Next Article in Journal
How to Promote Traditional Automobile Companies’ Intelligent-Connected Transformation under the New Dual-Credit Policy? A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis Combined with Funding Time Delay
Previous Article in Journal
The Impact of Digital Talent Inflow on the Co-Agglomeration of the Digital Economy Industry and Manufacturing
 
 
Font Type:
Arial Georgia Verdana
Font Size:
Aa Aa Aa
Line Spacing:
Column Width:
Background:
Article

Global Governance of the Space System: A Multilevel Governance Analysis

by
Francisco Del Canto Viterale
Department of Space Studies, John D. Odegard School of Aerospace Sciences, University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, ND 58202, USA
Systems 2024, 12(9), 318; https://doi.org/10.3390/systems12090318
Submission received: 28 June 2024 / Revised: 5 August 2024 / Accepted: 21 August 2024 / Published: 23 August 2024
(This article belongs to the Section Systems Practice in Social Science)

Abstract

:
The proliferation of new and more diverse number of actors in the space industry in recent decades has created a more complex, decentralized, and unpredictable global governance of the space system. In the contemporary era, space activities are conducted by a diverse multitude of actors, engaging in a multiplicity of interactions across a variety of levels and arenas. Although there is a substantial body of literature addressing the global governance of space, few of these works have analyzed the multilevel governance of the current space system. The primary hypothesis of this research is that the governance of the space system has become more fragmented, decentralized, and distributed across multiple levels or arenas. This research emphasizes the necessity of utilizing systems approaches and an International Relations (IR) perspective to analyze the global governance of the space system. Therefore, the primary objective of this research is to examine the key characteristics of the 21st-century space system using a multilevel governance framework (MLG) and to assess the relevance and implications of each level. This paper contributes to the emerging field of global space governance by applying a MLG framework to the space system. The result is a comprehensive, multilevel analysis of the contemporary space system, identifying, describing, and explaining the role of the space actors in various levels of analysis (international, regional, national, and subnational).

1. Introduction

During the 20th century, space activities were largely confined to the two superpowers in the context of the Space Race and a select few countries at the national level. The conclusion of the Cold War also marked a transition to a new space system, which emerged with new characteristics [1] (p. 232).
In the 21st century, there has been a notable transition from a relatively straightforward bipolar system to a more complex multipolar space system. While outer space played a significant role in the 20th century, particularly in the context of the space race between the two superpowers, the majority of space activities were confined to the two space powers and a select few nation-states. The conclusion of the Cold War and the advent of the 21st century also marked a transition to a novel space system, exhibiting distinctive characteristics: (i) A new and more diverse group of actors is involved in space activities, including more countries, more private companies, more research labs and universities, more intergovernmental and regional processes, and others. (ii) New dynamics of interactions are emerging, including more cooperation, more competition, and more conflict among space actors. (iii) New trends in the space sectors are developing, with a variety of new topics emerging, including militarization, commercialization, and governance of outer space; the proliferation of new and more diverse numbers of actors in the space industry; and new levels or arenas of action.
The changes in the space domain have prompted a re-examination of the necessity of new paradigms and approaches that can offer a more comprehensive understanding of the increased complexity within the space system. The inadequacy and unreliability of traditional academic tools have become increasingly pertinent to the development of novel theoretical and methodological approaches. In this context, concepts such as global governance [2], space governance [3,4], and multilevel governance [5] provide insights into the growing complexity of the space system.
This research has identified several fundamental questions regarding the current space system. These include: (i) how the governance of the space system operates, and (ii) how power and decision-making processes are distributed across different levels or arenas of action among actors within the space system.
The main hypothesis of this research is that the governance of the space system has become more fragmented, decentralized, and distributed across multiple levels or arenas that require new examinations and explanations. This research emphasizes the necessity of utilizing systems science approaches and social sciences perspectives to analyze complex systems, such as the space system.
The principal objective of this study is to examine the essential characteristics of the 21st-century space system through the lens of a multilevel governance framework (MLG) and to evaluate the relevance and implications of each level. The MLG model enables the identification of the most pertinent actors at each level of analysis, the delineation of their respective roles, powers, and objectives, and the recognition of the interactions that are generated among them. A comprehensive examination of the space system in the 21st century at the level of each arena facilitates a more nuanced understanding of the implications of novel phenomena in the global governance of the space system, thereby corroborating the primary hypothesis of this study.
This paper contributes to the nascent field of global space governance by applying an innovative MLG framework to the space system. The objective of this essay is to contribute to the advancement of academic research on the study of outer space from the systems Sciences and International Relations (IR) perspective.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the necessity of a systemic-level approach to analyze socially complex systems, such as the space system. Section 3 identifies and describes the theoretical concepts and models provided by the IR disciplines for the analysis of complex systems. Section 4 introduces the multilevel governance framework. Section 5 applies the multilevel governance framework to the study of the space system analyzing in detail each level or arena of action. Finally, Section 6 presents a summary of the principal findings, scientific and academic discussions, and conclusions.

2. Space System

In the context of increasing complexity in social systems such as international and space systems, explanations of interesting phenomena necessitate a meticulous examination of a multitude of potential causes and interconnections between various forces [6] (p. 1013). As Wallerstein [7] (p. 80) observed, “major problems in a complex society cannot be solved by breaking them down into small parts that seem analytically manageable, but rather by trying to deal with these problems in their complexity and interrelationships”.
Systems theory has a long history of investigating complex systems. These systems are present in research in a variety of disciplines, including biology, economics, social studies, and technology. In more recent times, the field of complexity has become a natural area of interest for real-world socio-cognitive systems and emerging systems research. Complex systems are typically high-dimensional, nonlinear, and challenging to model.
Since Ludwig von Bertalanffy introduced the General Systems Theory in the late 1950s, systems science has been employed to study natural, physical, and social systems. This approach delineates the principal components, interactions, and functions of these systems. The majority of scientific disciplines have employed systems thinking as a means of enhancing their understanding of the subject matter under investigation. Some of the examples are in Physics (Nicolis and Prigogine, 1977); Biology (Flood and Jackson, 1991); Economy (Wallerstein, 1982); Sociology (Parson, 1951); Political Science (Easton,1953); Communication (Von Foerster, 1979); International Relations (Kaplan, 1957); Education (Bánáthy, 1973); Philosophy (Bunge, 1979); and Systems Engineering (Checkland and Scholes, 1990).
There is a long history of using systems science to examine international relations. Morton Kaplan was the first to popularize the systems approach in International Studies in 1957. Since then, several academics and scholars within IR have used various models of the international system to analyze international affairs (e.g., Kaplan, 1957; Deutsch, 1966; Singer, 1971; Braillard, 1977; Waltz, 1979; Wallerstein, 1982; Rosenau, 1990; Jervis, 1997; Wendt, 1999; Braumoeller, 2012, etc.). However, the study of international space relations has not benefited from this application.
The use and application of systems thinking to the analysis of international relations opened an intense epistemological debate within IR between micro-level and macro-level (systemic) approaches. The main difference is related to how international relations problems are approached: whether to focus on the study of the structure (macro/systemic) or to concentrate on the components (micro). While micro-level viewpoints contend that changes are the product of individual causes, structural theories (macro/systemic) posit that international outcomes result from systemic constraints.
During the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, macro-level theories were highly prevalent in the field of international relations (IR), resulting in the development of numerous models. Prominent examples include the International System Model (Kaplan, 1957), the Global Village Model (McLuhan, 1962), the World System Theory Model (Wallerstein, 1974), and the Balance of Power Model (Waltz, 1979). These macro-level approaches were employed extensively in the study of international relations during those decades.
The failure to predict the end of the Cold War and the Communism bloc produced an epistemic revolution within IR that promoted changes in methodological tools. Precisely, at the end of the 1980s, the significance and relevance of the systems approach within the IR community decreased due to the lack of explanation offered to describe changes in the international system. Since then, an increasing number of scholars began to adopt analytical perspectives in preference to the systems approach, and the strategic choice approach, based on methods inspired by microeconomics, came to occupy a central position in the field of IR. In the present era, the majority of scholars engaged in the study of international relations (IR) tend to favor a micro-level approach to examine international affairs, which is surprising considering the interconnectedness and interrelatedness of the international system of the 21st century, which requires, more than ever, a holistic and systemic approach.
The starting point for the use of the systems approach in space activities is the assumption that the set of activities related to outer space can be studied and analyzed as a system within the broader context of the international system. In this sense, the space system, when considered as a subsystem of the broader international system, can simultaneously be studied and analyzed as a system in its own right. This approach allows for the identification and analysis of the components, interactions, internal processes, and emergent realities that constitute the space system.
The space system has undergone significant transformations over the past three decades, evolving from the traditional bipolar structure that defined space during the Cold War era to a new era of space exploration in the 21st century. These changes are leading to an intersystem transition process, which may be defined as “the period between the ‘decadence’ of a system and the ‘emergence’ of another”. The transition between space systems represents profound changes in the main system parameters, including the number and type of actors, the type of interactions, the mechanisms and processes, and the emergent realities.
At this point, the systems approach, and more specifically, the macro-level analysis, can be considered a useful tool to understand the complexity of a system such as space.
In recent decades, systems models have gained considerable popularity as a tool for understanding reality. A considerable number of scholars are engaged in the development and application of systems models in a diverse range of fields, including (but not limited to) the following: Beer (1984), Troncale (2006), Mobus and Kalton (2014), and Rousseau, Billingham, Wilby, and Blachfellner (2016). In this context, systems theory has developed a substantial body of theoretical models that can be applied to the social sciences. In general, systems models are more consistent and stable than other traditional non-systems models used in international relations, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Chicken games. This is because they allow for a more accurate description of the components, interactions, and functions of the systems in question.
In this sense, the MLG framework, as a systems macro-level model, offers a unique opportunity to shed light on the new space system of the 21st century. This is achieved by enabling analysis at the following levels: (i) levels or arenas of action, (ii) different types of actors involved, (iii) interactions and relationships among the actors, and (iv) the identification of new emergent realities or megatrends. The principal attributes of the MLG model will be elaborated upon in detail in Section 4.

