designation through sensation, designation through the past, and designation through extinction. Thus, a more appropriate title would be “Three Reasons for Designating the Pudgala”. However, since the Vātsīputrīya school refers to these three reasons as distinct “designations”, this text adheres to the Vātsīputrīya convention by referring to them as “three kinds of designations”. |
4 | According to the research of Kimura (1960, p. 395), the term “holy scripture” (shengdian 聖典) here refers to the Buddhist scriptures. |
5 | Later Buddhists often referred to the Vātsīputrīya school as “antaścaratīrthika”, a typical representation of viewing other sects as heresy. See Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā: The Pudgalavādins (that is Vātsīputrīyas), however, are referred to as the internal non-Buddhists (antaścaratīrthikāḥ). They seek a self, termed pudgala, which is indefinable and different from the skandhas, the fundamental elements. Otherwise, it would seem like they adhere to the doctrines of the non-Buddhists (tīrthikas). (pudgalavādinas tu punar antaścaratīrthikāḥ/skandhebhyas tattvānyatvābhyām avācyaṃ pudgalanāmānam ātmānam icchanti/anyathā tīrthikasiddhāntābhiniveśadarśanaṃ syāt). (Poussin 1901, p. 455:16‒18). Also, see the Chengguan’s 澄觀 Commentary on Mahāvaipulya Buddhāvataṃsaka Sūtra (Da Fangguangfo Huayanjing Shu 大方廣佛華嚴經疏): There are two kinds of non-Buddhist: one is totally external, outside the realm of Buddhism. The other is internal non-Buddhists......The internal non-Buddhist, originating from the Vātsīputrīya and Vaipulya, who claim to understand Buddhist scriptures by their intelligence, generating their “reality (yi一)” views, and appending to Buddhism, hence the name. Vātsīputrīya, reading Śāriputrābhidharma, devised their interpretation, claiming “self” beyond the four alternatives (*catuṣkoṭi, siju 四句), in the fifth, indescribable repository. The Buddha said these people are no different from non-Buddhist. All treatises generally reject them, hence the name non-Buddhist… 外道有二:一外外道,即佛法外。二內外道……佛法外道,起自犢子、方廣,自以聰明讀佛經書而生一見,附佛法起,故得此名。犢子讀《舍利弗毗曇》,自別制義,言我在四句外,第五不可說藏中。佛說此人不異外道。諸論皆推不受,名外道也……(T35. 1735. 713a2–8). |
6 | Chen (2008, p. 37) referred to the Vātsīputrīya school as non-Buddhist, and X. Li’s (2003, p. 106) statement suggests that Huiyuan might have drawn some lines of thought from the treatise of the Vātsīputrīya school, *Tridharmikaśāstra (henceforth the TDŚ, Sanfadu Lun 三法度論), which was attacked by other Buddhist schools as adhering to non-Buddhist dharma, for his understanding of the immortality of the spirit. |
7 | Huiyuan’s writing style is characterized by his reluctance to directly quote Buddhist scriptures. Consequently, it is indeed challenging to ascertain the influence of specific texts on him through direct citations. Previous studies have shown a preference for sourcing from what are now considered mainstream Buddhist scriptures of the time, thus emphasizing texts like the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras or the MPU. However, I believe this approach may project our contemporary understanding of Buddhism onto Huiyuan. Historically, Huiyuan had significant interactions with Saṃghadeva, a monk who translated Abhidharma texts. A notable instance is the TDŚ, for which he specifically requested Saṃghadeva to undertake the translation. Memoirs of Eminent Monks (henceforth GSZ, Gaoseng Zhuan 高僧傳): Later, there came a monk from *Kaśpira (Jibin 罽賓) named Saṃghadeva, who was well-versed in various canons. He arrived in Xunyang in the 16th year of the Taiyuan太元 era of the Jin Dynasty. Huiyuan requested him to retranslate the *Abhidharmahṛdaya (henceforth AH, Apitan Xin Lun 阿毘曇心論) and the TDŚ. As a result, the two schools (of thought) flourished, and Huiyuan composed prefaces to clarify their doctrines, providing guidance for learners. 後有罽賓沙門僧伽提婆,博識眾典,以晉太元十六年,來至潯陽。遠請重譯《阿毘曇心》及《三法度論》,於是二學乃興,並制序標宗,貽於學者。 (T50. 2059. 359b20–23) In his preface to the TDŚ, Huiyuan offers high praise for this work, stating the following: The TDŚ indeed originates from the four Āgamas. The four Āgamas are the sūtras within the Tripiṭaka and the deep repositories among the twelve divisions of the Buddhist canon. They are unified by the three dharmas, with the dharma of awakening as the path. 《三法度經》者,蓋出四阿含,四阿含則三藏之契經,十二部之淵府也。以三法為統。以覺法為道。 (T55, no. 2145, p. 73a3–5). |
