How Did Chinese Buddhists Incorporate Indian Metaphors? A Study of Lushan Huiyuan’s Use of Firewood–Fire Metaphors in the Shadow of Indian Canons

Abstract

In the discourse of Lushan Huiyuan 廬山慧遠, the firewood–fire metaphor (xinghuozhiyu 薪火之喻) is employed to illustrate personhood (shen 神), referring to pudgala. Scholars often criticize Huiyuan for interpreting personhood as a true “self” (ātman) under the influence of the Vātsīputrīya school, thus contradicting the doctrine of non-self. This paper suggests that this might be a dual misunderstanding of both Huiyuan and the Vātsīputrīya school. Huiyuan’s firewood–fire metaphor is indeed profoundly influenced by the Vātsīputrīyas’ three kinds of designation. Yet, he never commits to the substantial self, and his argument primarily aims to refute the view of annihilationism (duanmie 斷滅), that is, that life ceases to exist after one period ends. This stance fully aligns with the doctrine of non-self that has been central since the inception of Buddhism. Additionally, Huiyuan’s explanation of the indestructibility of personhood (shen bumie 神不滅) is a reluctant proposition; its fundamental purpose does not lie in discussing transmigration, but rather in demonstrating the state of “body and mind both cease” following the cessation of causes and conditions once “transmigration ends”.

1. Introduction

Lushan Huiyuan’s 廬山慧遠 (334–416) Body Ends, Personhood Does Not Perish (henceforth XJSBM, Xingjin Shenbumie 形盡神不滅) is the fifth essay in Monk Does Not Bow Down Before a King (henceforth BJWZL, Shamen Bujing wangzhe Lun 沙門不敬王者論). Its main theme appears to be very clear—it proposes a real soul as the subject of reincarnation. Meanwhile, due to his profound influence from the Abhidharma Scholar (pitan xue 毘曇學), Huiyuan is somewhat of a “controversial” figure in the study of Chinese Buddhism. He is undeniably a highly respected monk, for he holds strong Buddhist faith, strictly adheres to the disciplinary rules, disciplines himself rigorously, and devotes himself to the construction of Buddhist learning communities, setting a good example for later Buddhists. However, some Buddhist scholars believe that he could not correctly comprehend the profound meaning of prajñā and emptiness (śūnyatā); hence, several scholars criticize him. For example, Ren (1985, p. 700) points out that through *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa (henceforth MPU, Da Zhidu Lun 大智度論), Huiyuan did not change his basic proposition of XJSBM; instead, it seems to have solidified his original view, which appears to be behind the conceptual and theoretical form similar to Nāgārjuna’s mādhyamaka school Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (henceforth MMK, Zhonglun 中論).

Lushan Huiyuan utilized the firewood–fire metaphor twice in his works. The instance that has received the most attention is in XJSBM, where he used it to represent the term shen metaphorically. This has long been interpreted as his endorsement of a substantial soul, thereby expounding the viewpoint that his conception of the soul has a rich background in Chinese traditional culture’s soul (linghun 靈魂), indistinguishable from the Indian non-Buddhist (waidao 外道) concept of ātman. Such criticism equates his discourse on the soul with non-Buddhi, sharply negating his qualification as a Buddhist thinker. Even if Huiyuan provides some non-realist interpretations of personhood, influenced by the prajñā (Murakami 1962, p. 377), this methodology supremely prioritizes prajñā and Mādhyamaka, completely ignoring the overall anti-essentialist characteristic of Buddhism.

This study posits that the doctrine of pudgala1 within the Vātsīputrīya school offers a cogent interpretation of the Āgamas. Huiyuan’s concept of “personhood” (shen)2 absorbs not only the Āgamas but also the Vātsīputrīya interpretation of the metaphor of firewood and fire. This is because his articulation of “personhood” aligns precisely with the Vātsīputrīya’s three types of “designations” (prajñapti, shishe 施設)3 for the “indefinable aggregate”. Although Huiyuan does not directly quote Buddhist canons to prove the firewood–fire metaphor, he uses Zhuangzi’s metaphor for discussion. However, he asserts in XJSBM that “the metaphor of firewood and fire originates from the holy scriptures 火木之喻原自聖典” (T52. 2102. 31c25), emphasizing the Buddhist canonical origins4 of this metaphor. The firewood–fire metaphor indeed frequently appears in early Chinese translated Buddhist texts, and it is highly likely that Huiyuan had exposure to, learned from, and even participated in translating these works.

Due to the Vātsīputrīya school being widely regarded as heterodox within Buddhist traditions5, previous studies suggest that even if Huiyuan accurately understood the perspectives of the Vātsīputrīya, this does not imply that he embraced correct Buddhist thought.6 I argue that our misunderstanding of Huiyuan may have originated from our initial misconceptions about the Vātsīputrīya school. Therefore, it is essential to first clarify the doctrines of the Vātsīputrīya school before analyzing how it influenced Huiyuan.7 Therefore, while some scholars like Ren criticize Huiyuan for his interpretation of shen, this paper argues that such critiques may overlook the subtlety of Huiyuan’s metaphoric use, which aligns with early Buddhist non-self concepts.

2. The Firewood–Fire Metaphor and Pudgala in Wei-Jin Translated Buddhist Scriptures

Fire, as one of the most common natural phenomena, is extensively found in the metaphors of various philosophical traditions worldwide. Hence, apart from Zhuangzi and Han-era figures using fire and combustible materials as metaphors, this metaphor’s use in India is also quite widespread. Considering Huiyuan’s Buddhist monastic status, his discursive aim, and his claim that the firewood–fire metaphor originates from the canons, the interpretation of his firewood–fire metaphor from within the Buddhist tradition has crucial, even decisive significance beyond perspectives offered by studies of the body–spirit relationship (xingshen guanxi 形神關係) and the Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism (weijin xuanxue 魏晉玄學)8.

2.1. The Firewood–Fire Metaphor Observed in the Āgamas Translated during the Wei-Jin Period

In Buddhism, fire is often used in metaphors that do not express positive meanings. For example, the Ādittasuttaṃ (Saṃyutta Nikāya 35:28) in Theravāda Buddhism uses fire to denote afflictions such as greed, hatred, and ignorance, with the combustible materials being the dharmas of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind.9 Although this Sūtra does not explicitly use the firewood–fire metaphor, it already incorporates elements such as fire and fuel. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, the fire metaphor is frequently used to denote worldly suffering, as in the “burning house of the three worlds 三界火宅” (T09. 262. 14c24–25) in the Sad-dharma Puṇḍárīka Sūtra (Miaofa Lianhua Jing 妙法蓮華經).

