Scotus, Aquinas, & Radical Orthodoxy: Using the Law of Non-Contradiction to Reframe the Univocalist Debate
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Scotus’ Argument from Contradiction
Having stated his thesis, Scotus then defines its terms:I say that God is not only conceived in a concept that is analogous to a concept of a creature—that is, in a concept that is entirely different from one that is applied to a creature—but also in a concept that is univocal to him and to a creature.(Ordinatio, 1.3.Q2.26)5
Scotus hereby weds univocity to logic. The laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle cannot survive being torn asunder from univocation. Regarding the former law, ‘X’ and ‘not X’ can only be a contradiction if X has a univocal meaning in both statements. The statements “the Titanic sunk” and “the Titanic has not sunk” only contradict if there is a univocal meaning for the term “Titanic”. Unless both speakers are referring to the same boat—i.e., the one that sank in the North Atlantic on 15 April 1912—then there can be no contradiction, for the statements do not contradict if one refers to the famous Titanic sinking, while the other refers to a large rugby player taking a bath. Univocity is also essential to syllogisms. In the syllogism ‘A is B, B is C, therefore A is C’ (Ibid, pp. 11–12), the term ‘B’ must have the same univocal meaning throughout.7 For example, take the famous syllogism:And to avoid disagreement over the word “univocation,” I call a concept univocal if it is one in such a way that its unity is sufficient for a contradiction to arise when it is affirmed and denied of the same thing. Its unity is also sufficient for its use as a middle term in a syllogism so that we may conclude without committing a fallacy of equivocation that when the extremes are united in the middle term having that unity, they are also united among themselves.(Ordinatio, 1.3.Q2.26)6
Unless the shared term ‘man’ is univocal in both instances the logical conclusion cannot be reached, and any homeless man with a beard might actually be the undead Socrates. Cross has already clearly articulated this reading, showing that Scotus believed one’s terms must stand still if theology is to be taken seriously as scientia. (Cross 2007, p. 194) Thus, without univocity “theology would simply perish”.8 In light of this, Scotus rather provocatively suggests that since other Masters use deductive arguments in both natural and revealed theology,9 therefore univocity is not an aberration from the prevailing tradition but ever assumed within it: “Masters who write of God and of those things that are known of God, observe the univocity of being in the way in which they speak, even though they deny it with their words”. (Ordinatio, 1.3.1, n. 7, XI).10Socrates is a man.All men are mortal.Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
This flows out of Scotus’ former definition of univocity, for if the statements ‘God is a finite being’ and ‘God is an infinite being’ are contradictory, then the shared term ‘being’ must be univocal (as in the Titanic example).13 Ironically, on this view, only univocity can properly articulate the ontological difference between infinite creator and finite creature, for only if there is a univocally shared term can heaven and earth be logically distinguished. While the historical controversy this argument generated is beyond our scope, its distinction between doubtful and certain concepts is useful for illustrating Scotus’ use of the law of non-contradiction as well as his desire to articulate the creator-creature divide.The first argument runs as follows: every intellect that is certain about one concept and dubious about others has the concept about which it is certain as other than the dubious concept. The subject includes the predicate. But the intellect of a person in this life can be certain that God is a being while doubting whether this being is finite or infinite, created or uncreated; therefore, the concept of God as a being is other than this or that concept; and although included in each of these, it is none of them of itself, and therefore it is univocal… Proof of the major premise: one and the same concept can never be certain and doubtful at the same time. So either it is another concept [different from the doubtful ones], which is our thesis, or it is not, but then there is no certainty for any concept.12
If an analogy is merely the juxtaposition of two distinct concepts without any univocal commonality, then God can be characterized as a stone with the same accuracy as he can be called wise, for both concepts are equally blind (Labooy 2014, p. 65). This version of analogy is unable to provide the unity required for a contradiction, for the two concepts are distinct, and so cannot have a shared underlying term.15if you say that the formal notion is other as regards those things that pertain to God, a disconcerting consequence results, that from the proper notion of anything found in creatures nothing can be inferred about God, because the notion of what each has is entirely different; indeed, there is no more reason to conclude that God is formally wise from the notion of wisdom that we perceive in creatures than there is to conclude that God is formally a stone; for some concept other than the concept of a created stone can be formed that bears a relationship to the concept of a stone as an idea in God, and therefore one can say, “God is formally a stone”, according to this analogous conception, just as he can be said to be “wise” according to that other analogous concept.(Ordinatio I, d. 3, nos. 39–40)14
