Securitization, Humanitarianism, and the Religious Dimension of European Migration Policy

Abstract

This article critically examines the evolution of EU migration policy discourse from 1989 to 2024, highlighting the shift from overt securitization to a more humanitarian and managerial framing, which still retains some securitization elements. By analyzing key policy documents, including the Hague and Stockholm Programmes, the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), and the 2024 Pact on Migration and Asylum, this paper demonstrates how migration has been increasingly framed as a technical and economic issue while still maintaining exclusionary logics. Although humanitarian language has softened, policy goals remain focused on containment, selective inclusion, and externalizing responsibility. The second part of the article explores the religious aspect of EU migration policy, arguing that, despite the formal secularism of EU institutions, religious identity, particularly Islam, is implicitly intertwined with discourses of risk, cultural incompatibility, and integration. Drawing on Peter Berger’s theory of pluralism, the paper highlights a fundamental tension between the EU’s normative claims to diversity and its implicit preference for secular Christian frameworks. The analysis examines pathways for integrating religious consultation into EU governance and its potential to address the persistent marginalization of religion as a factor in inclusion and political agency. By linking migration discourse to the often-overlooked role of religion, this article calls for a more coherent, pluralist-informed EU strategy for migration and integration.

1. Introduction

The European Union continues to grapple with balancing security concerns and its declared humanitarian principles in migration and asylum policies. Since the 2015 refugee crisis, there has been a noticeable change in the EU’s official narrative on migration. The earlier securitization approach, which framed immigration as a security risk requiring strict controls, has increasingly been complemented by a focus on compassion, solidarity, and core European values. Policy statements now often emphasize goals such as “saving lives” in the Mediterranean and protecting the human rights of migrants and refugees (Ovacık and Crépeau 2025). This suggests a shift toward a more compassionate, values-driven stance, essentially replacing the earlier restrictive mindset associated with “Fortress Europe” (Balibar 2007). Further analysis reveals that this humanitarian rhetoric may be superficial, as the core exclusionary logic—filtering, controlling, and marginalizing migrants—remains unchanged despite shifting language (Učakar 2017). Essentially, security policies persist, framed within a humanitarian narrative. The recent EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, effective from 2024, promises an even more humanistic and human-rights-oriented approach.

Migration debates in the EU extend beyond policy, touching on deep questions of cultural and religious identity. Although the EU promotes itself as a defender of secular, universal values, the influx of mostly Muslim refugees and migrants has rekindled the challenges of religious diversity. Public discourse often portrays Muslim migrants as the cultural or religious “Other” compared to a presumed European identity (Ralston 2023). Even in more moderate conversations, an unspoken distinction remains between the EU’s secular–liberal ideals and the religiosity of migrant groups. It is therefore crucial to analyze how religion influences the evolving narrative of migration in the EU. The key question is whether shifting to a humanitarian rhetoric truly promotes the inclusion of religious minorities or if it simply masks religion under a guise of secular universalism.

Methodology and Research Questions

This study explores the development of EU migration policy by analyzing key strategic documents related to migration. It focuses on ‘explanatory themes’ (Philo 2007) that influence the EU’s understanding of migration, reflecting values, theme hierarchy, internal consistency or conflicts, and discursive elements like new or modified terms, semantic relationships (Fairclough 2003), and common semantic structures or syntax (van Dijk 2002). The goal is to trace how discursive patterns in European migration policy evolve, how main themes change, and how these shifts impact core explanatory frameworks, highlighting which topics gain prominence and how this affects the value hierarchy. Initially, a conceptual map of European migration policy was created based on an extensive literature review. Key themes identified, such as security, border control, externalization, selectivity, humanitarianism, and exclusion, served as primary categories for document analysis. These themes provided the initial framework for a thematic analysis of EU policy documents. As the documents were analyzed, the presence, absence, sequence, and hierarchical positioning of these themes were systematically traced, along with their interrelations and tensions. This approach enabled a critical examination of how various discursive elements have shaped the values, priorities, and contradictions within EU migration policy over time. The final section examines the religious aspect of EU migration policy, analyzing how the 2024 Migration Pact addresses religious challenges, considers religion as an underexplored factor in defining ‘inside’ versus ‘outside,’ and explores how secular EU discourse manages increasing religious diversity.