The metaphor of firewood and fire in Huiyuan’s XJSBM might have multiple sources. The overt source is the line of thought extending from Zhuangzi, Huan Tan 桓谭, and Wang Chong 王充 in Chinese intellectual history, particularly their metaphors involving fire and combustible materials.10 Huiyuan directly employed Zhuangzi’s firewood and fire metaphor as an allegory for his argumentation. However, this might merely be a rhetorical strategy,11 with its underlying objective remaining within the Buddhist doctrine. The covert source should originate from within Buddhism itself. Many examples of the firewood and fire metaphor already existed in the documents Huiyuan could access. Kimura (1960, p. 395) noted this and found some examples in the MPU and the MMK.12 Lo (1995, pp. 152–57) has provided a detailed summary of the firewood and fire metaphor, which Huiyuan might have come across.13 In fact, the firewood–fire metaphor can be found in the canons translated by the Lushan monastic community. For instance, in the Madhyama Āgama (henceforth MĀ, Zhong’ahan Jing 中阿含經) translated by Saṃghadeva, it says the following:

Just as when a fire is burning, [if] no more firewood is added, [it will] cease. Without firewood, the fire does not continue, this fire is said to be extinguished. 猶如然火熾，不益薪則止，無薪火不傳，此火謂之滅。

(T01. 26.608c26–27)

The aforementioned citation is a metaphor for the Buddha’s nirvāṇa14 in the MĀ. Given that Saṃghadeva and Lushan Huiyuan had deep interactions,15 it is reasonable to infer that Huiyuan would be aware of the existence of such a metaphor in the canons. However, the description in the MĀ is quite brief, and therefore, we need to rely on other Āgamas to understand the main theme this metaphor expresses in the original Buddhist scriptures:

If there is a fire kindled before me, lit due to the conditions of firewood and grass, if no more firewood is added, the fire will then extinguish forever, never to arise again... matter has already ceased and is known, sensations, perceptions, volitions, and consciousness have already ceased and are known... 若有於我前然火，薪草因緣故然，若不增薪，火則永滅，不復更起，東方、南方、西方、北方去者，是則不然……色已斷已知，受、想、行、識已斷已知…

(T02. 99. 246a3–10)

Therefore, in this context, firewood refers to the five aggregates: matter, sensation, perception, volition, and consciousness. In Buddha’s view, the continuity of life is due to the persistence of the five aggregates. If the five aggregates no longer persist, then the fire would lack the firewood needed to continue burning, leading to its extinction. In another scripture from the Saṃyukta Āgama (henceforth SĀ, Za’ ahan Jing 雜阿含經), the phrase “when the firewood is exhausted, the fire goes out 若不增薪，火則永滅” is used to metaphorically depict Buddha’s nirvāṇa:

[Our Buddha has] transcended all celestial beings, Asuras, dragons, and yakshas, has established the inexhaustible Dharma, and the Buddha’s work is now complete. Having achieved peace and extinction, the great compassionate one enters *nirvāṇa, like a fire going out when the firewood is exhausted, and he ultimately achieves eternal residence. 度脫諸天人，修羅龍夜叉，建立無盡法，佛事既已終。於有得寂滅，大悲入涅槃，如薪盡火滅，畢竟得常住。

(T02. 99. 167c7–10)

This scripture says, “When the firewood is exhausted, the fire goes out 薪盡火滅” to illustrate the event of Buddha exhausting all his deeds in the world, eventually attaining nirvāṇa. In original Buddhism,16 nirvāṇa is seen as the final extinction, with no conscious activity following it.17 Thus, the objects accompanying conscious activities also lose their significance.18 The following expression, often used in Āgamas to describe nirvāṇa,19 captures this:

My birth is exhausted, the pure conduct (*brahmacaryā, fanxing梵行) has been established, what had to be done has been done, and I know myself to be without future existence. 生已盡，梵行已立，所作已辦，不更受有。

(T01. 26. 787b20–21)

Nirvāṇa refers to the state of no rebirth after extinguishment, meaning “cessation” or “extinction”. Original Buddhism did not view nirvāṇa as a higher state of existence but as the ultimate extinction. Thus, the “when the firewood is exhausted, the fire goes out” in the Āgamas is used to illustrate the final cessation of the residual five aggregates of the Buddha after his death in this life.

2.2. Fire and Pudgala: How Did the Vātsīputrīyas Accept the Firewood–Fire Metaphor from Āgamas

However, two hermeneutical gaps exist between the metaphor of firewood and fire in the Āgamas and Huiyuan’s use of it: First, how can the “firewood is exhausted, the fire goes out” used for Buddha’s five aggregates (body) in the Āgamas transition to the bodies of ordinary people? Second, how do the burning and extinction of the five aggregates lead to the concept of pudgala?

Regarding the first gap, this is because, in the perspective of the sect of the elders (Sthavira Nikāya) tradition20, represented by the Sarvāstivāda, the Buddha and the arhats, even after eradicating all afflictions, still maintain their “earthly body”, comprising the five aggregates. Although Buddha’s disciples likewise praised universally affirmed his accomplishments, there is no doubt that, as far as the sect of the elders, represented by the Sarvāstivāda school, is concerned, the Buddha was unequivocally human.21 Therefore, even the earthly body of the Buddha, like the bodies of ordinary people, is outflowed. As pointed out in the *Vibhāṣā Śāstra (henceforth VŚ, Piposha Lun 鞞婆沙論):

If the Buddha’s body was always free from outflow (*anāsrava), then the *Anupamā should not arouse lust, the *Aṅgulimāla should not provoke anger, the *Garvita should not incite arrogance, and *Uruvilvākāśyapa should not stir up ignorance. Therefore, there is either lust, anger, ignorance, or arrogance present in this context, and hence, it is known that the Buddha’s body is outflowed (*āsrava). 若佛身一向無漏者，彼無喻女不應起淫意、鴦掘魔不應起瞋恚、慢高兒不應起慢、郁鞞羅迦葉不應起痴意。如此，此中或有著、或有瞋、或痴、或有慢，以是故知佛身是有漏。

(T28. 1547. 463b2–6)

The VŚ provides several examples of afflictions arising from the Buddha’s body to illustrate that the Buddha’s body is outflowed. In addition, the Buddha faced numerous hardships during his last life, which stemmed from his past negative karma, and he had to suffer due to these negative actions in his final life. These hardships include being slandered by Sundarī, and falsely accused by Ciñcā, getting his foot injured by Devadatta, his foot being pricked by Acacia needles, suffering from headaches and rheumatism, having to eat horse fodder at Verañjā, enduring six years of ascetic practices, begging for food in a Brahmin settlement, and returning with an empty bowl.22

Therefore, although the Āgamas use firewood as a metaphor for the Buddha’s body, there is no essential difference between the five aggregates of ordinary people and the Buddha’s life body in the view of the sect of the elders (such as Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda). Hence, this metaphor naturally applies to the five aggregates of ordinary people.

The second gap points to the relationship between pudgala and the five aggregates. Buddhist scholars tend to characterize this relationship mainly in three ways: first, similar to the non-Buddhist view of the substantial “self” independent from the aggregates (dravyāntara ātman); second, akin to the Sarvāstivāda school’s view of the hypothetical self (ātmaprajñapti); and third, similar to the Vātsīputrīya school’s term pudgala. These schools differ in their use of the term pudgala. In non-Buddhist traditions, pudgala may more closely resemble a soul, capable of existing independently of the body. For the Sarvāstivāda school, pudgala does not exist; what is referred to as pudgala is simply another way of expressing the five aggregates. The Vātsīputrīya school, however, holds a view distinct from these two, positing that the relationship between pudgala and the five aggregates is neither identical nor different.