One first peels off all the creaturely imperfections from a term then magnifies the remnant to an infinite degree appropriate for the divine (Christopher Insole calls this the “Infinity Function”) (Insole 2001). As Bercken summarizes: “We can only attribute pure perfections to God if we first have a notion of what a pure perfection is, independently of God’s having it”.17 However, an even simpler way of referring to the divine could be found not merely in infinite perfections but in infinity itself.18 Infinity does not add any additional content to being:every metaphysical inquiry about God proceeds in the following way: it considers the formal notion (ratio) of something, then it removes from that formal notion the imperfection that it has in creatures while retaining the formal notion as such, to which it then attributes completely the highest perfection and in this way, it attributes that notion to God. For example, take the formal notion of wisdom (or of intellect) or of the will. It is first considered in itself and according to itself. Then, given that this notion does not in itself formally imply any imperfection or limitation, the imperfections that are connected with it in creatures are removed from it. Then, once the notions of wisdom and will as such are preserved, these properties are attributed to God in the most perfect way. Therefore, every inquiry about God assumes that the intellect has an identical, univocal concept that it receives from creatures.(Ordinatio 1.3.Q2. 39–40)16
Regarding intense whiteness, there are not two separate things added together (i.e., whiteness and intensity) into a compound. You cannot have color without a degree of shade; color always comes ‘pre-shaded’. The intensity of color is not something external added after the fact, but a mode of its own intrinsic being. In Cross’ words, the “shade is variable but not a separate property”.20 In the same way, the degree of being, whether infinite or finite, does not compound or add something to being (i.e., such as adding ‘wisdom’ or ‘goodness’ would do) but is merely a mode (i.e., the level of intensity) of being. Infinity does not negate simplicity and thus is the highest possible designation for the divine. Scotus thus takes such pains to protect divine otherness through simplicity and infinity, revealing a similarity—at least of intention—with Aquinas, who also peeled off creaturely layers from perfection terms (e.g., Summa Theologiae q.13.9). It is fitting that both of their nicknames are degrading, for both the ‘dumb ox’ and the ‘dunce’ are ever-humble at the feet of transcendence.a concept more perfect and yet simpler, available for us, is the concept of infinite being. This concept is simpler than the concept ‘good being’, ‘true being’ or concepts of other, similar things; because ‘infinite’ is not a quasi-attribute or property of being, or of that of which it is said. Rather it signals an intrinsic mode of that entity, such that when I say ‘infinite being’ I don’t have a concept that is like an accidental concept, composed out of the subject and property, but, rather, I have an essential concept of a subject in a certain grade of perfection, viz. infinity, just as ‘intense white’ doesn’t express the same things as an accidental concept like ‘visible white’, indeed the intensity expresses an intrinsic grade of whiteness in itself. And thus the simplicity of the concept ‘infinite being’ is evident.(Ordinatio. I, d. 3, pt. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 58, Vat. III.40)19
3. Expanding the Argument from Contradiction
That is why Aristotle wrote that anyone who negates the law of non-contradiction is “no better than a mere plant [i.e., an unthinking object] … if words have no meaning, [then] reasoning with other people, and indeed with oneself, has been annihilated”.29 While some might appear to have moved past the law of non-contradiction (e.g., Pseudo-Dionysius),30 most theologians would have to rethink their systems in order to continue in their rejection of univocity. While Radical Orthodoxy has tended to underemphasize the analytical side of Thomas Aquinas,31 even he held unshakeably to the law of non-contradiction:To argue that the law of non-contradiction is false is to imply that it is not also true. In other words, the critic presupposes that what he or she is criticizing can be either true or false, but not both true and false. But this presupposition is just the law of non-contradiction itself—the same law the critic aims to refute. In other words, anyone who denies the principle of non-contradiction simultaneously affirms it.