The empirical analysis examines 12 policy documents spanning from 1989 to 2024. These documents were selected based on the literature review, focusing on key texts that establish the foundational strategic directions for migration policy (Bunyan 1997; Lahav 2004; Schain 2009; Lavenex and Stucky 2011; Albahari 2015). We also included two European Commission documents produced in response to the increased influx of refugees into the EU in 2015, along with the most recent 2024 Pact on Migration and Asylum. The selection covers the Palma Document from the pre-Maastricht era, which provides key thematic frameworks that persist throughout the analysis period; two EU treaties (Maastricht and Amsterdam); the Convention on the Implementation of the Schengen Agreement, establishing free movement; three foundational programs of the European Council (Tampere Summit, Hague Program, Stockholm Program) outlining migration strategies from 1999 to 2014; the 2014 European Council summit conclusions that aimed to extend previous internal affairs and justice initiatives; and three key European Commission documents—the 2011 Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), and the 2015 Migration and Security Agendas, created in response to increased immigration. Finally, we examine the latest 2024 Pact on Migration and Asylum, the newest EU framework for managing migration. In the second part of the paper, the Lisbon Treaty is also analyzed for its Article 17 TFEU.

2. Evolution of EU Migration Discourse

2.1. Early Integration and the Security Frame (1985–2000)

Early EU migration policy documents focus on security as the primary goal. Before the Tampere Conclusions (Tampere European Council 1999), migration was viewed as a phenomenon that required strict regulation and prevention, with terms such as “border control,” “monitoring cross-border movements,” and “preventing illegal immigration” (The Palma Document 1989; Treaty of Amsterdam 1997; Tampere European Council 1999). At Tampere European Council (1999), the concept of “management” is introduced alongside “control,” and eventually replaces it in later policies such as GAMM (2011) and the European Agenda on Migration and Security (2015). By 2015, “control” appears only three times, whereas “management” is used broadly across topics like borders, migration, mobility, refugees, legal migration, and labor. In the 2024 Pact (Pact on Migration and Asylum 2024), the term control is no longer a term associated with migration.

While ‘control’ often implies repressive oversight, especially at borders, ‘management’ indicates a wider, technocratic approach. Migration is framed more as an administrative matter than just a security issue. This discursive change reduces the intensity of the language, yet the focus on restrictive actions persists: stopping irregular migration, preventing asylum fraud, combating cross-border crime, and implementing return policies. Although this shift creates room for broader objectives, such as connecting migration with development or safeguarding lives, it does not fundamentally change the restrictive nature of EU migration policy.

2.2. Post-9/11 and the Securitization Peak (2001–2010)

In this period, two notable discursive changes are apparent. First, the vocabulary shifts: earlier terms like “combating illegal migration” (The Palma Document 1989) are replaced by phrases such as “risk assessments,” “route analysis,” and “migration profiles” (Stockholm Programme 2010; GAMM 2011), framing migration more as a technical issue. As Pallitto and Heyman (2008) observe, surveillance is not eliminated but instead redirected from security to biopolitical governance, where people are classified by origin and socio-economic traits. Despite the use of softer language, the underlying control logic remains, depicting migration as a threat and stigmatizing migrants preemptively (Huysmans 2000; Calavita 2005).

Since the Hague Programme in 2004, migration has been increasingly recognized as a “social fact’ that requires a comprehensive approach. This suggests that migration cannot be stopped solely through control measures; it requires effective management. However, despite this shift in dialogue, the deeper socio-economic and historical roots of migration are often overlooked. Unlike Sassen’s perspective, which sees migration as socially constructed (Sassen 2000), EU documents tend to view migration as an ahistorical phenomenon originating outside the EU.

Since the early 2000s, EU migration policy has shifted towards viewing migration as both a security concern and an opportunity for economic growth. This change is evident in the replacement of the term “control” with “management.” Migration is now regarded as beneficial for the economy, particularly in addressing labor shortages and demographic decline. The Hague Programme (2005) was the first to highlight this positive aspect, followed by the Stockholm Programme (2010), which encouraged proactive recruitment efforts.

This economic framing clarifies the divide between legal and irregular migration. While legal migration is generally accepted, irregular migration is portrayed as a dual threat to security and legal frameworks. GAMM (2011, p. 15) emphasizes that policy credibility hinges on managing irregular flows. The Hague Programme (2005) associates unauthorized labor with the informal economy but neglects the EU’s structural dependence on low-skilled migrants (Calavita 2005; Triandafyllidou 2010).

Although humanitarian rhetoric persists, migrants are still dehumanized. Classic metaphors, such as “waves” or “floods,” from the Tampere programme have shifted to language focusing on labor needs. Migrants are viewed not as autonomous agents but as passive respondents to European market demands. Overall, changing the narrative from migration as a threat to an opportunity does not eliminate exclusionary logic; instead, it transforms it. Current migration policies serve as selective instruments that favor labor market efficiency, economic growth, and EU stability, while marginalizing unskilled migrants and enhancing external border controls (Tsoukala 2005; Wodak 2006).