Some scholars have recognized that Huiyuan’s personhood was influenced by the Vātsīputrīya school’s “indefinable self (bukeshuo wo 不可說我)” (Lü 1979, pp. 152–53; Sheng 2010, p. 260), as Huiyuan expressed his admiration for the Vātsīputrīya school’s TDŚ (Lü 1979, pp. 74–76) but often lacks meticulous argumentation. The Vātsīputrīyas habitually use the fire and firewood metaphor to express the relationship between the five aggregates and the “indefinable aggregate (bukeshuo yun 不可說蘊)”.23

First of all, The TDŚ of the Vātsīputrīya school lists the pudgala alongside conditioned and unconditioned dharma as the third type of indefinable dharma. It proposes three ways to establish the existence of the pudgala:

The indefinable (*avaktavya, *avācya) is the designation through sensation (*vedanā prajñapyte), designation through the past (*atītaḥ prajñapyte), and designation through extinction (*nirodhaḥ prajñapyte). If one does not understand the designation through sensation, through the past, and through extinction, it is termed indefinable ignorance. The designation through sensation refers to sentient beings who have already received the aggregates, spheres, and elements, reckoning one and the rest. The designation through the past refers to the past aggregates, spheres, and elements. As stated, “At that time, I was called Quxuntuo”.24 The establishment through extinction refers to the saying due to reception, as stated, “The Blessed One entered *nirvāṇa”. 不可說者，受、過去、滅施設。受施設、過去施設、滅施設，若不知者，是謂不可說不知。受施設者，眾生已受陰、界、入，計一及余。過去施設者，因過去陰、界、入說。如所說，我於爾時名瞿旬陀。滅施設者，若已滅是，因受說。如所說，世尊般涅槃。

(T25. 1506. 24a29-b8)

The designation through sensation refers to the construction of the pudgala based on the aggregates, spheres, and elements that sentient beings perceive, emphasizing the inseparable relationship between the pudgala and the five aggregates. The designation through the past constructs the pudgala based on the aggregates, spheres, and realms perceived by sentient beings in the past, which likely refers to past lives since the text uses the typical phrasing from the Jataka tales where the Buddha says, “At that time, I was called X”. The designation through extinction constructs the pudgala for sentient beings in the state of nirvāṇa. It is only through these means that we can discuss what someone’s past state was like, what their present state is like, and whether they have entered nirvāṇa.

However, due to the paucity of the Vātsīputrīya school’s texts in the existing Buddhist scriptures, we are unable to find the fire and firewood metaphor in the Vātsīputrīya school’s literature from Huiyuan’s time or earlier. However, four indirect pieces of evidence suggest that this metaphor was popular within the Vātsīputrīya school.

Firstly, two pieces of evidence come from the Vātsīputrīya school system. The first piece of evidence comes from the discussion of the final state of Buddha or an Arhat in the TDŚ:

The one who completely eradicates all afflictions, due to having realized, has a remainder. This is called “with the remainder”. Without remainder means that when this sensation of aggregates is abandoned, it does not continue like an extinguished lamp. This is *nirvāṇa without remainder. 無余者，若此受陰捨，更不相續如燈滅，是涅槃此名無余。

(T25. 150. 24a26–28)

Although the TDŚ does not delve into the issue of the Arhat’s physical death and mental extinction, the metaphor of the “extinguished lamp” is highly similar to the expression “the fire goes out when the firewood is exhausted” in the Āgamas. A lit lamp contains both fuel and fire. Therefore, according to Kimura, the example in the MMK and MPU where a lamp is used as a metaphor for the five aggregates serves as a source for Huiyuan’s firewood and fire metaphors. In my view, this cannot be taken as direct evidence but rather as indirect evidence because the MPU does not directly mention firewood and fire, just as the mention of “lamps” in the TDŚ could also be seen as indirect evidence. Moreover, in fact, Huiyuan had a closer connection with the TDŚ than with the MPU. According to Buddhist historical texts, the TDŚ was translated at Huiyuan’s request, and he also wrote a preface for this treatise.

The second piece of evidence comes from the Saṃmatīya school, a sub-school of the Vātsīputrīya school,25 whose treatise *Sammitīya Nikāya Śāstra (henceforth SNŚ, Sanmidi Bu Lun 三彌底部論) introduces three types of person similar to those in the SNŚ:

There is the person designated through dependence (*āsrayaprajñaptapudgala), the person designated through transmigration (*saṅkramaprajñaptapudgala), and the person designated through extinction (*nirodhaprajñaptapudgala). 依說人、度說人、滅說人。

(T32. 1649. 466b2)

The person designated through dependence corresponds to the designation through sensation in the TDŚ, indicating that the five aggregates serve as the foundation upon which the pudgala is established, with their primary function being to integrate the five aggregates. The person designated through transmigration corresponds to the designation through the past in the TDŚ, indicating that there is a pudgala that has passed through the past, present, and future. The person designated through extinction corresponds to the designation through extinction in the TDŚ. This refers to the pudgala, or the person, that ceases to exist concurrently with the extinction of the five aggregates upon reaching nirvāṇa. This is, in essence, the object of extinction in nirvāṇa. (See J. Li 2021, p. 13)

In the discussion of the person designated through dependence, the Saṃmatīya school refers to the fire metaphor (huopi 火譬).26 Although the details of the fire metaphor are not mentioned here, the person designated through dependence elaborates on the relationship between the pudgala and the five aggregates. There are also another two indirect pieces of evidence from an opponent of the Vātsīputrīya school that can reveal the metaphorical content of the fire metaphor, though it does not originate from the Vātsīputrīya school itself.

Third, the chapter Examination of Fire and Firewood (Agnīndhanaparīkṣā nāma daśamaṃ prakaraṇam) in the MMK is often regarded as a refutation of the Vātsīputrīya’s argument for the “indefinable aggregate”27:

If the fire (agni) becomes the firewood (indhana), there is unity between the doer (kartṛ) and the action (karmaṇaḥ). If, however, the fire is different from the firewood, then it can exist independently of the firewood. yadîndhanaṃ bhaved agnir ekatvaṃ kartṛkarmaṇoḥ, anyaś ced indhanād agnir indhanād apy ṛte bhavet. (MMK 10.1) 若燃是可燃，作作者則一；若燃異可燃，離可燃有燃。

(T30. 1564. 14c4–5)

In the opposing view, fire is used as a metaphor for pudgala, which is the result of combustion, while firewood is used as a metaphor for the five aggregates. The MMK later provides a detailed refutation of this metaphor.

The fourth one is in the Ātmavādapratisedha (Chapter on Refutation of the Self) of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāsya (Henceforth AKBh, Apidamo Jushe Lun 阿毘達磨俱舍論), where Vasubandhu presents the Vātsīputrīya school’s fire and firewood metaphor while refuting their concept of pudgala and uses the metaphor to illustrate this concept:

Just as a fire is understood through its firewood, so too is a person (pudgala) understood by taking up the aggregates…yathendhanam upādāyāgniḥ prajñapyate evaṃ skadhān upādāya pudgalaḥ iti… (Pradhan 1967, p. 479) 故彼所言：如依薪立火，如是依蘊立補特伽羅。

(T29. 1558. 152c23–29)

Despite the two to three hundred years that separate the MMK and the AKBh, this metaphor continues to circulate within the Vātsīputrīya school, reflecting its significance to this school. It is also presented in the canon of the Saṃmatīya school, a sub-school of the Vātsīputrīya school, which strongly suggests the established position of this metaphor within the Vātsīputrīya tradition. It is highly plausible that Huiyuan and Saṃghadeva obtained a detailed understanding of the Vātsīputrīya tenets from Saṃghadeva during the translation process of the TDŚ.