3. Approaching System Dynamics

The space system of the 20th century may be regarded as a relatively simple system, comprising just two states engaged in a competition for superiority in space activities. This context is commonly referred to as the ‘space race’. It is notable that no other non-state actors were playing a significant role, with interactions occurring primarily at the national and international levels. Since the conclusion of the Cold War, these space systems have undergone a significant transformation, evolving into a markedly diverse and dynamic historical period.
The expansion of the space industry in recent decades has led to the emergence of a more diverse range of actors, resulting in a more complex, interconnected, and unpredictable space system. In the contemporary era, space activities are conducted by a multitude of space actors, who engage in a diverse array of interactions across a multitude of levels or arenas. The long list of empirical changes that the international system has experienced in the last decades, including the rise of new actors, interactions, dynamics, trends, processes, and topics on the agenda, has obliged the epistemic community to develop new theoretical and methodological tools.
To gain a deeper comprehension of the evolving reality and the increasing complexity of the international system, scholars within the discipline of International Relations have produced a substantial body of literature comprising novel concepts that seek to address these novel phenomena. Alter [8] provided a comprehensive overview of the numerous concepts that have emerged in an attempt to comprehend the intricate dynamics of the international system. These include complex interdependence (1977), international regime (1993), ordered anarchy (1984), global governance (1992), multilevel governance (1993), and regime complexes (2020), among others. Despite the proliferation of theoretical concepts, Alter concluded that there is a lack of consensus and a “conceptual disagreement” within the academic community in order to identify a concept that could properly describe the new empirical changes in the international system, and “IR scholars are all struggling to pin down a phenomenon that refuses to stand still, and that the terms scholars create to discuss these developments also keep shifting” [8] (p. 379).
The majority of these concepts have been, and continue to be, employed with varying degrees of success by IR scholars in their attempts to comprehend the dynamics of the international system. The first and one of the most widely utilized concepts is that of complex interdependence. Since the end of the 1970s, Keohane and Nye have begun to describe the emergence of a new international system, which they have characterized by the existence of new actors interested in global affairs and by the acceleration and intensification of their contacts. This has generated a new context, which they have called complex interdependence. In essence, Keohane and Nye identified the emergence of new and more intricate interconnections between the system’s actors, particularly in developed countries and in specific domains such as the economy and communication. This complex interdependence in world politics was defined by Keohane and Nye as: “transnational relations -contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of governments” [9] (p. 331).
In the 1990s, Rosenau developed the concept of global governance, which encompasses a multitude of actors and forms of authority, both formal and informal, that influence behavior in the global arena. Rosenau posited that governance without government could provide order in world politics. In accordance with Rosenau’s systemic argument: “To presume the presence of governance without government is to conceive of functions that have to be performed in any viable human system irrespective of whether the system has evolved organizations and institutions explicitly charged with performing them” [10] (p. 3).
A broader definition was subsequently proposed, defining global governance as the sum of the many ways, individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. Global governance must be considered as a collection of many levels of government related to the activities, regulations, and mechanisms, both formal and informal and both public and private, that exist nowadays [11] (p. 7).
The concept of multilevel governance was first introduced in 1993 by Marks and Hooghe to describe the redistribution of power among different levels or arenas in the context of the European Union. In particular, the authors emphasize the role of the supranational and subnational levels in the decision-making process. A more comprehensive theoretical and methodological analysis will be presented in Section 4, and an application to the space system will be discussed in Section 5.
Two novel concepts in IR, the international regime complex and international regime complexity, were introduced to address the empirical study that the majority of contemporary international issues are likely to connect to, overlap with, or be in conflict with multiple international institutions and policies [8] (pp. 375–376). In 2004, Raustiala and Victor defined the concept of international regime complexes to capture how multiple institutions govern global environmental issues. In light of the growing number of transnational rules and institutions, a regime complex was defined as “an array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area” [12] (pp. 278–279).
In recent years, another concept has gained prominence in the field of international relations: polycentric governance. Tepper defines polycentric governance as a system of decentralized governance comprising multiple independent decision-making centers, with at least partial overlap in their respective jurisdictions [3] (p. 533). Oto defined polycentric governance as “a system of governance in which multiple authorities oversee the same area, albeit with different but overlapping interests and scopes of responsibility” [4] (p. 2). Furthermore, Oto posited that polycentric governance is an inherent attribute of most governance systems, particularly global systems. Fundamentally, a polycentric governance system is defined by three key attributes: (i) the existence of multiple levels at which decisions are made, (ii) the coexistence and cooperation of these levels, and (iii) an exchange between coexisting and competing ideas, practices, and methods [4].
The aforementioned theoretical concepts attempt to define the same empirical phenomenon: the increasing complexity of international systems and the methods through which these systems attempt to establish order. As a result of the growth in the number of actors and interactions, the new global governance must be regarded as a novel emerging phenomenon. This is characterized by the formation of policies within intricate networks through which disparate actors, while retaining a degree of autonomy, nevertheless interact in a mutually dependent manner, creating a determined order of the system.

4. System Model—Multilevel Governance (MLG) Framework

As previously stated, there is a comprehensive list of theoretical concepts developed by scholars in IR that aim to illuminate the evolving dynamics of the international system. A variety of terms have been employed to describe the dynamics of global governance, including complex interdependence, international regimes, multilevel governance, global constitutionalism, and ordered anarchy. Among these concepts, multilevel governance has gained particular prominence due to its capacity to facilitate predictability. Essentially, the multilevel governance framework describes a complex mechanism of negotiation among actors situated at different levels (subnational, national, regional, and international).
The concept of MLG was born in 1993 when Marks and Hooghe conducted research into the implications of the European Union (EU) following the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. In essence, they observed that the EU facilitated the dispersion of authority to jurisdictions within and beyond the boundaries of nation-states. This resulted in a transition from a traditional state-centric model of governance to a new model of multilevel governance. This redistribution of power from the nation-state to international and local stakeholders modifies the decision-making process, the distribution of power, and the arenas of action. The researchers ultimately reached the following conclusion: “European integration is a polity creating process in which authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of governance-subnational, national, and supranational” [13] (p. 342).
The primary argument is that the authority—the competence to make binding decisions that are regarded as legitimate—has been dispersed from the central state in two directions. Authority has shifted both to subnational jurisdictions and to international institutions, thereby spreading the power vertically between levels of government and horizontally across multiple actors. Marks defined multilevel governance as a system of continuous negotiation among governments at various territorial levels, illustrating how supranational, national, regional, and local governments are intertwined in overarching policy networks [14].
Similarly, Piattoni defined governance as a complex negotiation mechanism between multiple actors that are found in numerous territorial arenas or scenarios. “The levels connected by MLG must be understood primarily as territorial levels (supranational, national, sub-national), each commanding a certain degree of authority over the corresponding territory and the individuals residing in it” [15] (p. 172). This has constituted an extensive process of institutional creation and decisional reassignment, which has resulted in the transfer of certain previously centralized functions of the nation-state to the supranational level and the local level.
In their analysis, Hooghe and Marks [16] (p. 4) identified four principal characteristics of the emerging multilevel governance model, as follows:
  • The traditional role of the state in the creation of public policies and the aggregation of domestic interests is no longer as dominant as it once was. Indeed, a significant number of non-state actors now have a special interest in the creation of scientific production policies.
  • The decision-making process is a collaborative effort involving actors at various levels, given the significant interconnectivity between the agents engaged in different arenas. In light of this interdependence, it has become imperative for these agents to collaborate in order to reach a consensus.
  • The influence of intergovernmental and supranational institutions has grown in importance as they have assumed a more prominent role on the global stage.
  • The scope of subnational actors extends beyond the boundaries of their respective states or localities, encompassing engagement in both state and global arenas, where they establish transnational connections.
This analytical framework emphasized three key aspects: firstly, the growing number of actors at different levels or arenas; secondly, the increasing interactions among them; and thirdly, the novel relevance of the new levels or arenas of action. Consequently, the concept of multilevel governance prompted the examination of the role, power, and authority of states, as well as the distribution of power between new actors.
The Peace of Westphalia (1648) established a world order in which the nation-state emerged as the primary actor in international relations. Since the 1970s, new international actors, including transnational companies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have gained power and relevance in the global dynamics and have begun to challenge and contest the world order, which is based on the overall authority of the states over the other participants in the international system. Some experts began to anticipate the end of the central role of the states [17], while others suggest that states will continue to be critical stakeholders, but will have to share the international stage with new actors that will compete with them for power and relevance [18].
Multilevel governance does not directly challenge the sovereignty of the states. Rather than being explicitly challenged, states within the European Union are being integrated into a multilevel policy framework through the actions of their leaders and numerous subnational and supranational actors [13] (p. 371).

5. System Analysis—The Multilevel Governance of the Space System

As previously stated, the multilevel governance framework is an analytical tool that enables the study of complex systems. Therefore, it is beneficial to apply this conceptual and theoretical method to the analysis of the space system with the aim of understanding the governance of space-related activities. This can be achieved by mapping the most relevant actors involved in space activities according to arenas or levels.
In recent decades, the multilevel governance model has demonstrated utility in a number of geographical contexts beyond the EU, as well as in a variety of sectors, including climate change, economic development, and global security. Despite the growing number of scientific studies employing the multilevel governance model, its application in the field of space studies remains limited.
Among the few isolated cases, the Secure World Foundation conducted a study on space governance, employing a multilevel analysis. This analysis identified three levels of analysis (international, national, and subnational) and the major actors in each arena [4]. A more detailed examination was conducted by Antonino Salmeri regarding the multilevel governance of space mining. While primarily a space legal analysis, Salmeri employs the multilevel framework to provide a comprehensive examination of international and national laws, norms, and policies pertaining to the exploitation of extraterrestrial resources [19].
The MLG model enables the identification of four principal levels or arenas within the space system, where a multitude of actors engage in interactions and make decisions about space activities.

