The Quest for Intelligibility as Mediation Between Science and Theology

Abstract

In this article, we explore how natural sciences can serve as sources of theological reflection. We do this by clarifying the notion of the intelligibility of the world and showing how it may work as the mediator between science and theology. In contrast to the celebrated classification of the relationship between science and religion provided by I. Barbour, we elaborate our approach within the threefold division: concordism, discordism, and articulation (mediation). We opt for the articulation mode of relationship, arguing that the link between science and theology can be articulated by raising the issue of intelligibility from the epistemic and ontic points of view. From the epistemic perspective, it results that both science and theology are operating according to proper principles and are aimed at unifying their domains of discourse and giving proper understanding. From the ontic point of view, both are related to reality: science applies its own principles to the universe and works under empirical commitments, whereas theology discusses God himself, the relationship between God and all things (creatures), and God’s action in created reality. We emphasize how the articulation mode contributes to the formulation of a worldview, and we problematize the articulation by asking whether it is a convergent or divergent strategy. For this purpose, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s philosophical approach is applied. Finally, we show that Georges Lemaître and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, who used two very different scientific and theological approaches, can come together if we consider them from the point of view of the intelligibility of the universe.

1. Introduction

The relationship between religion and science has, in fact, been the subject of continued debate since the beginning of Christianity. However, since the 1960s, the interdisciplinary field of “science and religion”, also referred to as “theology and science”, has increasingly been recognized as a distinctive field of study. This is due to the extensive work of different scholars (including, for instance, I. Barbour, Th. Torrance, P. Davies, J. Haught, J. Polkinghorne, W. Stoeger, A. McGrath, F. Tipler, R. Russell, N. Murphy, A. Peacocke, W. Drees, M. Heller, and M. Artigas) who have explored the subject in a very systematic manner. Currently, the relationship between theology and science is a recognized field of study with dedicated journals (e.g., Scientia et Fides, Theology and Science, or Zygon) and institutions engaged in its pursuit (such as the European Society for the Study of Science and Theology, the International Society for Science and Religion, the Center for Theology and Natural Sciences in Berkeley, the Grupo Ciencia, Razón y Fe at Universidad de Navarra, the Copernicus Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Krakow, the Ian Ramsey Centre at Oxford, and more). Their scope of research mainly consists of studying historical and contemporary interactions between science and theology and providing philosophical analyses of how they interrelate.

In this introductory part, we recall that there are several typologies that probe the interaction between science and theology. Although the relationship between the two could (and should) be analyzed from a systematic and/or historical point of view, for reasons of space, we do not focus on the complexity of its history (e.g., Harrison 2015). While there are a variety of models describing this relationship, only a small subclass within this plurality refers to the warfare narratives. For instance, in his celebrated proposal, Ian Barbour (1997, pp. 77–105) distinguished four types of relationships, namely conflict, independence, dialogue, and integration. More recently, Ted Peters (2018) classified ten models. While four are confrontational (scientism, scientific imperialism, theological authoritarianism, and evolutionary controversy), the remaining ones emphasize cooperation (two languages, two books, ethical alliance, dialogue, naturalism, and theology of nature). What we want to emphasize from the beginning is that the historically-laden and systematically-laden views on the science–theology relationship are broader than just conflict or separation. Quite the contrary, it proves to be rather a dialogical perspective, assuming instances of greater or lesser agreement between the two sides (Tanzella-Nitti 2024).

For the remainder of our article, we adopt the approach proposed by one of us, which is to analyze the science–theology relationship while raising the issue of intelligibility. It is indeed possible (Lambert 1999) to individuate three main modes of interaction between theology and science. The first mode is concordism, according to which both disciplines are put at the same level, and the differences between them are blurred. The second one is discordism, according to which there is a clear delineation between the two. As a result, neither can make any contribution to the other since they remain separated. Finally, the third mode is articulation, which assumes that while the methodological differences between science and religion are to be respected, mediation and dialogue between the two are possible. Dominique Lambert has shown how each of these modes may operate at the ontological, epistemological, and ethical levels of the relationship. What mediation or dialogue adds is the assumption that science and theology are speaking about the same reality, but of course, through different perspectives. While they may be focused on different limit questions or methodologies, the possibility of consonance between them is nevertheless assumed within articulation mode. The main aim of this article is twofold. On the one hand, we intend to show that the relationship between science and theology can be articulated in an insightful manner by raising the issue of intelligibility from the epistemic and ontic points of view. On the other hand, we argue that within the articulation mode, one can fruitfully approach the differences between the scientific and theological worldviews.

The text is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the notion of the intelligibility of the world. In Section 2.1, we discuss it from the epistemic and ontic points of view, and in Section 2.2, we clarify the philosophical and theological rationale for such a formulation of this term and discuss a variety of possible perspectives on the problem of intelligibility. In Section 3, we discuss the articulation mode of the science–theology relationship by taking important theoretical stimuli from the works of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and Georges Lemaître. In Section 4, we explore Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s philosophical approach in order to address the problem of intelligibility in reference to the conceptual framework and formulation of the worldview. In Section 4.1, we provide a set of important definitions needed to analyze the constitutive aspects of worldviews. In Section 4.2, we confront the scientific and theological worldviews in reference to the problem of intelligibility. In Section 5, we problematize the articulation mode by characterizing it as convergent strategy à la de Chardin and Pierre Duhem (with his relatively unknown concept of “forme idéale de la science”) aimed at formulating a unified worldview. We conclude the article by pointing out the open problems.

2. The Intelligibility of the World

In this section, we introduce and explain the notion of the intelligibility of the world from the ontic and epistemic points of view. Here, we develop several ideas that were discussed in a preliminary manner in previous articles by one of the authors (Marcacci and Oleksowicz 2023; Oleksowicz and Kłosowski 2023).

2.1. Terminological Clarifications

Terms such as intelligibility, rationality, or comprehensibility are very often used as synonyms and employed to define one another. For instance, according to Michał Heller (2008, pp. 38–40), the intelligibility of the world can be conceived of as a pre-assumption of science, that is, as a certain working philosophical hypothesis about the world that science tacitly assumes. Heller argues that if we witness the successful development of science, this means that science has comprehended some aspect of the world that has been investigated. Briefly put, “intelligibility of the world” means that the world can be known and that we manage to know it quite effectively. Firstly, let us note that Heller uses other synonyms to describe the intelligibility of the world, such as rationality, comprehensibility, realism, etc. Secondly, although these different concepts are connected by a series of overlapping similarities, it is not settled a priori that they can be merely interchanged in any context. Probably, they can be best seen as “family resemblance” concepts, as Ludwig Wittgenstein suggested (Wittgenstein [1953] 1973).

