Management of Religious Diversity in Chile: Experiences from Local Governments

Abstract

This article analyzes the origins, characteristics, and functioning of the Chilean public institutions dedicated to managing religious diversity at the municipal level. Paying attention to the effects produced by the promulgation of the 1999 Cults Law, the text problematizes how the tensions between political, technical, and religious elements affect the daily functioning of the Municipal Offices of Religious Affairs (OMARs in Spanish). Here, the influence of evangelical pressure groups seeking to position themselves at the level of local politics meets local governments led by mayors searching to expand their access to forms of organized citizenship. The article is based on a historical review of the forms of religious management in Chile and interviews with those in charge of the OMARs in communes of the city of Santiago.

1. Introduction

The study of the relationship between religion and politics in Chile has gained relevance since the late 20th century. However, it has significant antecedents in constitutional discussions on religious freedom, which not only guaranteed the separation between church and state, but also established mechanisms to ensure equal treatment of all religious groups present in the country.

The role played by the Catholic Church in defending human rights during Pinochet’s dictatorship (1973–1990), as well as in facilitating spaces and conditions for the transition to democracy, has received great attention, to the point of establishing the Chilean case as paradigmatic at the international level (Salinas 1994; Correa and Viera-Gallo 1986; Lehmann 1990; Lynch 1991; Kelly 2018; Freston 2011; Goldfrank and Rowell 2012). Likewise, recent research has highlighted the dynamic role played by evangelical churches during this period, debunking installed prejudices regarding their apoliticism or inclination toward conservatism (Boas 2016; Mansilla and Orellana 2018). Here, important fractures and divisions within the diverse evangelical world regarding the issue of democratic breakdown and state violence have been analyzed, highlighting parallel evangelical initiatives that opted for mobilization and protest against Pinochet (Maldonado 2013; Fediakova 2004; Mansilla and Orellana 2018). Although with nuances, both cases reflect the political and public importance that religious organizations can occupy in contexts of political crisis and social change (Peterson 2024).

However, studies related to analyzing the role of religion in Chilean politics after the dictatorship remain an open field of investigation. Although changes in the political strategies of the Catholic hierarchy regarding the defense of morally conservative agendas have been highlighted (Hagopian 2009; Hass 1999; Levine 2012), as well as the growing interest of evangelical sectors in entering the political field through activism, evangelical parties, and candidacies for elected positions (Fediakova 2010, 2012; Mansilla et al. 2019; Sandoval 2018), little exploration has been conducted regarding the institutional changes responsible for managing public participation in the growing religious diversity in contemporary Chile. One of the most important advances has been the enactment of a law establishing regulations on the legal constitution of churches and religious organizations in 1999.

In Chile, the main reflections have come from the legal field, which has problematized the biases, possibilities, and limitations of the new legal framework (Del Pico 2012, 2018; Precht 2000; Salinas 2008). However, the concrete effects of these institutional changes on interactions between religious agents, the current regulations, and the governmental agents responsible for administering them have only recently been highlighted (Marín 2023). At the Latin American level, the management of the religious has been consolidated as an area of growing interest, especially regarding the relationship that states build with religious groups, particularly Catholic and evangelical ones. In Argentina, García Bossio (2018) analyzes the model through which the state has recently linked with religious entities through a type of secularism based on recognition and collaboration. Through the Secretariat of Worship, this approach not only guarantees religious freedom within a democratic framework, but also promotes the participation and collaboration of religious organizations in areas such as health, education, and social assistance. However, this relationship is not free of tensions, as it can lead to the favoring of certain religious institutions to the detriment of others, which calls into question fundamental principles such as neutrality, equality, separation of the church and state, and religious freedom.

In the same context, the work of Mosqueira and Carbonelli (2025) analyzes the impact of regulations on the governance of religious diversity in the Province of Buenos Aires. In this framework, both state and religious agents intertwine a complex network of interests at different levels, which evidences a mobilization of both material and symbolic resources. Although they identify heterogeneous governance models among municipalities, they highlight the agency capacity of religious actors to redefine the legitimacy of their entities and actions, beyond the existing regulatory framework.

In the Mexican context, Gaytán (2025) highlights the existing tensions between the normativity emanating from the state and the demands originating from local spheres, thus questioning the concept of secularism conceived at the national level. While at the national level, there persists an approach focused on the exclusion of religion from the public space, the local reality evidences a remarkable vitality of religious expressions, which are integrated into the daily life of people through the recognition of various groups, as well as their religious and cultural practices in the public sphere. In this sense, the author suggests the need to redefine the concept of secularism in order to adequately manage religious diversity, in accordance with democratic principles that allow its full inclusion in the public debate.

Following this regional trend, our research focuses on the analysis of a specific dimension of this new public institutionality for religious management: the Municipal Offices for Religious Affairs (OMARs). Modeled after the National Office of Religious Affairs (ONAR), OMARs function as bridges connecting local governments with religious organizations present in the territory. However, offices at the national and local levels not only follow different models, but also face problems in communication, which will be discussed later. Contrary to the ONAR, OMARs show exceptional characteristics in their establishment and operation, articulating various forms of interaction and collaboration between municipalities and local churches. Additionally, their daily operation informs the different representations that public and private agents hold regarding the role of religion in political affairs more generally.