5.1. National Level

In an international system that remains predominantly constituted by nation-states, which compete with one another for resources, prestige, and power, the national level represents a crucial domain for the analysis of space activities.
From its earliest days, the space industry has been closely associated with the actions of national governments, given the inherent complexity and expense of the enterprise. Consequently, during the 20th century, space activities were conducted in accordance with a centralized, government-led model, with a primary focus on national security and defense interests [20]. However, the space business model underwent a gradual transformation in the 1970s and 1980s, with the incremental integration of private sector actors [21,22], and in the 21st century, the space industry is undergoing a significant transformation, with the advent of a new business model that is increasingly commercialized where the private sector is playing a much greater role [23]. Although the space business model is in the process of transitioning from a state-centric to a multilevel decision-making model [13] (p. 371), nation-states continue to play a pivotal role in the 21st century space system.
Despite the growing number of new non-state space actors involved in space activities, the government continues to play a central role, articulating a significant portion of the activities in the space domain. National governments assume a variety of roles in the field of space including that of planner, manufacturer, investor, developer, owner, operator, regulator, and customer. National agencies, research centers, and laboratories also perform space R&D and, in some cases, assume a manufacturing role (e.g., India, Korea) [24] (p. 59).
The multifaceted nature of this role necessitates the implementation of space activities across various governmental sectors (e.g., defense, communications, transportation, and environment) and at different governmental levels (federal, provincial, and local) [1] (p. 232). As Oto observes, the governance of the space system at the national level is characterized by the presence of multiple bodies that coordinate and represent countries on matters pertaining to space. These bodies, which can be found within a given nation, exhibit a diversity of agendas, yet they are all shaped by the overarching national strategy. Typical government-sector organizations engaged in space-related activities include space agencies, research institutes, laboratories, and ground-testing facilities [4] (pp. 5–6).
As Table 1 illustrates, numerous entities within the national government are engaged in space-related activities.

5.1.1. National Space Agencies

The most notorious governmental institutions related to space activities are national space agencies. These space-related governmental bodies, created within the government, are responsible for coordinating, planning, and implementing national space policies and strategies. During the 20th century, the number of space agencies was relatively limited. However, with the end of the Cold War and the advent of the new millennium, we have witnessed a significant increase in the number of space agencies due to the growing interest of nation-states in space activities. Currently, there are 78 space agencies around the world, 16 of which have the capability to launch spacecraft, and 6 of these agencies (NASA, CNSA, ROSCOSMOS, ESA, ISRO, and JAXA) have the additional capability to land spacecraft on other planets. Notable among these agencies is NASA, but there are also important agencies in Russia, China, Europe, Canada, Japan, and India [25]. In the 20-year period between 2000 and 2020, 37 national space agencies were established, including those in Japan, Iran, Mexico, South Africa, and Portugal. In the relatively brief period of five years between 2014 and 2019, 16 additional space agencies were established, including those in Australia, Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. Finally, in recent years, several new agencies have been created, the most recent of which include those in Greece (2019), Costa Rica (2021), Spain (2023), and South Korea (2024).
The growing importance of space agencies is reflected in the increased funding and expanded roles they are afforded by their respective governments. In the past decade, government budgets for space activities have undergone a notable increase. In 2023, global government expenditure for space programs reached a record of approximately 117 billion U.S. dollars, representing a growth of over 15% compared to the previous year. In parallel, the majority of space-faring nations have revised their space policies in the past decade, including the United States, China, the European Union, India, and Japan. Additionally, numerous emerging and even smaller powers have developed new space policies over the past two decades. These policies will be conducted and executed by the national space agencies.

5.1.2. Universities and Research Laboratories

Universities, research laboratories, and other academic institutions have a long tradition of collaborating with governments in training, research, and the application of new technologies in the space sector. However, in the context of the scientific and technological revolution, which is commonly referred to as the Fourth Industrial Revolution [26,27], these actors are becoming more relevant than ever. These actors fulfill two crucial functions within the space industry: the training of a specialized workforce and the conduct of applied research. In the current space system, higher education institutions play a pivotal role in space R&D in numerous countries and partner economies. As the OECD observed, the roles of these actors are expanding in terms of both function and relevance: “they are a source of innovation, knowledge diffusion, and technological transfer for the sector, conducting basic and applied research, as well as publishing and patenting activities. Furthermore, many space economy startups originate in the higher-education sector” [28] (p. 64).
Despite the traditional autonomy that higher education institutions and research institutes have historically enjoyed from the government, in the majority of cases, these actors remain politically, legally, and economically dependent on the national government. Enders explained the intertwined nature of the relationship between governments and universities: “The contemporary university was born of the nation-state, following the establishment of clear national economic interests. Their regulatory and funding context was, and still is, national; their contribution to national cultures was and still is, significant, and universities played, and still play, a considerable role in what some have called the military-industrial complex of nation states. In this perspective, they are very much national institutions”. [29] (pp. 364–365).
A long-standing tradition of collaboration exists between higher education institutions and the space sector in the United States. This collaboration encompasses the training of a skilled workforce and the conduct of research, in addition to active participation in space missions. From the world-renowned Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), established by Caltech researchers and situated in close proximity to NASA but still under the administrative control of the California Institute of Technology, to the leading role of the University of Arizona in the Phoenix Lander mission to Mars, to the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory’s launch of the DART mission, to the collaboration of 11 American universities in the University Partnership Program with the recently established US Space Force, all these prestigious higher education institutions and research centers played a significant role in the development of the American space program.
Similarly, other prominent space-faring nations, including the European Union, China, Russia, and India, are positioning their higher education institutions as pivotal actors in the advancement of space exploration. China’s university system is playing a pivotal role in the growth of its space sector, providing invaluable intellectual capital and highly qualified research to the two major public Chinese aerospace corporations, the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) [30]. Similarly, in Europe, initiatives such as the European Space University for Earth and Humanity (UNIVERSEH), which was established in 2020, are seeking to develop novel methods of collaboration in the field of space. This endeavor involves the coordination of five universities from five distinct European countries (France, Luxembourg, Germany, Sweden, and Poland) with the backing of the European Commission [31].

5.1.3. Space Military Forces

There is a clear correlation between space activities and military institutions. Since the successful launch of the V-2 in 1943, which was the first known human-made object to enter outer space, while also representing the world’s first long-range combat ballistic missile and the forerunner to the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) of the postwar era, activities in outer space have been closely linked to the national defense and security of sovereign countries. The space race (and the moon race) was also conceived within the broader context of the Cold War, during which the superpowers acted in outer space intending to increase their influence in the international arena.
The post-Cold War period saw a reduction in tensions between the two superpowers, which in turn facilitated the proliferation of cooperative agreements in space. These included the Shuttle/Mir program (1994) and the ISS (1998). However, the advent of a new space system in the 21st century, combined with the rise of new actors with global ambitions in the international system, has led to the emergence of geopolitical tensions between the United States and new contenders, particularly China and Russia. In the context of a more competitive and aggressive international system, the extraterrestrial dimension has emerged as a dominant scenario, reinforcing the traditional geopolitical adage that whoever controls outer space controls the world. This has in turn encouraged the implementation of more aggressive national military space policies in recent years.
Historically, the majority of countries have integrated space forces or units into their national air forces. However, in recent decades, the growing relevance of the space domain has prompted national governments and military sectors to establish independent space forces. Some of these forces have been designated as autonomous armed service branches, with the primary objective of enhancing warfighting capacity in the space domain. Notable examples of these novel trends include the establishment of the United States Space Force in 2019, the formation of the Chinese Strategic Support Force under the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and with the direct influence of Xi Jinping in 2015, and the re-establishment of the Russian Space Force in 2015 after its dissolution in 2011. In alignment with this pattern, France proceeded to establish the French Space Command in 2019, while Iran subsequently made public the existence of its own Space Command in 2020.

5.1.4. Private Sector Companies

Space companies played a relatively minor role in the 20th century under the government-oriented model. However, this began to change in the 1970s with the gradual entry of the private sector into the space industry, particularly in the United States, Europe, and Japan. The majority of experts concur that the space business model has undergone a significant transformation in the 21st century, with space companies assuming a key role in the emerging space system [20,21,22,23].
In recent decades, the number of companies engaged in space-related activities has increased exponentially. Currently, there are over 10,000 space companies globally, representing approximately two-thirds of all space-related endeavors [32]. Traditional aerospace companies, such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin, are developing new commercial strategies, including the formation of the joint venture ULA, in response to the emergence of a new generation of space companies. These include Blue Origin (2000), SpaceX (2002), Virgin Galactic (2004), and Rocket Lab (2006), which have collectively transformed the space industry through the development of innovative technologies that have significantly impacted the space business [33] (pp. 39–47).
Despite the increasing globalization of the private sector and the growing role of transnational corporations in international space activities, international space law still requires that all commercial activities in space obtain authorization and ongoing supervision from a national government, typically in the form of a license [34]. This represents a significant obstacle for space companies seeking to engage more actively at the international level, given their inherent dependency on national governments. Space companies are constrained by the limitations of national space policies and regulations.
In addition to the advancement of new technology that has made the development of previously unimaginable sectors in space possible, the exponential growth of space companies in recent decades can also be attributed to the introduction of new national space policies that have fostered public–private partnerships as a novel space development strategy. The United States was the first country to encourage the privatization of the space industry under President Ronald Reagan (1981–1989). This was achieved through the Commercial Space Launch Act, which was signed in October 1984. Subsequently, in 1988 and 2004, amendments were introduced to facilitate the licensing and insurance process for private entities. This strategy was further reinforced with the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (2006) and the Commercial Crew Program (2011), which encouraged public–private partnerships with aerospace companies.
China has been also promoting the growth of its domestic space industry. In 2014, Document 60 was released with the objective of modernizing the financing channels into strategic sectors, including environmental protection, agriculture, transportation, energy, and space. This document permitted private investment in specific areas of the space industry. Since the implementation of Document 60, there has been a notable increase in investment in China’s private sector, with an estimated growth of approximately USD 3 billion annually. The Chinese commercial space market has experienced a significant expansion, with an annual growth rate exceeding 20 percent from 2017 to 2024. Projections indicate that the market will reach CNY 2.34 trillion (USD 326 billion) by 2024. Another noteworthy example is the case of India. The Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, has established the Indian Space Association (ISpA), an industry body comprising both government and private companies. The objective of the ISpA is to complement the Centre’s efforts in commercial space exploration and space-based communication. “For 75 years since independence, Indian space has been dominated by a single umbrella of Indian government and government institutions. Scientists of India have made huge achievements in these decades, but the need of the hour is that there should be no restrictions on Indian talent, whether it is in the public sector or in the private sector” [35].
Over the past decade, there has been a proliferation of national space policies and legislation pertaining to commercial space activities. This reflects, in part, the exponential growth of the commercial space sector and the deepening relationship between national governments and space companies. To illustrate, four countries have enacted new national space legislation on space mineral resources. Notable examples include the United States (US Commercial Space Paunch Competitiveness Act, 2015), Luxembourg (Law on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources, 2017, and the Law on Space Activities, 2020), Japan (Space Activities Act, 2018, and Space Resources Act, 2021), and the United Arab Emirates (Federal Law on the Regulation of the Space Sector, 2019).