To better grasp this notion, we think that it should be analyzed from both an ontic and an epistemic point of view. The world (reality) as we know it is one in which being and knowing are mutually related and conditioned. By the term world or reality, we refer to everything that exists, that is, the set of all things in general. God, of course, is real, but not a thing, a reality of or in the world. All our knowledge is of things, events, processes, etc., that partake of being. Hence, every concept of reality that we have carries with it a relation to being. More specifically, reality as such makes itself accessible to us in such a way that it admits our intellectual activity (e.g., signification, description, knowing, explanation, modeling, intention, etc.), the results of which we will denote by the term conceptual framework. At the same time, it should be noted that the reality that is grasped via a certain conceptual framework remains something that we cannot fully master. When we speak truly about the world, there is more than we can express through our conceptual framework. In other words, the notions of conceptual framework and the concepts used to describe reality are related but are not identical. In what follows, we will interchangeably use two concepts, world and reality, although we are aware that each of them has a very heavy semantic content and that their semantic fields do not always coincide.

Therefore, ontic intelligibility means that there is a reality that can be known, whereas epistemic intelligibility means that there is a conceptual framework that partially grasps that reality. Briefly put, while the former means that there is some intelligibility inherent in the objective reality, the latter stands for the intelligibility inherent in the human conceptual framework. Let us note that our proposal to define intelligibility is mainly based on the distinction between reality and subject (human agent) and on the employment of the term conceptual framework, which we will define more precisely in Section 4. By the terms “to know” or “to grasp reality”, we understand classically both certain cognitive acts and cognitive results. By the former, we refer to certain activities, for example, perception, recollection, or judgment, but also reasoning, inference, and so on. By cognitive results, we understand properly formulated scientific statements, for instance, the Pythagorean law, the law of gravity, and so on. Moreover, in contrast to broadly understood idealistic philosophical approaches, we assume that such a thing as objective reality does exist. Finally, we are aware that the distinction between reality and subject is contextually sensitive. One can think about problems linked with this distinction in the realm of the quantum measurement process. However, for reasons of space, we do not deal more specifically with these issues here.

2.2. Philosophical and Theological Rationale

As we have noted, the notion of intelligibility indicates that ontic intelligibility and epistemic intelligibility are related. What is the relationship between them? Answers to this question may vary since they depend on the conception of truth that lurks in the background. The notion of truth in this context denotes a state of affairs that is ontologically prior to the truth of the conceptual framework, that is, of human cognition. The truth of being (the ontic necessity) would mean that the thing is what it is. Thus, ontic intelligibility is a necessary condition for epistemic intelligibility. In other words, the former is something that is independent of the human cognizer and without which the latter is not possible.

One can find a rationale for the above statements in the works of various prominent philosophers of nature. For instance, Aristotle, in his Physics (II, ch. 1, 191b21–23), proposed to define nature as “a principle and cause of being moved or of rest in the thing to which it belongs primarily and in virtue of that thing, but not accidentally”. For him, nature possessed the sort of an intrinsic intelligibility that was self-evident. However, he was at the same time well aware that the acquisition of scientific knowledge about the physical or biological reality required laborious methodological and empirical effort (Oleksowicz 2018, 2019). In medieval times, Thomas Aquinas was clearly optimistic about the ability of the human mind to penetrate nature’s secrets since, according to him, natural entities were objects proportioned to man’s intellect (Summa Theologiae I, qq. 84–87) and, thus, it was also possible for humans to talk about God on the basis of their knowledge of nature (Summa Contra Gentiles I; Summa Theologiae I, qq. 2–26). W. Wallace interestingly comments that Galileo “not only used nature as a principle to explain the acceleration of freely-falling bodies; he also believed that nature was highly intelligible to the divine mind and could be made equally so to the human mind provided it reasoned correctly” (Wallace 2023, p. 14). This means that for Galileo, the intelligibility of nature was not merely something that was assured through effect-to-cause reasoning capable of unraveling the underlying nature of the processes being investigated. For him, the idea of intelligibility was also a means to extoll God putting the world in motion. Isaac Newton expressed his admiration for God in a similar manner in the General Scholium to his Principia. Let us also recall here Albert Einstein’s famous comment on the problem of intelligibility:

One may say “the eternal mystery of the world is its comprehensibility”.… In speaking here of “comprehensibility”, the expression is used in its most modest sense. It implies: the production of some sort of order among sense impressions, this order being produced by the creation of general concepts, relations between these concepts, and by definite relations of some kind between the concepts and sense experience. It is in this sense that the world of our sense experiences is comprehensible. The fact that it is comprehensible is a miracle.

(Einstein 1954, p. 292)

Einstein clearly emphasized that science of any kind is possible due to the amazing “philosophical fact” that nature is intelligible. Scientists try to conceptually grasp reality through some sort of unifying intellectual penetration into things in the world that are themselves internally coherent. The scientific endeavor is activated by a wonder in front of the comprehensibility of the world.

Undoubtedly, the Christian idea of the world created by God out of nothing (ex nihilo) contrasts with many philosophical doctrines of the world. Nevertheless, the Christian reading of the Book of Scripture and the book of nature together not only became an integral part of medieval contemplative practice but also has informed philosophical understanding of the intelligibility of the world in modern times. Peter Harrison rightly recognized this from a Christian point of view:

The intelligibility of nature lay not only in the realm of meaning, however. As a divine artifact, the world was also causally related to God—as pagan thinkers, albeit in different ways, had recognized. In the Christian understanding of this relation, God was not only the efficient cause of things—the original cause that had brought them all into being—but was understood to be the source of the matter and form of the creatures, and the end or final cause to which all things were drawn. The study of nature, on this understanding, pointed to God as the causal power that ultimately underpinned the existence of all things.

(Harrison 2015, pp. 56–57)

In other words, from a Christian perspective, it is possible to catch a glimpse of divine reality through things that are material, visible, and mutable. It is because the intelligibility of created reality finds “an ultimate ground in the transcendent and uncreated Rationality of God” (Torrance 2001, p. 44). Moreover, this sort of primacy of divine intelligibility invites human inquiry to penetrate more and more deeply into the intelligible reality that ultimately derives from God and is not merely imposed by the human epistemic relation to reality. This theological claim about the independence of the intelligibility of the world from the human agent may be construed to reinforce human scientific activity, where the latter is to be understood as making intelligible what has yet been unknown.