the first indemonstrable principle is that ‘the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time,’ which is based on the notion of ‘being’ and ‘not-being’: and on this principle all others are based….(Summa Theologiae 1a, 1, 8, ad 2)32
For a more modern example (of which there are many), Alan Darley—in his defense of the rationality of analogy—maintains the strong thesis that:First of all that which destroys the nature of being is contrary to it. Now, the nature of being is destroyed by its opposite, just as the nature of man is destroyed by things opposite in nature to him or to his parts. But the opposite of being is non-being, with respect to which God is inoperative, so that he cannot make one and the same thing to be and not to be; he cannot make contradictories to exist simultaneously… God is unable to make opposites exist in the same subject at the same time and in the same respect.(Summa Contra Gentiles, Book II, ch 25, par 11–12)33
[the law of non-contradiction] applies to [God] literally and supremely… The principle of non-contradiction is grounded upon the Primary Name of God, He Who Is, by which He cannot not Be. Similarly, the law of identity (A = A), which depends on the law of non-contradiction, is the creaturely analogue of the Tetragrammaton, ‘I AM THAT I AM.’ (Exodus 3:14).(Ibid, p. 231)
Pickstock justifies her position by arguing that since the laws of logic were formulated within an Aristotelian ontology they lose their applicability when looking beyond finite substance:…does analogy in logic violate the principle of non-contradiction? One must concede… that it appears to do so. Scotus was rigorous and correct in this respect… Just as there can only be pure identity and simplicity in the infinite—since finite things are always composed and shifting—so, inversely, there can be no mere logical identity in the un-limited since this notion only makes sense by reference to limitations.34
Thus, basic laws of logic seem to break down on the doorstep of divinity.35For Aristotle… the law of excluded middle applies because there is such a thing as (for him always limited) “substance”… If God, as according to Aquinas, lies beyond limited substance, then the law loses its field of application. In a similar fashion, the law of excluded middle cannot readily apply to participation of the bounded in the unbounded. For the finite to enter into participation in the infinite is to enter into identity and non-identity, and this coincidence is reflected and doubled in the circumstance that the finite here becomes both finite and infinite at once… Creation seems to impose these mysteries and the incomprehensible logic of analogy seems sensitive to them. According to a Scotist perspective, however, they undergo a démystification… the space for the Logos to amend even our logic may be somewhat lacking on Scotist premises.(Ibid, pp. 554–55, 557–58)
Dialetheism recognizes that lived experience requires one to constantly bracket off areas of unresolved contradiction (e.g., between determinism and freewill), without these exploding and wiping out all other forms of reasoning (e.g., that my car and another car cannot inhabit the same space at the same time) (Ibid, 234.). Thus, one could maintain—perhaps for scriptural or theological reasons—that analogy is entitled to a trans-logical status while univocity is not, for one contradiction does not automatically justify another. However—even if one were to grant the truth of dialetheism—this objection would still be moot, for univocity is not ‘another’ contradiction at all. Rather, univocity would be entailed in the contradiction of analogy itself. This becomes clear when one thinks through the implications of Pickstock’s claim:It might be argued that if it is logically possible for any contradiction to be true… then all contradictions are rationally acceptable. This, though, most certainly does not follow… The fact that something is a logical possibility does not entail that it is rational to believe it. It is logically possible that I am a fried egg, though believing that I am is grounds for certifiable insanity… there is a lot more to rationality than consistency. A view, such as that the earth is flat, may be quite consistent (and so logically possible in traditional terms), and yet quite irrational….