2.3. Substantiality or Designation: The Pudgala of the Vātsīputrīyas

Historically, Buddhist traditions have often designated the Vātsīputrīya school as proponents of self-affirmation due to their use of the term pudgala, and thus viewed them as “heresy”. However, such criticism essentially imposes the definitions and positions of pudgala from other sects onto this school. However, such criticism fundamentally imposes the definition and position of pudgala from different sects onto this school. The TDŚ uses the concept of “designation” to describe the pudgala. In the chapter on the refutation of the pudgala in the TDŚ, Vasubandhu summarizes the Vātsīputrīya school perspective as designating the aggregates as pudgala in the same way as fire is designated (upādāyāgniḥ prajñapyate evaṃ skadhān upādāya pudgalaḥ). This concept is also found in MMK28:

That which is dependently co-arisen, we declare to be emptiness. That is a dependent designation. That itself is the middle way. yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ sūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe, sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saîva madhyamā. (MMK 24:18) 眾因緣生法，我說即是無,亦為是假名,亦是中道義。

(T30. 1564. 33b11–12)

In the MMK, the term “dependent designation” (prajñaptir upādāya)29 is used to express the notion of conceptuality, which Kumārajīva translated as “provisional names. (Jiaming 假名)” If pudgala is merely considered a conceptual designation, it holds no substantial status. Priestley (1999, p. 324) notes that the Vātsīputrīya school did not agree with this view, as pudgala performs the function of the subject of rebirth and thus cannot be merely a nominal concept. Possibly influenced by the Sarvāstivāda critique of illusory concepts, from the time of Vasubandhu, the Vātsīputrīya no longer regarded pudgala as a “designation” but as a “substance” (dravya). However, this assertion does not withstand scrutiny, as in the Mahāvibhāṣā Śāstra, the Sarvāstivāda already considered the Vātsīputrīya’s view of pudgala as “substance”.30 Therefore, this might simply be a conclusion drawn from the perspective of Sarvāstivāda scholars looking at the Vātsīputrīya school, which could fundamentally differ in underlying logic from the Sarvāstivāda school.

Even if the Vātsīputrīya school regards pudgala as a dharma, such dharma should also be considered a designated dharma.31 Just as Nāgārjuna’s “prajñaptir upādāya” differs from the non-Buddhist view that names and conventions are real as stipulated with Brahma, the Vātsīputrīya’s pudgala differs from the non-Buddhist notion of an intrinsic self (ātman) independent from the aggregates, merely representing a functionally designated dharma. It is distinct from the Sarvāstivāda school’s dharmas like form and sensation, which are not “substances” (dravya), but it can be described as dharma due to its specific functions, distinct from the five aggregates.

Moreover, the Vātsīputrīya school views the aggregates, spheres, and elements as “designations”,32 and the TDŚ also refers to the three dharmas (sanfa, 三法) as “imagination”33. Our understanding of the Vātsīputrīya’s dharma as a substance may be based on its similarities with the Sarvāstivāda school.34 Even though the Vātsīputrīya school and the Sarvāstivāda school have the same dharma names and numbers, this does not mean that the ontological structure of these two schools is consistent, which might suggest that the Vātsīputrīyas’ concept of “designation” is similar to the Sarvāstivāda’s “substance” (dravya) as a basis for logical argumentation.35 Therefore, the Vātsīputrīyas’ view of the basic dharma characteristics as designations means that the pudgala is a designation upon a designation. Therefore, although the Vātsīputrīya school admits the pudgala, this is likely to be essentially different from the Hindu’s emphasis on the “self” which is independent real existence.

3. The Relationship between Shen and Pudgala: How Huiyuan Accepted the Teachings and Metaphor of the Vātsīputrīyas

Huiyuan is undoubtedly a representative of the Interpretation of Buddhism during the Eastern Jin Dynasty; hence, the real essence of Buddhism he sought to express is often concealed within his usage of Chinese philosophical terms. Unlike Sengzhao 僧肇, who lived around the same period, Huiyuan rarely quoted Buddhist scriptures in his independent works but instead made extensive references to the three profound studies (Sanxuan 三玄), making his texts more elusive. However, I believe that the essence of the “meaning matching” (geyi 格義) of Buddhism lies in expressing Indian Buddhist teachings through traditional Chinese philosophical concepts, rather than any form of Sinicized doctrines.

Existing scholarship is not lacking in studies on Huiyuan’s concept of “personhood”, among which Japanese scholar Ukai (2001, pp. 3–17) believes that the personhood discussed by Huiyuan in Three Periods of Retribution (Sanbao Lun 三報論) and BJWZL does not represent the ultimate emptiness wisdom of prajñā’s observation but rather appears to be more of an entity, containing elements of the unpredictable and ineffable divinities found in traditional Chinese thought. However, the author also points out that there are some differences between Huiyuan’s term shen and the traditional Chinese view of the soul. The traditional Chinese view of the soul is more concrete, while Huiyuan’s “personhood” is more mysterious and unfathomable, not an eternal and unchanging substance, but one that operates within phenomena and ultimately connects with the ultimate nirvāṇa. In my view, Ukai’s research has indeed grasped the characteristic of Huiyuan’s personhood that differs from the shen in Daoism, but this characteristic is not specific enough.

I argue that Huiyuan’s firewood and fire metaphor aptly illustrates the concept of personhood as described in the Vātsīputrīya school’s pudgala, and fully corresponds to the three forms of designation postulated by the Vātsīputrīya school, thus accurately representing their teachings. This is a paradigmatic example of the influence of Indian Buddhism on Chinese thought. The misunderstanding of Huiyuan’s work in previous research is often because the Indian teachings expressed by Huiyuan belonged to a school considered “heresy” by later Buddhism, rather than what was considered the orthodox prajñā tradition of his time.

3.1. Unify the Five Skandhas: The Similarity between Huiyuan’s Term Shen as “Animating Things and Moved by Things, Operating under Borrowing Numerals” and the Vātsīputrīya’s Notion of Pudgala as “Designation through Sensation”

In XJSBM, Huiyuan mainly discusses his view on personhood, where he employs the firewood and fire metaphor. The discussion revolves around the independence of personhood. Huiyuan’s opponent first points out the following:

the subtle (jing 精) and the coarse (cu 粗), being of the same qi, inhabit the same dwelling throughout. When the dwelling is intact, qi gathers and there is spirit (ling 靈); when the dwelling is destroyed, qi disperses and the illumination (zhao 照) is extinguished. Once dispersed, it returns to its source in the great origin, once extinguished, it returns to nothingness. 精粗一氣始終同宅，宅全則氣聚而有靈，宅毀則氣散而照滅，散則反所受於大本，滅則復歸於無物。

(T52. 2102. 31b18–21)

In the view of Huiyuan’s opponent, personhood is dependent on the body (xing 形), completely lacking independence; hence, it inhabits the same dwelling throughout. Huiyuan first describes his view of personhood:

What is this so-called personhood? It is that which is extremely subtle and thus constitutes a spirit. Being extremely subtle, it is not something that can be depicted through hexagrams (guaxiang 卦象). Therefore, the sage describes it stimulates things (miaowu 妙物), even though those with supreme wisdom cannot ascertain its bodily form or exhaustively discuss its profound workings. This leads to widespread doubt and confusion among common people, such slander is deeply rooted. If one were to speak about it, it would indeed be speaking of the unspeakable (bukeyan 不可言). 夫神者何邪?精極而為靈者也。精極則非卦象之所圖。故聖人以妙物而為言，雖有上智猶不能定其體狀窮其幽致，而談者以常識生疑多同自亂，其為誣也，亦已深矣，將欲言之，是乃言夫不可言。

(T52. 2102. 31c2–6)