In another paper (Oleksowicz and Kłosowski 2023, p. 10), a number of possible perspectives on the problem of intelligibility were proposed. In the context of this article, we would like to reiterate that Christian theology refutes the agnostic position (according to which it is not known whether the world is intelligible) and the surrender position (i.e., the belief that the search for intelligibility is not worth pursuing). On the contrary, from the Christian perspective, the world is intelligible in its ontic and epistemic aspects, and the latter depends on the former, which is ultimately grounded in God. From the epistemic perspective, both science and theology operate according to proper principles and are aimed at unifying their domains of discourse and giving a proper understanding of them. From the ontic point of view, both pertain to the universe: science does so by applying its own principles and working under empirical commitments, whereas theology either discusses God himself or the things that depend on him (Roszak 2023). We add two more aspects to this existing classification: (1) intelligibility points to the invariant reality of being, and (2) the world is intelligible, but it does not follow that everything is intelligible to us.

Let us comment on the first aspect. As Thomas Torrance notes, while the ontic intelligibility inherent in reality is unchanging, it is our changeable knowledge that is objectively grounded in the reality independent of ourselves:

In objective knowledge of this kind there come to light invariant elements which govern our basic conceptions and affirmations of the reality concerned, but in so far as that reality exceeds our capacity to master it or resists encapsulation in our forms of thought and speech, there inevitably arise tentative variable representations of it which are to be regarded as having their truth not in themselves but in that to which they refer beyond themselves.

(Torrance 2001, p. 137)

In other words, while the objective referent of the conceptual framework (the world or some aspect of the world) does not change, our conceptual frameworks in which we seek to express the meaning of reality are variable, and their openness to change is measured by the depth of the invariance of the objective referent.

Moving on to the second aspect, let us note that our basic intuitions about the character of truth suggest that there are true propositions that exist independently of the human subject. In other words, whether something may be true or not does not depend on it being known or not. Essentially, the plethora of philosophically discussed concepts of truth can be exhaustively divided into epistemic and non-epistemic (Künne 1995). The former relies on the subject and on the conditions in which it can state whether the sentence is true. The non-epistemic concepts are based on the belief that the logical value of a sentence depends entirely on the objective perspective. To determine the objects that decide whether certain sentences are true or not, philosophers introduced different theoretical terms. For our aims, it suffices to adopt the concept of state of affairs and the following definition of truth: “The sentence is true if and only if it describes a certain state of affairs (claims the existence of a certain state of affairs) and if this state of affairs exists (happens)” (Borkowski 1980, p. 119). In fact, from the semantic point of view, classical logic assumes that each proposition has one of two logical values, regardless of the subject’s knowledge (Aristotle, De Interpretatione, ch. 9). This position has been known as semantic realism on truth (Dummett 1991). In fact, it emphasizes that, on the one hand, the domain about which a given proposition states something is independent of human knowledge, and on the other, that there is a link between the proposition and the thing to which it refers such that the sentence is true regardless of whether any subject performs the appropriate cognitive act. However, this principle of bivalence is inconsistent with the philosophical doctrine of anti-realism on truth, which associates the truth of a proposition with its warranted assertibility, meaning that the truth value of a proposition depends on the knowledge of the subject (Dummett 1978). We evoke this debate on the character of truth in this article because the notion of intelligibility tacitly (in the background, so to speak) assumes the notion of knowledge, which is often combined with the notion of truth. In fact, modern epistemic logic often assumes that knowledge consists exclusively of true sentences.

Coming back to our main point, we must stress that semantic realism and anti-realism on truth are not the only viable options with regard to the problem of intelligibility. That is, besides the position that there are truths independent of the human agent and that only the things that meet specific conditions of assertibility can be true, at least two other positions are also possible. Specifically, there are some sentences for which we cannot ascertain their truthfulness but which potentially are (or were, or will be) true (e.g., if I were living at the same time and place as Copernicus, I would be able to verify the truth of the statement that “on 25 December 1539 at 4 PM Copernicus was singing Christmas carols”, but since I am not, I cannot do this). Also, it cannot be ruled out that there are sentences for which we cannot specify their truthful character whatsoever (e.g., the future events or past events occurring in spacetime regions of light cones separated from us) (Jarmużek 2018).

At this point, we would like to take stock of what has been discussed so far. For Christian theology, God is the Truth. In this context, we cannot say that God is True (what we are saying about God can be true or false) but that God is the (ultimate) Truth. Thus, there is the Truth that is independent of the human agent, and there is the created world in which we can grasp some traces (vestigia) of the Creator. In particular, a human being is created in the likeness of God. In what we have discussed here, we have used the expression “being intelligible” as a synonym for “being possible to be known”. However, it cannot be ruled out that such a possibility may never become reality for some reasons. If this is so, then we have the following options:

• Truth may be the object of our knowledge, but our knowledge does not construct it (realism).
• Truth may be the object of our knowledge, but the cognitive act co-constructs it (weak anti-realism).
• Truth is not currently the object of our knowledge, but in principle, it can be the following:
  • Realist position: the knowledge mentioned in item 3 does not construct the truth;
  • Anti-realist position: the knowledge mentioned in item 3 co-constructs the truth.
• There are truths that, in principle, cannot be the object of our knowledge.
• Our cognitive acts create truth (strong anti-realism).

Let us now consider some important theoretical stimuli from the works of de Chardin and Lemaître on how to articulate the science–theology relationship by raising the issue of intelligibility.

3. Relating Science and Theology: Articulation

Science has nothing to do directly with religious content, that is, content received and accepted in the context of an act of faith. Here, we make an implicit assumption that such content pertains to those truths of the Christian faith about which the natural sciences have nothing to say (because such truths cannot be grasped by empirical and/or formal methods). Nonetheless, when one is attempting to express such content in search of its intelligibility, one is implicitly or explicitly using philosophical concepts or ideas, paving the way for a philosophical reflection that emerges from science itself. To give meaning to such a statement, we have to say that science, in the process of its development, implicitly and continuously addresses questions of a philosophical nature. For example, if we want to know what a thing is or what reality is, we have to face the question of the source of its being. However, physics is not able to answer this question because it explains what something is by reference to another already existing thing. It cannot explain where existence as such is coming from. This question is a metaphysical one and comes naturally from physics, but the latter cannot resolve it without going beyond its scope.

Furthermore, when reflecting on its foundations, science cannot do anything but admit some ontological assumptions. For example, as demonstrated by Einstein’s comments quoted above, physics implicitly admits that reality is intelligible and can be described by mathematics. This means that human thought can apprehend something of the structure and properties of the world and translate them in terms of a particular (quasi-)formal language. This is an assumption that cannot be justified by science itself but is the implicit starting point and prerequisite for a physical understanding of nature. In the process of constructing mathematical theories, it is, thus, not possible not to reflect on the very nature of mathematics. Answering the question of what mathematics is may not be directly necessary to apply it, but if one is interested in answering this question, one has to adopt—explicitly or implicitly—a particular philosophy (Platonist, empiricist, formalist, etc.). In fact, it is not possible to reflect seriously on science (whether formal or empirical) without being confronted with some philosophical assumptions or reasoning.