Methodologically, this research is based on testimonies from OMAR officials and public servants in three low-income municipalities of the Metropolitan Region of Santiago, Chile. As mentioned later, due the fact that OMARs are unstable bodies that depend on the mayor’s will, it is difficult to know how many of the 346 Chilean municipalities have active offices, although an event organized by the ONAR in 2024 claimed the assistance of 60 OMAR representatives, giving an idea of their current vitality. Regarding the selection of cases for this research, these are based on their consistency in working with local religious communities and faith-based initiatives centered on local social problems in Santiago, the country’s capital that concentrates the majority of the municipalities and population. Interviews were conducted between 2021 and 2023 under a semi-structured interview scheme aimed at understanding the ways in which these public employees interpret their experiences working simultaneously with state and religious agents (Taylor et al. 2016). The selection of these individuals followed theoretical and non-probabilistic criteria (Coyne 1997; Glasser 1978; Strauss and Corbin 1990) related to the office’s activities, its connection with local churches, and its collaboration with religious social intervention projects at the local level. In terms of the sample, 10 OMAR representatives and municipality officials were included, among a total sample of 60 people that also included religious leaders and members of faith-based organizations working in the three selected municipalities.

Due to the nature of these offices—an aspect that will be analyzed later—all OMAR interviewees came from evangelical churches of different denominations, although it is acknowledged that this characteristic may not represent all offices in the country. The interview analysis was carried out through descriptive coding and content analysis using MAXQDA software. Here, the codes were divided between those related to the ONAR (9 codes) and OMARs (17 codes). Due their descriptive nature, the codes were related to the composition of offices, relations to other state functions, connections to religious institutions, and everyday and structural problems, among other common themes.

2. Trajectories of Religious Freedom in Chile: Difficulties and Accommodations

The issue of religious freedom was initially linked to the political and legal recognition of the Catholic religion. This was one of the challenges that the young Latin American republics faced after their independence from Spain in the early 19th century. The various proposed solutions were reflected in different constitutional texts, underscoring their political and social relevance (Celis 2005). In the case of Chile, these solutions likely reflected the political class’s difficulties in reconciling liberal principles—such as the guarantee of fundamental rights in a constitutional state—with more traditional cultural elements, like the religious nature of society.

Freedom of worship, conceived as a full fundamental right expressly protected by the legal system, was not constitutionally enshrined until 1925, although it had already been legally recognized in 1865 through an interpretative law of Article 5 of the 1833 Constitution. This law declared that under Article 5 of the Constitution, those who did not profess the Catholic religion were allowed to worship in private spaces and were authorized to establish and maintain private schools to educate their children according to their own doctrines (Estellé 1968). This was the first legal recognition of the protection of religious freedom in Chile, after nearly 55 years in which most constitutional texts had almost invariably repeated that “the religion of the Republic of Chile was the Catholic, Apostolic, Roman religion, with the exclusion of the public practice of any other”.

Subsequently, the 1925 Constitution was promulgated, marking significant progress in religious matters for several reasons. First, it explicitly enshrined freedom of conscience as a constitutional guarantee by including it in the list of rights and freedoms within the Charter itself. Second, it recognized the possibility of publicly manifesting any worship, within certain limits, including authorization to erect and maintain temples. Finally, it established that all churches and religious institutions would be governed by the same rules of common law from the Constitution’s entry into force, although rights acquired before that date would be governed by the laws in effect at that time. This ensured the prevailing status of the Catholic Church compared to other churches and religious organizations in Chile. Additionally, the first transitory article of the Constitution guaranteed the Catholic Church state economic contributions, but only for five years after the Constitution’s promulgation.

The challenge, however, lay in how to carry out the separation. Representatives from the conservative wing of the Commission pushed to ensure the Catholic Church’s full freedom in exchange for the repeal of the monopoly it had held under previous constitutions. At the same time, they sought state compensation for this religious institution, as the loss of its privileged status implied the cessation of state financial contributions.

As will be explained later, no constitutional or legal text explicitly established the Catholic Church’s status, so its legal attribution was granted based on interpretations contained in judicial rulings issued under the previous Charter. According to the new provision, other churches had to be constituted in accordance with the rules applicable to non-profit legal entities under private law, with their patrimonial aspects governed by common law. This only affected the Catholic Church in relation to its future assets.

In summary, the innovations introduced by Article 10 enshrined the constitutional separation of church and state, a process that had already been gradually occurring through various laws, mainly since the last quarter of the 19th century. In this context, in addition to the Freedom of Worship Law (1865), notable laws include those that established the secularization of cemeteries (1871 and 1883), the secularization of marriage (1884), and the abolition of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and the recurso de fuerza (1874 and 1875), among others.