According to Huiyuan, personhood is extremely subtle and cannot be manifested in a concrete form. Therefore, the sage uses the ability of personhood to subtly facilitate all things to describe it. In the aforementioned passage, things (wu 物) refer to the composite of body and spirit (personhood in a particular person), typically understood as the concept of sentient beings in Buddhism or generally meaning “person”.36 The sage portrays personhood as a subtle existence, which even the wisest cannot understand the state of or exhaustively describe the profundity of. Personhood is constantly changing and stimulates sentient beings, but itself is not a specific entity. It is an incredibly subtle existence that cannot be named; therefore, it is called the “unspeakable”. This is similar to the Vātsīputrīya school’s “indefinable aggregate”. This kind of description seems to be referring to personhood as a mysterious independent existence that is beyond the body. However, Huiyuan subsequently points out the following:

Personhood is something that is fully responsive yet without a master, completely subtle yet without a name. It animates things (ganwu 感物) and moves, and it operates under borrowing numerals (jiashu 假數). 神也者圓應無主，妙盡無名，感物而動，假數而行。

(T52. 2102. 31c7–9)

Numerals (shu 數) refer to the materials of the body, including the five aggregates, twelve sense bases, eighteen elements, and so forth. The concept referred to as “animating things” entails the gathering of specific “numerals” into a unity, thereby forming a unified “person”. This process corresponds to the unification of the five skandhas (aggregates). This passage reveals that Huiyuan’s concept of the body does not possess independence from the five aggregates like non-Buddhist theories. It must manifest as a body and operate through principles such as the four great elements. Huiyuan aims to demonstrate that he does not oppose the view that body and spirit are inseparable.

In earlier Chinese philosophical literature, there is no shortage of works emphasizing the inseparability of body and spirit. For example, Huan Tan and Wang Chong of the Eastern Han Dynasty pointed out the following:

The spirit residing in the physical body is like the fire in a candle. If well-supported and protected, the candle can burn without being extinguished. Without the candle, the fire cannot independently travel in the void, nor can it light the candle again. The extinguished candle is akin to an old person, with falling teeth and graying hair, muscles withered and waned. The spirit can no longer nourish it, permeating inside and outside. The life force dries up and dies, just as the fire and candle both come to an end. 精神居形體，猶火之然燭矣。如善扶持，隨火而側之，可毋滅而竟燭。燭無，火亦不能獨行於虛空，又不能復然其灺。灺猶人之耆老，齒墮發白，肌肉枯臘，而精神弗為之能潤澤，內外周遍，則氣索而死，如火燭之俱盡矣。

(Huan 2009, p. 32)

The body needs the qi to the body, the qi needs the body to be perceived. There is no solitary burning fire under the heaven, how can there be an intangible solitary perceiving spirit in the world? 形須氣而成，氣須形而知。天下無獨燃之火，世間安得有無體獨知之精？

(Wang 1990, p. 875)

For Huan Tan and Wang Chong, although there is a distinction between body and spirit, overall, they still hold the view that the spirit is inseparable from the body, much like how fire cannot exist without a candle. The changes in Huan Tan’s candle are seen by Buddhists as an accurate depiction of the realities of birth, aging, illness, and death in sentient life. Lo (1995, p. 149) believes that Huiyuan opposed Huan Tan’s candle–fire metaphor (zhuhuo zhiyu 燭火之喻), but in my view, Huiyuan probably would not deny the inseparability of body and spirit. Huiyuan also would not think that body and spirit can be separated, which is precisely the Vātsīputrīya school’s doctrine of pudgala and the Five Skandhas being “not different” (buyi 不異). In this sense, the role played by personhood is akin to that of the spirit, functioning to respond to and integrate the five aggregates, and consequently unifying them into a composite person.

3.2. Rejection of Annihilation Views: The Similarity between Huiyuan’s Shen in Its Function of “Postmortem Transmigration” and the Vātsīputrīya’s Pudgala as “Designation of the Past”

However, the real divergence between Huiyuan and his opponent in XJSBM lies in, apart from the inseparability of the pudgala and the Five Aggregates, the “non-identity” that is the transmigration between different sentient beings. Following the above, Huiyuan immediately points out the following:

[Personhood] animating things sentient but is not a thing, hence things transmigrate (hua 化) but do not perish. [It] borrows numerals but is not a numeral, thus [this life’s] numerals end but it does not cease. [神]感物而非物，故物化而不滅，假數而非數，故數盡而不窮。

(T52. 2102. 31c8–9)

In this context, transmigration refers to reincarnation. In Huiyuan’s perspective, although personhood can integrate the five aggregates and govern the activities of people, it is distinct from the body represented by people and the five aggregates. Therefore, when the body ceases, personhood does not cease to exist, and it enters the process of reincarnation. The five aggregates cannot be transferred to the next sentient being, but the personhood can, which Huiyuan refers to as a “postmortem transmigration” (mingyi 冥移)37:

Personhood has the function of postmortem transmigration. 神有冥移之功。

(T52. 2102. 31c13)

Huiyuan expounds on his relationship between body and personhood. In Huiyuan’s view, the major mistake of the annihilators of the spirit is to deny the function of postmortem transmigration. Postmortem transmigration may seem to emphasize the separation of body and personhood, but it is not so. Postmortem transmigration here only means that personhood can inhabit different bodies, whereas the separation of body and personhood assumes that personhood can survive independently outside the body. Therefore, Huiyuan’s theory of postmortem transmigration does not acknowledge the doctrine of a real soul that exists separately from the aggregates. In the process of reincarnation, the lives of both worlds must necessarily borrow their own body. The continuation of personhood is not derived from its substantial essence but from its function as a postmortem transmigration. Just as in the Vātsīputrīya school, reincarnation is similarly termed “designation”.38

Postmortem transmigration equates to the designation of the past in the TDŚ. The Vātsīputrīya school, through this, designates the “consistency” of five different aggregates throughout the process of rebirth in multiple lifetimes. Just as the TDŚ uses the Buddha’s past lives as evidence, this kind of “consistency” certainly lacks absolute reality, and is, therefore, a “designation”. The Buddha and his past lives are two different sentient beings. Subsequently, he uses the metaphor of transmission of fire from one piece of firewood to another:

The transmission of fire to different firewood is like the transmission of personhood to different bodies. If the preceding firewood is not the succeeding firewood, then we know the art of pointing to the end is subtle, the preceding body is not the succeeding body. 火之傳異薪，猶神之傳異形，前薪非後薪，則知指窮之術妙，前形非後形。

(T52. 2102. 32a1–3)

Therefore, in Huiyuan’s view, the most important function of personhood is to transfer from one body to another, a process analogous to the transfer of fire between different pieces of firewood. In previous research, this theory is seen as a blend of Buddhist Buddha nature, Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism original non-being (benwu 本無), and the idea of the soul in traditional Chinese religions. It is from this that Huiyuan’s notion of a real “soul” is argued and is considered to be in violation of Buddhist teachings and a non-Buddhist view. It is even further revealed that Huiyuan’s opponents’ understanding of firewood and fire may be more in line with the description of “when firewood is exhausted, the fire goes out” in the Āgamas:

The personhood’s dwelling in the body is like fire’s existence in wood, its birth must be concurrent, and its destruction must be simultaneous. When the body departs, the personhood disperses with nowhere to dwell, when the wood decays, the fire subsides with no support, this is the logical result. 神之處形，猶火之在木，其生必並，其毀必滅。形離則神散而罔寄，木朽則火寂而靡托，理之然矣。

(T52. 2102. 31b22–24)

In the view of Huiyuan’s opponents, personhood exists within a specific body, much like fire resides in wood. Their birth must coexist, and their extinction must happen simultaneously. Therefore, when the body is gone, the personhood will scatter with nowhere to reside; when the wood decays, the fire will extinguish, having nowhere to depend on. This appears more akin to the earlier stated discourse in the Āgamas of “as the fire goes out when the firewood is exhausted, thereby gaining eternal residence”, because both stress that fire relies on firewood and “when firewood is exhausted, the fire goes out”. However, in reality, Huiyuan’s use of the firewood–fire metaphor was certainly not to emphasize the personhood being independent from the body as a substantial “self” independent from the aggregates. As his opponents stated, “When the wood decays, the fire quiets with no support”—a worldly metaphor representing an objective phenomenon that Huiyuan would likely not dispute. It appears that Huiyuan intended to emphasize that the decay of the wood is not a trivial matter. If one believes that personhood is extinguished after this life, this view is incorrect. Therefore, just as the Vātsīputrīya school’s designation of the past merely designates the relationship of past and future lives in the cycle of rebirth, Huiyuan’s fire transmission also largely expresses similar implications.