Our conclusion here is that science, in its foundation and in its practice, may be the suitable context for generating many questions that are philosophical in nature. Theology, being a rational clarification of religious content, also uses rational concepts and notions that are philosophical in nature (being, time, life, person, history, etc.). Therefore, philosophy is the proper “space” in which articulation between questions coming from science and questions emerging from rational expressions of religious traditions may have a place (Heller 2011).

Starting with science, some solutions to metaphysical problems coming from it delineate the borders of a possible philosophical interpretation of science—an interpretation that is not necessarily logically compatible with some other philosophical frameworks. Then, science can refute, so to say, some philosophical statements. If we adopt, for example, a philosophical assumption saying that the universe (and reality as a whole) must always remain the same in space and time (as some Marxists assumed in order to build the so-called “steady-state cosmology”), we face a contradiction with what is coming from recent cosmological thought. In the same vein, if we reject evolution and assume that life is the product of instantaneous creation, then we are faced with a direct contradiction with the historical interpretation of life that comes from biology. If this is the case, some theological expressions happen to be non-compatible or non-homogeneous with the content of empirical sciences. Teilhard expressed this fact in a letter written on 2 November 1947, to the French philosopher Emmanuel Mounier. Speaking of what he referred to as the “theology of science” (“théologie de la science”), Teilhard said that

given certain developments in the Sciences, certain representations of God and certain forms of worship are excluded because they are not homogeneous with the experimental dimensions of the Universe.

(Teilhard de Chardin 1965, p. 291, transl. from French by D.L.)

With his cosmology, Lemaître (Lemaître 1946), as the philosopher and mathematician Ferdinand Gonseth emphasized (Emery 1985, 2006), produced a refutation of some of Kant’s antinomies. The latter “proved” that the concept of the beginning of time cannot be part of science (that is, of human understanding). However, in 1931, Lemaître showed that the beginning of time is a natural beginning that can be completely described by physics: by general relativity (as a singularity of the spacetime manifold), by thermodynamics (as a state of minimum entropy), and by quantum theory (as a unique primeval quantum). This means that philosophical obstacles can be refuted using a reflection coming from science. This was also done by Lemaître when he emphasized the fact that the theological concept of creation cannot be identified with the natural beginning of the universe (the expression “natural beginning” comes from Lemaître himself). If we are reflecting philosophically on the meaning of the natural beginning of the universe, we realize that this is an initial state that exists and is completely described by physics. Still, creation is not a process that acts on already existing beings but an act that gives existence to all beings. Hence, philosophy and logic can be used to refute the identification between creation and the natural beginning of the universe. Here, we see that philosophy and science can help clarify some theological concepts, and theology can, in turn, help refute some misplaced meanings given to the Big Bang, such as that of being an expression of metaphysical creation (Heller 1996).

Similarly, a philosophical reflection coming from theology and saying that human knowledge cannot be absolute can express some doubts concerning the tacit philosophical assumption that science should be identified with absolute knowledge, or a similar philosophical reflection can criticize a possible identification of the mathematical infinite with some divine attribute. All this shows that science and philosophy are not at all independent. However, as theology is expressed using philosophical frameworks, we can see that science and theology cannot meet directly and only via philosophical mediation.

Teilhard criticized the tendency to confuse science and theology. In fact, he rejected a certain kind of “concordism” and instead defended what can be described as “coherence” in the sense described below. When one approaches certain questions concerning the universe as a whole, the meaning of the history of life or of human thought, etc., the possible interpretations of scientific content (i.e., the possible hermeneutics of nature) converge towards a philosophy of nature and also towards metaphysics (and, starting from the latter, they may also converge towards a theology of creation). This stance was expressed as follows:

Religion and science obviously represent, in the mental sphere, two different meridians that it would be wrong not to separate (concordist error). But these meridians must necessarily meet somewhere on a pole of common vision (coherence): otherwise, everything collapses within us, in the realm of thought and knowledge.

(Teilhard de Chardin 1976, p. 174, transl. from French by D.L.)

Some authors have considered Teilhard to be concordist in his theological interpretation of the scientific evolutionary perspective. However, if one studies Teilhard’s texts carefully, it becomes evident that he was not, in fact, a concordist. Teilhard defended the epistemological autonomy of science with respect to theology. To express that idea, he used the Louvain geologist Canon Henry de Dorlodot’s terms, speaking of “Christian naturalism”: the fact that one has to respect the distinction between the level at which second causes are acting and the level describing the proper action of the first cause (Teilhard de Chardin 1957, p. 40). What he defended was not concordance between science and theology but convergence without confusion between the two domains.

Articulation between science and theology is related to the fact that while science is never identical to theology, it can nevertheless converge towards the latter through the mediation of the set of philosophical questions (about foundations, value, or meaning) that it inevitably generates in the process of its very development. In fact, this convergence means that certain philosophical questions generated by science are progressively approaching certain themes, concepts, or notions studied by theology.

The interesting point here is that we can preserve the epistemological autonomy of science without severing the link to theological reflection. Duhem, who developed an epistemological position (based on a conventionalist reading of science) that refuses any confusion between science and metaphysics or between science and theology, nevertheless admits a kind of original articulation based on the observation that some deep and invariant structure is revealing progressively through the historical development of science. This structure is provided by “mathematical representation”: “an ever more ample and ever more precise mathematical representation of the inanimate world that experience reveals to us” (Duhem 1914, p. 201, transl. from French by D.L.).1 This means that even more recent theories are replacing the oldest ones and that some deep and unifying formal structures can be progressively exhibited. Thus, according to Duhem, there is some kind of deep, cumulative truth. What is more, he considered in his time that this deep formal and unifying structure was provided by “general thermodynamics”:

Among the various ways of treating the physical theory which are at present shared by men of science, which is the one that carries within it the seeds of the ideal theory?… This theory, as we have often said, is, in our opinion, the one we call general thermodynamics.

(Duhem 1914, p. 201, transl. from French by D.L.)