Early EU migration policies initially focused on restricting entry through rigorous external border controls, exemplified by The Palma Document (1989) and the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). As perspectives shifted from viewing migration as a threat to seeing it as an opportunity, policy documents increasingly prioritized selective migration, primarily to facilitate labor movements beneficial to the economy. This evolution is reflected in the structure of the official texts. Before the Hague Programme (2005), the emphasis was on border enforcement and internal security. Following 2004, the focus shifted toward legal migration and integration, with issues such as irregular migration and border enforcement addressed in subsequent sections. This pattern continued until the European Agenda on Migration and Security (2015), which, in response to the Syrian crisis, revived urgent humanitarian measures at the forefront of the policy discussion.

Although EU migration policy primarily resides within Justice and Home Affairs, it has gradually incorporated external policy aspects. Since the 1999 Tampere Conclusions, internal security has been viewed as part of a comprehensive security approach that blends internal and external measures. The scope has broadened from merely border protection to including collaboration with origin and transit nations. The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM 2011) shifts responsibility outward, portraying migration management as a duty of third countries in exchange for development assistance and increased access to mobility. External tools encompass capacity building, “mobility partnerships,” “cooperation platforms,” and “migration dialogues,” complemented by economic initiatives like “circular growth,” “co-development,” and “remittance transfers.” However, such cooperation relies on conditions. As GAMM (2011) underlines, successful border control, curbs on irregular migration, and effective return systems are essential prerequisites for partnerships. Despite the diplomatic language, the main objectives remain focused on economic gains and security.

This trend is often seen as externalization (Bigo and Guild 2005; Triandafyllidou 2010; Hayes and Vermeulen 2012). Responsibility shifts to third countries, which are tasked with managing migration, while the EU provides financial and technical support. The Stockholm Programme (2010, p. 37) states that the EU will assist third countries in developing migration policies—implicitly placing the burden on them. Although these initiatives are framed as humanitarian efforts, they primarily serve EU domestic interests. The European Council Summit Conclusions (EUCO 79/14) (2014) clarify that only countries with adequate border and return systems qualify for migration benefits. Access to legal pathways depends on these conditions, as outlined in GAMM (2011) and the European Agenda on Migration and Security (2015). EU acts are portrayed as generous, while failures in third countries are attributed to poor governance. A similar approach applies to asylum: GAMM (2011, p. 17) advocates “asylum capacity building” in “friendly” nations, shifting refugee responsibilities outside the EU. Although labeled as solidarity, these measures primarily focus on containment and emergency aid rather than addressing the root causes.

2.3. Humanitarian Rhetoric Ascendant (2011–2020)

A significant change in EU migration policy during this period is the shift from a securitarian to a humanitarian approach, particularly evident in the European Agenda on Migration and Security (2015), following the Middle Eastern refugee crisis—a move from territorial protection to prioritizing lives. However, this did not lead to more lenient policies; instead, humanitarianism became a new justification for border controls and deterring irregular migration. Before the Hague Programme (2005), EU strategies focused on internal security, border control, and protecting the rights of legal residents and asylum seekers. The Hague Programme was the first to explicitly acknowledge the “humanitarian catastrophes” in the Mediterranean, attributing them to poor management. Although policies started to emphasize the EU’s role in rescuing migrants at sea, they did not advocate for more legal entry options. Instead, they focused on returns (Stockholm Programme 2010; European Council Summit Conclusions (EUCO 79/14) 2014) and combating irregular migration (GAMM 2011), thus reinforcing securitization.

The 2015 European Agenda on Migration addresses migrant deaths and considers root causes broadly. It advocates for a humane approach and aims to “stop human suffering”, but mainly reaffirms previous security measures such as “dismantling smuggling networks,” “protecting EU borders,” and “assisting frontline states.” Frontex’s role includes saving lives but also involves “identifying, registering, and returning migrants” and “destroying smugglers’ vessels” (European Agenda on Migration and Security 2015). This creates a split between EU humanitarian efforts and the perception of migrants as the “criminal Other.” Despite references to international law, security interests often take precedence over humanitarian concerns. Access to asylum is becoming increasingly limited due to stringent proof requirements and heightened suspicion of misuse, while legal mobility relies on cooperation to reduce irregular migration flows. As highlighted in GAMM (2011) and reaffirmed in 2015, fingerprinting at “hotspots” is depicted as humanitarian; however, it often functions as a deterrent. Migrants are mainly seen as victims of trafficking and smuggling stemming from third-country governance failures and the lack of legal routes. Although this portrayal fosters empathy, it also shifts migrants from rights-bearers to passive recipients of aid.