During the 1925 Constitution’s validity, no other laws or reforms were enacted that directly and significantly deepened the separation between Church and State. Similarly, the 1980 Constitution, which remains in force, reiterated almost verbatim the former Article 10 from its predecessor (Constitución Política de la República de Chile 1980). The Commission responsible for drafting the 1980 Constitution extensively debated whether to establish in the constitutional text the type of legal personality that would characterize the country’s churches, or whether the same legal status should be granted to the Catholic Church and other churches. The practical implications of this decision were mainly related to the constitution and administration of churches, since, in terms of property rights (such as acquiring assets or entering into legal acts), both categories of entities would be subject to common law rules (Alessandri Rodríguez 1998).

Ultimately, the Commission reached an agreement determining that recognizing churches’ rights over their current and future assets implied granting them a legal personality under public law. This decision was made independently of the fact that, for practical reasons, new organizations had to request state recognition, as had been the case for all non-Catholic churches up to that point.

This sought to ratify a factual difference based on public administrative needs, such as the need to register churches—a function historically managed by the Ministry of Justice and the State Defense Council. These bodies processed churches’ applications for legal personality in accordance with private law rules, without considering the religious nature of the organizations, treating them more like any other private entity, such as sports clubs. To avoid infringing on religious freedom, the state granted this legal personality without making judgments about the organizations’ religious nature, limiting itself solely to formal aspects. Thus, there was a state practice that recognized a differentiated status for churches, although nominally they were granted the same legal personality as any other private organization.

Consequently, the current constitutional provision regarding freedom of conscience, religion, and worship is as follows:

Article 19—The Constitution ensures all persons:

“6°—Freedom of conscience, the manifestation of all beliefs, and the free exercise of all forms of worship that do not oppose morality, good customs, or public order. Religious denominations may erect and maintain temples and their dependencies under the security and hygiene conditions established by laws and ordinances. Churches, religious denominations, and religious institutions of any worship will have the rights granted and recognized by the laws currently in force regarding assets. Temples and their dependencies exclusively intended for worship will be exempt from all types of contributions.

Over the years, the original wording became insufficient, especially after Chile signed various international treaties, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief; the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, 1981, and 1992, respectively); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and the American Convention on Human Rights (also known as the Pact of San José of Costa Rica). The extension of the guarantees enshrined in these treaties imposed on the Chilean state creates an obligation to broaden the protection of religious freedom, shifting from a purely freedom-based approach to one that guaranteed all citizens the possibility of choosing and practicing their respective faiths.

The importance of these international treaties cannot be underestimated. It is essential to recognize the obligations they impose on the legislature and the Executive Branch, as established by Law No. 18.825 of 17 August 1989, which amended the second paragraph of Article 5 of the 1980 Constitution, recognizing the duty of state bodies to respect fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution and by international treaties ratified by Chile and in force in the country (Constitución Política de la República de Chile 1980).

Thanks to this modification, it is understood that fundamental rights limit the exercise of national sovereignty, regardless of the source of these rights. This has sparked a debate about the hierarchy of international treaties within Chile’s legal framework, leading to doctrinal opinions that consider them either constitutional norms or intermediate norms. However, the clear language of the new second paragraph has fostered consensus among interpreters, who agree that authorities must adopt a proactive stance to ensure the effective fulfillment of human rights.

As a consequence of this, and in order to comply with the constitutional mandate to guarantee equality among various religious groups, on 1 October 1999, during the presidency of Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, Law 19.638 was enacted and published in the Official Gazette on October 10 of the same year. The message with which the Executive Branch presented the bill to Congress was partly based on the inconvenience of granting religious entities a legal personality under private law, as this would amount to an act of mere “religious tolerance” rather than a recognition of “religious freedom”.

The bill was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies on 2 November 1993, and its processing ended almost six years later, on 14 October 1999, with the publication of Law No. 19.638 on the “Legal Constitution of Churches and Religious Denominations”. The common legal framework established by the law to formalize the operation of churches in Chile is characterized by recognizing general rules and key definitions related to religious freedom. It also establishes specific regulations regarding the legal nature of religious institutions, their constitution, the rules applicable to their assets, and their dissolution. Apart from these special provisions, religious organizations are governed by common law in their other legal acts.

Religious freedom, as stated by Nogueira (2006), is intrinsically linked to freedom of conscience, as it entails a unique relationship between the individual and a higher being situated on a transcendent plane. This right is expressed in two dimensions: a subjective one, as an intimate personal experience, and an objective one, as recognition and legal protection by the State. From this perspective, religious freedom is enshrined in Law No. 19.638. In Chapter II—specifically Articles 6 and 7—this law outlines a set of entitlements that constitute this right, recognizing them for both individuals and religious entities.

The limitations on religious freedom are set forth in the Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile, and relate specifically to morality, good customs, and public order. According to Nogueira (2006), these are explicit restrictions; however, there are also implicit limitations arising from the necessity to reconcile this right with other constitutionally protected rights or interests.

In this regard, the author contends that the legal reference to “morality” as a limitation on freedom of conscience and religion should be interpreted within the framework of social or public morality. The latter is understood as a body of behavioral norms derived from various philosophical and religious traditions—not exclusively from any single one—and acknowledged as valid within a specific historical context.

