Global Power Dynamics in the Contemporary Space System

Abstract

In the 21st century, the space system has experienced a substantial shift from a simple unipolar to a new and more complex structure. This transition is the result of the emergence of new space powers and global power dynamics. The central hypothesis of this research work is that the space system is undergoing an intersystem transition from a unipolar, U.S.-dominant, post-Cold War space system to a new and more complex structure that includes new space powers and a redistribution and rebalancing of power dynamics. The unipolar structure that prevailed in the post-Cold War era has been replaced by a new space system, in which emerging space powers exhibit global ambitions and a willingness to compete with and challenge the United States’ dominance. These shifts in the number of space actors, power dynamics, and the structure of the space system necessitate novel scientific approaches. This research postulates the utilization of systems science as a means to enhance our comprehension of the intersystem transition and the rebalancing of power in the space system in recent decades. The result of this study is a comprehensive analysis of the major space actors in the 21st-century space system, the analysis of the redistribution of power among them, and the new power structure that has emerged.

1. Introduction

In the 21st century, the space system has experienced a substantial shift from a simple unipolar to a new and more complex structure. The unipolar structure that prevailed in the post-Cold War era has been replaced by a space system, in which emerging space powers exhibit global ambitions and a willingness to compete and challenge the United States’ dominance. This transition has been accompanied by the emergence of new space powers and a shift in global power dynamics, resulting in a significant redistribution of power within the space structure.

The concept of power occupies a central position in the analysis of international relations. However, it is also a notion that is pervasive and arguably overused in this field. Since the Westphalia Peace in 1648, nation-states have been the predominant actors in the international system, driven by a pursuit of increased power. The inherent propensity of states to seek power is attributed to the anarchic nature of the international system and the absence of supranational authorities. The concept of power, as generally defined, refers to the ability of the possessor to cause the object of that power to perform actions that would not otherwise be performed [1]. This notion frequently involves the utilization of military, economic, or political threats to ensure a nation’s own objectives, occasionally at the expense of other nations [2,3].

The application of the concept of “power” within the context of the space sector remains ambiguous and unclear. Within the academic community, there is no consensus on an accepted definition of the concept of space power. David Lupton is among the earliest scholars to define “space power” as “the ability of a nation to exploit the space environment in pursuit of national goals and purposes, and includes the entire astronautical capabilities of the nation” [4]. Subsequent definitions have focused on specific aspects that define a broad concept such as space power: the development of military space capabilities [5,6], the relevance of the geopolitical and geostrategic aspects [7,8], the new role of the space economy and the private sector [9,10,11], the increasing relevance of space cooperation and space diplomacy to build “soft power” [12,13], the capacity of states to shape the regulatory landscape [14], or a combination of some of these aspects. The majority of these conceptual definitions of space power support the notion that space power encompasses more than just the military aspects of the domain. Rather, they contend that space power also incorporates the commercial, political, and diplomatic dimensions of space, which collectively contribute to the realization of a national goal.

In the realm of international relations, the realist school of thought has long held that outer space constitutes a critical asset for states to expand their influence within the international system. Consequently, in addition to the conventional realms of power—namely, the terrestrial, maritime, and aerial domains—new dimensions have emerged in recent decades, including the cyber/virtual and outer space domains. In this regard, Everett Dolman introduced the concept of “astropolitik”, a refined realist perspective on state competition in outer space [7]. According to Dolman, space activities are regarded as geopolitically vital assets, and states are likely to compete and engage in strategic competition for control of these assets.

In addition to the concept of power, the notion of “power dynamics” becomes central to understanding the distribution of power in a system. As Kaufman noted [1], the concept of power is inherently relational, as it is defined in relation to other actors within the system. In essence, the term “global power dynamics” refers to the interactions and relationships between nations as they exercise influence over one another in political, economic, and military domains. The dynamics of international power politics are shaped by a range of factors, including competition over resources, capabilities, strategic alliances, and partnerships. These dynamics have the potential to shift power balances and produce changes in the structure of the space system.

The analysis of global power dynamics in the space sector has been developed by several scholars [7,8,15,16], based on the classical school of geopolitics developed in the late 19th century and early 20th century [17,18,19]. Some of the fundamentals of realism that have included outer space as a critical factor of the current international system have also been considered. Geopolitics posits that antagonistic relations among states will persist as a pervasive aspect of the human condition. The prospect of eliminating war is highly improbable. Indeed, the fundamental strategy for ensuring “peace” is to deter aggression by maintaining a favorable balance of power [20].