Neither the Āgamas nor Huiyuan’s XJSBM offer general discourses on the body–spirit relationship; instead, they provide context-specific discussions. The fire going out when the firewood is exhausted in the Āgamas applies to the time of Buddha’s nirvāṇa; only then can it be said that all firewood is burned out, and the fire finally extinguishes. Huiyuan’s opponent’s so-called fire on the wood emphasizes the correspondence between fire and wood. XJSBM does not abstractly stress the soul as a substance existing outside the body, ruling over the body. I believe that Huiyuan later reveals the purpose of writing this thesis:

Those who are deluded see the body decay in one life and assume that both the personhood and emotion have completely vanished, just as they see the fire exhaust one piece of wood and assume it is completely extinguished. 惑者見形朽於一生，便以為神情具喪，猶覩火窮於一木，謂終期都盡耳。

(T52. 2102. 32a4–5)

In Huiyuan’s view, those who are confused see the body of this one lifetime perish and assume that both the personhood and body have disappeared, considering this the ultimate extinction, much like those who believe fire exists only on this one piece of wood. The Āgamas’ phrase “when the firewood is exhausted, the fire goes out” refers to all firewood being burned out, and no new wood remaining, serving as a metaphor for the Buddha’s final life achieving nirvāṇa. However, Huiyuan’s opponents do not fall into this category but rather use any piece of wood as a metaphor indicating that life no longer possesses a personhood upon death. Huiyuan emphasizes that the firewood–fire metaphor originates from Buddhist canons, demonstrating his familiarity with the metaphor’s reference in the scriptures, and hence, he clearly could not agree with such a perspective.

The viewpoint of Huiyuan’s opponents is considered in Buddhism as an annihilationist view (ucchedavādā, duanjian 斷見), which believes that there is no cycle of rebirth after the end of life in this world. Indeed, Huiyuan is facing the annihilationist view advocating the theory of spirit extinction (shenmielun 神滅論). In the opening of XJSBM, the opponents pose a challenging question:

When one’s vital qi is exhausted in one lifetime (jiyu yisheng 極於一生), life ends and it dissipates, leaving no personhood, although as a wondrous thing that facilitates everything, it is the transformation of yin and yang. After transformation, it becomes life, and after another transformation, it becomes death. It gathers to begin and disperses to end. 夫稟氣極於一生，生盡則消液而同無神，雖妙物故是陰陽之化耳，既化而為生，又化而為死，既聚而為始，又散而為終。

(T52. 2102. 31b15–17)

From the phrase “exhausted in one lifetime”, it is clear that the opponents’ main argument emphasizes that there is no reincarnation after the end of one lifetime, which is considered a typical annihilationist view in Buddhism. Before Huiyuan, similar annihilationist views like those of his opponents were indeed prevalent, as pointed out by Yang Quan 楊泉 in his Theory of Things (Wuli Lun 物理論):

Humans are born by absorbing essence (Jingqi 精氣)39 and die when the essence is exhausted. Death, just like extinction, is like fire. When the firewood is exhausted, the fire goes out and there is no lighter. Therefore, after the fire is extinguished, no residual fire remains; and after a person dies, no soul remains. 人含氣而生，精盡而死。死，猶澌也，滅也。譬如火焉，薪盡而火滅，則無光矣。故滅火之余，無遺炎矣;人死之後，無遺魂矣。40

What Yang Quan advocates in the phrase, “no soul remains after a person dies”, is seen in Buddhism as emphasizing the annihilationist view that there is no cycle of rebirth after death in this life. Buddhism usually juxtaposes the annihilationist view and eternalist view (śāśvata-dṛṣṭi, changjian 常見) as two erroneous beliefs:

If one says: “The soul (*jīva) is the same as the body”, that person has no divine practice. Again, if one says: “The soul is different from the body”, that person has no divine practice. Not attached to these two extremes, one treads the middle way. 若見言：“命即是身。”彼梵行者所無有。若復見言：“命異身異。”梵行者所無有。於此二邊，心所不隨，正向中道。

(T02. 99. 84c20–23)

Here, jīva refers to the soul. The eternalist view or the theory of “self” that is that the soul is separate from the body implies that the soul is a spiritual substance that exists independently of the body. The view of the eternal soul is a kind of eternalist view. On the other hand, the annihilationist view of “non-self” or that the soul is the body posits that the soul and the body are inseparable, and when the body dies, the soul no longer has a basis for existence. The SĀ points out the following:

There is a teacher who perceives that the true self is in this world as known and spoken, yet knows nothing about what happens after life ends, this is called the first teacher coming out of the world... The first teacher who perceives the true self in this world as known and spoken is called the annihilationist view. 有一師，見現在世真實是我，如所知說，而無能知命終後事，是名第一師出於世間……其第一師見現在世真實是我，如所知說者，名曰斷見。

(T02. 99. 32a4–11)

For original Buddhism, represented by the Āgamas, the eternalist view refers to the real soul in the cycle of rebirth after the end of this life, while the annihilationist view refers to the cessation of rebirth after the end of a single life. Because the definition of “two views” in the mādhyamika school is different from that of original Buddhism, referring to “existence” and “non-existence”,41 the original Buddhist definition of the annihilationist view is often obscured, so much so that Huiyuan’s refutation of the annihilationist view has been overlooked. But Huiyuan’s statement that “the deluded see the decay of body in one life” reveals his main argument against the annihilationist view.

Therefore, Huiyuan does not use the eternalist view to refute the annihilationist view; the main theme of his XJSBM is solely to refute the annihilationist view. Refuting the annihilationist view does not necessarily mean advocating the eternalist view of a real soul separate from the body. However, Buddhist scholars, based on the strict definition of “self” in the Mādhyamaka school, often view his doctrine as a type of “theory of self”. Simultaneously, many researchers often interpret it as similar to the thought of the immortal soul in the context of Daoist magic arts because of the implications of the soul as a sovereign entity in the Chinese language, particularly as this kind of Daoist magical arts thinking was indeed prevalent in Huiyuan’s time.42 Just because these ideas coexisted with Huiyuan does not imply that he adopted them. On the contrary, Huiyuan was a steadfast opponent of these concepts. The TDŚ, to this point, regarding the meaning of the three designations, states:

The designation through the past is to control the annihilationist [view] of sentient beings. Designation through extinction is to control the eternalist [view]. 過去施設者，制眾生斷。滅施設者，制有常。

(T25. 1506. 24b6)

The Vātsīputrīya school precisely believes that the purpose of designation through the past is to counteract the annihilationist view, that is, the view that rebirth completely disappears after the end of a single life. Huiyuan’s proposal of the firewood and fire metaphor is indeed also aimed at opposing this kind of annihilationist view. However, he did not propose this view with the intention of advocating the eternalist view of the immortality of the soul. Contrarily, his attitude towards personhood is negative, something that needs to be dissolved. This is related to his discussion about transmigration.