participated esse at once is and is not the divine esse: if a thing is “like” what is higher than it, and this is irreducible to its being like in some ways (univocally) and unlike in other ways (equivocally), then it must be at once present as something that exists and yet also present as not this thing—and in the same way and the same respect.38
4. Conclusions
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1 | See Ordinatio, 1.3.Q2.35. |
2 | E.g., J. Derrida (1967), L’écriture et la différence (Paris: Seuil), p. 216; G. Deleuze (1968), Différence et répétition (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France), pp. 52–58. This further develops in the late century through Courtine, Boulnois, Prouvost, and Marion, et al. For further information, see Hankey and Hedley (2005, p. 56). |
3 | The main critique of Scotus comes from the Radical Orthodoxy camp, led by John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock. See Catherine Pickstock (2005). |
4 | The most famous example can be found in Aquinas. See ST 1a, q.13, arts. 1–12. |
5 | Translation from Bercken (2016, p. 42). “Secundo dico quod non tantum in conceptu analogo conceptui creaturae concipitur Deus, scilicet qui omnino sit alius ab illo qui de creatura dicitur, sed in conceptu aliquo univoco sibi et creaturae”. |
6 | Ibid, 42. “Et ne fiat contentio de nomine univocationis, univocum conceptum dico, qui ita est unus quod eius unitas sufficit ad contradictionem, affirmando et negando ipsum de eodem; sufficit etiam pro medio syllogistico, ut extrema unita in medio sic uno sine fallacia aequivocationis concludantur inter se uniri”. |
7 | Richard Cross, “Scotus and Suárez at the Origins of Modernity”. Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy: Postmodern Theology, Rhetoric, and Truth, edited by W. J. Hankey and Douglas Hedley. (Hankey and Hedley 2005), 71. |
8 | |
9 | Lectura, 1.3.1.1-2, n. 113. |
10 | Quoted from Cross, Scotus and Suárez, 72. Cf. Reportatio IA, d. 3, q. 1, n. 38. In other words, they implicitly assume univocal concepts while denying them explicitly with their words. |
11 | See Ordinatio, 1.3. Q2.35. |
12 | Ordinatio I, d. 3, nos. 25–30. Translation from Frank and Wolter (1996, pp. 111, 123). “Primo sic: Omnis intellectus certus de uno connceptu, et dubius de diversis, habet conceptum de quo est certus, alium a conceptibus de quibus est dubius: subjectum includit praedicatum: sed intellectus viatoris potest esse certus de Deo, quod sit ens, dubitando de ento finito vel infinito, creato vel increato; ergo conceptus entis de Deo est alius a conceptu isto vel illo, et ita neuter ex se, sed in utroque illorum includitur; ergo univocus. Probatio maioris: quia nullus idem conceptus est certus et dubius; ergo vel alius, quod est propositum, vel nullus—et tune non erit certitudo de aliquo conceptu”. |
13 | Cross, Faith, 195. It is worth noting that Cardinal Cajetan also saw this objection, realizing that an analogy of attribution would always lead to some univocally shared predicate. Thus, Cajetan sheltered Aquinas by over-emphasizing his view of analogy as proportionality. There is no shared trait or concept between creator and creature (e.g., Wisdom, Goodness) but merely a relation of proportionality (e.g., God is to humanity as humanity is to ants). Cajetan’s rendition of Aquinas fell under harsh scrutiny in the twentieth century (some of which was a resourcing of critiques already made in Cajetan’s time). Not only does it drastically reduce the breadth of Aquinas, but proportionality itself must always rely on some shred of attribution, for how can something serve as a term in a proportional relation if it does not have some prior shape or meaning? For a fuller discussion see Rocca (2008, pp. 103–35). |
14 | Translation from Frank, Metaphysician, 115. “Quod si dicas, alia est formalis ratio eorum quae conveniunt Deo, -ex hoc sequitur inconveniens, quod ex nulla ratione propria eorum prout sunt in creaturis, possunt concludi de Deo, quia omnino alia et al.ia ratio illorum est et istorum; immo non magis concludetur quod Deus est sapiens formaliter, ex ratione sapientiae quam apprehendimus ex creaturis, quam quod Deus est formaliter lapis: potest enim conceptus aliquis, alius a conceptu lapidis creati, formari, ad quem conceptum lapidis ut est idea in Deo habet iste lapis attributionem, et ita formaliter diceretur ‘Deus est lapis’, secundum istum conceptum analogum, sicut ‘sapiens’, secundum illum conceptum analogum”. Different translations have been enlisted throughout to highlight different aspects of the text. |
15 | |
16 | Translation from Ibid, 57. “Omnis inquisitio metaphysica de Deo sic procedit, considerando formalem rationem alicuius et auferendo ab illa ratione formali imperfectionem quam habet in creaturis, et reservando illam rationem formalem et attribuendo sibi omnino summam perfectionem, et sic attribuendo illud Deo. Exemplum de formali ratione sapientiae (vel intellectus) vel voluntatis: consideratur enim in se et secundum se; et ex hoc quod ista ratio non concludit formaliter imperfectionem aliquam nec limitationem, removentur ab ipsa imperfectiones quae concomitantur eam in creaturis, et reservata eadem ratione sapientiae et voluntatis attribuuntur ista Deo perfectissime. Ergo omnis inquisitio de Deo supponit intellectum habere conceptum eundem, univocum, quem accepit ex creaturis”. See also Ordinatio I, d. 3, nos. 39–40. |