A group of experts is conducting an extensive examination of contemporary space politics. The examination includes the rise of new competitors, the redistribution of power, and the potential scenarios. The prevailing opinion among experts in the field is that the United States, Russia, and Europe continue to play a significant role. However, a notable shift has emerged, marked by the emergence of lesser-known states. These include independent space powers such as Japan, China, and India, as well as a broader group of new entrants, including Australia, Luxembourg, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and South Africa [21]. This emergent paradigm of global power dynamics within the space system has been conceptualized by some authors as a multilateral competition for “space club” membership [22].

A prevalent viewpoint among experts in the field is that China is rapidly emerging as a significant player in the global space sector, particularly in comparison to the United States [23,24,25,26,27]. However, this does not necessarily imply an imminent challenge to the prevailing dominance of the United States. In the context of global space governance, the United States is regarded as a structural superpower, with the capacity to disseminate its preferred norms and to impede the diffusion of those it opposes, thereby constraining China’s capacity to expand its space cooperation network [14].

According to some experts, the United States will continue to be the world’s leading space power. They believe that the country has the necessary tools—national, commercial, and allied—to maintain its competitive advantage in space [9]. In contrast, other experts affirm that China and the United States are engaging in an international competition to scientifically explore and economically develop the Moon and other celestial bodies, also called the “second space race”, and suggest that China will probably replace the U.S. space leadership sometime in the second part of the 21st century [28].

Despite the existence of extensive research that seeks to explain the changes in global power dynamics within the 21st century space system, the majority of them lack a systemic perspective that clarifies the distribution of power across the space system. This research proposes the application of systems science as a method to enhance our understanding of the rebalancing of power in the space system in recent decades.

In the context of systemic changes, the primary research question of this paper is as follows: what are the main characteristics of the process of intersystem transition that the space system is currently experimenting with? This main question gives rise to several other specific questions. First, are states developing new strategies for the development of space power? Second, which actors in the space system are acquiring real capability to threaten U.S. leadership? Third, is there currently a redistribution of power happening in the space system? If such a redistribution is occurring, what is the nature of the changes in the balance of power among the major space actors, and what new space power structure is emerging as a result of these changes?

The primary objective of this research study is to address the following three significant systemic changes in the study of the space system: (i) to identify the main space powers in the current international system and explain how they are developing space capabilities; (ii) to describe new dynamics and the redistribution of power within the 21st century space system; and (iii) to identify the new characteristics and trends of the new structure of power in the space system.

The central hypothesis of this research work is that the space system is undergoing an intersystem transition from a unipolar, U.S.-dominant, post-Cold War space system to a new and more complex structure that includes new space powers and a redistribution and rebalancing of power dynamics. The unipolar structure that prevailed in the post-Cold War era has been replaced by a new space system, in which emerging space powers exhibit global ambitions and a willingness to compete with and challenge the United States’ dominance.

Despite its status as the preeminent space power, the United States has confronted the emergence of new competitors, including China, Japan, and India, in recent years [21]. Additionally, the space landscape has witnessed a proliferation of new coalitions and alliances, including the Artemis Accords, the International Lunar Research Station Cooperation Organization, and numerous regional processes.

These shifts in the number of space actors, power dynamics, and the structure of the space system necessitate novel scientific approaches. This research posits the utilization of systems science as a means to enhance our comprehension of the rebalancing of power in the space system in recent decades. The systems approach provides a useful analytical framework to study the intersystem transition that the space system is currently experiencing.

The result is a comprehensive study of the major space actors within the 21st century space system, including an identification of the major and new space powers, as well as the analysis of the redistribution of power among them.

The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the systems approach used in this research. Section 3 explains the intersystem transition in the new space system, centering on the evolution from the 20th century space system to a new space age in the 21st century. Section 4 examines the relevance and variety of the current space powers, providing a detailed analysis of the major space powers, including the United States, China, Russia, India, the EU, and Japan. Section 5 discusses global space dynamics and the new distribution and polarization of powers in outer space. Section 6 describes the new structure and balance of power of the space system. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the main findings, scientific and academic discussions, and conclusions.

2. Method—Systems Approach

The utilization of systems sciences for the analysis of international relations constitutes a long-standing tradition, with its origins dating back to Morton Kaplan’s pioneering application of the method in the late 1950s [29]. Since that time, numerous experts have employed the systems approach to provide a more holistic perspective on international phenomena. Systems theories of international relations emphasize the structure of the international system to explain the behavior and interactions of the system’s units. The fundamental units of this system are states, which collectively constitute a system of states.