5.2. International Level

At the international level, there is no space supranational entity that unifies and coordinates space activities, nor is there a forum where national actors can transfer power and competencies. Instead, there is an extensive list of different intergovernmental, multilateral, and non-governmental initiatives where multiple space actors, with different powers, purposes, and membership, participate and interact in multiple, diverse, and overlapping processes of space governance.
Table 2 shows the major space actors identified at the international level of the space system classified by the type of organization.

5.2.1. Supranational Organizations

The space system, as a subsystem of the international system, is subject to the same challenges that the global system faces, namely a lack of centralized authority and a state of anarchy. This signifies the absence of a global government or supreme authority with enforcement capabilities, as is the case at the national level. This does not imply that the space system must be chaotic; rather, the order that can be established is not a result of a supranational entity, but rather a global governance structure in which a multitude of actors collaborate to establish and maintain norms, principles, rules, policies, institutions, and other forums that collectively influence the behavior of actors in space affairs.
The fragmented and decentralized nature of the space system prevents the major space powers from reaching a consensus, making it challenging to establish supranational organizations that could coordinate efforts, as is the case with space agencies at the national level. At this point, the notion of developing a supranational organization with genuine authority and capabilities akin to an international or global space agency appears to be a utopian proposition.

5.2.2. Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)—General Purpose

In the absence of a supranational institution in the space system, intergovernmental organizations (OIGs) become central actors. These are institutions constituted by nation-states, with a legal personality separate from their member states, and they can enter into legally binding agreements with other IGOs or with other states [36].
At the international level, the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) is the longest-standing and most significant IGO with a mandate related to space activities. Created in the context of the Cold War and after the surprise launch of Sputnik 1, the main goal of this intergovernmental organization was to promote cooperation among the major space players to use the new “domain” for peaceful purposes and to avoid any potential military use. Furthermore, COPUOS is responsible for the implementation of five United Nations treaties (Outer Space Treaty, 1967; Rescue Agreement, 1968; Liability Convention, 1972; Registration Convention, 1975; and Moon Agreement, 1979) and several agreements (Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space, 1963; Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting, 1982; Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, 1986; Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, 1992; and Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interests of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries (1996)) pertaining to outer space activities.
The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) serves as the secretariat for the UN COPUOS, assuming responsibility for the day-to-day operations and record-keeping of the Committee. It plays a pivotal role in fostering collaboration with specialized agencies and conducting capacity-building activities.
A plethora of agencies and offices operate under the auspices of this United Nations organization, addressing a multitude of topics and mandates on space development. These include the Space Applications Section (SAS), the United Nations Platform for Space-Based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (UN-SPIDER), and the International Committee on GNSS (ICG), among others.
Although the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) and the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) play a central role in the space system as a unique global forum for space actors to discuss issues related to the peaceful uses of outer space, the intergovernmental system exhibits several limitations in terms of global governance of space. As many experts observe [37] (p. 5), the definition of rules and norms for the responsible use of space has been a complex and contentious issue that has been significantly influenced by national security interests rather than universal goals. In the majority of cases, these intergovernmental organizations have encountered significant obstacles in the implementation of their projects, with the same nation-states that have adopted them being the primary impediments. In this context, the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) has been constrained in its ability to achieve broad consensus on new space-related matters and has not produced any new legally binding norms. Furthermore, it has been unable to establish a unified and centralized decision-making process, which has prevented the formation of a supranational organization.
The lack of tangible results in the space domain has encouraged the UN system to shift its strategy, moving from the aspirational intergovernmental binding agreement to more flexible formats. The United Nations General Assembly has encouraged states to implement transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) regarding space exploration. These measures include information exchanges, facility visits, and international cooperation. This encouragement was expressed in the publication of the report “Group of Government Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities” in 2013. In a similar vein, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) has been engaged in the development of voluntary guidelines for long-term stability since 2010. These guidelines, known as the “Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability (LTS) of Outer Space Activities”, were finally adopted by COPUOS in 2019 [37] (pp. 6–7). In this sense, the UN merely encourages international cooperation, leaving the process of defining and implementing the terms of such cooperation entirely to the states involved.

5.2.3. Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)—Specific Purpose

Also at the international level, several IGOs focus on specific purposes that have shown less ambitious but more efficient roles in the space system. Some organizations, such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), are regarded as exemplars of successful collaboration between governments and other non-state actors in the domain of space [38].
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is one of the longest-standing, most prominent, and most effective intergovernmental organizations within the United Nations system. The ITU was established in 1865 and currently comprises 193 member states. As the specialized agency of the United Nations, the ITU is responsible for all matters pertaining to information and communication technologies. The ITU’s Space Services Department is responsible for the allocation of geostationary orbits utilized by telecommunications satellites and the radio frequencies employed for satellite broadcasting. Even though, like any other intergovernmental organization, it has very few enforcement mechanisms, the ITU has played an important role in regulating the allocation of orbital slots successfully. It is therefore a good example of best practice in space cooperation and governance.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a United Nations (UN) specialized agency that has brought together 193 countries to support, coordinate, and cooperate on the global civil aviation system. ICAO has been highly successful in producing a substantial body of binding law on matters about air law. Since its inception in 1944, the ICAO has established enforceable standards and witnessed a remarkable expansion in civil aviation, which is now fully regulated and controlled, thereby ensuring a safe and well-managed system. It has recently initiated a collaborative effort with UNOOSA to examine the potential for overlap between air and space safety and traffic management activities [39].
The success of IGOs declines when the topics being discussed are more sensitive or complex. In the case of the negotiations conducted by the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the UN Institute for Disarmament Research on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the results have been considerably less impressive.
Since the 1980s, the Conference on Disarmament (CD), a multilateral forum comprising 65 members, including the United States, China, and Russia, has engaged in negotiations on arms control and disarmament at the global level, including the placement of weapons in outer space. Despite the CD’s notable success in negotiating the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), it has been unable to reach comparable agreements in the space domain. The lack of progress in the space domain can be attributed to several factors, including the inability of member states to reach consensus on critical measures, such as the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), and nuclear disarmament [40]. China and Russia have been engaged in collaborative efforts within the context of the Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PAROS) and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) through the Conference of Disarmament. The PPWT was initially proposed by China and Russia in 2008, and a revised version was presented in 2014. The United States has rejected the treaty proposal because it is fundamentally flawed. The reasons for this rejection include the absence of a verification mechanism, the lack of restrictions on anti-satellite weapons, and the failure to address the threat of space debris resulting from weapon testing.

5.2.4. Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements

The recent global proposals for UN agencies for space governance, including PAROS, PPWT, and TCBMs, have demonstrated that the UN strategy shift from binding to voluntary initiatives has not resulted in any significant progress. The prevailing trend at the international level is the transition from a model of intergovernmental and binding rules to a more flexible multilateral system of space governance, one that is non-binding in nature.
In recent years, there has been a proliferation of bilateral and multilateral initiatives that are less formal and more flexible than past intergovernmental efforts, particularly in the absence of binding agreements. It appears that countries are increasingly relying on non-binding international agreements to generate rules, regulations, and norms in space, which may be indicative of a shift towards a more bottom-up model of governance, rather than the traditional top-down approach employed by the UN system. Space experts such as Rajagopalan [41] argue that this is because there is, particularly in Western countries, a lack of confidence in the ability of other powers to pursue legally binding measures and they argue that less binding agreements may serve as an initial step in fostering trust and confidence in one another. In contrast, countries such as China and Russia continue to assert that legally binding measures are the sole means of securing space, as evidenced by their support for the PAROS and PPWT initiatives.
In line with this, in recent years, we have observed the emergence of new international bilateral and multilateral initiatives, driven by political and geopolitical considerations that do not include binding agreements. In addition to the regional processes of space that will be discussed in detail in Section 5.3, some experts have suggested the emergence of a new space race [42,43,44] and the idea of a future scenario where space will be characterized by a fragmentation of international cooperation along lines of terrestrial power. This phenomenon is referred to by some experts as “space blocs”, groups of nations that collaborate closely with one another, but they also engage in competition with other blocs [45]. Two recent examples of such competition are the Artemis Accords and the Sino-Russian lunar agreement.
The Artemis Accords represent a significant development in the field of international space cooperation, exemplifying a new trend of non-binding bilateral and multilateral agreements established beyond the UN system. In essence, the Artemis Accords comprise a series of bilateral agreements between the United States and other countries, collectively supporting the implementation of the American Artemis Program. This program aims to facilitate a return to the Moon, with the ultimate objective of advancing space exploration to Mars and beyond. The Artemis Accords were initially signed in October 2020 by representatives of the national space agencies of eight countries: Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Subsequent signatories have increased the number of members to 43, including strategic space actors such as India, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, and France. The Accords remain open for signature indefinitely, as NASA anticipates that additional nations will join in the future.
In addition to the political objective of revitalizing the American space program and establishing a new long-term strategic vision, it appears that the United States is seeking to develop a new international initiative that would promote certain norms to be observed in outer space, beyond the Cold War-era United Nations space treaties. Tepper asserts that initiatives such as the Artemis Accords illustrate the potential for alternative forums to exert significant influence over the trajectory of future space exploration and governance. These forums can serve as the foundation for the governance of long-term human space habitats, effectively establishing a new social contract that will shape interactions in space [3] (pp. 518–519).
Despite its rapid growth and success, the Artemis Accords have also generated numerous critiques from experts, scholars, and leaders in the space industry. The primary criticisms pertain to the United States’ refusal to endorse the Artemis Accords at the United Nations, thereby avoiding negotiations with other space powers; the absence of China due to the 2011 ban imposed by the US Congress; and the perception that the Accords are too American-centric [46] (p. 103).
In March 2021, China and Russia entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding the construction of the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS). This was followed by the formal announcement of the joint ILRS project in St. Petersburg, Russia, in June 2021. The primary objective of the agreement is the construction of a lunar base. Furthermore, the agreement formally extends an invitation to additional countries and international organizations to join the ILRS project. “CNSA and ROSCOSMOS jointly invite all interested international partners to cooperate and contribute more for the peaceful exploration and use of Moon in the interests of all humankind, adhering to the principles of equality, openness and integrity”. The project remains “open to all international partners interested in cooperation”, and other countries and international organizations are encouraged to contribute to “any aspect of the mission in every stage” [47].
The International Lunar Research Station, which is led by China and has the clear objective of establishing an alliance of countries that are aligned with China and Russia, is viewed as an alternative to the American Artemis Accords. As of the present date, 11 countries have joined officially the International Lunar Research Park. These include China, Russia, Nicaragua, Thailand, Egypt, Venezuela, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Belarus, South Africa, and Serbia. Additionally, China has successfully attracted several organizations, universities, and companies to join the ILRS. This includes the Asias-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) and the Adriatic Aerospace Association (A3) in Croatia [48].
In addition to the two primary multilateral agreements, several other initiatives have emerged in recent years, some of which overlap with the aforementioned processes. For instance, in May 2022, the BRICS launched a new Joint Committee on Space Cooperation with the collaboration of the five national space agencies from the five member countries that have adopted this commitment (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). The objective of this initiative is to enable remote sensing satellite data sharing from six operating satellites. The announcement was perceived as a response to the satellite collaboration of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, an informal alliance among the United States, Australia, India, and Japan.

