Dao, the Godhead, and the Wandering Way: Daoism and Eckhart’s Mystical Theology

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

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Comments for author File: Comments.pdf

Author Response

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Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

This article argues that “there is an interesting congruence between Daoism and Meister Eckhart’s mystical theology.” In advancing this argument, the article makes profitable comparisons between “Daoism” and Christian mysticism. In this respect, the author argues that “In both systems, nature at its fundamental level is characterized by namelessness, emptiness, encompassment, and dynamism.” These are interesting propositions.

I have, however, some remarks for improving this article:

1.     Key concepts such as Dao, “Daoism,” and “nature” should be dealt with more carefully. I believe this is an important and yet easy-to-solve issue. The author could engage, for example, James Miller’s China's Green Religion: Daoism and the Quest for a Sustainable Future (Columbia University Press) for discussions about terms such as Dao, Daoism and nature.

2.     P.1: “Like the Dao, the Godhead is the ground of all being.” I agree. Yet, there might be an important distinction between the Dao as envisioned in early Daoist scriptures such as the Laozi and the Godhead. The Dao and the Godhead might be the Absolut, but the Dao is Impersonal, while the Godhead is, by Christian standards, a Personal Being. Even in the Daoism of the Heavenly Masters and later Daoist movements, the Dao remains an impersonal principle. In later Daoist theologies, the Dao transforms himself into Yuanshi Tianzun 元始天尊, Lingbao Tianzun 靈寶天尊, and finally Daode Tianzun 道德天尊and his posterior incarnations as Laozi (see Vincent Goossaert, “Daoist Primers,” in Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies). But is Yuanshi Tianzun a Personal God? I believe that the gods of the Daoist pantheon (e.g., the Three Pure Ones 三清) are hardly “personal” in the Christian sense of a transcendent God who cares about establishing a personal relationship with His creation. Robert Hymes deals with a similar problem in his Way and By-Way. The distinction between Personal and Impersonal is a matter of great debate, for example, in the Hindu tradition. The author probably should acknowledge this distinction between Impersonal and Personal forms of the Absolut as an important question for comparative studies of religion.

3.     P. 3, line 91: “Each of these aspects challenge a view of nature” This sentence is incomplete.

4.     P. 3: “However, since the Dao is meant to be referring to a 105 state of perfection and origin from” What kind of perfection? Moral? Ontological?

5.     P. 3: “It is important to remember that the Dao can be regarded as the condition for the cosmos themselves.” Why does the author refer to “cosmos” in the plural?

6.     P. 3: “In a technical sense, the Dao is not a thing (determinate being), and thus, it is nothing.” Perhaps “no-thing” is a more precise way of putting it? The author probably means that the Dao is not a discernible thing; rather, it is the pre-condition for everything.

7.     P. 4: “However, as already noted, the Godhead 150 of Eckhart is not referring to the personal deity of Christianity, but to the very condition 151 for those Triune persons.” This is very important and goes back to my second point. In my opinion, the author should address this problem (the Absolut as Personal vs Impersonal) right in the beginning of the article.

8.     P. 4: “According to Eckhart, the 161 Godhead “is neither this nor that that one can speak of” This is very interesting and there is a lot of space for comparison with other traditions, such as Vedanta (e.g., neti-neti theology).

9.     A minor issue which happens throughout the article: the author italicizes Chinese characters, which is not necessary.

10.  Concerning the section “The Person: The Joyous Wanderer,” I completely disagree with the author’s views. I would argue that the Zhuangzi and later Daoist ritual traditions propose methods for annihilating the “person” and the “self” for ends that have nothing to do with being free from social constraints. Indeed, in my forthcoming book I demonstrate that this Daoist “discourse” has to do with the social body and the polity. But I believe the paper does a good job in articulating its argument. From this perspective, whether I agree or disagree is less important than the fact that the section functions well as an argumentative piece.