The systems approach has been demonstrated to serve as a valuable methodological instrument in comprehending the intricacies of the international landscape. It has been employed by scholars from diverse schools of thought within the field of international relations (IR) to analyze and explain international affairs. The fundamental premise of this theoretical framework is that the international system can be conceptualized as a single system whose structure and dynamics can be fully grasped through a systemic perspective [30] (p. 4). Consequently, a considerable number of scholars have employed a variety of models of the international system to analyze international relations [31,32,33,34,35,36,37].

The application of systems science to understand the distribution of, balance of, and changes in power among states in the international system has also been a point of interest among scholars in international relations. During the 1960s and 1970s, macro-level theories dominated the field, giving rise to numerous system models that sought to explain the redistribution of states’ capabilities and power within the international system.

Examples of systems analysis in international relations include the International System Model (Kaplan) [29], the Balance of Power Model (Waltz) [31], World System Theory (Wallerstein) [32], and System Effects (Jervis) [34]. Morton Kaplan employed systems analysis to differentiate among the various types of international system states. He also used this approach to study the balance of power and identify the hierarchical structure of international systems [29]. The contributions of Waltz had a profound impact on the field of international relations (IR) because he challenged the conventional reductionist approaches to international relations, proposing a system-level framework of analysis. Moreover, Waltz shifted the focus from the behavior of states to the dynamics of power between them, thereby contributing to the development of a more comprehensive understanding of international relations [31]. However, works applying these theoretical frameworks to the analysis of space activities have been limited in number and recognition.

The utilization of a systems approach in the context of space-related activities is predicated on the premise that the myriad activities associated with outer space can be comprehended and examined as a system within the overarching framework of the international system. In this regard, the space system, when regarded as a subsystem of the broader international system, can be studied and analyzed as a system in its own right. This approach facilitates the identification and analysis of the external context, components, interactions, processes, emergent realities, and structure that constitute the space system.

3. System Context—Intersystem Transition

The space system has undergone a substantial metamorphosis since the conclusion of the Cold War era. It transitioned to a unipolar structure during the post-Cold War period, representing a departure from the previous simple bipolar configuration that characterized the Cold War era. In the early 21st century, the space system underwent further transformation, giving rise to new space actors, dynamics, and trends.

This process is also known as an intersystem transition, in which a prior system configuration changes into a new systemic order. This transition between different stages of history represents the exhaustion of an established order and the emergence of a new one. Significant differences in the actors, phenomena, and relations of the emerging order coexist with those of the decaying structure. This phenomenon is characterized as the period between the ‘decadence’ of a system and the ‘emergence’ of another [38].

The intersystem transition in the space domain has demonstrated a resurgence of interest and development among multiple nation-states in defining national objectives in space. The contemporary global landscape of space exploration and development features the traditional space powers—the United States and the Russian Federation—as well as emerging space powers such as China, India, Japan, and the European Union. Additionally, a substantial group of nations with developing and ambitious space plans, including Turkey, Iran, Brazil, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and Pakistan, are present. This scenario represents a novel context in which multiple states are developing increasingly robust space programs and preparing for fierce competition.

The development of this new space system has resulted in several issues that impact the global system. These include the emergence of a new space race, the potential militarization and weaponization of space, the increasing commercialization and privatization of space, the lack of a global legal framework, and the utilization of space diplomacy and cooperation to create new international alliances.

The contemporary transformations within the space sector are a consequence of the alterations to the fundamental parameters of the space system. These alterations are manifesting in a gradual and persistent intersystem transition that is reshaping the balance of power in the space system.

4. System Actors—Space Powers

Nation-states have historically dominated the space sector since the inception of space-related activities. Traditionally, activities in outer space have been associated with strategic issues for a country, such as security, defense, communication, and research. The cost to other non-state actors to enter the space industry has been exceptionally high.

Despite the gradual emergence of private actors in recent decades, nation-states continue to wield significant influence in the 21st-century space system. While the private sector has assumed a more prominent role in the emerging space industry, these entities remain dependent on governments for financial support through public contracts and legal obligations under the Outer Space Treaty. A similar dynamic is observed among other significant stakeholders in the space industry, such as universities, research laboratories, and think tanks, which continue to rely heavily on governmental support. Consequently, given the persistent primacy of nation-states in the realms of international relations and space exploration, this research initiative will concentrate on the distribution of power among them.