8 | According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Chan (2019) notes that the term “Neo-Daoism” (or “Neo-Taoism”) aims to encapsulate the central philosophical developments in early medieval China, spanning from the third to the sixth century C.E. Chinese sources predominantly refer to this period as Xuanxue, or “Learning (xue) in the Profound (xuan)”. The term Xuanxue became widespread during the fifth century C.E. and described an academic discipline within the imperial academy’s curriculum. In this formal academic context, Xuanxue’s subject matter primarily revolved around the Yijing 易經, the Laozi 老子, the Zhuangzi 莊子, and selected commentaries on these works. These classical texts were regarded as possessing profound insights into the cosmos and the human condition, collectively known as the “Three (Great Works on the) Profound” (sanxuan). Their collective teachings, through the concept of Dao, envisioned a state of “grand harmony” and “great peace”, necessitating exploration and explanation. Thus, the objective of Xuanxue was to elucidate the nature and function of the Dao, which might otherwise remain obscure or elusive. The relationship between body and spirit is one of the fundamental topics of Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism, and many researchers have studied it. However, many previous studies, such as L. Liu’s (2013, pp. 134–35), have interpreted Huiyuan’s shen as the soul. |
9 | Gombrich (2006, pp. 65–69) provides an in-depth discussion of the metaphor of fire in the Nikāyas and its relation to nirvāṇa, identifying greed, hatred, and delusion as three types of fires, and positing that nirvāṇa represents the cessation of these fires. |
10 | This refers to the origins of Chinese intellectual history. As I will elaborate later, when Huiyuan discussed the metaphor of the firewood and fire, he employed materials from Zhuangzi. Fung (2018) has systematically reviewed the materials related to the firewood–fire metaphor in Chinese intellectual history post-Han dynasty, including those used by Huiyuan. |
11 | According to historical records, Huiyuan indeed often employed this strategy to interpret Buddhist doctrines. As seen in GSZ: Once, a visitor attended a lecture and found it difficult to understand the doctrine of reality. His doubts only increased over time. Huiyuan then drew upon the meanings from Zhuangzi to draw analogy, which then enlightened the confused visitor. 嘗有客聽講,難實相義,往復移時,彌增疑昧,遠乃引《莊子》義為連類,於是惑者曉然。 (T50. 2059. 358a11–13) In this context, I perceive a nuanced interplay of visibility in the materials presented, where Huiyuan tends to reference non-Buddhist materials from a “visible” or “illuminated” perspective, while the “shadowed” aspects pertain to his interpretations grounded in Buddhist internal doctrines. Consequently, I describe Huiyuan’s metaphor of the fire and firewood as “Metaphors in the Shadow of Indian Canons”. |
12 | The evidence Kimura presents originates from MMK: The five aggregates are constantly in continuity, just like the flame of a lamp (dīpa); thus, in this world, it is inappropriate to assert them as either finite or infinite. 五陰常相續,猶如燈火炎;以是故世間,不應邊無邊。 (T30. 1564. 38c28–29). The corresponding Sanskrit: skandhānām eṣa saṃtāno yasmād dīpārciṣām iva, tasmān nânantavattvaṃ ca nântavattvaṃ ca yujyate. (MMK 27:22). In addition, there is the MPU: Currently, for those who have not yet attained the true path, their minds are clouded by various afflictions, which create the causes and conditions for rebirth. At the moment of death, these five aggregates give rise to five new aggregates in continuity. This can be compared to one lamp (*dīpa) igniting another. 今未得實道,是人諸煩惱覆心,作生因緣業,死時從此五陰相續生五陰。譬如一燈,更然一燈。 (T25. 1509. 149c23–25). In my opinion, it is likely that Huiyuan had access to the MMK and MPU. Indeed, there are many similarities between the metaphors of lamp and firewood and fire that could serve as ancillary evidence. However, Kimura seems to have neglected the more direct evidence in Buddhist scriptures translated with the participation of Dao’an 道安 and the Lushan monastic community, such as the MĀ, VŚ, and TDŚ, and instead referenced texts translated by correspondents. |