Among the general rules and principles outlined by the law, the following stand out: the State’s commitment to guaranteeing that people can freely carry out their religious activities, and that the freedom of churches, denominations, and religious entities is respected (Article 3); and the prohibition of discrimination based on religious beliefs or using such beliefs to limit the equality enshrined in the Constitution or laws (Article 2). In this context, Article 4 defines what is meant by churches, denominations, or religious institutions, specifying that they are entities composed solely of natural persons who profess a certain faith. Article 5 clarifies that whenever the term “religious entity” is used, it refers to churches, denominations, and religious institutions of any faith.

At this point, Salinas (2001) raises the question of what elements should be considered for an organization to be deemed “religious.” According to the author, the law is not very explicit, but its reading allows for the identification of two fundamental aspects: that it is an entity composed exclusively of natural persons, and that these persons profess a specific faith. No other substantial requirement is demanded, such as a specific content of faith or a “notorious presence” in the country. It is evident that the law is limited in this regard, but it is also clear that the second aspect mentioned by Salinas (2001) is the most relevant for distinguishing a religious entity from one that is not.

In defining religious entities, the original bill explicitly mentioned “Evangelical Christian Churches”, reflecting the desire of these churches to obtain legal recognition equal to that of the Catholic Church. In fact, during the first three years after the return to democracy, at least five previous bills addressed the legal constitution of religious organizations, some exclusively referring to evangelical churches. However, this mention was removed in an early phase of the bill when reviewed by the Chamber of Deputies’ Committee on Constitution, Legislation, and Justice, eliminating any specific reference to evangelical churches.

Article 6 of Law 19.638 lists several rights granted to individuals in the exercise of religious freedom and worship, including the following: the freedom to profess and manifest the religious belief of their choice, or not profess any belief; the right to practice their faith publicly or privately, and individually or collectively; the right to receive religious assistance anywhere; and the right to receive or impart religious education by any means. It also recognizes the right of parents to choose their children’s religious and moral education according to their convictions. Article 6 establishes the freedom of individuals to associate to express their beliefs. Finally, Article 7 grants similar rights to “religious entities”, including not only the ability to exercise and freely disseminate their faith, but also the power to do the following:

“Establish their own internal organization and hierarchy; Train, appoint, elect, and designate individuals for positions and hierarchies and determine their own denominations”.

3. The National Office of Religious Affairs (ONAR)

The National Office of Religious Affairs (ONAR), initially called the Government Office of Religious Affairs, was created in 2007 with the primary objective of promoting, from a state perspective, the exercise of the Right to Religious Freedom, as guaranteed by the Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile. Dependent on the Ministry General Secretariat of the Presidency, its fundamental mission is to “represent the Government before religious entities.” In this context, the ONAR is responsible for addressing the requests of various faiths before the Executive Branch, thereby ensuring the proper enforcement of Law 19.638.

Within this framework, its strategic objectives are to promote effective equality and religious freedom in Chile, and to foster inter-religious dialogue (https://www.onar.gob.cl/que-es-la-onar/, accessed on 25 February 2025). To achieve this, Exempt Resolution No. 305 of 2024 establishes that, in order to bring the ONAR’s activities closer to the regions, a gradual national expansion process has begun. This process has materialized in the installation of advisors in the regions of Antofagasta, Valparaíso, Biobío, La Araucanía, and Los Lagos. Their primary role is to support the connection between religious entities and regional, provincial, and municipal institutions.

Beyond what is outlined in official documents, in practice, the relationship between ONAR and the Municipal Offices of Religious Affairs (OMARs) does not follow a clearly defined organic structure. On the one hand, the ONAR is located in the ministry in charge of political connections between the government, congress, and organizations of civil society, like churches. Due to its political nature, an important part of the ONAR’s activities is related to acts of public recognition, religious celebrations, inter-religious forums, and the promotion of religious freedom. These activities are highly centralized at the presidency level, and only recently have five regional offices been created in order to function as an intermediary and solve the lack of connection between the central and local levels, although the real effect of these offices and the criteria for selecting these regions are still unclear (Chile is divided into 16 regions). In some ways, this regional ONAR model suffers from the same difficulties of definition and scope as other forms of regional government within the dominant centralist and presidential political organization in Chile.

On the other hand, local governments enjoy certain degrees of autonomy, allowing them to act independently in areas like the management of religious diversity. Consequently, not all municipalities have a dedicated office for religious affairs; some municipalities do not align with the political orientation of the central government, and others maintain a certain distance or even question the ONAR’s leadership and direction. Some of the interviewees only knew the head of the ONAR by name, had never met with him or his team, and were unaware of whether the ONAR’s objectives aligned with those of the OMARs. Furthermore, some questioned its usefulness or reduced it to “political” matters that had little to do with local reality. In this sense, the disconnection reflects another aspect of the communication problems between the central political power and the reality of the territories that are common to Chilean politics.