Overall, I think: (1) the author must be more explicit about the Personal/Impersonal Absolut/Being problem; (2) because the author approaches “Daoism” from a philosophical perspective, they ignore Daoist Studies literature. However, Daoist Studies is very important for understanding the transformations of the impersonal Dao into a divine bureaucracy of “personal,” or at least, anthropomorphic deities (see Miller and Goossaert); (3) as a Daoist Studies scholar, I do not endorse the author’s understanding of Daoism. Indeed, I believe the article presupposes a strong distinction between “philosophical” and “religious” Daoism. But this is just a guess. Nowhere does the article explicitly invokes this dichotomy; (4) I do not agree with the basic conceptual framework informing this article. However, I endorse the intellectualist approach of this article, which I would like to see more often in Daoist Studies articles and books; (5) In my opinion, this article is a well-articulated piece that deserves being published. Its main contribution is putting philosophical discussions of Daoism to the service of a comparative perspective, which effectively broadens the reader’s understanding of the intriguing nature of the Dao/Godhead.

Author Response

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Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 3 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The paper “Dao, the Godhead, and the Wandering Way: Daoism and Eckhart’s Mystical Theology” compares the two teachings, particularly the two concepts “Dao” and “Godhead”. The attempt is exceptional and presents fresh research possibilities.

Above all, the comparison is highly commendable. Clearly, Daoism and Eckhartism are never strange for any scholar in intellectual, conceptual or religious studies. Few scholars, however, have attempted to compare the two concepts (Dao and the Godhead) or the two teachings. In the English-speaking world, as far as I can see, there is merely an unscholarly paper by Matthew Fox. For another, while Eckhart’s work has been partially translated into Chinese since 2003, few Chinese scholars have noted this, except for a brief introduction in a doctoral dissertation. The paper significantly addresses the gap and present some intriguing arguments.

Overall, most arguments in the paper are admirable, well-organised and sharp, but two shortcomings need to be addressed before publication.

The first shortcoming is that the source and second literature concerning Dao, Daoism and the Daodejing are somewhat. The discussion regarding Eckhart and Eckhartism, as can be seen, is well-supported and eloquent, with the author employing numerous second sources to support and develop the argument. However, when it comes to the Dao and Daoism, the sources and supporting references are much fewer, and the author barely employs any second literature written in Chinese. The interpretation history of the Daodejing is more than 1,800 years, and related commentarial texts are numerous. Ignoring the innumerable sources is unthinkably risky. The shortcoming may be caused by a language barrier. If so, the author could refer to The Daode jing Commentary of Cheng Xuanying: Daoism, Buddhism, and the Laozi in the Tang Dynasty. The text fully translates Cheng Xuanying’s commentary, which is a landmark in the interpretation history of the Daodejing.

The second problem is Hans-Georg Moeller’s translation of the Daodejing, which is frequently quoted in the paper, is occasionally inaccurate and misleading. As the beginning of the third section clarifies (lines 170-173), “All of the ten-thousand things find their origin in the Dao, and so, their innermost nature and existence comes from nothing apart from the Dao. Therefore, all things are prefigured and enfolded in the Dao; ‘The Dao is the flow of the ten thousand things.’ This includes contradictions, such as presence and nonpresence.”

The quoted text contains a phrase of the Daodejing: “The Dao is the flow of the ten thousand things”. However, the translation of the phrase is misleading.

I quote the original text here to clarify the problem better. The original Chinese text is “道者，万物之奥”. The translation probably misinterprets the character “奥”. I have examined many official Chinese dictionaries and found that the character should not be translated into “flow” according to available lexical resources. When referring to other translated works of the Daodejing, we can read different approaches. Stephen Mitchell translates the sentence into “The Tao is the center of the universe.” For another, the sentence is translated “the Way is the reservoir of the myriad thing” by Edmund Ryden. Moreover, commentaries to the Daodejing generally align with the interpretations of Mitchell and Ryden. Therefore, I have to say the Moeller’s translation of “奥” is groundless and misleading (unless some supporting evidence or clues can be provided). The author should correct this understanding and reconsider the related argument accordingly.

Although I do not want to underestimate Moeller’s work, but I have to say it is probably not the best choice for academic research in this context. The author could employ the works by Stephen Mitchell and Edmund Ryden as the references before submitting the revised draft.

Overall, the paper is well-written and can be published, provided that the author fully addresses the two aforementioned shortcomings.

Comments for author File: Comments.pdf

Author Response

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Author Response File: Author Response.pdf