13 | In my opinion, even though Lo has comprehensively cataloged numerous instances of the firewood metaphor that existed prior to, and concurrent with, Huiyuan, and that may well have been read by Huiyuan, this does not necessarily prove that there was definite intersection between these instances and Huiyuan. Instances like passages from the Shorter Chinese Saṃyukta Āgama (Bieyi za ahan jing 別譯雜阿含經, T100) with an unclear translator and time frame, or metaphors unrelated to the main theme, like the metaphor concerning “warmth” (nuan 暖) in the AH translated by Saṃghadeva, should not be used as evidence. However, evidence from the MĀ translated by Saṃghadeva, which provides strong proof, was unfortunately excluded by Lo. Lo excluded it because the text does not explicitly refer to the body. Despite the lack of explicit reference to the body here, I still believe it can serve as evidence. The “firewood” here carries the same metaphorical significance as the lotus in the previous context, both symbolizing the Buddha’s body, according to the research of Lamotte (1981). |
14 | In addition, the Chapter on Extinguishing of the Fire (huomie pin 火滅品), the sixteenth section of the Ekottarika Āgama (zengyi ahanjing 增壹阿含經) translated by Saṃghadeva, features a passage concerning the Buddha’s extinguishment. As seen in the Ekottarika Āgama: The *Tathāgata’s appearance in the world is extremely rare, occurring only once in many eons, truly imperceptible. It is also difficult to come across this place, where all actions cease completely. With no remaining desire and no defilements, it fully extinguishes into *Parinirvāṇa. 如來出世甚為難遇,億劫乃出,實不可見,此處亦難遇,一切諸行悉休息止,愛盡無余,亦無染污,滅盡泥洹。 (T02. 125. 578a18–20). Furthermore, the Sanskrit term nirvāṇa, commonly used to mean “extinguishing of fire” in everyday language, is extended in religious doctrine to signify “the complete cessation of body and mind for the liberated”. Cf. Monier-Williams (1899, p. 577). |
15 | The GSZ states the following: Saṃghadeva was particularly adept in the Abhidharma-hṛdaya, thoroughly grasping its intricate essence. He frequently recited the *Tridharmikaśāstra... Master Lushan Huiyuan was known for his earnest devotion to exquisite scriptures, extensively compiling collections of sacred texts. With a humble and open mind, he eagerly anticipated distant visitors. Upon hearing of aṃghadeva’s arrival, he immediately extended an invitation to join him at Mount Lu. 僧伽提婆⋯⋯尤善《阿毘曇心》,洞其纖旨。常誦《三法度論》⋯⋯先是,廬山慧遠法師。翹懃妙典,廣集經藏,虛心側席,延望遠賓,聞其至止,即請入廬岳。 (T50. 2059. 328c22–329a13). |
16 | Original Buddhism, also referred to as pre-sectarian Buddhism, Early Buddhism, or Primitive Buddhism, denotes the form of Buddhism before the emergence of various sectarian divisions. The canonical collections from this period are primarily represented by the sūtras and vinayas. The extant texts of the sūtras include the Āgamas, which are Chinese translations prevalent in Northern Buddhism, and the Nikāyas, which are in Pāli and form part of Southern Buddhism. As Lamotte (1988, p. 156) observes, the Āgamas and the Nikāyas share significant foundational similarities, yet they differ in their modes of expression and sequence. |
17 | In this context, nirvāṇa refers to the final death of a liberated person after their last lifetime. For original Buddhism, the final life of the Buddha or arhat consists of two phases. The first phase is the practice and realization of liberation. At this point, they have eliminated all afflictions, but retain the body of the final life until death, referred to as the “earthly body”. This phase is termed nirvāṇa with the remainder (sopadhiśeṣa nirvāṇa, youyu niepan 有餘涅槃). After the death in this life, there is no longer any cycle of rebirth; no new body emerges, and there is no object for consciousness to cling to. This is referred to as nirvāṇa without