4. Religious Management at the Local Level Through the Municipal Offices of Religious Affairs (OMARs)

Currently, there is no standard procedure for selecting a head for the Municipal Offices of Religious Affairs (OMARs) in Chilean municipalities. Although these offices tend to be administratively located within the Community Development Directorate (DIDECO)—the local government office responsible for managing civil society initiatives—the activation of an OMAR depends primarily on the value and importance that the mayor assigns to coordinating religious actors in the territory. This political determinism is central to understanding the characteristics, functions, and limitations of these offices in their daily work, as well as the opportunities they offer local religious organizations to increase their interaction and influence within local governments.

Since the opening of OMARs relies solely on the mayor’s will, it is difficult to determine how many are currently open and active nationwide. The offices often experience irregular functioning and frequent changes in leadership. While Salinas (2009) estimated that at least 35 municipalities had such offices in 2009, Foubert (2017) reported that only 19 OMARs were operating regularly by 2014. These numbers fluctuate even more during election periods and shifts in the ideological orientation of the parties governing municipalities. Right-wing mayors tend to be more inclined to create new offices or revitalize existing ones. However, the lack of resources and the uncertain definition of their functions make it common for an office opened during one administration to enter periods of inactivity, closure, or reorganization following electoral cycles.

Unlike their national counterpart, the National Office of Religious Affairs (ONAR), the operation of OMARs is not clearly defined, and largely depends on the initiative of the person in charge. In some municipalities, like Lo Prado, the guidelines are clearer. According to the OMAR officer there, the office defines three core action areas: first, addressing the proposals and needs of local churches; second, guiding social charity initiatives led by churches to assist neighbors and people in need; and finally, connecting local churches with the policies, visions, and objectives directed by the municipality (manager of Lo Prado OMAR). However, this model is not universally shared. In practice, OMARs often act as mediating agents that navigate between the interests of religious actors and the local government’s political agenda. As the Lo Prado manager explained,

“One of the first things I had to explain to the pastors was that I am not the representative of the church at the municipality, I am the representative of the municipality at the council of pastors. Many expected me not to be loyal to the mayor when making certain decisions.”

(Manager of Lo Prado OMAR)

This liminal character of the OMARs arises from both the vagueness of their specific functions and the influence of local religious actors in opening these offices. However, all the interviewed OMAR officials agreed that a common issue is a lack of knowledge about the number and type of religious organizations present in their municipalities. As the OMAR officer from San Bernardo explains,

“During the administration of Mayor Nora Cuevas, this office was operational. I don’t know if it operated under DIDECO, but it did exist, and it had the same mandate that I have, which is to create a registry of churches at the municipal level. But I have to create it myself because apparently, it doesn’t exist—the mandate was not carried out. So, I’m currently working on that. My professional background is in engineering, so if I’m assigned a project, I work based on that, regardless of any contingencies. The previous person in charge, who was a pastor, I don’t know what their working method was like.”

(Manager of San Bernardo OMAR)

Although most interviewees claim that they seek to professionalize the role of the person in charge, the truth is that the opening and operation of an office tends to occur due to an ideological affinity between the mayor and certain organized religious groups that manage to convey the importance of activating the office at the local level. As in the case of the ONAR at the national level, OMARs are mostly managed by individuals associated with evangelical churches or organizations who do not always have a clear project linked to the responsibilities and limitations of the position. One former ONAR director is even more categorical, stating that “OMARs are currently co-opted by some of these pastoral councils” (former ONAR director).

The evangelical influence in the opening of an OMAR is primarily observed in the way in which the mayor determines who occupies the position of the person in charge. This not only highlights the significant importance of the mayor’s leadership within Chilean local politics—where they make decisions, demonstrate closeness, and manage resources with considerable flexibility and autonomy (Álvarez 2014; Fouillioux 2007; Valdivia 2012)—but also the power that some churches possess to suggest members of their ranks who will allow them to increase their political influence and prestige. While in some cases, the person in charge emerges from acquaintances that the mayor or their advisers have within a certain evangelical denomination aligned with their political affiliation, in other cases, the choice arises as part of a negotiation process led by the churches themselves or groups of evangelical leaders, known as “pastoral councils.” The case of the OMAR in Lo Prado, for which the person in charge is also a pastor and the director of a religious NGO, serves as an example of this:

“We joined the pastoral council of Lo Prado. The pastoral council had been asking for a long time for the creation of an office for religious affairs here, for pastoral care at the municipality. The mayor asked them and said, ‘Alright, the person I need would have to be like this, and I need you to propose people who have these three capacities,’ and the pastoral council proposed me, and the mayor accepted.”

(Manager of Lo Prado OMAR)

However, although the opening of an OMAR is generally celebrated by the mayor and churches as an important milestone, in practice, the office operates with very limited budgets and staff. In the case of the OMAR in Pedro Aguirre Cerda, the person in charge mentions working alone and having an annual budget of five hundred thousand pesos (currently approximately five hundred dollars), which forces her to find creative ways to position the office’s work both inside and outside the municipality. At times, she manages to contact local churches to sponsor events organized by the OMAR. Additionally, by requesting favors and making petitions to other municipal departments with more resources (Youth Office, Senior Citizen Office, Women’s Office, etc.), the office gains presence in other outreach activities aimed at civil society. However, the lack of financial support, combined with the constant suspicion of other local government members who do not value the presence of religion in local government in the same way, creates the conditions for the office to easily become a political space for public recognition and negotiation of benefits between the mayor and local religious leaders.