The blending of trafficking and smuggling—introduced initially in Tampere European Council (1999) and reiterated in the Stockholm Programme (2010)—casts irregular migrants as part of criminal systems. Later documents (for example, GAMM 2011; European Agenda on Migration and Security 2015) portray them as victims in need of protection. The phrase “Destroying smugglers’ vessels” is presented both as a humanitarian effort and a tool against crime. However, this hides the lack of legal migration pathways and promotes a militarized stance.

Scholars warn that using humanitarian language may justify stricter controls (Cuttitta 2015; Albahari 2015). Despite shifts in rhetoric, EU migration policy remains focused on territorial control. Humanitarian actions often support deterrence and containment strategies. This aligns with Chouliaraki’s (2012) concept of “post-humanitarianism,” a form of solidarity driven by rational interests rather than empathy. Therefore, migration policy primarily targets security and economic objectives, supported by development aid and externalization efforts. Humanitarianism can conceal tighter asylum restrictions and legal migration systems shaped by labor market demands.

Another development is the increasing link between asylum seekers and irregular migrants, often presented through a humanitarian narrative that claims to protect only the “truly needy” (European Agenda on Migration and Security 2015). Triandafyllidou (2010) observed the growing assumption of illegality in asylum, which helps merge asylum with irregular migration. Asylum policies are now more focused on preventing abuse and swiftly deporting rejected applicants. Wodak (2006, p. 186) describes this trend as the blending of “asylum seeker” and “immigrant” into “illegal asylum seeker.” Before the Hague Programme (2005), asylum was a fundamental EU value rooted in international commitments; afterward, it shifted to a management approach, emphasizing information control and fraud prevention over the protection of rights.

In summary, the EU’s shift in migration policy discourse reflects more a strategic rebranding than a complete departure from securitization. The way the issue is talked about has genuinely shifted—one cannot imagine the EU of 1995 frequently discussing “saving migrant lives” as it did in 2015. However, this is more a change in tone than in core policies. The core belief that undesirable migration should be restricted remains. Now, this restriction is often justified as being beneficial for migrants or necessary to maintain a system that assists genuinely needy individuals. While the language and reasons have become more focused on European liberal values and compassion, the fundamental approach characterized by exclusion within the “Fortress Europe” framework remains essentially unchanged. This creates a discursive duality: Europe is portrayed both as a defender of human rights and as a region with tightly controlled borders (Učakar 2017).

2.4. Moving on from the Crisis: 2024 Pact on Migration and Asylum

Following the 2015 migration crisis, the EU sought ways to incorporate migration issues into its human rights-based narrative, culminating in the 2024 Migration Pact. This pact aims to provide “a fresh start on migration: building confidence through more effective procedures and striking a new balance between responsibility and solidarity” (Pact on Migration and Asylum 2024). A primary goal is to break the deadlock of the Dublin Regulation, which assigns sole responsibility for asylum management to the first member state where an applicant enters the EU. The New Pact proposes a flexible solidarity mechanism allowing member states to decide how they will contribute to asylum management. Along with this “system of solidarity and responsibility,” the Pact includes three pillars: “secure external borders,” “fast and efficient procedures,” and “embedding migration in international partnerships.” At first glance, the Pact’s language appears unchanged from the 2015 European Agenda on Migration, still employing terms such as “migratory pressures” and “large flows” to describe migration (Pact on Migration and Asylum 2024). It also describes border movements with phrases such as “robust screening,” “migration database,” “border procedures and returns,” “crisis protocols,” “fast and efficient procedures,” and “preventing abuse” (Pact on Migration and Asylum 2024).

However, a closer look reveals new framing that moves away from depersonalized descriptions of migration. For instance, the Pact refers to “individual applicants,” shifting focus from a homogeneous flow of people to a focus on individual cases: “the Pact sets out a new framework that ensures fair sharing of responsibility and solidarity between member states while providing certainty for individual applicants” (Pact on Migration and Asylum 2024). In border management, it emphasizes “the focus on applicants.” It includes a paragraph on “Legal guarantees,” introducing an “independent monitoring mechanism to ensure respect of fundamental rights, supported by the Fundamental Rights Agency, Frontex, and the new European Agency for Asylum” (Pact on Migration and Asylum 2024). It promotes an “individual assessment of asylum claims” and guarantees protection of access to asylum, the right to liberty, children’s rights, and the right to an effective remedy (Pact on Migration and Asylum 2024). The Pact also directly addresses migrants multiple times, mentioning “certainty and protection for migrants and refugees” (Pact on Migration and Asylum 2024) and “legal guarantees and a monitoring system to ensure full respect of rights from beginning to end of the process” (Pact on Migration and Asylum 2024). In the section on search and rescue at sea, the Pact states that “search and rescue is a legal obligation and a moral duty” (Pact on Migration and Asylum 2024), explicitly distancing itself from the European Agenda 2015’s association of rescue with destroying smugglers’ vessels at sea (European Agenda on Migration and Security 2015), a wording that was quickly revised in the EU policy discourse.