the remainder (anupadhiśeṣa nirvāṇa, wuyu niepan 無餘涅槃). Harvey (2004, p. 181) describes the later state as “experiences have become cool”. According to early Buddhism, we can only describe that the present five aggregates, including experience or consciousness, will cease after the last lifetime of an arhat; however, we cannot speak of the state post-cessation because it utterly transcends our cognition and belongs to the category of questions to which the Buddha did not respond. Anything beyond the subjective–objective experiential domain of the āyatanas would be mere empty words (vācāvatthukam) (cf. Lin 2022, pp. 145–55). |
18 | While it is conceivable that from the standpoint of original Buddhism, the state “after” nirvāṇa represents a kind of ontological nihilism, for original Buddhism, this transcends the scope of cognition and hence holds no value for discussion. Thus, when questions arise in the sūtras about the Buddha’s existence after death, the Buddha does not respond (cf. Lin 2022, pp. 152–55). |
19 | Based on a rough estimation by the author, terms like “bushou houyou 不受後有” often found in the SĀ, occur over 220 times in the Āgama section of the Taishō Tripiṭaka 大正新脩大蔵経. Similarly, the term “bugeng shouyou 不更受有”, frequently used in the MĀ, appears over 110 times in the Āgama section of the Taishō Tripiṭaka. |
20 | Due to the limited transmission and translation of the Vātsīputrīya school’s own texts, there is no direct evidence that explicates their view of the Buddha’s body. However, traditions within the Sthavira Nikāya, including the Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda, tend to interpret the Buddha’s body based on the literal meanings of the Āgamas, not considering the Buddha’s earthly sufferings mere performance. Given that the Vātsīputrīya school is part of the Sthavira Nikāya, and considering that the Sarvāstivāda sees the doctrines of the Vātsīputrīya as closely related to its own, any significant differences in the conception of the Buddha’s body would likely have been noted by them. However, since the Sarvāstivāda does not highlight such differences, this paper assumes a similarity in views. Therefore, this discussion on the Vātsīputrīya’s conception of the Buddha’s body relies on the descriptions from the Sarvāstivāda. |
21 | In addition to the literal interpretation of the Āgamas and the sect of the elders (Sthavira Nikāya), another perspective on the Buddha may originate from the Mahāsāṃghika school. This school characterizes the Buddha as transcendent (lokottaravāda) with all aspects of him considered undefiled, including his physical birth. His birth is described as apparitional (upapāduka), and his life experiences are portrayed akin to a narrative. His body is deemed illusory, and he exhibits the characteristics and gestures of humanity, which are foreign to him, only to conform to worldly conventions (lokānuvartana). Refer to the preface of the Mahāvastu for more details. (Lamotte 1981, pp. 39–40). |
22 | This narrative is ubiquitous in Buddhist canons. According to Lamotte (1981, p. 43), it appears in texts such as the MPU, the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinayapiṭaka, and the Sūtra on the Cause of Creation Spoken by the Buddha (Foshuo Xingqixing Jing 佛說興起行經, T197). |
23 | Based on the available literature, it appears that the Vātsīputrīya school might not itself refer to the pudgala as an “indefinable self”; this terminology may originate from misrepresentation by critics from other sects. Instead, the school may employ terms such as “indefinable aggregate” or “indefinable dharma (bukeshuo fa 不可說法)”. |
24 | The expression here is similar to the Jataka tales, commonly used by the Buddha to denote his previous lives. Due to the limitations of my Sanskrit (or other Indian languages) and Buddhist literature proficiency, I am currently unable to reconstruct a verifiable term for a particular past life of the Buddha. |