The evangelical primacy in the OMARs contrasts with the low presence of members of other religions in the administration or activities of the office. Both at the national level, in the ONAR, and at the local level, in the OMARs, there is a consensus that the Catholic Church does not require the services of these offices to organize its activities, gather resources, or influence political issues of its interest. As mentioned above, the Catholic Church has historically enjoyed a privileged position that allows it to gain direct access to elite political, cultural, and economic circles to negotiate favors, communicate its positions, and exert influence. This partly explains why the creation of this new religious institution was an initiative of evangelical sectors looking for equal treatment from the state, who continue to use it to channel their demands to the state. As a former ONAR director mentions,

“The Catholic Church meets directly with the president or with the Minister of the Presidency once a month, and they address their issues from a different position. They resolve them almost on equal footing. The rest of the other religions operated more through the ONAR.”

(Former ONAR director)

At the local level, this assessment is echoed when the person in charge of the OMAR in Pedro Aguirre Cerda states that “there is a clear divide with the Catholic Church, they are entirely self-managed” (person in charge, OMAR Pedro Aguirre Cerda). Moreover, she adds that it is usually the municipality that approaches the most well-known parishes in the neighborhood to inform them about the aid or guidance they can offer. However, in practice, these Catholic parishes manage material resources, volunteer work, and professional support through Catholic networks that connect schools, congregations, donors, religious NGOs, and ecclesiastical authorities at the national and international levels. From this perspective, the limited resources that the local OMAR can offer are mostly reduced to managing permits for the use of public spaces or coordinating the mayor’s participation in religious events or ceremonies.

If the disconnection with the Catholic Church at the local level is based on its self-sufficiency, the almost nonexistent presence of minority religions in local government stems from a lack of knowledge and initiative. Although all interviewees mention having approached Mormon churches, Jehovah’s Witnesses, or other religious groups present in the area, and generally lacking knowledge of their daily needs and not having strategies to include them in the OMAR’s work plans. When asked about this, one person in charge responded that “the other churches have less contact, like the Mormon churches. There is one here that is always closed, and whenever I go out, I always try to pass by to talk to them” (manager of Pedro Aguirre Cerda OMAR). Certainly, this reality cannot be extrapolated to all offices in the country, as there are experiences of offices managing to identify and assist religious diversity to varying degrees. However, evangelical hegemony and Catholic independence appear to be widespread phenomena nationwide.

Despite this evangelical hegemony in the leadership of the OMARs, the ties they establish with particular evangelical churches at the local level can take on quite divergent characteristics. These variations stem in part from the nature of local governments in Chile, which develop relationship styles with residents that range from clientelism and welfare assistance to collaboration. In some cases, establishing links with evangelical churches is difficult due to a lack of information about their location or the lack of interest they express in the relationships that could be generated with the local government. As repeated in interviews with those in charge, many evangelical churches operate as independent and decentralized ministries, often with little legal regulation. Some churches are created in parks, vacant lots, or the backyards of pastors’ homes, without the authorization and permits required by the municipality or the Ministry of Justice for religious organizations in Chile. In this context, many of these local religious organizations resist receiving the officials, sending information, or collaborating in activities organized by the municipality, due to the fear of exposing their irregular legal status. Moreover, in terms of conflict management, those interviewed agree that, rather than involving conflicts between religious organizations, many of the problems arise from the daily interaction of irregular ministries, complaining neighbors, and municipal actors, with few resolution tools.

On the other hand, managers affirm that a significant portion of local evangelical churches approach the municipality to request economic or material support needed to carry out their activities. Consistent with the observation that many Chilean municipalities lack genuine forms of co-governance that include residents’ input in defining and executing local budgets (Mardones 2008; Israel 2007), these evangelical groups tend to view the local government as a provider of material aid for the most disadvantaged populations. As one person in charge mentions,

“Evangelical churches, sadly, we see ourselves reflected as the ones who are always asking, in every sense. But there is a role that the evangelical church plays that isn’t reflected in these requests, because now I’m on the other side. Today, I can see what people often talk about but we don’t understand—it’s just that the evangelical church only wants to ask for things.”

(Manager of Pedro Aguirre Cerda OMAR)

Although in many cases, the requests are aimed at obtaining permits required by municipal regulations to use public spaces or carry out activities, in others, the requests extend to material aid, such as transport buses, Christmas gifts, audiovisual equipment, or any municipal resource that churches could use. This form of welfare assistance (asistencialismo in Spanish) not only generates expectations and dependence among many religious organizations regarding what they can obtain from local authorities and offices, but also fuels potential clientelist relationships, in which resources are transferred in exchange for loyalties, favors, and support which are useful during election campaigns.