17 | Furthermore, perfection terms must be univocal or else they would be imperfect, which is—by definition—the opposite of perfection, rendering perfection terms qualitatively unthinkable. See Bercken (2016, p. 13). |
18 | |
19 | Quoted from Bercken (2016, pp. 59–62). “Tamen conceptus perfectior simul et simplicior, nobis possibilis, est conceptus entis infiniti. Iste enim est simplicior quam conceptus entis boni, entis veri, vel aliorum similium, quia ‘infinitum’ non est quasi attributum vel passio entis, sive eius de quo dicitur, sed dicit modum intrinsecum illius entitatis, ita quod cum dico ‘infinitum ens’, non habeo conceptum quasi per accidens, ex subiecto et passione, sed conceptum per se subiecti in certo gradu perfectionis, scilicet infinitatis,—sicut albedo intensa non dicit conceptum per accidens sicut albedo visibilis, immo intensio dicit gradum intrinsecum albedinis in se. Et ita patet simpli citas huius conceptus ‘ens infinitum’”. |
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21 | |
22 | |
23 | |
24 | “I say that God is not only conceived in a concept that is analogous to a concept of a creature—that is, in a concept that is entirely different from one that is applied to a creature—but also in a concept that is univocal to him and to a creature”. Ordinatio, 1.3.Q2.26. Translation from Bercken, 42. Italics my own. The ‘not only’ may perhaps be crucial here, for Scotus does not necessarily wish to negate analogical otherness altogether, but exposes that all successful statements of such otherness have a latent univocal core that makes them statable. In Latin: “Secundo dico quod non tantum in conceptu analogo conceptui creaturae concipitur Deus, scilicet qui omnino sit alius ab illo qui de creatura dicitur, sed in conceptu aliquo univoco sibi et creaturae”. |
25 | In Summa Theologiae 1a.13.5 Aquinas does not negate univocity but merely a pure univocity: “…some words are used neither purely univocally nor purely equivocally…” Translation by O’Rourke (1964, p. 65). Indeed, though Scotus and Aquinas take different approaches, both seem to ultimately intend to carve out a middle path where theological language is neither fully equivocal nor fully univocal. |
26 | “…a genuine and full divine transcendence is retained in Scotus through the emphasis on infinity, at once incommensurably distant and boundless, as the key divine property”. “Both thinkers [Scotus and Aquinas] exhibit a better grasp of the more transcendent and ontologically deeper and more drastic character of the Creator/created divide. If Aquinas renders it coincident with the ontological difference between Being and beings or between Act and partial act still in potency to full actuality, then Scotus expresses it in terms of the gulf between the simplicity of the infinite and the always composed character of the finite and, like Aquinas, realizes that purely spiritual beings can also be composed—in his case of a limited substantive grouping of formalities”. “What this prevarication fascinatingly shows is Scotus’s unease about the implications of his approach and an implicit fear that he is in danger of overly “containing” God” (Milbank 2017). |
27 | There are perhaps hints of this direction in Petrus Thomae, Francis Mayronis, or Nicolas Bonetus, and as such, ‘step further’ in this sentence is not meant to imply that this is somehow forging an entirely new path, but that one is merely going a single step further along that path than Scotus and others. |
28 | Any term that translates the applicability of the Law of non-contradiction into a predicate should suffice. |
29 | Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1006b8-9. |
30 | For a good discussion of Pseudo-Dionysius on this question, see Fitzgerald (2009), pp. 243–54. |
31 | “Radical Orthodoxy, following Chenu, Gilson, and De Lubac, has tended to privilege the neo-Platonic, mystical elements of Thomas’ thought at the expense of the more analytic, Aristotelian aspects, but this approach can only be justified by largely dismissing Thomas’ commentaries on Aristotle as unrepresentative of his own thought, a contentious interpretation which runs into problems in the parallel cases of his commentaries on Scripture or on the neo-Platonic texts such as the Book of Causes or the Divine Names of Dionysius which are clearly interpreted in the light of Aristotle. One must question why Thomas would bother to write a commentary on a book unless he thought it had authority, so it seems safer to assume that he agrees with the authority unless there is clear textual evidence to the contrary” (Darley 2013, p. 229). |
32 | Translation from Ibid, 229. “Et ideo primum principium indemonstrabile est quod non est simul affirmare et negare, quod fundatur supra rationem entis et non entis, et super hoc principio omnia alia fundantur…” |