5.2.5. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have emerged as important actors within the international system. These organizations, operating independently of government influence and pursuing diverse objectives such as humanitarian crises, environmental issues, and poverty alleviation, have assumed a growing significance within the international system since the mid-1970s. This remarkable expansion in their capacity to act as international actors has enhanced the impact of NGOs when engaged in the formulation of global public policies.
In certain domains, such as the environment, they have succeeded in raising awareness of this issue at the highest levels of governance. This is evidenced by the numerous global conferences and agreements where governments are compelled on a regular basis to act by these NGOs. Unfortunately, the influence of NGOs in the space sector appears to be relatively limited in comparison to other fields [49].
Despite a long tradition of NGOs related to space that play an important educational and scientific role, the influence of these organizations on the governance of space has not been significant. Among the most prominent space non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are the International Astronautical Federation (IAF) (1951), the International Academy of Astronautics (IAA) (1960), the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) (1963), the Planetary Society (1980), the Space Foundation (1983), the National Space Society (1987), the Mars Society (1998), and the Secure World Foundation (2008).

5.3. Regional Level

The regional level has emerged as one of the most dynamic and active levels within the space system. Although regional initiatives are considered part of the international level, the increasing significance of this phenomenon necessitates a distinct analytical approach. In general, regional subsystems are defined by the presence of “clusters of states coexisting in geographical proximity as interrelated units that sustain significant security, economic, and political relations” [50] (p. 188), and the concept of the region is understood as an “intermediate form of community” between the national community of the state and the potential global community of humankind [51]. In this context, the term regionalism is defined as the tendency of governments and peoples in two or more states to establish voluntary associations and to pool together resources (material and nonmaterial) in order to create common functional and institutional arrangements. Furthermore, these actors are engaged in a rapidly expanding network of economic, cultural, scientific, diplomatic, political, and military interactions [52].
Since the conclusion of the Cold War, there has been a proliferation of regional processes within the international system, intending to harmonize commercial, economic, social, and cultural policies among member states. In addition to the classic European Union model, numerous other processes are occurring across the globe. These include the North American Free Trade Agreement (1994–2020), the later United States, Mexico, and Canada Agreement (USMCA) (2020-present), the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) (1991)/Union of South American Nations (2008), and the African Union (2001).
The existence of a regional level constituted the initial impetus for the formulation of a multilevel governance model that sought to elucidate the redistribution of power from the national level to supranational and subnational levels. It was in the European regional process that the initial experience of regionalization of space was first identified, namely the establishment of the European Space Agency (ESA) in 1975. The ESA was constituted with ten founding members and commenced operations in 1980, becoming the inaugural intergovernmental regional organization with a mandate related to activities in outer space.
Concurrent with the ascendance and proliferation of regional processes across the international system since the conclusion of the Cold War, the majority of new regional integration processes commenced collaboration in the space sector as well, thereby reinforcing the regionalization of space cooperation. The majority of these nascent regional processes have established institutionalized forms of cooperation, thereby leading to the emergence of new regional actors within the space system.
Table 3 provides a synopsis of the seven principal space processes at the regional level to date.

5.3.1. European Space Agency (ESA)

Following the conclusion of the Second World War, a long-standing tradition of regional cooperation emerged in Europe. In 1957, six countries, including Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany, signed the Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community (EEC) as the first customs union. Additionally, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was created for cooperation in nuclear power. The success of Europe’s nuclear research facility (CERN) introduced a novel approach to space activities in Europe based on collaboration. The initial step was the establishment of the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) and the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) in 1964. The European Space Agency (ESA) was formed in 1975 through the merger of the ESRO and ELDO, with 10 founding member countries, and officially came into being in 1980.
Since that time, the European Space Agency (ESA) has expanded to include 22 member states and has become a model for other regional space agencies. The European Space Agency (ESA) has undertaken a number of notable space missions, including the Giotto space probe (1985), which was the first ESA interplanetary mission and enabled the examination of the core of Halley’s Comet. The Ulysses spacecraft (1990) was also launched by the ESA to explore the Sun’s polar regions, and the Ariane series of launch vehicles was established. Furthermore, the ESA established a system of meteorological satellites known as Meteosat and launched the Cassine’s lander Huygens (1997) atmospheric entry robotic space probe, which landed successfully on Saturn’s moon Titan in 2005. There were several contributions to the International Space Station (ISS) including the Columbus Lab (2008), which made ESA became a full partner in the operation of the station. In 2011, Galileo was created, an indigenous global navigation satellite system independent of the Russian GLONASS, Chinese BeiDou, and American GPS systems. Finally, the James Webb Telescope (2021) is another significant addition to the ESA’s portfolio of space missions in partnership with NASA.
At this point, the European Space Agency (ESA) is considered the model for many other regional space processes that have emerged in recent decades. The ESA serves as an exemplar of an operational international organization for space activities, typifying a successful working model for scientific, technological, and political cooperation in space at the regional level. Nevertheless, given its intergovernmental nature, the ESA did not alter the structure of the European space industry, which remained focused on the national scale and concentrated in three countries, namely Germany, France, and Italy [53].
A remarkable aspect of this process is that, while the EU and its member states collectively fund 86% of the ESA budget, the ESA is not an EU agency. Although the ESA has collaborated with the EU on two of its current flagship space programs (Copernicus and Galileo), the relationship has not always been harmonious. Despite the European Space Agency (ESA) and the European Union (EU) agreeing on cooperation in June 2021, with the signing of the Financial Framework Partnership Agreement (FFPA), the establishment of the European Union Space Agency (EUSPA) may be interpreted as the EU’s attempt to develop a potential rival to ESA [54].
In May 2021, the European Union established the EU Space Program Agency (EUSPA), which is an EU agency and a distinct entity from the ESA. The EUSPA is responsible for the oversight of the EU Program for Space Activities. Despite the existence of a close collaboration between the two entities, there is an evident overlap in their respective functions within the context of the EU.

5.3.2. Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF)

The Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) was established in 1993, following the conclusion of the Cold War, with the objective of enhancing space activities in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan assumed a leading role in the establishment of the APRSAF. It comprises a diverse array of actors, including national space agencies, governmental bodies, international organizations, private companies, universities, and research institutes from over 40 countries.
One of the most significant aspects of this regional process is that it has established an open and flexible framework, rather than legally binding agreements, for the discussion of a wide range of space-related topics, including but not limited to the development and utilization of space technology. The APRSAF currently comprises four working groups: Space Applications, Space Technology, Space Environment Utilization, and Space Education.
The growing number of high-ranking officials in attendance at APRSAF events presents a valuable opportunity to discuss international cooperation for space activities in practical terms in issues such as disaster management and environmental protection.

5.3.3. Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO)

In parallel with the remarkable advancement of the Chinese space program, China initiated a robust space diplomacy initiative with the objective of spearheading its own regional process. In 1992, China, in conjunction with Pakistan and Thailand, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding, thereby establishing the Asia-Pacific Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology and Applications (AP-MCSTA). Following workshops and conferences, the initiative was formalized into a permanent organization, with a signing ceremony in October 2005 in Beijing, China, which enabled the initiation of APSCO cooperation activities in 2008 [55]. Subsequently, APSCO initiated a process of standardization and institutionalization of space activities, including the establishment of a headquarters in Beijing, China; the development of educational and training programs; and the formulation of a common space policy under the program Vision 2030.
Basically, APSCO is an intergovernmental organization whose mission is to facilitate and reinforce the advancement of collaborative space programs among its member states. APSCO aspires to emulate the ESA model by establishing a more formal regional process that includes intergovernmental organizations that promote collaboration among the state members. In order to achieve this goal, it strives to establish a foundation for cooperation in the peaceful applications of space science and technology.
To date, there are eight full members, including Bangladesh, China, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey; one signatory state, Indonesia; one observer, Mexico; and several representatives from Argentina, Malaysia, the Philippines, Russia, and Sri Lanka. The majority of ASPCO member countries are also associated with APRSAF, which creates a tangible overlap between APSCO and APRSAF in terms of their influence on space activities in the Asia-Pacific region.

5.3.4. The Arab Space Cooperation Group (ASCG)

In line with the economic strategies of several Middle Eastern countries, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which are investing in the space sector in anticipation of the end of the oil era, several countries in the region established the Arab Space Cooperation Group in 2019 [56]. In essence, this is a regional entity with a focus on space activities, chaired by the UAE’s Space Agency, which is responsible for coordinating regional space efforts among the 14 member states (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and the UAE).
The primary objectives of the organization are to harmonize regulations among space authorities, adopt a unified position at regional and international forums, and implement joint initiatives for comprehensive collaboration.

5.3.5. Latin American and Caribbean Space Agency (ALCE)

On 18 September 2021, the Constitutive Agreement of the Latin American and Caribbean Space Agency (ALCE) was signed, establishing the organization as an international entity tasked with facilitating collaboration in the field of space exploration among Latin American and Caribbean countries. The initiative was initially proposed in 2006 at the America’s Space Summit, a gathering of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.
The regional process includes 18 members, including regional space leaders such as Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico, but Brazil, the foremost space power in Latin America, has yet to formalize its membership.
In a manner similar to that of the European Space Agency (ESA), the ALCE seeks to foster connections and collaboration between the countries of the region on matters pertaining to space. Its objectives include the undertaking of activities related to the exploration and peaceful utilization of outer space, the Moon, and other celestial bodies, as well as the conducting of research and training initiatives.