As mentioned above, the opening of an OMAR is the exclusive responsibility of the mayors, who see this office as a benefit for the municipality and their own municipal administration. This assessment of churches as an important political actor depends on a problematic condition of Chilean local politics in the post-Pinochet dictatorship period: the growing scarcity of forms of citizen organization. The transition to democracy was based on a political paradox in which the reopening of democratic channels for electing authorities simultaneously produced a decline in forms of grassroots political organization and mobilization. Under the pretext of “protecting” the fragile, newly re-established democracy—still threatened by the presence of the military and inherited authoritarian regulations (Garretón 2004)—political activity tended to focus more on agreements between party elites than on the institutional channeling of society’s interests into politics through these parties. This, combined with the promotion of individualistic orientations inherent to neoliberalism (Moulian 2004; Lechner 2002; Joignant 2003), has led to collective forms of organization that were central in the second half of the 20th century (unions, neighborhood councils, social movements, etc.) becoming minority actors with little mobilizing power.

In this context, evangelical churches are becoming increasingly important in shaping political relations at the local level. Although the evangelical community in Chile represents only 17% of religious identifications (Encuesta Bicentenario 2023), the lack of grassroots organizations at the territorial level makes them one of the few forms of organized citizenship alongside neighborhood councils. This makes them attractive actors for those seeking to expand their political support base, such as candidates for municipal councils, district deputies, or mayors. As one OMAR manager mentions,

“The mayor, for example, I’ve seen that he has shown quite a lot of closeness to the evangelical world. I’m not a politician, I don’t know how to distinguish well whether someone does it to ingratiate themselves or not, and I wouldn’t dare to judge that either—not out of naivety, but because I believe it’s not my place. I’m not on the inside to know if what he says is true or not. But he has been quite close to the evangelical world. He feels supported by the pastors. The pastors have also learned a bit to approach him, because there were also several pastors with political leanings to the other side.”

(Manager of San Bernardo OMAR)

Stories of politicians approaching religious organizations to promote their candidacies during campaign periods are common in the testimonies. However, the concrete support they may receive from congregations is always uncertain. In some cases, pastors themselves attempt to persuade the congregation to support a specific candidacy, highlighting the supposed compatibility between the candidate’s ideas and beliefs and the church’s values. In other cases, religious leaders simply present the candidacies and leave members free to make their own decisions. Regardless of religious leaders’ openness toward local political leadership, this approach is based on the assumption that there is a uniform evangelical vote that can be convinced and mobilized—a situation that has proven difficult to demonstrate in practice (Fediakova 2004; Bargsted and De la Cerda 2019; Boas 2021). While evidence suggests that evangelicals tend to place greater importance on the candidate’s religion or their views on controversial issues of sexuality and reproduction (Boas 2016), the diversity within and between evangelical churches makes it difficult to guarantee loyalties that translate into votes at the end of a democratic election.

On the other hand, although mayors have a certain level of autonomy and leadership that makes them key actors in local politics, the resources they manage are not unlimited, and are subject to bureaucratic constraints imposed by central governments. In these contexts of needs and shortcomings, local governments find allies in religious organizations willing to create collaborative strategies to meet the needs of church members, the neighborhood, or the community at large. Unlike those religious actors who see the municipality only as a source of resources to exploit, these organizations adopt a more collaborative attitude driven by social and political interests inspired by Christian values. There are numerous examples, such as the one described by one of the interviewed managers:

“I have the case of a church that offers me a free program for children. They secure everything through a foreign organization, providing materials to the children as part of their evangelization role, but they also give gifts according to age groups. It’s a job they do voluntarily—they come, coordinate with the local church, train monitors, and then carry out the entire distribution for free.”

(Manager of San Bernardo OMAR)

Other examples include community kitchens, drug rehabilitation programs, aid for unhoused populations, and legal assistance for undocumented migrants, among many other possibilities. These social assistance initiatives often rely on the human and financial resources provided by the church, although in some cases, churches succeed in formalizing religious NGOs (faith-based organizations) linked to a specific church or denomination (Crisp 2014; Gocmen 2013; Clarke 2006). Through these legal entities, religious organizations gain access to public and private funding both within and beyond local government structures. Regardless of their legal framework, these religious organizations are typically in constant contact with the local government to fulfill their charitable missions on a daily basis. Depending on the type of assistance they provide, many of these religious organizations must maintain regular contact with Employment Offices (OMILs), Municipal Education Corporations, the primary health care network, local police, and many other offices dedicated to distributing social services and aid at the local level. Although in many cases, religious organizations deal directly with these offices, the interviewed officials report that the OMAR also acts as an intermediary that facilitates these connections, due to its liminal position. As one manager explains,

“With the municipal area, what often happens is that we have to keep asking who is in charge, who we can call, because people change all the time. We have to respond to all the needs that users may have. If there are educational needs, we must find out which schools are offering study leveling programs in night schools. If it’s about housing, for example, we have to ask, ‘Which department handles housing?’ The Urban Development Department. We need to maintain that relationship with the municipality to know where to effectively refer people who are in need or facing some kind of social issue.”