The discussion on skilled immigration has traditionally focused on migration, emphasizing the welcome of skilled migrants into the EU. The Pact builds on this by stressing the importance of setting “a positive example for how the EU can manage migration by building open societies” (Pact on Migration and Asylum 2024). It outlines an action plan for integration, including the integration of “the views of migrants in policy development through a dedicated expert group to advise the Commission” (Pact on Migration and Asylum 2024). The document shifts towards a more individual-centered approach, highlighting the voices of migrants, their participation, and the protection of their rights.

While the Pact was still under political review, the EU encountered another migration crisis, this time from Ukraine, its eastern neighbor. The 2022 crisis highlighted the EU’s capacity for humanitarian response and underscored its ongoing double standards. Days after Russia’s invasion, the EU unanimously activated the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) for the first time1, providing immediate, collective protection to millions of displaced Ukrainians—mainly women, children, and those of Christian background. This marked an unprecedented act of solidarity: by March 2025, approximately 4.2 million Ukrainians had sought protection in the EU under this scheme (Ciger 2025). The activation of the TPD exempted Ukrainians from complex asylum procedures, granting them immediate rights to residence, work, education, and social assistance across member states (Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 2022). It proved that when political will is present, the EU can respond humanely and united to a mass influx. However, the positive reception of Ukrainian refugees—often seen as “innocent victims of aggression” and even “Europeans”—starkly contrasted with how refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, or Africa were treated in 2015–2016.

The Ukrainian example suggests hope that the new 2024 Pact on Migration and Asylum’s thematic frameworks go beyond mere words, implying actionable measures. However, it raises the question of whether the EU would react as quickly and uniformly if refugees originated from a region with a different cultural and religious background. We do not claim that activating the Temporary Protection Directive for Ukraine was solely due to its religious proximity to the EU; larger geostrategic considerations in international relations also play a role, topics beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, it invites us to reflect on the role of religion in this context. Suppose the EU’s migration discourse has largely been secular, oscillating between security and humanitarian concerns. What does this mean for a Europe that is becoming increasingly diverse in terms of religion? How accurately does the secular narrative account for or neglect the reality of pluralism, especially considering Islam’s role in Europe’s migration history? The next section will examine the religious dimension of EU migration policies, which remains unspoken but is central to debates about insiders versus outsiders and ‘us’ versus ‘them’—the overarching socio-political narrative surrounding migration.

3. Religion, Secularism, and Pluralism in the European Context

Religion has traditionally been a delicate and often muted subject in EU policy discussions. The European project, especially in the late 20th century, was founded on a primarily secular approach to governance (Wolff 2021). While the EU treaties recognize Europe’s “religious and humanist inheritance,” and EU institutions engage with religious communities, conversations about religion tend to be framed in terms of cultural heritage or fundamental rights (such as freedom of religion), rather than detailed theological or religious identity issues (Foret and Mourão Permoser 2015). In reality, EU migration and integration policies rarely explicitly consider the religious identities of migrants. This secular stance reflects Europe’s historical process of secularization—referred to by Sarah Wolff (2021) as “secularism as identity”—and the continent’s ongoing religious diversity. Here, a historical consideration of the Westphalian peace is crucial to understanding the official secular nature of the EU as an institution. Religious issues were deliberately placed within states’ sovereignty, since religious unity is neither possible nor favorable in such a religiously diverse environment as the EU member states.

Sociologist Peter Berger’s theory of pluralism provides valuable insights for understanding this situation. His framework is relevant to Europe, where, despite widespread secularization in public life, religious diversity continues to grow, partly due to immigration. Berger initially supported the mid-20th-century secularization thesis, which posits that modernity leads to a decline in religion. However, he later revised this view in his 2014 book, “The Many Altars of Modernity,” where he argues that modernity does not diminish religion but instead increases its variety. Modern societies now see a proliferation of different faiths and worldviews, resulting in a landscape where no single worldview is universally accepted. People are confronted with a range of belief options and must choose or create their meaning systems. We are in a pluralist era where diverse worldviews coexist and compete, offering individuals freedom but also presenting new existential challenges (Berger 2014). For Europe, this perspective clarifies that many European societies are largely secular in their daily practices; however, immigration and globalization have introduced greater religious diversity, ranging from revived Christianity within migrant communities to Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, and other faiths, establishing a presence (van der Maas 2022).