4.1. The Rise of Space Actors

During the Cold War, the number of nation-states engaged in space activities was restricted to the two superpowers and a select group of nations that employed space-related activities with limited exploratory, commercial and military implications, such as Japan, France, Israel, China, Canada, and India. The 1990s witnessed a paradigm shift towards a novel space system in the 21st century, which precipitated a surge in interest within the space sector. Nation-states engaged in outer space activities have exhibited renewed interest in the domain, while other states are expressing initial interest. The majority of national space programs have concentrated on public interest activities, including national security and defense, economic development, social applications, science, education, and national prestige. Nonetheless, despite the increasing involvement of new non-state actors in space activities, governments continue to play a pivotal or catalytic role in articulating the majority of activities in the space domain.

As of January 2025, 90 nation-states have active involvement in activities related to outer space and space exploration [39]. Presently, 80 countries have registered a satellite in orbit, and at least 10 of these 80 have full launch capability and can access orbit [40]. In addition to the traditional space powers of the 20th century (the United States, Russia, Europe, China, India, and Japan) that remain important, there are emerging space powers with ambitious space plans (Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Brazil, South Korea, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, etc.), and a significant group of nations that are also developing stronger space programs (Canada, Argentina, Indonesia, and Egypt, among others).

4.2. Major Space Actors

Currently, there are 78 states with space agencies around the world, 16 of which have the capability to launch spacecraft, and 6 of these agencies (The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the China National Space Administration (CNSA), the European Space Agency (ESA), the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), the Russian State Corporation for Space Activities (ROSCOSMOS), and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA)) have the additional capability to land spacecraft on other planets [41]. These agencies possess the capacity to launch and recover multiple satellites, develop and deploy cryogenic rocket engines, and operate space probes. Each of these space powers has different capabilities, interests, influence, and power. The analysis will focus on the most relevant actors and describe their key characteristics, power, objectives, and strategies.

4.2.1. The United States

The United States has historically occupied a vanguard position in the domain of space exploration since the nascent days of the space age. During the 20th century, in the context of the Cold War, the United States engaged in fierce competition with the Soviet Union, which reached its zenith with the Moon landing. This period of intense competition between the two superpowers persisted until the conclusion of the Cold War in 1991, marking the end of a significant era in global politics and the exploration of space. In the 1990s, the United States successfully established a coalition of space powers, including Russia, several European countries, Japan, and Canada, to create the most significant cooperative endeavor in outer space: the International Space Station.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the United States was at the vanguard of a coalition of countries in the International Space Station (ISS) experience. Concurrently, however, new competitors began to express interest in outer space and challenge the United States’ space leadership. The United States delayed its response until 2017, when Space Directive 1 was signed, paving the way for the creation of the Artemis Program in 2019. This new American space program was developed in response to the emergence of new and formidable competitors in the global space sector. The explicit goal of the Artemis Program is to revitalize the American space program and maintain the nation’s leadership position in outer space [42].

In 2019, the government confirmed this strategy with another space directive. In 2020, the United States released a revised National Space Policy under the Trump administration. This space policy advocates for the expansion of the United States leadership in space, the encouragement of private sector growth, the expansion of international cooperation, and the establishment of a human presence on the Moon, with an eventual human mission to Mars. In December 2021, President Biden ratified a new space strategy, entitled ‘The United States Space Priorities Framework’, which has served as the nation’s space policy until the present day [43]. The second Trump administration that is taking office appears to intend to continue the space policy and programs established during the previous administration, with the possibility of certain adjustments. The field of human and private spaceflight may experience an increase in funding, while the allocation for space science remains uncertain.

The recently developed American strategy in space includes the establishment of an international coalition to support the Artemis program, formally known as the Artemis Accords [44]. These accords are non-binding bilateral agreements between the United States government and other states. The initial accords were signed in October 2020 by eight nations, and as of 2025, the accords had encompassed 52 countries, representing most continents and including numerous prominent space powers such as India, Brazil, Japan, and France.

Furthermore, the United States’ strategic approach involves the establishment of the United States Space Force (USSF), which was inaugurated on 20 December 2019, as an autonomous service within the U.S. Armed Forces. In 2020, the United States Space Force (USSF) established its inaugural doctrine: Spacepower. This doctrine acknowledges the significance of outer space as a crucial element contributing to the United States’ economic prosperity and national security. Additionally, it underscores the necessity for the nation to adapt its national security space organizations, doctrine, and capabilities to deter and defeat aggression and safeguard national interests in space [45].