25 | The history of the Vātsīputrīya school is further split into four sub-sects. Cf. Samayabhedoparacanacakra (henceforth SBC, Yibu Zonglun Lun 異部宗輪論): Due to differences in interpretation of a certain verse, four sects emerged from this school (Vātsīputrīya school). These were the *Dharmottarīya, *Bhadrayāṇīya, *Saṃmatīya, and *Ṣaṇṇagarika. 從此部中流出四部:謂法上部、賢胄部、正量部、密林山部。 (T49. 2031. 16c22–24). |
26 | The SNŚ states the following: This is called the [person] designated through dependence, as illustrated by the metaphor of fire. 是名依說[人],如火譬。 (T32. 1649. 466b6). |
27 | Similar viewpoints are held by both Jizang 吉藏 and Yinshun 印順. Please see the Zhongguan Lunshu 中觀論疏 (Commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā) where it is clearly written: “This chapter aims to refute the Vātsīputrīyas. 今此一品,正破犢子。” (T42. 1824. 94, b23–26); see also Yin (2000, p. 195). |
28 | In this context, the perspectives of the Vātsīputrīya school are recounted through AKBh and MMK because the original texts of the Vātsīputrīya have been severely scattered and lost. Although the recounting by opposing schools inevitably carries distortions of the Vātsīputrīya’s views, it is necessary here to utilize the critiques of opponents to reconstruct the Vātsīputrīya’s positions as accurately as possible. Moreover, the discussions among various schools are fundamentally aimed at interpreting the sūtras, and this study focuses on examining whether the Vātsīputrīya provides a reasonable interpretation of the sūtras, rather than delving into the doctrinal divergences between the schools. |
29 | Indeed, scholars such as Yao (2021, p. 20) assert that Nāgārjuna’s concept of “dependent designation” derives from the Vātsīputrīya school. |
30 | Establishing Asura as the sixth realm’s pudgala, its entity is substantial. 立阿素洛為第六趣補特伽羅,體是實有。 (T27. 1545. 8b24–25). |
31 | Regarding the underlying logical differences between the Vātsīputrīya and the Vaibhāṣika schools concerning “dharma”, this is a substantial issue that cannot be adequately expounded in a single section of this text. A detailed argumentation will be reserved for my subsequent papers. |
32 | The SBC states the following: The Vātsīputrīya school’s doctrine synonymously accords... provisionally designated names based on aggregates, spheres, and elements. 犢子部本宗同義……依蘊處界假施設名。 (T49. 2031. 16c14–15). |
33 | The TDŚ states the following: Only the three continuums are compiled, and the three dharmas are imagined. 唯三相續撰,三法者是假想。 (T25. 1506. 15c16). |
34 | The similarities between the Vātsīputrīya school and the Sarvāstivāda school can be seen in the Mahāvibhāṣā śāstra (Da piposha lun大毘婆沙論): …this doctrinal system (Sarvāstivāda) and the Vātsīputrīya school...... though mostly similar, have minor differences......此論宗(有部)與犢子部......雖多分同而有少異......(T27. 1545. 8b17–27). |
35 | The underlying logical differences in the concept of dharma between the Vātsīputrīya school and the Sarvāstivāda school represent a significant issue that cannot be adequately addressed within a single section. A detailed argumentation on this topic will be reserved for a subsequent paper. |
36 | According to Zhang (2019, pp. 12–13), there is no shortage of works from the same period that uses the term “things” (wu 物) to refer to “person” (ren 人) or that contain reflections on the person. Zhang lists 10 examples from Guo Xiang’s 郭象 Commentary on Zhuangzi (Zhuangzi Zhu 莊子注), such as the following: When one is generous enough to accept all things, all things (wu 物) must return to him. 夫寬以容物,物必歸焉。 (Guo 1961, p. 162). All thing (wu 物) is enslaved to its own desires, by their physical body. 凡物各以所好役其形骸。 (Guo 1961, p. 60). Furthermore, there are similar usages in non-philosophical texts such as A New Account of the Tales of the World (Shishuo Xinyu 世說新語) where the following is written: Ji 嵇, Ruan 阮, Shan 山, Liu 劉 were drinking merrily in the bamboo grove. Wang Rong王戎 came late. An attendant said, “The mundane thing (suwu 俗物) has come again to spoil our mood!” 嵇、阮、山、劉在竹林酣飲,王戎後往。步兵曰:“俗物已復來敗人意!” (Yu 2007, p. 917). |
37 | The author proposes two possible interpretations for “ming冥” in this context. The first is “dark and obscure”, emphasizing the mystery of the reincarnation process. The second is “after death”, indicating that reincarnation occurs after death. From a rhetorical perspective, the first interpretation makes more sense. However, if we consider it from the perspective of Buddhist doctrine, the author leans more toward the second interpretation. |