Berger’s pluralism thesis offers valuable insights, but applying it to the EU as a supranational entity has limitations. His theory portrays a sociological scenario—how individuals and societies experience religious diversity and navigate the resulting “marketplace” of beliefs. It highlights that pluralism brings both freedoms and challenges: people may become more aware of their own beliefs when others are present, often feeling tension and disorientation amid conflicting truth claims. Thus, pluralism is not inherently a peaceful state of mutual tolerance; rather, it is a continuous process of negotiation, contestation, and adaptation. Berger views pluralism not as an end goal but as a fact of modern life that societies must manage, often through robust religious freedom and dialogue (Berger 2014).

When applying this perspective to the EU, we must avoid merely stating “the EU should be pluralistic.” Since the EU is a political entity rather than a society or individual, it cannot hold beliefs but can create or restrict spaces for different beliefs. Berger’s framework highlights that ignoring the importance of religion does not eliminate its influence; in pluralistic environments, religious issues that are suppressed often reemerge in other forms. Additionally, Berger would recognize that pluralism naturally entails challenges and conflicts, which the EU, like any political body, will need to manage rather than expect to resolve effortlessly.

3.1. The Religious Dimension in European Migration Governance

The EU’s migration policy primarily focuses on shared secular values, such as democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, which are viewed as neutral and universal, while minimizing religious differences. The EU’s secular stance generally suggests religion should stay private and that public policies can be based on neutral, universally acceptable principles. This view is reflected in the EU’s self-perception: early versions of an EU Constitution in the 2000s even considered referencing God or Christianity, but eventually, any explicit mention of Christian heritage was removed to maintain neutrality (Madeley 2003). The Lisbon Treaty’s Article 17 TFEU establishes a careful balance: the EU respects the legal standing of churches and religious groups under national law and commits to an “open, transparent and regular dialogue” with them, while avoiding endorsement or favoritism towards any religion (Georgescu 2024).

Essentially, religion is recognized as part of Europe’s identity and civil society; however, EU institutions view themselves as secular entities. This results in migration and integration policies that emphasize legal, economic, and civic aspects—migrants are viewed as workers, possess skills, or are asylum seekers or family reunification cases—not primarily as individuals with specific religious identities (Foret and Mourão Permoser 2015). The EU’s official integration strategies focus on language acquisition, employment, and compliance with European laws and values, rarely addressing religious practices or interfaith dialogue (Cesari 2013). The underlying belief is that if migrants find employment, learn the local language, and adopt democratic values, their religious differences will either fade or remain private (Ralston 2023). Overall, the EU’s secular narrative portrays itself as universal and inclusive, but it deliberately excludes open discussions about religion.

3.2. The Secular Discourse of EU Policy and Its Limits

The secular, “religion-blind” approach aims to treat everyone equally by focusing on shared needs like shelter, work, and language. However, it can overlook specific religious aspects of integration, such as providing places of worship, accommodating religious holidays or dietary needs at workplaces and schools, or fighting religious discrimination in the job market (Lähdesmäki 2022). It is crucial to understand the institutional reality: responsibilities are divided between the EU and its member states in matters of religion and integration. Under EU law, immigration and asylum are areas where the EU shares authority with member states; however, migrant integration remains primarily a national matter. While the EU can offer support and incentives, it cannot harmonize laws in this area (Georgescu 2024). Similarly, Article 17 TFEU mandates respecting member states’ arrangements on religion, keeping church-state relations outside EU influence. Education and cultural policies, which often involve accommodations for religious groups, are primarily national. Therefore, the EU’s ability to manage religious diversity is limited: it can combat discrimination through directives and fund integration or exchange projects, but it cannot dictate how individual countries balance secularism and religious rights (McCrea 2011). Each member state has its approach—from France’s strict laïcité to Denmark’s Evangelical Lutheran state church—which heavily influences how migrant religions are received. In its migration policy discourse, the EU tends to use neutral, lowest-common-denominator language that avoids theological or doctrinal issues for broader acceptance (McCrea 2011). Recognizing this legal and institutional framework is essential when evaluating the EU’s approach to religion; some of its silence may be strategic or legally necessary.