3.3. Emotions Uncontrollable: The Similarity between Huiyuan’s Shen as “Upon Transmigration Cessation, Causes, and Conditions Cease Permanently” and the Vātsīputrīya’s Pudgala as “Designation through Extinction”

Although Huiyuan in XJSBM vehemently insists on the indestructibility of personhood, this emphasis is, in fact, an act of resignation. In his view, transmigration is the inevitable predicament for sentient beings burdened by emotions (qing 情):

Emotion is the mother of transmigration, personhood is the root of emotion, and emotion has a way of meeting the beginning. 情為化之母，神為情之根，情有會初之道。

(T52. 2102. 31c12–13)

In Huiyuan’s view, personhood is the source of emotion, but emotion is the direct cause of transmigration. Concerning the specific function of emotion, he points out the following:

[If one] has emotion, [one] can animate things [through] emotion; [if one] has cognition, [one] can seek to understand [through] numerals. 有情則可以物感，有識則可以數求。

(T52. 2102. 31c9–10)

According to Huiyuan, the reason why a “person” is a person is because of the emotion that gathers elements such as the five aggregates, causing them to constitute a causal chain that cycles and flows endlessly. Huiyuan evaluated emotion in the fourth piece, Pursuit of the Ultimate Truth for not Transmigration 求宗不順化 (henceforth QZBSH, Qiuzong Bushunhua), of his work BJWZL:

Emotion becomes increasingly stagnated, and entanglements grow deeper. How can the trouble it causes be asserted that it is exceptional? 情彌滯而累彌深，其為患也，焉可勝言哉？

(T52. 2102. 30c6–7)

Consequently, Huiyuan posits that due to the influence of various passions and desires, emotion increasingly solidifies and becomes more deeply entangled, embodying ignorance, attachment, and various other afflictions. Thus, emotion is the trouble that represents his thorough negation of emotion. It is precisely because emotion leads to reincarnation that Huiyuan pointed out the following in QZBSH:

If [we] do not allow emotion to burden life, then it is possible for life to be extinguished (zeshengkemie 則生可滅). [If we] do not allow life to burden the personhood, then the personhood can be extinguished (zeshenkeming 則神可冥). When mingshen juejing 冥神絕境, it is called entering nirvāṇa. 不以情累其生，則生可滅，不以生累其神，則神可冥，冥神絕境，故謂之泥洹。

(T52. 2102. 30c14–16)

In this context, Huiyuan’s statements “zeshengkemie 則生可滅” and “zeshenkeming 則神可冥” convey the state where both life and spirit (personhood) are extinguished.43 Therefore, Huiyuan believes that the true nirvāṇa lies precisely in not allowing emotion to burden life, thus completely extinguishing the possibility of life. This is the state of “when the firewood is exhausted, the fire goes out”, as described in the Āgamas. Only under this condition can the personhood be extinguished.

From the Daoist perspective, “mingshen juejing 冥神絕境” might be a natural, carefree state, a kind of transcendent state of existence. But in Huiyuan’s context, he merely borrowed the term from Daoism, not the connotation. However, Buddhist scholars during the Wei-Jin period were often influenced by Chinese thought or retrospectively applied the conditions of Buddhism after its full Tathāgatagarbha transformation to the Wei-Jin era, forgetting that the essence of meaning-matching Buddhism lies in the Indian Buddhist original meaning it defends. For instance, Furuta (1979, pp. 97–140) argues that Huiyuan’s shen promises its eternality and that its “mystery” (ming 冥) embodies the transcendence of spirit. M. Liu (2014, p. 29), based on Huiyuan’s depiction of the shen, points out that the eternity of the spirit propagated by Buddhism is not merely reminding us to value the spirit beyond the physical body. Its deeper implication lies in the fact that the emotional entanglements and physical constraints we perceive are false appearances, and the transcendent state of the spirit’s mystical unification with the divine realm is the true original home belonging to humanity. This interpretation of shen resembles Daoism more than Buddhism.44 Huiyuan’s mingshen juejing should be understood as the personhood that, as an affliction (ming),45 no longer takes the four elements, five aggregates, and so on as its object (jing), and thus does not give rise to new sentient beings, that is, personhood nevermore animating things and borrowing numerals. It corresponds to the designation through the extinction of the Vātsīputrīyas, or not receiving existence in the future in the Āgamas. But before this, the most crucial capability of personhood is postmortem transmigration, which his opponents deny:

Hence, Zhuangzi said: “The birth of a man is a concentration of qi. When qi is concentrated, it is life; when dispersed, it is death. What is my worry if the pains of life and death ?” Those who speak well of the Dao must have acquired it. If it is indeed so, the ultimate truth culminates in one life. It makes sense that when life ends, there is no transformation. 故莊子曰：“人之生，氣之聚，聚則為生，散則為死。若死生為彼徒苦，吾又何患？”古之善言道者，必有以得之，若果然耶，至理極於一生，生盡不化義可尋也。

(T52. 2102. 31b27-c1)

His opponents cite Zhuangzi’s view that concentration is life and dispersion is death to argue that the ultimate truth is limited to one life, and the spirit ceases to operate after the end of life. In response, Huiyuan also cites Zhuangzi’s discourse to refute this:

The debater does not seek the argument of being born and dying (fangsheng fangsi方生方死) but is confused about the concentration and dispersion in one transmigration. He does not think about personhood’s Dao as the spirit that stimulates things but says that the subtle and the coarse end together. Is this not sad? 論者不尋方生方死之說，而惑聚散於一化，不思神道有妙物之靈，而謂精粗同盡。不亦悲乎？

(T52. 2102. 31c23–25)

From this, it can be inferred that Huiyuan might not deny Zhuangzi’s statement that “concentration is life, dispersion is death”, and further responds to Zhuangzi’s view of life and death. In Huiyuan’s view, the real point of contention is not whether the body and the personhood are accompanied, but the ability of the personhood to transfer to different bodies. Therefore, he considers the argument that the ultimate truth culminates in one life to be confused about the concentration and dispersion in one transformation; the key is that there is only one life. His emphasis on the transmission of fire from firewood does not lie in expressing that fire is independent from firewood, but repeatedly clarifying that fire cannot be separated from firewood and that firewood continually emerges so that fire has no choice but to keep burning. On this matter, Huiyuan points out the following in his QZBSH:

The Three worlds flow, with sin and suffering as their field. [If] transmigration is exhausted, then causes and conditions cease forever (huajin ze yinyuan yongxi 化盡則因緣永息). [If they continue to] flow, suffering is endless. How can this be clear? [If] life takes the body as shackles, life is from transmigration. Transmigration [is from] emotions stimulating, then the personhood stagnates at its origin (ben 本), and intellect (zhi 智) dims its illumination (zhao 照). Once it is confined, what remains is only oneself, and what is involved is only movement. Hence, the spiritual rein (lingpei 灵辔) is lost, the path of life opens daily, and it follows desire (tan’ai 贪爱) in the long stream. Can it just be experienced once? 三界流動以罪苦為場，化盡則因緣永息，流動則受苦無窮，何以明其然？夫生以形為桎梏，而生由化有,化以情感，則神滯其本，而智昏其照，介然有封，則所存唯己，所涉唯動。於是靈轡失御生塗日開，方隨貪愛於長流，豈一受而已哉。

(T52. 2102. 30c4–13)

Huiyuan characterizes this endless transmission of the fire phenomenon as infinite suffering. He believes that the body is precisely the root of the fetters that bring life. Personhood is the trouble that impedes extinction. The intellect represents the spirit, manifesting cognitive functions, but the dim intellect46 obstructs illumination, which means the truth of Buddhism. It is due to the combined action of body and personhood that life continues to circulate in the sea of suffering of reincarnation.