38 | Buddhism does not endorse the idea that a real soul is transferred from one body to the next in the cycle of rebirth; lives in two different existences are considered completely independent individuals. However, there is a general acceptance of the transference of consciousness, karma, and some memories, though different schools hold significant divergences on this matter. The Vātsīputrīya school’s perspective on reincarnation may be akin to the intermediate existence (antarābhava) as understood by the Sarvāstivādins, as the intermediate existence is outlined in the SNŚ (Cf. T32. 1649. 470b16-c18). The “designation through the past” of pudgala might serve as a designated “consistency” bridging lives in two lifetimes due to the continuity of karma and memory within the process of reincarnation. |
39 | In the original sentence here, jing 精 and qi 氣 are not used in conjunction. They should be interpreted intertextually, advocating for their conjoined use, with the meaning being Jingqi 精氣. |
40 | Yang Quan’s Theory of Things has escaped, and this quotation can be found in Wang’s (1990, p. 877) note. |
41 | The assertion “it exists” refers to eternalism, whereas the view “it does not exist” pertains to annihilationism. astîti śāśvatagrāho nâstîty ucchedadarśanam. (MMK 15.10) 定有則著常,定無則著斷。 (T30. 1564. 20b17). |
42 | As Ge (1985, p. 110) 葛洪 asserts: The physical body is the dwelling of the spirit. Therefore, it is likened to a dike—if the dike is destroyed, the water will not stay. It is compared to a candle—when the candle is worn out, the flame will not remain. If the body is overworked, the spirit disperses; when energy is exhausted, life ends. If the roots are exhausted while the branches flourish, then the green vitality will leave the tree. When the energy is weak and desires prevail, then the spirit will depart from the body. 形者,神之宅也。故譬之於堤,堤壞則水不留矣。方之於燭,燭糜則火不居矣。身勞則神散,氣竭則命終。根竭枝繁,則青青去木矣。氣疲欲勝,則精靈離身矣。 |
43 | Here, the character “ming冥” serves as a verb with the meaning of “extinguishing”. Earlier in the text, Huiyuan used this meaning when stating his opponent’s annihilation view: The body, once born, vanishes completely. Having vanished entirely (mingjin 冥盡), it’s not only without anything to uphold. 出生之表則廓然冥盡,既冥盡矣,非但無所立。 (T52. 2102. 28a24–27) Moreover, it may also mean “yoke”, that is fully merging with nirvāṇa, a usage similar to the term “parinirvāṇa”, which means entering (pari-) nirvāṇa completely. |
44 | Ji (2024) notes that the philosophies of nourishing life (yang sheng 養生) and carefree wandering (xiao yao 逍遙) are two derivations of Zhuangzi’s theory of body and spirit (shen 神), addressing different aspects of life. The philosophy of nourishing life is the starting point, targeting the holistic existence encompassing both body and spirit. The subject of carefree wandering is the spirit, not the body, and its realm is the spiritual world, not the mundane world. The state of carefree wandering is one of “being unburdened” (wu dai 無待) where the spirit transcends the constraints of the physical body without dependencies or attachments, aligning with the primal Dao and manifesting a state of freedom and ease. |
45 | The character “ming 冥” carries meanings such as “ignorance”, “darkness”, “obscurity”, “after death”, “secret union”, etc. Therefore, if one presupposes that Huiyuan’s ultimate philosophical goal is the immortality of the soul, it is highly possible to misinterpret “mingshenjuejing 冥神絕境” as aligning with some mysterious state. However, in Buddhist literature, the use of “ming 冥” in the sense of “ignorance” or “darkness” often conveys the idea of delusions or afflictions, such as in the Dīrgha Āgama (Chang’ahan Jing 長阿含經): There are sentient beings who are ignorance afflictions, without wisdom, not recognizing good and evil, unable to truly know suffering, accumulation, cessation, and the path. 又有眾生愚冥無智,不識善惡,不能如實知苦、習、盡、道。 (T01. 1. 36b10–11). Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā (Da Zhuangyan Lun Jing大莊嚴論經) states the following: I am confused by the desire, am blind and in darkness, seeing nothing. 我為欲迷惑,盲冥無所見,我於真濟所,造作諸過惡。 (T04. 201. 327a29). The Sūtra of the Expedient Practices of Meditation (Xiuxing Fangbian Chanjing 修行方便禪經) translated by Huiyuan’s group Buddhabhadra states the following: With the achievement of the [four-]elements definition meditation, the long-lasting ignorance afflictions [will be] extinguished, which can purify the mind, leaving it untainted like empty space. 界方便成就,久遠痴冥滅,能令意清淨,無垢如虛空。 (T15. 618. 319c1–2). |