3.3. ”Inside” vs. “Outside” Divide in the EU

Although not explicitly stated at the EU policy level, religion has a profound influence on debates about who is allowed entry, who is excluded, and how those admitted are expected to live (Moreno-Lax 2018). The interaction between securitization and humanitarianism in EU policies is shaped by a cultural-religious logic: security measures often target those perceived as culturally “unfit” or threatening (usually implicitly Muslim), while humanitarian actions tend to favor those seen as relatable or innocent (such as victims fitting European secular ideals, sometimes implicitly Christian or at least not too “different”) (Mavelli and Wilson 2016). Over the past twenty years, Muslims have frequently been portrayed—in media, politics, and public perception—as the culturally incompatible “Other” in immigration debates (Foner and Simon 2015; Ralston 2023). This stereotyping varies across Europe but has been widespread enough to influence policies and attitudes. The earlier securitization narrative often linked Muslim presence with security threats: Muslims were depicted as potential radicals, a fifth column, or carriers of illiberal values opposed to “European” norms (Mavelli and Wilson 2016). The arrival of large numbers of Muslim refugees and migrants—especially during the 2015 crisis, when over a million people, mostly from Muslim-majority countries like Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, entered the EU—compelled Europe to reevaluate its identity. Public sentiment in many areas reflected “existential anxieties” about Islam in Europe (Wolff 2021). At the EU policy level, institutions maintained a formally neutral, secular–humanitarian stance. EU statements and decisions during the crisis did not frame the issue as “Christian Europe vs. Muslim refugees.” Instead, they addressed responsibilities, the logistical distribution of asylum seekers, border security, and humanitarian duty (Mavelli and Wilson 2016). In these cases, the secular language of EU policies shifts the focus away from underlying religious divides.

The main religious divide written in the literature is the “predominantly Christian inside” and the “predominantly Muslim outside” (Goździak et al. 2020). However, this dividing line is not as clear as it looks, neither on the inside nor on the outside. It is important to clarify that Muslim migrants are not a monolithic group—they come from various countries such as Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh and have diverse religious practices and levels of devotion. Additionally, Europe’s Muslim population includes not only recent migrants but also longstanding communities like Turkish-origin populations in Germany, North Africans in France, South Asians in the UK, and converts. Moreover, it is not solely composed of immigrants or their descendants; indigenous European Muslims and potential new members with Muslim majorities are also part of the demographic. Bulgaria, which joined the EU in 2007, hosts the most significant indigenous Muslim minority, consisting of Turks and Pomaks, making up about 10% of its population. Cyprus, as an EU member, has a Muslim community primarily of Turkish Cypriots, although ongoing political issues complicate their status. In the Balkans, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, both candidates for EU membership, have Muslim-majority or dominant populations (Goździak et al. 2020). If they join the EU, it will contradict the idea that the EU is a “Christian club” (Hennig 2020) by including states with predominantly Muslim populations.

Some EU initiatives have begun tackling anti-Muslim hatred and discrimination as part of broader anti-racism and inclusion strategies. For instance, the EU’s Anti-Racism Action Plan (2020) explicitly aims to combat Islamophobia, while the Fundamental Rights Agency tracks anti-Muslim incidents. The European Parliament’s Anti-Racism and Diversity Intergroup discusses Islamophobia alongside other issues. They must pay special attention to the recent rise of populist rhetoric, which often portrays Europe’s secular liberal norms, like gender equality, as Christian achievements. Consequently, Muslims, usually characterized as patriarchal, are seen as threats to women and LGBTQ+ communities (Goździak et al. 2020). A notable example is how some far-right groups have adopted language from women’s liberation to oppose Muslim immigration, claiming Europe needs protection from what they call misogynistic Islam. This phenomenon is sometimes called “femonationalism”—using feminist rhetoric to justify nationalist, anti-Muslim policies (Farris 2017).

Scholars such as Hennig (2020) note that the rise in Christian identity politics weakens liberal pluralism across Europe. By drawing a religious line around Europe—claiming it is fundamentally Christian and that others are not quite European—it reinforces an exclusionary mindset. This resembles, in some ways, the humanitarian vs. security dichotomy, where humanitarian language disguises security concerns; here, references to Christian origins conceal an exclusionary goal. Both approaches serve to delineate an inside group (deserving, “us”) from an outside group (threatening, “them”). In Christian identity discourse, this boundary is religious and civilizational: Europe’s “us” likely includes all native Christians (regardless of practice) and possibly assimilated Jews and secular people; the “them” often refers to Muslims—and sometimes, other non-European groups.2

3.4. Religious Accommodation on the EU Level

Although EU policies are generally secular, the EU has a Religious Engagement Infrastructure that includes formal mechanisms for accommodation. Article 17 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) requires EU institutions to engage in an “open, transparent, and regular” dialogue with churches, religious groups, and philosophical or non-confessional organizations, while also reaffirming that the regulation of religion remains with individual member states (Georgescu 2024). This creates a careful balance between supranational consultation and national sovereignty. The European Parliament’s Vice-President for Article 17 relations facilitates this dialogue through high-level seminars and policy briefings, which regularly focus on issues such as religious freedom, social inclusion, and migration (Georgescu 2024).