Indeed, Huiyuan’s discussions are filled with descriptions of various sufferings in samsara, and many previous studies have viewed these as expressions of a plea for liberation, such as Lee (2021, pp. 79–115), who interprets Huiyuan’s discussions within the framework of the four noble truths. However, the key lies in understanding the role of the shen in this context—whether it is ultimately annihilated or if the practice merely purifies it. Lee (2021, p. 96) interprets the state of the soul’s original pure existence as envisioned by Huiyuan as our true liberation, describing this liberated state of the spirit as an original pure existence. Indeed, a notable distinction in Huiyuan’s use of the “fire and firewood” analogy, compared to the Āgamas and the Vātsīputrīya school, is that his discourse does not discuss the extinguishing of fire; perhaps for this reason, Lee translates the other three truths using common expressions—The Suffering, The Cause, The Path—yet uniquely describes the truth of cessation as “Liberation” instead of “Cessation”. As Lee subsequently notes, Huiyuan describes this process as “attaining the fundamental ideal by returning to the origin” and its result as nirvāṇa, which in Sanskrit indeed means the extinguishing of fire. On the other hand, if Huiyuan truly believed the shen to be something pure, why then does the above quotation use the phrase “the personhood stagnates at its origin” (shen zhi qi ben 神滯其本)? This might only be conceivable if he similarly held a negating attitude towards the personhood.

Therefore, Huiyuan’s assertion of the indestructibility of personhood does not emphasize personhood as having an absolute reality like the real self in Hinduism; it must inevitably not be separated from the five aggregates. The phrase indestructibility of personhood is only used because afflictions, like firewood, constantly emerge, and it is impossible to extinguish them without experiencing strenuous Buddhist learning activities. Hence, he says, “Can it just be experienced once?” Only after transmigration is exhausted and causes and conditions cease forever, can final liberation be achieved, which is the designation through the extinction of the Vātsīputrīyas. Only then will the great fire called shen truly cease.

In Zhuangzi’s philosophy, the term “as births, so deaths, as deaths, so births” (fangsheng fangsi 方生方死) refers to a transcendent, carefree poetic state where life and death are perceived as one.47 However, Huiyuan’s term “being born and dying” refers to the unceasing cycle of life and death, driven by immeasurable suffering. Therefore, the personhood that does not extinguish is not a metaphysical revelation of human nature by Huiyuan, but rather an explanation for the endless vexation from Huiyuan’s perspective. Who would not wish for the personhood to be extinguished?

4. Conclusions

This article investigates the Indian origins of Huiyuan’s firewood and fire metaphor, asserting that both the Āgamas and the Abhidharma made extensive use of the firewood and fire metaphor before Huiyuan. The Āgamas use the phrase “firewood is exhausted, fire is extinguished” as a metaphor for nirvāṇa, while the Vātsīputrīyas use the firewood and fire metaphor to analogize the pudgala subjected to multiple designations. From this, it is concluded that Huiyuan rejected the doctrine of a substantial “self”.

Further delving into Huiyuan’s discourse, we find that Huiyuan never claimed the existence of a real “self” separated from the aggregates. The main purpose of the XJSBM argument is to respond to the opponent’s assertion that life is exhausted with the dissipation of qi in one life, and with the exhaustion of life, the spirit also perishes, and to use this to refute the nihilistic view that there is nothing after the demise of one life. Huiyuan’s true doctrine, as revealed by the title of Pursuit of the Ultimate Truth for not Transmigration, is to take nirvāṇa, characterized by the period after the transmigration extinguishes causes and conditions, which cease permanently, as the doctrine, and to resist the conformity to the cycle of rebirth. Huiyuan’s argument has never deviated from the original Buddhist opposition to annihilationism and has also never accepted the frequent occurrence of a “self” separate from the aggregates, fully adhering to the spirit of “no-self” that has been followed since the original Buddhism.

However, Huiyuan’s readers, who often measure Huiyuan by the standard of the Mādhyamaka school and the prajñā thought, are ignorant of the original Buddhist discourse and misunderstand the Vātsīputrīyas’ notion of pudgala, being confined to the Wei-Jin “meaning-matching” Buddhist concept.48 They cannot penetrate these concepts to examine their Buddhist essence and consequently view Huiyuan as a representative of the belief in the immortality of the soul, akin to Daoist magic arts. But this author believes that Huiyuan’s description of the “personhood” in BJWZL fully corresponds to the Vātsīputrīyas’ three designations of the “indefinable aggregate” (as shown in the

Table 1. Comparison between the pudgala of the Vātsīputrīyas and Huiyuan’s Concept of shen.

Function	Vātsīputrīya School’s Pudgala	Lushan Huiyuan’s Shen
Unify the Five Skandhas	Designation through Sensation 受施設	Animating Things and Moves, Operating under Borrowing Numerals 感物而動，假數而行
The “Consistency” of Rebirth in Lifetimes	Designation of the Past 過去施設	Function of Postmortem Transmigration 冥移之功
The Object of Nirvāṇa	Designation through Extinction 滅施設	Upon Transmigration Cessation, Causes and Conditions Cease Permanently 化盡則因緣永息

below), and is a paradigm of Chinese Buddhists accurately grasping Indian Buddhist doctrine.

Huiyuan’s “matching meaning” strategy was more radical compared to Sengzhao, who widely quoted various Sūtras. Although we can deduct from his stance that the “firewood-fire metaphor originates from the holy canons” that he should have been aware of the rich firewood and fire metaphors in the original Buddhist scriptures and the Abhidharma literature of the various Buddhist schools, he completely obscured the Indian origin of the firewood and fire metaphor and widely cited the Zhuangzi as the basis for his argumentation. Apart from being a response to his opponent’s preemptive citation of the Zhuangzi, I suspect this was largely due to Huiyuan’s confidence in his Buddhist scholarship and his mastery of Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism concepts. However, as later Buddhists gradually abandoned “matching meaning” and the views of the Vātsīputrīyas were increasingly criticized by Mahāyāna Buddhism as the heretical belief in a “real self”, Huiyuan’s insights were obscured in the dust of history. His scattered references to the shen were unfairly derided as identical to the concept of an eternal soul found in Daoist magical arts.

Finally, I believe this paper’s contribution lies in adhering to certain universally unchallenged principles, such as prioritizing the internal perspectives of Buddhism over external viewpoints and paying closer attention to texts associated with figures closely linked to Huiyuan. These aspects have been variously overlooked in previous research. Additionally, I acknowledge that within Buddhism, there are undoubtedly interpretations that regard shen as an immortal soul that must be purified to achieve liberation. It is also undeniable that Huiyuan was influenced by the MPU or the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras. However, if we avoid projecting later interpretations of Buddhism onto his era, this should form the basis of a secondary investigation. Since the 20th century, Buddhist studies have increasingly focused on the Āgamas and Abhidharma, yet when engaging with Chinese Buddhist philosophy or doctrine, these texts and this research seems forgotten. Despite the well-known close interaction between Huiyuan and Saṃghadeva involving translations of Abhidharma texts and his preface to the TDŚ, it seems that East Asian Buddhism is not an isolated phenomenon. By updating our understanding of Indian Buddhism, we may gain a deeper insight into East Asia.