46 | Huiyuan points out intellect: The intellect has brightness and darkness; hence its illumination varies. 智有明暗,故其照不同。 (T52. 2102. 31c11). This is akin to the mental factors of intellect (prajñā caitasika, somewhat analogous to the rational cognitive function) of the Sarvāstivāda school, representing the basic cognitive function of sentient beings’ minds. Cf. Abhidharmavibhāṣā Śāstra (Apitan Piposha Lun 阿毘曇毘婆沙論): Just like in a dark room, although there are various objects, without the illumination of a lamp, the eye cannot see them. Even if a person possesses intellect, if they do not hear the teachings from others, that person will never be able to distinguish the meanings of good and evil. 譬如暗室中,雖有種種物,若無燈明照,有目不能見。若人雖有智,不從他聞法,是人終不能,分別善惡義。 (T28, no. 1546, p. 2b14–17). In the context of original Buddhism and the Sarvāstivāda School, consciousness activity is considered a defilement, hence it can be referred to as “dim intellect”. Even when the Buddha and Arhats achieve liberation, their consciousness activity remains a defilement, although no new defilements arise. The Sarvāstivāda School refers to this state as “outflow-free” (anāsrava). Therefore, the Āgamas use the metaphor of a fire being extinguished to symbolize the Buddha’s final passing, emblematic of the complete consumption of the last remainder (firewood). |
47 | The term “fang方” has two implications. First, it signifies being in a particular state. The full sentence suggests different understandings of life and death based on their different states. Secondly, it denotes the sequential occurrence of two events (Wang and Chen 2013, p. 66). John Williams (2017, p. 11–12) translates “fangsheng fangsi 方生方死” as “as births, so deaths; as deaths, so births”, and points out that this implies the sagely person is open to a plurality of distinctions. |
48 | In my view, Huiyuan’s “meaning matching” functions much like a translation. Just as in contemporary English Buddhist studies, the term “meditation” is used to translate “dhyāna”, this is clearly unrelated to the influence of Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy. While the appropriateness of certain translations can be debated, it does not impede the progress of Buddhist scholarship. |
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Function | Vātsīputrīya School’s Pudgala | Lushan Huiyuan’s Shen |
---|---|---|
Unify the Five Skandhas | Designation through Sensation 受施設 | Animating Things and Moves, Operating under Borrowing Numerals 感物而動,假數而行 |
The “Consistency” of Rebirth in Lifetimes | Designation of the Past 過去施設 | Function of Postmortem Transmigration 冥移之功 |
The Object of Nirvāṇa | Designation through Extinction 滅施設 | Upon Transmigration Cessation, Causes and Conditions Cease Permanently 化盡則因緣永息 |
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Xin, F. How Did Chinese Buddhists Incorporate Indian Metaphors? A Study of Lushan Huiyuan’s Use of Firewood–Fire Metaphors in the Shadow of Indian Canons. Religions 2024, 15, 986. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15080986
Xin F. How Did Chinese Buddhists Incorporate Indian Metaphors? A Study of Lushan Huiyuan’s Use of Firewood–Fire Metaphors in the Shadow of Indian Canons. Religions. 2024; 15(8):986. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15080986
Chicago/Turabian StyleXin, Fang. 2024. "How Did Chinese Buddhists Incorporate Indian Metaphors? A Study of Lushan Huiyuan’s Use of Firewood–Fire Metaphors in the Shadow of Indian Canons" Religions 15, no. 8: 986. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15080986