Foret and Mourão Permoser (2015) note that actors from Europe’s main religious traditions, like the Catholic Church and mainline Protestant churches, continue to influence migration discussions. However, they do so subtly by translating their advocacy into secular terms. Organizations affiliated with churches that assist refugees or migrants often frame their input around human rights, charity, and dignity, which are values rooted in Christian social teaching but presented as universal. These principles align with EU normative language, allowing such organizations to be viewed as experts or humanitarian voices rather than as “religious lobbyists” (Leustean 2013). However, in recent years, there has also been tangible evidence of Muslim engagement in this area. Since 2016, the Representative Office of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been active, participating in initiatives from the Article 17 dialogue to combating anti-Muslim hatred. The Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organisations has attended multiple Commission meetings and maintains a lobbying presence. Additionally, the Collective for Countering Islamophobia in Europe joined the EU Transparency Register3 in 2022 to support victims and push for policy reforms against anti-Muslim discrimination. Overall, these efforts demonstrate that pathways for religious consultation, especially for Muslim groups, are integrated into EU governance. Therefore, scholars should go beyond broad claims of marginalization by examining specific gaps in representation, resource inequalities, or policy influence, rather than assuming widespread exclusion.

The 2024 Pact on Migration and Asylum maintains a formal and impersonal tone throughout its discourse. Nevertheless, it designates specific agencies, such as the European Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) and the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), to oversee and assist in implementing the Pact by providing expertise on fundamental rights and gender equality. The Pact also explicitly involves civil society actors in contributing feedback on the European Annual Asylum and Migration Report, supporting the solidarity mechanism, including providing services to migrants and asylum seekers, and advocating for their rights. A notable inconsistency persists: while EU border security is addressed through top-down measures, migrants’ rights are primarily defended from the bottom up, relying on agencies and civil society to uphold humane treatment and human rights. Nonetheless, the 2024 Pact marks the first EU migration policy explicitly encouraging agencies and civil society to support the Pact’s human rights objectives and the first to promote “including the views of migrants in the development of policies” (p. 15). Through this bottom-up approach, also religious specifics of migrants could be taken into account and catered to on a case-by-case basis.

4. Conclusions

This article traces the development of EU migration policy discourse from 1989 to 2024, demonstrating a shift from a primarily securitarian approach to one that is more focused on humanitarian and technocratic language. However, despite these rhetorical adjustments, the core policy logic remains centered on containment, control, and selective inclusion, primarily driven by economic interests and internal security concerns. Although migration is sometimes presented as an opportunity, this perspective remains conditional, layered, and exclusionary, especially toward irregular migrants and those considered economically “unproductive”.

Crucially, the paper argues that EU migration policy discourses, while formally secular and ostensibly neutral, indirectly reproduce normative hierarchies that marginalize religious difference—especially concerning Muslim communities. This exclusion is not articulated through overt religious language but is embedded in the depersonalized management of mobility, the logic of securitization, and the instrumental framing of humanitarianism. Religious pluralism—understood in Berger’s terms as the coexistence and contestation of multiple worldviews—is neither explicitly acknowledged nor adequately addressed in EU-level policy.

EU governance has included pathways for religious consultation, which provides opportunities to identify specific gaps in representation, resource disparities, or policy influence among various religious groups, rather than assuming widespread exclusion. This approach supports the EU’s goals of inclusion, human rights, and democratic legitimacy. However, the institutional tendency to delegate responsibility for refugee protection and integration further shifts these challenges onto third countries, worsening imbalances and diverting attention from the Union’s internal inconsistencies.

For EU migration governance to align with its stated values, it must move beyond managerial and securitized rationales toward a more pluralist-informed approach—one that takes seriously the religious and cultural dimensions of belonging, inclusion, and citizenship. Future policy frameworks should more explicitly engage with the intersection of religion and migration, not as a threat to cohesion, but as a constitutive element of the European social fabric. As we have demonstrated in the above analysis, the recent 2024 Pact on Migration and Asylum opens up space for such a development.