Dynamic Research on the Collaborative Governance in Urban and Rural Black-Odorous Water: A Tripartite Stochastic Evolutionary Game Perspective
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- (1)
- How can the conflicts and coordination relationships between various subjects in the governance of urban and rural BOW under the CEPI be systematically portrayed?
- (2)
- How do the subjects interact strategically to promote the effective collaborative governance of urban and rural BOW?
- (3)
- What factors affect the collaborative behavioral strategies of the subjects in the governance of urban and rural BOW, and how do these factors exert their influence?
2. Literature Review
2.1. Multidimensional Research Advances of Black-Odorous Water and Its Governance
2.2. Environmental Power and Responsibilities Dynamics under Central Environmental Protection Inspection
2.3. Theoretical Framework
2.4. Stochastic Evolutionary Game Model
3. Problem Definition and Model Framing
3.1. Problem Description and Assumptions
3.2. Payoff Matrix and Game Model Construction
4. Stochastic Evolutionary Game Model Construction
4.1. Integration of Gaussian White Noise for Stochastic Evolutionary Model Construction
4.2. Investigation of the Existence and Stability of the Equilibrium Solution in the Model
4.3. Taylor Expansion of the Evolution Equation
5. Numerical Simulation Analysis
5.1. Analysis of the Impact of the Initial Probability in Stochastic Game System
5.2. Analysis of the Impact of Diverse Variables in Stochastic Game System
5.2.1. The Impact of Parameter α on the Tripartite Adopted Tactics
5.2.2. The Impact of Parameter λ on the Tripartite Adopted Tactics
5.2.3. The Impact of Parameter J on the Tripartite Adopted Tactics
5.2.4. The Impact of Parameter P on the Tripartite Adopted Tactics
6. Discussion
6.1. Conclusions
6.2. Recommendations
- (1)
- Enhance governance willingness and adjust the consistency of belief systems. On the one hand, the central government could flexibly utilize mechanisms such as spiritual preaching activities, conference mobilization, and administrative interviews to deconstruct old perceptions under the pressure of normative institutions, enabling local governments to construct a new consensus and identity for ecological civilization construction in the new era. On the other hand, it is necessary to guarantee the authentic participation of the people, enhancing their sense of ownership and aligning them with the guiding consensus released by the central authority, facilitating their integration into the governance of urban and rural BOW to form an effective complementary mechanism.
- (2)
- Integrate diverse resources and adapt the agency of governance behaviors. Tailored configurations of heterogeneous resources within the environmental governance system that influence the expansion of capabilities are required for various subjects. This involves not only relying on policy mobilization through administrative authority but also actively utilizing financial resources such as preferential policies and special subsidies; mobilizing human resources, including the media, experts, and scholars; and employing a variety of technical means to broaden channels for opinion expression and information communication. Such an approach can encourage the proactivity, initiative, and creativity of environmental governance behaviors among central, local, and social actors, thereby achieving effective resource governance outcomes.
- (3)
- Guide collaborative mechanisms to adjust the tacit understanding of cooperative behaviors. Relying on the political authority of the central government and under the premise of achieving continuous policy and goal alignment, specific mechanisms and rules can assist in clarifying responsibilities and the division of labor among the various entities involved in the management of issues of BOW, preventing the fragmentation of power and responsibility. Simultaneously, strengthening the construction of horizontal integration and vertical linkage mechanisms, as well as comprehensive coordination networks, can enable adaptation to differences and changes through effective communication, thus achieving action coupling and sustainable experience. In the process of pollution governance, enhancing vertical incentive and constraint mechanisms for various subject behaviors, namely, comprehensive assessments and punishments, can overcome the inherent shortcomings of unidimensional hierarchical systems and enhance the effectiveness of collaborative governance.
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Dimension | Parameters | Symbols | Description |
---|---|---|---|
Belief | The intensity of the inspector’s beliefs in environmental governance | α | 0 < α < 1 |
The willingness of government entities to cooperate with environmental governance | β | 0 < β < 1 | |
The subjective intensity of the engagement of external supervisory forces in environmental governance | γ | 0 < γ < 1 | |
Resource | The authority of policies from the inspector to urge environmental governance | π | π > 0 |
Financial resources given to government entities to address environmental issues | J | J > 0 | |
Manpower mobilization capability of government entities in environmental governance | ρ | ρ > 0 | |
Technical support resources for the opinion expression platforms of external supervisory forces in environmental governance | ε | ε > 0 | |
Action | The organization costs incurred by inspectors in inspection | Cd | Cd > 0 |
Accountability and penalties for the government entities’ passive management in inspection | P | P > 0 | |
Selective benefits for inspectors such as reputation and status in inspection | Rd | Rd > 0; | |
The intensity of intervention in inspection | λ | 0 < λ < 1 | |
The bargaining and execution costs of government entities in environmental governance | > 0 | ||
Autonomy loss costs of government entities in environmental governance | > 0 | ||
Selective benefits of government entities by neglecting environmental protection | Rz | Rz > 0 | |
The information cost of environmental advocacy by external supervisory forces | Cw | Cw > 0 | |
Selective benefits of external supervisory forces for engagement in BOW governance | Rw | Rw > 0 | |
Construction of collective benefits in BOW governance | E | E > 0 |
The Game Parties and Strategy | Strategy of Inspectors | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Thorough Inspection (X) | Not-Thorough Inspection (1 − X) | ||||
Strategy of urban-rural government entities | Active cooperation with governance (y) | Strategy of external supervisory forces | Active advocacy (z) | , , | , , |
Passive advocacy (1 − z) | , , | , , | |||
Passive cooperation with governance (1 − y) | Active advocacy (z) | , , | , , | ||
Passive advocacy (1 − z) | , , | , , |
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Peng, K.; Dong, C.; Mi, J. Dynamic Research on the Collaborative Governance in Urban and Rural Black-Odorous Water: A Tripartite Stochastic Evolutionary Game Perspective. Systems 2024, 12, 307. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems12080307
Peng K, Dong C, Mi J. Dynamic Research on the Collaborative Governance in Urban and Rural Black-Odorous Water: A Tripartite Stochastic Evolutionary Game Perspective. Systems. 2024; 12(8):307. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems12080307
Chicago/Turabian StylePeng, Kangjun, Changqi Dong, and Jianing Mi. 2024. "Dynamic Research on the Collaborative Governance in Urban and Rural Black-Odorous Water: A Tripartite Stochastic Evolutionary Game Perspective" Systems 12, no. 8: 307. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems12080307