33 | Translation from Ibid, 229. “Primo quidem igitur contra rationem entis est quod entis rationem tollit. Tollitur autem ratio entis per suum oppositum: sicut ratio hominis per opposita eius vel particularum ipsius. Oppositum autem entis est non ens. Hoc igitur Deus non potest, ut faciat simul unum et idem esse et non esse: quod est contradictoria esse simul… Unde eiusdem rationis etiam est quod Deus non possit facere opposita simul inesse eidem secundum idem”. |
34 | |
35 | Descartes made a similar claim, contending that God could have made a contradiction if he had willed it: “…no good or evil, nothing to be believed, or done, or omitted, can be fixed upon, the idea whereof was in the divine intellect before his will determined itself to effect that such a thing should be… neither willed he that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two right angles, because he knew that it could not be otherwise. But on the contrary… because he [wanted] that the three angles of a triangle should necessarily be equal to two right angles, therefore this is true and no otherwise…” Descartes as quoted in and translated by Cudworth and Hutton (1996, p. 22). Descartes was soon accused by Cudworth, among others, of elevating the will above intellect and thus negating not only truth but eternal morality as well, reducing right and wrong to the arbitrary will of God. Ibid, 16–17. It is difficult to see how Radical Orthodoxy can make this move beyond reason without likewise elevating the will over the intellect, ironically coming quite close to what they accuse the Scotist tradition of creating in its later, more nihilistic, manifestations. Cf. Milbank (2013, pp. 34–49). |
36 | One may protest that univocity was never a logical problem but a theological one, e.g., univocity is wrong because scripture rejects idolatry. In this way, analogy and univocity could both be philosophically exempt from the laws of logic and yet only analogy would be theologically permissible. However, the theological issue only arose because of its use of logic, for creaturely language is improper precisely because it allegedly contradicts divine transcendence. If contradictions are allowed, then finite language can be contradictorily applied to the divine without negating transcendence. The theological problem of idolatry only applies in light of the logical either/or of creator/creature. Thus, the logical question cannot be distinguished from the theological one, and if the former is side-stepped then so is the latter. |
37 | “… there is some evidence within the text of The Divine Names to suggest that even Dionysius drew back from discounting the applicability of the law of non-contradiction to God… For God to deny himself would entail falling from truth and since (in language reminiscent of Aristotle), ‘truth is being’… this would also entail falling from being which is impossible even for God. ‘God cannot fall from being’. The Greek text adds… ‘and therefore is not not to be’, which implies, in its context of a discussion on omnipotence, that He cannot be and not be at the same time. Dionysius further explains that this is because of his perfect power: God cannot lack anything, including truth, knowledge, or being. In this passage, at least, Denys sees no conflict between God as transcendently beyond everything he has made, including the power ‘to be’ and the fact that he cannot fall from truth or ‘fall from being’. This is a surprising text which is difficult to square with his other assertions regarding God as ‘beyond being’. … O’Rourke concludes that it is an ‘exception’ in which Dionysius ‘appeals to an evidence to which, on his own terms, he is not entitled’”. Darley (2013, p. 230). |
38 | |
39 | Not only would this reconcile univocity and analogy but also equivocality and analogy, for analogous speech could be declared 100% equivocal. This could help defend the analogy from the critiques of Barth and Pannenberg, who maintained that the analogy of being negated the otherness of God. For a helpful analysis of said critiques, see Rocca (2008, pp. 93–103). |
40 | |
41 | |
42 | One could also rework this thusly: if ‘being’ is not univocal to God and creatures, and even Aquinas admits the law of non-contradiction builds on the concept of ‘being’, (Summa Theologiae 1a, 1, 8, ad 2) then the law itself can only hold analogically. In which case, once again, univocity could both apply and not apply. |
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Lyonhart, J.D. Scotus, Aquinas, & Radical Orthodoxy: Using the Law of Non-Contradiction to Reframe the Univocalist Debate. Religions 2024, 15, 994. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15080994
Lyonhart JD. Scotus, Aquinas, & Radical Orthodoxy: Using the Law of Non-Contradiction to Reframe the Univocalist Debate. Religions. 2024; 15(8):994. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15080994
Chicago/Turabian StyleLyonhart, Jonathan David. 2024. "Scotus, Aquinas, & Radical Orthodoxy: Using the Law of Non-Contradiction to Reframe the Univocalist Debate" Religions 15, no. 8: 994. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15080994