5.3.6. African Space Agency (AfSA)

The African Space Agency (AfSA) is a regional space organization established by the African Union (AU) in January 2023 with the objective of promoting cooperation between the space policies of the AU’s member states. The regional process encompasses 55 African countries, some of which have initiated promising space programs, including South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, and Nigeria.
On 31 January 2016, the African Union Heads of State and Government convened in Addis Ababa and adopted the African Space Policy and Strategy, which constituted the inaugural concrete step towards the achievement of an African Outer Space Program. In October 2021, the Executive Council of the African Union approved the structure of the African Space Agency, representing a significant advancement in the achievement of the African Outer Space Program, which is identified as a flagship initiative within the AU Agenda 2063. On 25 January 2024, in Cairo, Egypt, the newly established structure of AfSA was inaugurated and declared operational.

5.4. Subnational Level

The multilevel governance model delineates the manner in which the authority and decision-making process is shifting from the national to the regional and supranational levels, as well as to the subnational level. In the context of the emergence of a new international system in the 21st century, the role of subnational actors is becoming increasingly relevant and critical for global governance. Within the vast territories of many nation-states, there are subnational entities that show three major characteristics. Firstly, they possess the qualities of an international actor. Secondly, they exhibit the nature of governments with certain capacities, powers, and governmental competencies. Thirdly, they are politically and institutionally located outside of the central state administration [57].
Cities and regions at the subnational level have played an important role in world history as economic, political, and international actors. However, in the domain of space, they were subordinated to national interests for the majority of the 20th century. In the traditional state-centric space business model, the national government assumed responsibility for the entirety of the space industry’s activities, whereas cities and regions served a relatively minor role, functioning primarily as locations for specific space-related operations.
At the beginning of the 21st century, science, technology, and innovation (STI) assumed a more prominent role as a central instrument for generating economic wealth and social development. Currently, there is a broad consensus that a country’s wealth and development opportunities are strongly linked to the consolidation of STI sectors and the need for robust research and development (R&D) investments [58,59]. A considerable number of international actors at the national, regional, and subnational levels are engaged in the design of ambitious STI policies and strategies, as well as the investment of substantial resources in R&D with the objective of developing their STI systems and fostering economic growth [60]. The successful experience of Silicon Valley in the United States in attracting people, ideas, and companies has served as a model for the development of high-tech hubs, also known as “innovation hubs”. Many cities around the world are following this successful model of STI ecosystems, creating favorable conditions at the local level to attract talent, capital, and business [61].
A growing body of literature has emerged that addresses the increasing role of cities and regions as subnational actors, with a more significant role in the international system. This literature examines the role of cities as education hubs [62], innovation hubs [63,64,65], smart cities [66,67], and global cities [68,69]. Similarly, in the space domain where the traditional state-centric model of the space industry is undergoing a transition towards a more diversified model in which subnational actors play a more significant role, it is also possible to find literature regarding space clusters [24,59,70] and space ecosystems [71].
The model of innovation hubs has been applied to the space sector in recent years to analyze those local or regional physical spaces that bring together researchers, creators, and innovators with the objective of nurturing ideas into industry-changing products and services. The OECD examines the emergence of space industry clusters globally, as these cities are home to the space industry, which encompasses space technology firms and public companies engaged in the development of satellites and space applications [59]. Other scholars employ an ecosystem approach to analyze space hubs, a methodology that has been applied to diverse industries, including electronics, internet platforms, and other complex environments, and it is gaining traction in the context of space activities. A space ecosystem is defined as “the alignment structure of the multilateral set of partners that need to interact in order for a focal value proposition to materialize” [71].
A significant differentiation within the subnational level refers to the type of actors involved. At least two actors are discernible within the space system: cities and regions. Traditionally, space hubs or ecosystems have been established in cities. A considerable number of cities across the globe have been designated as space hubs and are engaged in efforts to stimulate the space industry. These include Moscow (Russia), Seoul (South Korea), Bengaluru (India), Wuhan, Guangdong and Beijing (China), Toulouse (France), Bremen (Germany), Milan (Italy), Adelaide (Australia), Cape Town (South Africa), Houston, Huntsville, Los Angeles, and Cape Canaveral (USA), among others. In addition, regions at the subnational level are investigating the potential of the space industry to facilitate economic and social development. The considerable autonomy that many regions (also known as states, provinces, communities, etc.) enjoy, coupled with the transfer of competencies from the national to the subnational level in many countries, has enabled these geographical units to plan and construct space hubs. Some examples of regions that have established space hubs include the East of England and Scotland (UK), Southern Kanto (Japan), Quebec (Canada), California, Washington, Colorado, Florida, and Texas (USA), among others [59,70].
Historically, the development of space hubs or clusters has been driven by a variety of space activities, including the establishment of large governmental facilities, the creation of national space agencies, the development of military space facilities, and the construction of universities and research laboratories focused on space-related studies. In recent decades, as a result of shifts in the space industry, new space hubs have emerged in locations with a concentration of space-related businesses. Table 4 presents a list of subnational actors classified by sector and their respective roles in driving space activity.

5.5. The Multilevel Governance of the Space System

The previous analysis demonstrates how the space actors have increased the number and interest in space activities within the space system, and how they are distributed across a wide range of levels.
Figure 1 illustrates the application of the multilevel governance framework to the space system. Four distinct levels or arenas were identified, and within each of them, several space actors were identified, including national, international, regional, and subnational actors.
The application of the MLG framework to the study of space systems allows for the identification of several emergent realities of this system. These include:
  • The identification of four distinct levels or arenas where actors engage in actions within the space system: national, international, regional, and subnational. Each of the aforementioned levels is characterized by a distinct set of actors and attributes, although there is occasionally a degree of overlap.
  • The number and variety of actors involved in space activities at all levels have increased.
  • The consolidation of the national level as a critical arena for the exercise of power and the making of decisions.
  • The absence of a supranational space authority at the international level.
  • The major space intergovernmental regimes created in the 20th century are becoming increasingly inactive, while new, more flexible, non-binding multilateral agreements among space actors are emerging.
  • The advent of a novel regional arena, exemplified by the ESA experience, has gained prominence since the beginning of the 21st century, with numerous new space regional processes.
  • The relevance of the subnational level is also increasing, where cities and regions are encouraging the development of space ecosystems.
  • The existence of a more fragmented and decentralized space system, with a clear distribution of power across all the levels.
  • A transition from a state-centric to a multilevel governance model, with the distribution of power shifting from the national level to the other three levels.
  • In parallel, a shift in the model of global governance is occurring, moving from a top-down construction to a bottom-up approach, which is evidenced by the emergence of new non-binding bilateral and multilateral agreements that establish norms and regimes.

6. Discussion and Conclusions

This research examined the emergence of a new space system within the context of the 21st century international order. In particular, it employed a systems model of multilevel governance (MLG) to investigate the complexity of the current space system, tracing the emergence of new actors, types of interactions, and arenas within the space domain.
The contemporary space system has undergone a transition from a relatively simple bipolar system in the 20th century to a more complex multipolar space system in the present day. In order to analyze the changes that have occurred in the space system, traditional scientific analytical approaches may not be sufficient. To address the growing complexity of global governance of space systems in the 21st century, this research proposed and applied a multilevel governance approach.
The MLG framework enables the identification, simplification, and comprehension of the principal components of the system. This process involves the identification of the principal actors and their distribution across four distinct levels of the space system. The central argument of this section is that the governance of the space system has become more fragmented, decentralized, and distributed across multiple levels or arenas. This general hypothesis was corroborated by a reasonable degree of evidence after applying a systems model (MGL) that permitted the identification and description of the major actors and levels of the complex structure of the space system.
The current space system is a more decentralized system that involves a growing number of space actors distributed at various levels of governance. Section 5 covered all of these elements that decisively contributed to the conclusion in favor of the new multilevel governance of the space system.
Table 5 summarizes the main results from the application of the MLG framework to the study of the global governance of the space system.
This research makes a significant contribution to the analysis of global governance in the space sector, applying a theoretical and methodological framework (MLG) for the first time to examine the space system. The analysis yielded several contributions. First, it provided a comprehensive description of the major space actors at each level or arena of action. Second, it explained the role, goals, and power of the central space actors. Third, it examined the type of relationship among actors and levels. Fourth, it analyzed the way global issues in the space system are ruled without the existence of a supranational entity. Finally, it unveiled new research areas that require further analysis.
The global governance of space is currently facing a number of significant challenges in the context of the 21st-century space system. The lack of consensus between space powers; the increase in complexity due to the growing number and types of actors involved; the shift from supranational and intergovernmental to bilateral and multilateral non-binding instruments; the dispersion of space actors in multiple and diverse arenas of action; and the increasing economic, military, and geopolitical relevance of outer space have collectively positioned space activities as a critical area in the international relations of the 21st century.
The growing interest in outer space among various actors has led to the emergence of more complex, fragmented, and decentralized international space relations. This is due to the number, diversity, interests, and agendas of the various space actors involved. In the context of the 21st-century international system, the number of space actors engaged in public action within the space system at all levels will continue to grow.
The MLG framework represents a valuable systemic and methodological tool that can be effectively utilized to comprehend the intricate dynamics of governance within the space system. Following the presentation of a comprehensive overview of the multilevel governance of space in the present research, future studies should focus on more detailed aspects of the space system. This study may be regarded as a preliminary step in the formulation of a future research agenda on the utilization of the MLG model in the investigation of space activities. This agenda should encompass the following: (i) a detailed examination of distinct space sectors (debris, commercial, military, etc.) and (ii) an investigation of the role of new space actors, such as regional processes and NGOs, in each of the aforementioned arenas. Additionally, it would be advantageous to investigate the new interactions and overlapping among space actors, such as the cases of ESA/EUSPA and APSCO/APRSAF.
It is anticipated that the application of the MLG framework in new contexts will facilitate the clarification of the complex global governance of the space system and provide innovative responses to the empirical changes in the space system.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Data Availability Statement

This is a qualitative research, and the data is sharing in the list of references where the data come from.