Then, and this is an important point, such “ideal science” (i.e., the formal or structural “horizon” towards which theories are converging) can be interpreted philosophically by using some kind of analogy. There is an analogy (not an equivalence) between the formal structure of the aforementioned “general thermodynamics” and the structure of a philosophical cosmology. According to Duhem, philosophical cosmology is an Aristotelian one, but this is not so relevant to our discussion. What matters is the following: science, in its progress, exhibits a deep formal structure. This is what Duhem called an “ideal science”, which, according to him, was “general thermodynamics” (but, of course, we now have a rather different idea of what ideal science is). Science converges towards a unified structure (today, we can speak of unifying schemes, unification theories, etc.). By way of philosophical analysis, one can establish a formal analogy between this structure and the one of a “philosophical cosmology”. In more recent terms, one can say that it is possible to provide semantics to this unifying theory by using a philosophy of nature (or metaphysics), which, in turn, can be linked with the one used to express a theology of creation. This gives a precise meaning to a convergence (rather than concordance) of science towards theology because science and theology remain at two distinct epistemological levels. If sciences are shown to converge formally towards a unifying theory, and if the formal structure of the latter happens to be (formally) analogous to the structure of a philosophy of nature, then, in some sense, by way of an analogy (conceived philosophically), science can be thought to converge towards some theological vision. To illustrate this point succinctly, all sciences today reveal an evolutionary structure. By way of an analogy, the evolution of the universe and of life can relate to a philosophy of nature that is based on history. This category of history is also crucial in Christian theology (history of salvation, for example). Therefore, one could say that sciences converge progressively towards a historical philosophy of nature (whereby biological evolution and evolutionary philosophy of nature reveal a common historical structure) that happens to be coherent (i.e., what comes from a philosophy of nature interpreting science does not contradict the theological content) with a theology of creation.

Articulation between science and theology is not at all constructed conventionally or imposed arbitrarily from the outside. The complete intelligibility of reality needs to go far beyond science. This follows naturally from an epistemological and historical study of science because if we are searching for the meaning of science and its productions, we are led directly to the realm of philosophy (which is obvious in what we have said concerning the use of analogy). And by entering this field, we can also benefit from the conceptual clarifications of the expressions of some religious beliefs.

4. The Scientific and Theological Worldviews Confronted

It seems to be a common view that science is a suitable (or even the best) path towards understanding the world. Science and technology have become so pervasive in our daily lives that modern societies are mainly permeable to forms of rationality shaped by scientific and technological knowledge. Thus, it is widely assumed that truth should be the outcome of scientific knowledge. At the same time, Christian theology, which we conceive of as an attempt to make understandable the truths of Christianity, is called upon in the contemporary culture to take seriously not only the history of salvation but also God’s revelation through nature (Tanzella-Nitti 2022, pp. 121–235). As a consequence, there is an inevitable tension between the scientific and theological ways of looking at the same object, that is, the world. This tension has specific implications for the science–theology relationship.

God’s revelation in the created world is, ultimately, the source not only of the ontic intelligibility of the world but also of those epistemic experiences of the intelligibility that many scientists encounter while studying the underlying structure of the world, such as wonder, awe, beauty, rationality, intelligibility, comprehensibility, etc. For a theologian, there is no doubt that God sustains the world and is active in it. As we have mentioned, the biblical and theological account is straightforward: God is the Creator of the world, and everything depends upon him. There can be, however, a disagreement between the perspective on the source and character of the intelligibility of the world that comes from a worldview shaped by scientific-technological knowledge and that proposed by theology. Why is this the case? We think that one of the main roots of the conflict between science and theology is, in fact, the presumed or emerging contradiction, contrariety, or divergence not between scientific and theological truths but rather between theological and scientific worldviews (Grabowski 2000, pp. 126–35).

In what follows, we will first present a set of basic notions needed to properly understand the concept of the worldview, and then we will show how these notions can be applied when one is dealing with different worldviews, that is, the scientific worldview and the theological one, which concurrently yet differently address the problem of intelligibility.

4.1. Basic Notions and Their Definitions

Here, we would like to introduce a list of basic notions needed for our further discussion. The definitions provided below were developed within the theoretical framework established by the prominent Polish philosopher and logician Ajdukiewicz, a member of the Lvov-Warsaw School (Ajdukiewicz 1978, pp. 1–89).

Language (L) consists of three elements: (1) vocabulary (the class of words), (2) syntactic rules (which explain how to build complex expressions from atomic ones), and (3) semantic directives (which determine the meaning of language expressions).

Semantic directives (SDs) express the relationship between meanings attributed to language expressions and the way in which these expressions are used. More precisely, if someone correctly relates words (expressions) of a certain language L to meanings attributed to those words (expressions), then under the circumstances C, that person is willing to accept the proposition P. For instance, if Tom relates the word “pain” in English to its proper meaning, then he is willing to accept the expression “I feel pain” when he falls off his bike while riding at a high speed.

There are three types of basic semantic directives: (1) axiomatic semantic directives (SDAs), which prescribe propositions that cannot be rejected, as otherwise the meanings attributed to language expressions would be changed; (2) deductive semantic directives (SDDs), which assign to sentences of a certain type (premises) other sentences of a different type (conclusions); and (3) empirical semantic directives (SDEs), which assign to experience data the propositions that should be accepted in the face of such data. Each of these directives has its own range of application, that is, a class of axioms (SDAs), a class of sentences–sentence pairs (SDDs), or experience data–sentence pairs (SDEs).

There are two additional truth-conducing semantic directives: (1) to be a true proposition in own language (SDT1), whereby one accepts the proposition P and, at the same time, accepts the proposition “P is true in my language” (in other words, a proposition is true if and only if that proposition is asserted within a specific language according to its own basic semantic directives (SDAs, SDDs, and SDEs)); and (2) to be a true proposition in another language (SDT2), whereby if one accepts the proposition P and, at the same time, accepts the proposition “the expression P in the language L is a translation of the expression P₁ in the language L₁”, then one accepts the proposition “P₁ is true in the language L₁”.

Open language (OpL): Let us assume that there are two languages, S and M. If the language M contains all the expressions of the language S and assigns to them the same meanings as those in the language S, but in the language M there are also expressions that do not occur in the language S and at least one such expression has a direct semantic connection to an expression that also occurs in the language S, then we will say that the language S is open to the language M. The term direct semantic connection denotes that different expressions belong to the same element of the range of semantic directives (SDs).

Closed language (ClL) is a language that is not open.

Total language (ToL): We use the term isolated part to denote the non-empty class of language expressions whose elements do not have any semantic connections with other expressions of that language. A language that does not have any isolated parts is total.

Having the same meaning: If A and A’ have the same meaning in the language L, then they have to behave in the same manner within the whole range of applications of SDs. That is, the whole range of applications of SDs cannot be modified by the substitution of A’ for A and of A for A’ in all of its elements.

Mutually translatable languages (MT): Two languages are mutually translatable if and only if, for every expression in one language, there is at least one expression in the other language that is a translation of that expression from one language into the other, and vice versa.

Translation relation (TR): If the expression A in the language S has the same meaning as the expression A₁ in the language S₁, then we will consider the expression A to be the translation of the expression A₁ from the language S₁ to the language S. TR is a reflexive, symmetric, and transitive relation.