As is the case today, the United States has maintained its position at the forefront of the global ranking of governmental investment in space. In 2024, the U.S. government allocated over USD 79 billion to space-related activities, thus establishing its position as the country with the highest space expenditure worldwide. This expenditure constitutes a significant proportion of the global share, accounting for 59% [46].

4.2.2. People’s Republic of China

The People’s Republic of China’s engagement in 20th-century space-related activities was minimal. Despite the ambitious efforts of Mao Zedong to launch an artificial satellite into space, it was not until April 1970 that China became the fifth nation to do so. However, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, who exhibited a keen interest in science and technology, China established the foundation for ambitious space programs that would become prominent in the late 20th century. In the contemporary era, the People’s Republic of China’s space program has undergone substantial expansion, emerging as a prominent contender in the global arena and posing a substantial challenge to the United States’ preeminence [23,24,27].

Despite the fact that China initiated its ascension into the space sector in the 1990s, the nation was disregarded as a significant space actor. It was considered to have an underdeveloped space program that could not contribute to the creation of the International Space Station. The relationship between the United States and China has become increasingly distrustful, and, ultimately, the Wolf Amendment passed by the United States Congress in 2011 marks a crossroads in the geopolitical dynamic between the two countries. The U.S. has expressed concerns regarding the use of American intellectual property by China and the use of Anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) weapons. The American legal framework imposes restrictions on NASA’s capacity to engage in direct, bilateral cooperation with China. These restrictions are imposed by the FBI and include a prohibition on the use of government funds for such cooperation. Additionally, the legal framework restricts China’s involvement in the International Space Station (ISS). These decisions have made collaboration between the two countries all but impossible, have fueled U.S.–China competition, and have discouraged international cooperation.

Since the 1990s, China has prioritized the development of its manned space program, following a “three-step development strategy” prescribed by the Chinese government. This strategy aims to culminate in the construction of a space station and the execution of long-term missions in the 21st century. After this initiative, China has cultivated a robust and multifaceted space program, encompassing the development of its own communications, weather, reconnaissance, and navigation satellites [26]. China has successfully launched the Lunar Exploration Program, also known as Chang’e, and a manned spaceflight program that allowed the nation to become the third country to launch a human being into orbit in 2003. The country has also constructed its own space station, Tiangong, which was completed in 2022 with a permanent crew. Furthermore, China has initiated a new planetary program and an extended agenda of international cooperation with countries all across the world.

The strategic planning of space development has been a central pillar of China’s broader national strategy since the early 21st century. Since the year 2000, the nation has published a space policy document at five-year intervals, in which they articulate their principles, policies, actions, and decisions pertaining to international cooperation. Most recently, on 28 January 2022, China released a comprehensive white paper, titled “China’s Space Program: A 2021 Perspective”, which delineates the nation’s plans and priorities for the subsequent five years of space travel and exploration [47]. This document marks the fifth five-year space exploration plan that China has unveiled, following similar releases in 2000, 2006, 2011, and 2016.

In November 2012, Xi Jinping assumed the role of President of the People’s Republic of China, becoming the paramount leader of the country. Since then, China has considered outer space as a critical factor in its internal economic development and its efforts to challenge the United States’ global leadership. China views space exploration as a means of enhancing its national development and building international prestige and reputation. The Chinese president’s vision for space activities is articulated as follows: ‘To explore the cosmos, develop the space industry, and establish China as a space power is our eternal dream’ [47].

Since then, China has supported and funded one of the world’s most ambitious space programs including the following: building its own permanent space station; building its Mars robotic missions, including Mars sample return, by 2030; developing its Lunar robotic mission program and establishing a Lunar station on the Moon by 2036; developing a human landing system for Mars by 2049; constructing space-based solar power satellites in geosynchronous equatorial orbit (GEO) by 2050; constructing asteroid probes (2029–2034); and developing planetary defense [37]. China also aims to assemble, by 2030, a resilient space support structure with a fleet of satellite constellations that includes both civilian and military satellites [27] (pp. 4–5).

The People’s Republic of China has explicitly delineated its long-term objectives in the domain of space exploration and utilization. The nation’s ambition is to emerge as the preeminent space power by the year 2045, a target that aligns with the centenary of the establishment of the People’s Republic in 2049. President Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized the indispensable role of space in the pursuit of China’s global leadership.