Acknowledgments

To the Department of Space Studies, John D. Odegard School of Aerospace Sciences at the University of North Dakota, which facilitated this research project.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

References

  1. Del Canto Viterale, F. Transitioning to a New Space Age in the 21st Century: A Systemic-Level Approach. Systems 2023, 11, 232. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  2. Rosenau, J. The complexities and contradictions of Globalization. In Current History: A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs; Hassell Street Press: Kutztown, PA, USA, 1997; Volume 96, pp. 360–364. [Google Scholar]
  3. Tepper, E. The Big Bang of Space Governance: Towards Polycentric Governance of Space Activities. NYU J. Int. Law Politics 2022, 54, 485–557. [Google Scholar]
  4. Oto, C. Polycentricity and Space Governance. In Secure World Foundation, Space Sustainability Secure; World Foundation: Washinton, DC, USA, 2022; pp. 1–18. [Google Scholar]
  5. Hooghe, L.; Marks, G.; Schakel, A. Multilevel Governance. In Comparative Politics, 5th ed.; Caramani, D., Ed.; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2020. [Google Scholar]
  6. Orsini, A.; Le Prestre, P.; Haas, P.M.; Brosig, M.; Pattberg, P.; Widerberg, O.; Gomez-Mera, L.; Morin, J.-F.; Harrison, N.E.; Geyer, R.; et al. Forum: Complex Systems and International Governance. Int. Stud. Rev. 2020, 22, 1008–1038. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  7. Wallerstein, I. Open the Social Sciences: Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences; Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA, USA, 1996. [Google Scholar]
  8. Alter, K. The promise and perils of theorizing international regime complexity in an evolving world. Rev. Int. Organ. 2022, 17, 375–396. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  9. Keohane, R.; Nye, J. Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction. Int. Organ. 1971, 25, 329–349. [Google Scholar]
  10. Rosenau, J.N. Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics. In Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics; Cambridge Studies in International Relations; Rosenau, J.N., Czempiel, E.-O., Eds.; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1992; pp. 1–29. [Google Scholar]
  11. Global Governance Commission. The Commission On Global Governance. In Our Global Neighbourhood; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 1995. [Google Scholar]
  12. Raustiala, K.; Victor, D. The regime complex for plant genetic resources. Int. Organ. 2004, 58, 278–279. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  13. Marks, G.; Hooghie, L.; Blank, K. European integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-level Governance. J. Common Mark. Stud. 1996, 34, 341–378. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  14. Marks, G. Structural policy and Multi-level governance in the EC. In The State of the European Community: The Maastricht Debate and Beyond; Cafruny, A., Rosenthal, G., Eds.; Lynne Rienner: Boulder, CO, USA, 1993; pp. 391–411. [Google Scholar]
  15. Piattoni, S. Multi-level Governance: A Historical and Conceptual Analysis. Eur. Integr. 2010, 31, 163–180. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  16. Hooghe, L.; Marks, G. Multi-Level Governance and European Integration; Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, MD, USA, 2001. [Google Scholar]
  17. Strange, S. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1996. [Google Scholar]
  18. Halliday, F. Global governance: Prospects and problems. Citizsh. Stud. 2000, 4, 19–33. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  19. Salmeri, A. The Multi-Level Governance of Space Mining; Wolters Kluwer: Alphen, The Netherlands, 2023. [Google Scholar]
  20. Weinzierl, M. Space, the Final Economic Frontier. J. Econ. Perspect. 2018, 32, 173–192. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  21. Sommariva, A.; Gori, L.; Chizzolini, B.; Pianorsi, M. The economics of moon mining. Acta Astronaut. 2020, 170, 712–718. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  22. Peeters, W. Evolution of the Space Economy: Government Space to Commercial Space and New Space. Astropolitics 2022, 19, 206–222. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  23. Heracleous, L.; Terrier, D.; Gonzalez, S. NASA’s Capability Evolution Toward Commercial Space. Space Policy 2019, 50, 101330. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  24. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Chapter 3: Monitoring the evolving cast of space actors. In OECD Handbook on Measuring the Space Economy; OECD Publishing: Paris, France, 2022; Available online: https://www.oecd.org/publications/oecd-handbook-on-measuring-the-space-economy-2nd-edition-8bfef437-en.htm (accessed on 22 May 2024).
  25. Space Crew. Space Agencies around the World. Space Crew Team. 8 March 2008. Available online: https://spacecrew.com/blog/space-agencies-around-the-world (accessed on 22 May 2024).
  26. Schwab, K. The Fourth Industrial Revolution; Crown Business: New York, NY, USA, 2016. [Google Scholar]
  27. Schwab, K. Shaping the Fourth Industrial Revolution; World Economic Forum: Geneva, Switzerland, 2018. [Google Scholar]
  28. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Chapter 2: Progress in concepts, definitions, and measurements of the space economy. In OECD Handbook on Measuring the Space Economy; OECD Publishing: Paris, France, 2022; Available online: https://www.oecd.org/publications/oecd-handbook-on-measuring-the-space-economy-2nd-edition-8bfef437-en.htm (accessed on 22 May 2024).
  29. Enders, J. Higher education, internationalization, and the nation-state: Recent developments and challenges to governance theory. High. Educ. 2004, 47, 364–365. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  30. Li, X.; Niu, W. Support potential of elite civil universities for China’s space industry: Higher educational mobilization capacity for China’s space ambition. PLoS ONE 2020, 15, e0243456. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
  31. UNIVERSEH. Five Higher Education Institutions Create UNIVERSEH. Available online: https://universeh.eu/news/five-higher-education-institutions-create-universeh/ (accessed on 24 May 2024).
  32. SpaceTech Analytics. Space Tech Industry 2021/Q2. Landscape Overview. May 2021. Available online: https://analytics.dkv.global/spacetech/SpaceTech-Industry-2021-Report.pdf (accessed on 29 May 2024).
  33. Bank of America Equity Research. To Infinity and Beyond–Global Space Primer; Bank of America Merrill Lynch: New York, NY, USA, 2017. [Google Scholar]
  34. Goessler, A. Goessler, A. The Private Sector’s Assessment of U.S. Space Policy and Law; Center for Strategic & International Studies, Aerospace: Washington, DC, USA, 2022. [Google Scholar]
  35. The Indian Express. PM Modi Launches Indian Space Association for govt, pvt Coordination. New Delhi. 12 October 2021. Available online: https://indianexpress.com/article/technology/science/pm-modi-launches-indian-space-association-for-govt-pvt-coordination-7566992/ (accessed on 3 June 2024).
  36. International Legal Research Tutorial. International Organizations: Introduction. Duke University School of Law and University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. Available online: https://law.duke.edu/ilrt/int_orgs_1.htm (accessed on 10 June 2024).
  37. McClintock, B.; Feistel, K.; Ligor, D.C.; O’Connor, K. Responsible Space Behavior for the New Space Era Preserving the Province of Humanity; RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, CA, USA, 2021. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  38. Kaul, S. Could ICAO be a NewSpace regulator? ROOM Space Journal of Asgardia, 14–18 October 2024. [Google Scholar]
  39. Jakhu, R.; Pelton, J. Global Space Governance: Key Proposed Actions; (Key Findings and Recommendations of the forthcoming Book on Global Space Governance: An International StudyThe Conversation, 2017); Institute of Air and Space Law McGill University: Montreal, QC, Canada, 2017. [Google Scholar]
  40. Goguichvili, S.; Linenberger, A.; Gillette, A. The Global Legal Landscape of Space: Who Writes the Rules on the Final Frontier? Wilson Center–Insight & Analysis, 1 October 2021. [Google Scholar]
  41. Rajagopalan, R. Space Security: The Impossible Consensus between Powers. Polytechnique Insights-A Review by Institut Polytechnique de Paris. 24 November 2021. Available online: https://www.polytechnique-insights.com/en/columns/space/space-security-the-impossible-consensus-between-powers/ (accessed on 25 May 2024).
  42. Dolman, E. Astropolitik. Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age; Frank Cass: London, UK, 2002. [Google Scholar]
  43. Colucci, L. The United States Space Force: Space, Grand Strategy, and U.S. National Security; Praeger: Santa Barbara, CA, USA, 2023. [Google Scholar]
  44. Moltz, J.C. The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests, 3rd ed.; Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA, USA, 2011. [Google Scholar]
  45. Ben-Itzhak, S. Space Blocs: The Future of International Cooperation in Space is Splitting along Lines of Power on Earth. The Conversation. 21 April 2022. Available online: https://theconversation.com/space-blocs-the-future-of-international-cooperation-in-space-is-splitting-along-lines-of-power-on-earth-180221 (accessed on 22 May 2024).
  46. Pankova, L.; Gusarova, O.; Stefanovich, D. International Cooperation in Space Activities amid Great Power Competition. Russ. Glob. Aff. 2021, 19, 97–117. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  47. International Lunar Research Station (ILRS). Guide for Partnership; China National Space Administration: Beijing China, 2021. [Google Scholar]
  48. Jones, A. Serbia Becomes Latest Country to Join China’s ILRS Moon Base Project. SpaceNews. 10 May 2024. Available online: https://spacenews.com/serbia-becomes-latest-country-to-join-chinas-ilrs-moon-base-project/ (accessed on 26 May 2024).
  49. Reibaldi, G.; Grimard, M. Non-Governmental Organizations importance and future role in Space Exploration. Acta Astronaut. 2015, 114, 130–137. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  50. Buzan, B. Third World Regional Security in Structural and Historical Perspective. In The Insecurity Dilemma; Job, B.L., Ed.; Lynne Rienner: Boulder, CO, USA, 1991. [Google Scholar]
  51. Whiting, V. The Dynamics of Regionalization: Road Map to an Open Future? In The Challenge of Integration: Europe and the Americas; Smith, P.H., Ed.; North-South Center: Miami, FL, USA, 1993; pp. 17–49. [Google Scholar]
  52. Kacowicz, A. Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent, or Overlapping? Working Paper #262; Kellogg Institute: Notre Dame, IN, USA, 1998. [Google Scholar]