Meaning is a family of classes (properties) of abstraction specified by a translation relation (TR). In other words, the meaning A in the language S is the property A in the language S, which can be ascribed to A₁ in the language S₁ if and only if A₁ in S₁ has the same meaning as A in S. From a more general point of view, the meaning is what links specific thoughts (epistemic states) to the way in which one uses language to express these thoughts. Thus, meaning determines—to a certain degree—the use of semantic directives (SDs).

Conceptual framework (CF) is the class of all meanings attributed to expressions of a certain closed (ClL) and total language (ToL). This class has a proper structure based on the basic semantic directives (SDAs, SDDs, and SDEs) adopted in that language.

Worldview (WV) is the set of all propositions designated by the application of semantic directives (SDs) of a specific language and certain experience data. In other words, the worldview is the set of all true propositions within a certain conceptual framework (CF). Synonyms of WV are image of the world, paradigm, and Weltbild.

Let us now comment on the above notions and definitions. Firstly, let us note that the class of all meanings attributed to expressions of a certain language constitutes the semantic field of that language. In fact, the CF is built on the basis of that semantic field. Secondly, Ajdukiewicz makes an idealized assumption about languages, claiming that they are closed and total. This means that he analyzes languages as having well-defined SDs and CFs and, thus, any given language is isolated from other languages. This highly idealized assumption implies that any revision (change) within the SDs will, in fact, produce a different CF (and, by extension, a different WV). If it is so, then such an idealized assumption blocks any possibility of the revision or refinement of the existing CFs (WVs), as well as the formulation of new ones based on those precedents. As a result, we end up with a certain incomparability (or incommensurability) of various CFs or WVs. The separation of CFs or WVs precludes any comparison between them. If one stops at this point, Ajdukiewicz’s approach does not differ from Thomas Kuhn’s notion of incommensurability (Kuhn 1962).

Being aware of this deep limitation, Ajdukiewicz proposed four (more realistic) tendencies according to which WV (or CF) evolves, making it possible to compare different WVs (CFs):

• The elimination of contradictions—avoiding contradictions not only in the proposed scientific theories but also within any CF or L;
• Rationalization—choosing the CF that can resolve more problems without invoking empirical methods of inquiry;
• Improvement of the CF—reducing the number of unsolvable problems within a given CF;
• Increase in the empirical sensitivity of the CF—improving the ability to differentiate responses to given experiences.

These criteria work as tools to compare different WVs or CFs, and to a certain degree, they limit the above idealizing assumption.

Let us now address the following problem: if different Ls produce their own CFs (WVs), then they have their own criteria of truthfulness (SDT1 and SDT2). If this is the case, then each CF (WV) formulates its own truths. How, then, can one build a global worldview, even if one accepts the evolutionary tendencies for separate WVs or CFs? At first glance, it seems that one is forced to merely aggregate isolated worldviews, selecting from them what one wishes to take. Ajdukiewicz is well aware that if one uses an L, then one is always bounded by a certain set of SDs and CFs. In other words, it is not possible to speak without using an L, and it is not possible to interpret reality without using a certain CF. Moreover, if one accepts a given set of SDs, then one is forced to accept the propositions that come from the use of these SDs in the context of a given experience. One can choose a different L or CF, with all the consequences of that choice, but it is not possible to be neutral in the sense of not adopting any of them.

As previously mentioned, the specificity of a WV depends on two main factors: the experience data on the basis of which the WV is built and the character of the WV, which depends on the CF. The first factor does not require further explanation. The second one, as we have noted before, emphasizes that any revision within the SDs will produce a different CF and, as a consequence, a different WV. A change in the CF implies that new problems or issues become the focus of our epistemic attention. Not only do different sciences use different CFs, but also each science refines and changes its own CF. It is a common point of view in contemporary history and philosophy of science that scientific rationality has changed its shape throughout the ages and that styles of reasoning have changed (Hacking 1992; Nickles 2021). Although many people today regard science as a human enterprise that does not escape the contingencies of history, there is still a certain tendency within the scientific approach (but also the theological one) to formulate a global CF or WV. However, according to Ajdukiewicz, science cannot reach a perfect WV (Ajdukiewicz 1978, pp. 79–81). Rather, it chooses its own CF because of certain aims at hand and, at the same time, rejects any extensions of that CF that disagree with the already assumed SDs. In other words, there is a sort of self-limitation of science at play, which means that science is “sensitive” only to those propositions that belong to its CF and neglects those that do not. Does it mean that a perfect (unified) scientific WV is not attainable?

Firstly, it does not seem that for all sciences that have their own CFs, there exists an ideal or perfect CF on the basis of which a sort of perfect (global) WV can then be formulated. On the contrary, it seems that there are many coexistent WVs, each based on the locally perfect WV. It is not difficult to imagine that in a set of possible WVs, there can be many locally perfect WVs, but there does not have to be the most perfect and unique WV. For instance, one can think of many different WVs, each of them bound to a specific scientific discipline investigating a limited domain of reality, and it is not necessary to claim that, for instance, the physicalist worldview is the unique one since it is possible to assume a biological or sociological one at the same time. While the perfect global WV may be seen as a certain epistemic ideal associated with the notion of objective truth about reality, one cannot rule out the possibility of the coexistence of various epistemic perspectives (CF) on how to approach such an ideal limit (perfect WV). In our opinion, this neither undermines the objectivity of truth nor implies that any claim about reality can be equally valuable. Rather, it means that the notion of truth is bound to the local CF.

We think that Ajdukiewicz’s approach is a precise tool that is well-suited for the reconstruction and analysis of cases in which we are dealing with various WVs. Let us now see how it can be applied to such a case.

4.2. Different Worldviews and the Intelligibility of the World

Let us assume that there are two basic languages: the scientific language L_S and the theological language L_T; that there are two worldviews, the scientific worldview (WV_S) and the theological worldview (WV_T); and that in L_S and L_T, there are the expressions I_S and I_T, respectively, which describe the intelligibility of the world according to the proper language. When I_S and I_T are added to L_S and L_T, respectively, then we obtain two other languages: L_SI and L_TI. Each of the WVs has its own CF and SD, which are CF_S and SD_S and CF_T and SD_T, respectively. Let us now consider four cases:

• L_S and L_T are both total (ToL) and closed (ClL).
• L_S is open to L_SI.
• L_T is open to L_TI.
• I_S can be translated to I_T.

Ad. 1. If both languages are total, this means that there are no isolated parts in either language and that any part of each respective language can be compared with any other. If both languages are closed, this means that adding any new expression that is not a synonym of any of the expressions already present in the respective language will cause an expression to appear in that language that does not have any direct semantic connection to the expressions already present in the language. Thus, the language will no longer be total. As a consequence, I_S and I_T within L_S and L_T, respectively, are incomparable. In other words, I_S added to L_T or I_T added to L_S will not be semantically connected with the respective language to which it is added.