(Manager of Pedro Aguirre Cerda OMAR)

Through guiding users who require social assistance, both OMARs and religious organizations carry out a pedagogy of the state that informs users about existing services, as well as their rights and guarantees. However, this collaboration—which ultimately benefits users—also arises from shortcomings in the functioning of both local government and religious organizations. On the one hand, municipal bureaucracy, along with its relative economic and administrative dependence on the central government, often makes the delivery of benefits an inefficient process. A person in charge of the Municipal Migration Office comments that it is not uncommon for irregular or undocumented migrants who seek help from the municipality to be referred to religious organizations that can provide immediate assistance. The same happens in emergency situations, where the process of applying for aid can be lengthy and complex, often replaced by religious civil society initiatives that are more effective in both time and scope.

On the other hand, it is not only local government agents who rely on religious organizations to solve everyday problems. Many of these churches or the religious NGOs dependent on them require local assistance networks to provide comprehensive aid to the users they serve through their various initiatives. Since most of them lack autonomous resources to meet all user needs, they often act as intermediaries, offering guidance and support to users within the complex network of local public social assistance. It is common for a significant part of these religious organizations’ social aid functions to involve securing legal assistance, applying for benefits, finding available slots, or registering users in local public services. In this way, an everyday form of public–private collaboration emerges, where practical needs outweigh suspicions and stereotypes about the limits of religion in political and public affairs in a secular state like Chile.

5. Conclusions

As evidenced in this research, the treatment of religious diversity has traveled a long road full of difficulties, which have been addressed mainly through the legal sphere, through the guarantee of religious freedom in the country. However, this has implied, in our opinion, the construction of a model of governance of religious diversity based solely on the solutions provided by the legal system, or else, on actions of limited scope that respond more to political correctness (such as dialogue tables, inter-religious and intercultural meetings, and the celebration of religious festivities, among others), without effectively addressing the resolution of conflicts between religious entities or with civil society.

Nevertheless, the OMARs are a unique case for understanding the relationship between religion and local politics in contemporary Chile. Emerging along the lines of the ONAR, the OMARs represent processes of negotiation of meanings related to the place of religion in politics between community leaders, municipal bureaucrats, and ecclesiastical agents present in the territory. Although their location in the Directorate of Communal Development (DIDECO) tends to link them with other forms of promotion of civil society organizations (related to indigenous peoples, youths, senior citizens, or sexual diversity), their exclusive dependence on the will of the mayor in office provides information on how religious actors have managed to integrate themselves into local politics through the networks of favors and clientelistic loyalties that still predominate in the forms of communal administration of many municipalities. Given that many of these mayor–church links are circumstantial and do not have long-term projections, the functions and objectives of the OMARs are still unclear and subject to the professional and work experience of those in charge. Because of this, a change in the political orientation of the elected mayor may mean not only a change of the person in charge, but also the possible indefinite closure of the office.

The functioning of OMARs also allows us to observe how the management of religious diversity has important differences when analyzed at the national versus the local level. Although both the ONAR and OMARs have tended to be co-opted by evangelical actors and organizations aligned with the political orientations of the government of the day, at the national level, an approach focused on the recognition of diversity through inter-religious dialogue has tended to prevail, while at the local level, a mixture of clientelism, co-dependence, and virtuous collaboration tends to prevail. In the first case, the testimonies tend to agree that an important part of the links between churches and municipalities tend to be based on assistance dynamics between churches that request material resources and mayors who seek to ingratiate themselves with them in order to expand their influence on these forms of organized citizenship. Certainly, these interactions are not only based on particular interests and selfish calculations, but are mediated by specific representations of the role of the municipality and religion in local politics.

However, many of the interactions between churches and local governments do not take place so much in the calculation of benefits for the actors involved as in a framework of the possibilities and limitations of the communal administration. On the one hand, the municipal bureaucracy is legally and budgetarily limited to solving immediate problems that affect many neighbors, often having to resort to local churches that are better able to provide guidance, shelter, and material aid. For their part, many churches and organizations derived from them depend on municipal services and the local assistance network to assist their members or those who approach them seeking help. It is precisely these types of religious organizations oriented towards charity or social activism that open up possibilities for systematic collaboration on the basis of projects that identify local citizen needs. Whether through rehabilitation programs, solidarity kitchens, or legal assistance, these actors are able to generate stable communication channels with local governments, and are less dependent on the volatility of political clientelism. According to all interviewees, the promotion of social action initiatives led by religious actors represents the most desirable form of virtuous collaboration in the local management of local religious diversity.

In general terms, both the ONAR and OMARs present significant deficiencies in the construction of a religious diversity management model that allows them to adequately address issues, understand conflicts, make informed decisions, and explain the causes of and learn from the situations that have occurred (Moreras 2017). This implies, on the one hand, developing a greater capacity to manage religious diversity in the territory, avoiding reducing the contribution of religious groups to a purely welfare approach, and implementing harmonization practices in conflict resolution (Ruiz Vieytez 2017). In addition, it is essential to foster spaces for bidirectional education between religious actors and municipal and state actors. Moving toward a model of church–state relations with these characteristics would not only allow us to identify more efficient practices of co-governance and the resolution of everyday conflicts at the local level, but also to observe configurations of Chilean secularism beyond the abstract principles of neutrality and democracy. Although this discussion goes beyond the scope of this article, we believe it is an important avenue for further research.