  53. Peter, N. The changing geopolitics of space activities. Space Policy 2016, 37, 145–153. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  54. Foust, J. ESA and EU Mend Relations. SpaceNews. 22 January 2021. Available online: https://spacenews.com/esa-and-eu-mend-relations/ (accessed on 28 May 2024).
  55. APSCO. History Trace. Available online: http://www.apsco.int/html/comp1/content/historytrace/2018-06-26/21-153-1.shtml (accessed on 2 June 2024).
  56. Hainaut, B. The Middle East Enters the Space Race. Stimson. Security & Strategy. 3 November 2023. Available online: https://www.stimson.org/2023/the-middle-east-enters-the-space-race/#:~:text=The%20UAE%20also%20seeks%20to,Jordan%2C%20Sudan%2C%20and%20Lebanon (accessed on 2 June 2024).
  57. Ugalde Zubiri, A. La acción exterior de los Actores Gubernamentales No Centrales: Un fenómeno creciente y de alcance mundial. Polit. Rev. Cienc. Soc. 2006, 2, 115–128. [Google Scholar]
  58. UNESCO. UNESCO Science Report: Towards 2030; UNESCO Publishing: Paris, France, 2015; Available online: https://uis.unesco.org/sites/default/files/documents/unesco-science-report-towards-2030-part1.pdf (accessed on 30 May 2024).
  59. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Chapter 1. The Ongoing Transformation of the Global Space Sector. In The Space Economy in Figures; OECD Publishing: Paris, France, 2019; Available online: https://www.oecd.org/innovation/the-space-economy-in-figures-c5996201-en.htm (accessed on 23 May 2024).
  60. Lundvall, B. National Innovation Systems-Analytical Concept and Development Tool. In Proceedings of the DRUID Tenth Anniversary Summer Conference 2005 on Dynamics of Industry and Innovation: Organizations, Networks, and Systems, Copenhagen, Denmark, 27–29 June 2005. [Google Scholar]
  61. Athanasia, G. The Lessons of Silicon Valley: A World-Renowned Technology Hub. Center for Strategic & International Studies. 10 February 2022. Available online: https://www.csis.org/blogs/perspectives-innovation/lessons-silicon-valley-world-renowned-technology-hub (accessed on 23 May 2024).
  62. Knight, J. International Education Hubs. In Geographies of the University; Meusburger, P., Hhffernan, M., Suarsana, L., Eds.; Springer Open: London, UK, 2018; Chapter 21; pp. 637–655. [Google Scholar]
  63. Foray, D. The Economics of Knowledge; The MIT Press: Cambridge, UK, 2006. [Google Scholar]
  64. Lange, A.; Handler, D.; Vila, J. Next-Generation Clusters Creating Innovation Hubs to Boost Economic Growth. White Paper CISCO. June 2010. Available online: https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en_us/about/ac79/docs/pov/Clusters_Innovation_Hubs_FINAL.pdf (accessed on 1 June 2024).
  65. Leijten, J. Innovation policy and international relations: Directions for EU diplomacy. Eur. J. Futures Res. 2019, 7, 4. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  66. Lara, A.P.; Da Costa, E.M.; Furlani, T.Z.; Yigitcanlar, T. Smartness that matters: Towards a comprehensive and human-centred characterisation of smart cities. J. Open Innov. Technol. Mark. Complex. 2016, 2, 8. Available online: https://jopeninnovation.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40852-016-0034-z (accessed on 1 June 2024).
  67. Fukuda, K. Science, technology and innovation ecosystem transformation toward society 5.0. Int. J. Prod. Econ. 2020, 220, 107460. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  68. Curtis, S. The Power of Cities in International Relations; Routledge: London, UK; New York, NY, USA, 2016. [Google Scholar]
  69. Ljungkvis, K. The Global City 2.0: From Strategic Site to Global Actor; Routledge: New York, NY, USA, 2017. [Google Scholar]
  70. The Catapult Network. An International Comparison of Approaches to Space Cluster Development; Prepared for the Satellite Applications Catapult and the UK Space Agency by Red Kite Management Satellite Applications Catapult and the UK Space Agency. 18 May 2021. Available online: https://sa.catapult.org.uk/blogs/the-uk-space-sector-supply-chain-report-published/ (accessed on 27 May 2024).
  71. Orlova, A.; Nogueira, R.; Chimenti, P. The Present and Future of the Space Sector: A Business Ecosystem Approach. Space Policy 2020, 52, 101374. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
Figure 1. Multilevel governance analysis applied to the space system.
Figure 1. Multilevel governance analysis applied to the space system.
Systems 12 00318 g001
Table 1. Major national actors involved in space activities.
Table 1. Major national actors involved in space activities.
Type of National ActorsMajor Actors
• Space Agencies
  • NASA (USA).
  • CNSA (China).
  • ROSCOSMOS (Russia).
  • CNES (France).
  • JAXA (Japan).
  • ISRO (India).
• Universities and Research Labs
  • JPL (USA).
  • Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab (USA).
  • University of Tokyo (Japan).
  • Tsinghua University (China).
  • UNIVERSEH (European Union).
• Military Space Forces
  • Russian Space Forces (Russia).
  • US Space Force (USA).
  • PLASSP (China).
  • French Air and Space Force (France).
  • Iranian Space Command (Iran).
• Private Sector
  • SpaceX (USA).
  • Blue Origen (USA).
  • Arianespace (France).
  • I-Space (Japan).
  • Orionspace (China).
  • Skyroot Aerospace (India).
Table 2. Types of international space actors.
Table 2. Types of international space actors.
Type of OrganizationMajor Organizations
• Supranational• None.
• Intergovernmental (general purpose)
  • COPUOS.
  • UNOOSA.
• Intergovernmental (specific purpose)
  • Conference on Disarmament.
  • ITU.
  • ICAO.
• Bilateral/Multilateral Agreements (non-binding)
  • Artemis.
  • IRLS.
  • BRICS.
• Non-governmental
  • International Astronautical Federation (IAF).
  • International Academy of Astronautics (IAA).
  • International Astronautical Federation (IAF).
  • Mars Society.
  • Secure World Foundation.
Table 3. Space regional processes by year of foundation and number of members.
Table 3. Space regional processes by year of foundation and number of members.
Major Space Regional ProcessFoundationNumber of Countries
European Space Agency (ESA)197522
Asia Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF)199340
Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO)20058
The Arab Space Cooperation Group (ASCG)201914
Latin American and Caribbean Space Agency (ALCE)202118
The European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA)202127
African Space Agency (AfSA)202355
Table 4. Major subnational actors.
Table 4. Major subnational actors.
DriverSubnational Actors
Large Governmental Space Facilities
  • Baikonur (Russia).
  • Cape Cañaveral (USA).
  • Sriharikota (India).
  • Naro (South Korea).
  • Dongfeng Aerospace City (China).
  • Tanegashima (Japan).
Space Agency
  • Toulouse (French Space Agency—CNES).
  • Cologne (German Aerospace Center—DLR and the European Astronaut Centre—EAC/ESA).
  • Houston, Washington DC (NASA Centers).
  • Tokyo (Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency—JAXA).
  • Moscow (Russian Space Agency—ROSCOSMOS).
  • Bengaluru (Indian Space Research Organization—ISRO).
  • Beijing (China National Space Administration—CNSA).
Universities and Labs
  • Pasadena (JPL).
  • Houston (Rice University).
  • Silicon Valley (Ames Research Center, UC Berkeley).
  • Bremen (German Research Centre, University of Bremen).
  • Beijing (Beihang University, Tsinghua University).
Military facilities
  • Peterson Air Force Base (Colorado).
  • Redstone Arsenal (Huntsville).
  • Vandenberg Space Force Base (California).
  • Cape Canaveral Space Force Station (Florida).
  • Baikonur (Russia).
  • Haidian District, Beijing (China).
  • Hexagone Balard, Paris (France).
Commercial activities
  • Silicon Valley (Ares, Moon Express).
  • Texas (SpaceX, Blue Origin, Boeing).
  • Colorado (Sierra Nevada, ULA).
  • Luxemburg (SES, HITEC).
  • Milan (OHB Italy, Thales Alenia, Leaf Space).
  • Bremen (Airbus, OHB SE, Materialise).
  • Beijing (Galaxy Space, Galaxy Energy, I-space).
Table 5. Summary of the multilevel governance of the space system.
Table 5. Summary of the multilevel governance of the space system.
Level/ArenaActorsTrends
National
  • National Space Agencies.
  • Universities and Research Labs.
  • Space Military Forces.
  • Private Sector Companies.
  • The government remains a pivotal entity at the national level.
  • A growing number of actors at the national level in all sectors, including space agencies, educational and research institutions, military forces, and private companies.
  • Several actors operating under the auspices of the government.
International
  • Supranational Organizations.
  • IGOs (general purposes).
  • IGOs (specific purposes).
  • Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements.
  • NGOs.
  • A new and growing number of actors at the international level.
  • Fragmented and decentralized level of governance.
  • Absence of supranational initiatives.
  • Failure of the intergovernmental and binding regimes.
  • Increase in the number of bilateral/multilateral and non-binding agreements.
  • Limited role for space NGOs.
  • Overlap between actors.
  • New space blocs are emerging, moving space activities from cooperation to competition.
  • Shift from a top-down to a bottom-up approach.
Regional• Regional Process.
  • The emergence of new and diverse actors at the regional level.
  • A role model of the ESA.
  • Regional processes in Europe and Asia are overlapping.
  • Different models of regionalization, including supranational, intergovernmental, and multilateral.
Subnational
  • Cities.
  • Regions.
  • The emergence of new and diverse actors at the subnational level.
  • Implementation of new subnational space policies.
  • Transition from governmental to commercial hubs.
  • Differences but also overlaps between regions and cities.
  • Various driving factors, including military, governmental, and commercial facilities and activities.
Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.

Share and Cite

MDPI and ACS Style

Del Canto Viterale, F. Global Governance of the Space System: A Multilevel Governance Analysis. Systems 2024, 12, 318. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems12090318

AMA Style

Del Canto Viterale F. Global Governance of the Space System: A Multilevel Governance Analysis. Systems. 2024; 12(9):318. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems12090318

Chicago/Turabian Style

Del Canto Viterale, Francisco. 2024. "Global Governance of the Space System: A Multilevel Governance Analysis" Systems 12, no. 9: 318. https://doi.org/10.3390/systems12090318

Note that from the first issue of 2016, this journal uses article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Article Metrics

Back to TopTop