Ad. 2. From the definition of OpL, we know that adding the new expression I_S to the language L_S will not change the meanings of existing expressions in L_S. The latter will remain a ToL and will be a richer language than L_S since it is able to describe the problem of intelligibility within a new CF, that is, CF_SI.

Ad. 3. Here, our reasoning is analogous to that in item 2. We obtain that L_TI will remain a ToL and will be a richer language than L_T since it is able to describe the problem of intelligibility within a new CF, that is, CF_TI.

Ad. 4. Let us note that L_SI and L_TI are both total (ToL) and closed (ClL). Each of these languages preserves the specificity of the domain that it describes. For instance, in L_SI, one can find expressions about electrons, gene expressions, and biological evolution, but also about the intelligibility of the world; in L_TI, one can find expressions about the Trinity, Incarnation, history of salvation, and the intelligibility of the world. Let us now assume that I_S can be translated (TR) to I_T. If this is the case, then, as Ajdukiewicz has proved (Ajdukiewicz 1978, pp. 53–57), those languages (and all their expressions) are mutually translatable (MT).

Let us comment further on this point and its striking outcome. Firstly, we have assumed that L_S and L_T are closed (ClL) and total (ToL). This assumption follows the common perception of the scientific and theological languages as being very different, speaking about different domains, etc. (ClL). At the same time, however, each of these languages tries to be well integrated (ToL). Secondly, L_SI and L_TI, understood as proper extensions of the previous ones, remain total and closed. The difference between these new languages and the previous ones is that new expressions (i.e., a set of expressions) have been introduced into L_S and L_T, that is, I_S and I_T, respectively, both aimed at describing the intelligible character of the world. We do not specify here the content of these expressions, the manner in which they have been formulated, etc. The point is that the two languages speak about intelligibility in different ways, as we have argued in the preceding sections of this article. Thirdly, notwithstanding the differences between the scientific and theological ways of expressing the intelligibility of the world, it seems that it cannot be ruled out that I_S and I_T can be conceived of as translatable. Referring to our previous analysis, we think that such a minimum meaning of the notion of intelligibility could be expressed, for instance, in the following way: notwithstanding the changeable character of the CF (WV), along with the previously mentioned tendencies, what remains as invariant (constant) is a continuous openness of the proposed CF (WV) to be revised/reformulated in the light of further disclosure of investigated reality. Fourthly, if I_S and I_T are translatable (TR), the conclusion is that L_SI and L_TI are mutually translatable (MT). This conclusion is striking (counterintuitive) since it suggests that all expressions from L_SI and L_TI are mutually translatable.

This possibility is hard to imagine when one thinks about the domains of science and theology. Let us, however, emphasize that this striking result is due to very strong idealizations, namely that (1) L_SI and L_TI are ToL and ClL; (2) L_SI and L_TI are still ToL after adding new expressions (meanings) such as I_S and I_T, respectively; and (3) I_S is translatable to I_T.

5. Convergence: A Worldview That Unifies

Let us now describe more precisely the link between the notion of articulation, which we discussed in Section 3, and the notion of convergence. First, let us briefly recall what we have discussed so far concerning Lemaître and Teilhard de Chardin. In the case of Lemaître, we have shown that his thinking evolved towards a juxtaposition of science (understood in a conventionalist way à la Poincaré) and theology. His approach recognizes the existence of two paths to truth and respects the autonomy of each field while at the same time avoiding any convergence and articulation. In the case of Teilhard, we have presented a conception according to which if science is pushed to its limits (for instance, considering the universe and its history as a whole), it converges towards a philosophy of nature and theology. Thus, what we obtain here is a conception of increasing coherence (rather than concordance) between science and theology—a convergence of both when we are considering foundational questions. In the case of Duhem, we have noted that (like Poincaré and Lemaître) he also provided a conventionalist approach to science, which allowed him to sharply distinguish between science and theology. At the same time, according to him, science in its development tends towards an ideal form that is coherent with philosophy (for example, according to Duhem, thermodynamics—the “ideal science”—describes processes that are analogous to the transition between potency and act in Aristotelian philosophy).

What we refer to as articulation is a link established between science and theology through the mediation of philosophy. Articulation is not arbitrary (that is, imposed from the outside without any foundation in science itself) because one can pose—within the context of science—philosophical questions that cannot be tackled in the field of science as such. The main point concerning convergence is that science is not merely generating philosophical questions. In fact, one can observe that science is converging progressively, despite theoretical changes, errors, fallible models, etc., towards some unifying scheme. For instance, as we have mentioned, cosmology and biology are progressively outlining an explanation scheme characterized by evolution. Hence, the view that we are adopting here is the opposite of Kuhn’s idea of incommensurability of worldviews (WVs) or paradigms. In our opinion, this unifying scheme (which is, in a sense, a CF), which goes beyond separated worldviews, can be elaborated within a certain philosophical interpretation. For instance, an evolutionary unifying scheme that arises from physics and biology can be formulated using the philosophical category of history. By way of an analogy provided by what one can call a hermeneutics of nature, cosmological and biological evolution is, thus, the trace of a deep history. One can say that science is converging (tending) towards a philosophy of nature (or towards metaphysics, a philosophy of history) by virtue of a philosophical interpretation (hermeneutics). If this philosophical interpretation is also used in the field of theology, it is not difficult to see that while science remains completely distinct from theology, it may converge towards the latter on the basis of a certain kind of philosophical semantics. We interpret such convergence as the emergence of a worldview (WV) or conceptual framework (CF) that is capable of unifying what comes from science and philosophy, from philosophy and theology, or from science and theology due to the mediation of philosophy. Such a convergence should not be conflated with any sort of concordism. To put it succinctly, we argue that the intelligibility of reality as a whole is a necessary condition for any kind of convergence, but, at the same time, that convergence is activating a wonder in front of the comprehensibility of the world.

Now, we must discuss more precisely what we mean when we say that convergence is able to unify what comes from science and theology. For that purpose, we will refer to the notion of worldview as we have reconstructed it within Ajdukiewicz’s approach (Section 4). Let us assume, as in Section 4, that there are two basic languages: the scientific language L_S and the theological language L_T; that there are two worldviews, the scientific worldview (WV_S) and the theological worldview (WV_T); and that in L_S and L_T, there are the expressions I_S and I_T, respectively, that describe the intelligibility of the world according to the proper language.

5.1. Independence à la Lemaître

Lemaître suggested a mode of independence between L_S and L_T, which means that according to his interpretation, each of the languages is closed (ClL) and total (ToL). This corresponds then to case 1 from Section 4.2.

5.2. Convergence à la Teilhard de Chardin/Duhem

Teilhard de Chardin suggested a convergence of science toward a philosophy of nature and then toward theology. According to his interpretation, this means that the scientific language L_S is open to some language L_SP, which is enriched by a philosophy of nature. Moreover, let us assume that L_SP is potentially open (converging) to the sort of unifying language L_S-T (that is, a language that unifies science and theology). At the same time, the theological language L_T is open, for instance, to the language L_TH, which is a philosophical interpretation of Christian theology focused on the crucial role of the category of history in theological reasoning. Let us also assume that the latter, like L_SP, is potentially open (converging) to the language L_S-T. As a consequence, we have that L_S, via a philosophical mediation expressed in the language L_SP, is converging to L_S-T. Also converging to the latter is L_T, but this time via a philosophical mediation expressed in the language L_TH. This situation corresponds to cases 2 and 3 from Section 4.2.

Let us comment further on this approach. Firstly, we have assumed that L_S and L_T are closed (ClL) and total (ToL). This assumption resembles Teilhard’s criticism of any confusion between science and theology and Duhem’s conventionalist epistemology of science.

Secondly, L_SP and L_TH, understood as proper extensions of L_S and L_T, respectively, remain ToL and ClL. The difference between these new languages and the previous ones is that new expressions have been introduced into L_S and L_T and, as a consequence, so have new semantics: that of a philosophical (evolutionary) interpretation of nature and that of a philosophical interpretation of Christian theology that focuses on history, respectively, both aimed at describing the intelligible character of the world that is evolutionary. We do not specify here the content of these expressions, the manner in which they have been formulated, etc., but the main point is that the two languages speak about the intelligibility of the evolutionary world, at least to some extent, in a similar (analogous) way since both are converging to the same language L_S-T.

Thirdly, let us reiterate that in Section 4.2, we assumed that I_S can be translated (TR) to I_T. If this is the case, then those languages (and all their expressions) are mutually translatable (TR). But in the case that we are considering now, we cannot a priori assume that L_SP and L_TH are mutually translatable. On the contrary, we must note that some deep and invariant structure of reality (in its ontological and epistemological aspects) is being revealed progressively through the historical and fallible development of science and theology. It can be said that both science and theology result in being convergent (i.e., they tend to the same limit, but without reaching it) under the same respect, but only after a piecemeal a posteriori evaluation of what has effectively been done within each of the disciplines. Thus, a convergence is possible due to articulation, which is like a dynamic process of translation between L_S and L_T, thanks to philosophical mediation performed on a case-by-case basis. This articulation may be conceived of as the analog of TR. Although the two languages are not mutually translatable (MT), thanks to the articulation process, the meanings of expressions from different languages become analogous (i.e., more similar than dissimilar). It seems, then, that within the approach à la Teilhard de Chardin/Duhem, a sequence of different partial science–theology worldviews (e.g., WV_S-T¹, WV_S-T², WV_S-T³, etc.) may be formulated during the articulation process, thus avoiding concordism and discordism and tending towards the ideal limit of the unified WV_S-T, but without reaching it.

The last remark seems to contradict what we stated in Section 4.1 (Basic Notions and Their Definitions). There, we mentioned, referring to Ajdukiewicz’s approach, that in a set of possible WVs, there can be many locally unified WVs, but there does not have to be a perfect global WV conceived of as a certain epistemic ideal associated with the notion of objective truth about reality. This contradiction, however, is only apparent since one must have in mind that we have suggested an example of two languages in order to describe the intelligible character of the world that is evolutionary. In other words, we have proposed a domain-specific (in some respect) example of articulation, that is, local articulation, rather than an unrestricted (global) articulation of everything. Thus, we cannot exclude the possibility that several CFs (WVs) can be proposed, which are not to be confused but may be convergent. We use the term convergence (meaning a tendency to reach some sort of an ideal limit) to describe a type of articulation—avoiding concordism and discordism—between science and theology that tends towards offering a unified worldview (WV) to a certain extent. We leave the problem of why a unified universal WV_S-T cannot be reached for another discussion.

Fourthly, within this approach, which does not assume that L_SP and L_TH are mutually translatable (MT), we avoid the position of concordism. In addition, due to the convergence, we can also avoid discordism.

Briefly put, the articulation mode consists in maintaining methodological boundaries between L_SP and L_TH and, at the same time, a tendency towards a common space for dialogue. In our example, the subject of this dialogue is the issue of the intelligibility of the world. What deserves further attention is the fact that in the case of L_SP and L_TH, there can be differences between SDs and their formulation. Such differences may, in consequence, influence the characteristics of the similarities and differences between L_SP and L_TH. We leave this problem for another discussion.

6. Conclusions

In simple terms, something can be intelligible or comprehensible by virtue of making sense to us. What is intelligible is self-evident; it is given to us. The unintelligible is simply unspeakable; it is not given to us. It seems very reasonable to assume ontic intelligibility—that there is an objective reality that can, at least partially, be comprehended. At the same time, we have argued that objective reality can be understood using different cognitive tools. Thus, there also exists epistemological intelligibility—a never-ending disclosure of the objective reality due to our epistemic activity. Science, philosophy, and theology are modes of understanding. The crucial question is whether these modes are completely independent, linked by articulation thanks to a convergence of the formal structure of two philosophical interpretations: a hermeneutics of nature (provided by a philosophy of nature giving philosophical meaning to scientific content) on the one part, and a hermeneutics of theology (trying to extract the philosophical structure of theological discourses) on the other. The latter would mean that what is reached in the process of articulation could be more and more similar since pushing science to its limits may lead to reaching semantic domains normally elaborated within philosophical or theological conceptual frameworks. We think that while Lemaître was defending a certain kind of independence of science with respect to theology, Teilhard was defending what can be described as a convergence of science towards theology. These two positions have been carefully analyzed in our study by applying Ajdukiewicz’s philosophy of language.

The aim of our article has been to show that it is important to continue to defend the epistemological autonomy of science and theology and, at the same time, to avoid a radical separation between the two when we are considering the hermeneutical level, that is, the level of philosophical interpretation, which naturally arises when we are facing the question of the deep meaning of scientific content and practices and the question of the deep intelligibility of theological discourses. It would be worthwhile to revisit the attempts made, for example, by Jean Ladrière (1970) to overcome the limits of concordism and separatism, respecting the autonomy of science but refusing to enclose its meaning within its own formal limits. In addition, it would also be important to demonstrate that the power of science is to show, from the inside, that its complete intelligibility requires moving on to another form of discourse, that is, a philosophical hermeneutics that can face another hermeneutical attempt—the search for the rational and always partial intelligibility of theology.