In order to do this, China has become increasingly engaged in utilizing space as a diplomatic instrument on the global stage. For instance, China is the current leader of the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) and signed a strategic memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Russia in March 2021 for cooperation in constructing the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS). Moreover, China offers satellite development and launch services to developing countries that have a limited presence in space. Since 2010, China has launched at least 41 satellites for 18 countries. Of these countries, all but four were developing nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America [47]. In the 21st century, the People’s Republic of China has made significant advancements in the field of space, surpassing Russia in this domain for the first time in 2021. The share of Asia in global expenditures has increased substantially since the early 2000s, primarily driven by China’s substantial investments in the sector [46].

4.2.3. The Russian Federation

The Soviet Union has historically been a leader in the field of space exploration. During the Cold War of the 20th century, it was one of the two primary contenders in the so-called “space race”. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Federation assumed control of the Soviet space program, maintaining outer space as a strategic sector.

In the 1990s, during the transition of the former Soviet Union to the Russian Federation, the government of Boris Yeltsin opted to collaborate with the United States in the domain of space exploration. This partnership was initiated through the Shuttle–Mir program, which ran from 1994 to 1998, and was subsequently followed by the construction of the International Space Station in 1998.

Since his rise to the presidency of the Russian Federation in December 1999, Vladimir Putin has identified the domain of space as a critical sector for the restoration of Russia’s power and pride. A series of pivotal decisions have contributed to the revitalization of the space industry. These pivotal decisions included the institutional reorganization of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency in 1999, the establishment of ROSCOSMOS as the nation’s singular and centralized space agency in 2004, and the re-establishment of the Russian Space Forces in August 2015.

The establishment of a comprehensive, long-term strategic plan for space development was initiated in 2005. Putin’s space policy plans began with the First Federal Space Program (2006–2015) and continued with the New Russian Federal Space Program (2016–2025) also known as FKP-2025. The FKP-2025 is a long-term roadmap that includes ambitious plans, such as the construction of a giant superheavy rocket that would enable Russia to land its cosmonauts on the Moon by the end of the 2020s and begin building a permanent base there. The Moon landing is regarded as the strategic objective of Russian manned space flight, with a proposed launch date of 2030.

However, these ambitious programs have encountered substantial reductions in funding due to geopolitical tensions in Crimea and Ukraine, as well as the economic sanctions imposed by Western countries. Since 2014, the space program has undergone a shift in its strategic direction, characterized by a decline in innovation and an increased emphasis on military application. Russia prioritized its military space activities and retained the manned spaceflight and space exploration missions only to maintain its international status as a space power [48]. In the aftermath of the Ukraine war, Russia has severed commercial ties with Western countries, incurring substantial losses due to the expulsion of the Soyuz rocket from the global launch market and the termination of projects such as the ExoMars rover [49].

In the context of the rising tensions between Russia and Western countries, there has been a consideration of Russia’s potential withdrawal from the International Space Station (ISS), concurrent with efforts to fortify its relationship with China. In 2022, Russia announced its plans to construct its own space station, the Russian Orbital Service Station (ROSS), which is scheduled to commence construction in 2027 [50].

4.2.4. Republic of India

The origins of India’s space program date back to 1962, a mere 15 years after the nation’s independence from the United Kingdom. The Indian National Committee for Space Research (INCOSPAR) was established in 1962 to organize a national space program. This committee would later evolve into the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) in 1969. Notwithstanding India’s status as a nuclear power since 1974, its space program has maintained a remarkable peaceful orientation, with a focus on remote sensing, weather, and communication satellites [51]. During the 20th century, the primary focus of investment in outer space activities was to harness space technology for national development. India has achieved notable milestones among developing nations, including the development of two indigenous launch systems and the construction of satellite constellations for a variety of applications.

However, India modified its space policy and strategy at the end of the Cold War, making a strategic reorientation [26] (p. 120). China’s initiatives in space exploration, notably its human spaceflight programs, alerted India to the potential consequences of delaying the development of its own space programs. Consequently, India recalibrated its space strategy, shifting its focus to compete with its regional rivals, bolster national security, and establish an international reputation. In the context of the 21st century, India has rapidly advanced its space program, developing an extensive, diverse, and comprehensive set of initiatives.

In 2003, the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, challenged the nation’s scientific community to achieve the ambitious goal of sending a human being to the Moon. This challenge led to the announcement of the Chandrayaan program, India’s ambitious endeavor in lunar exploration. The program involves the development of a variety of spacecraft, including a lunar orbiter, an impactor, a soft lander, and a rover. In October 2008, India successfully launched its inaugural probe to the Moon, designated as Chandrayaan-1, which led to the groundbreaking discovery of water on the lunar surface. Subsequently, in August 2023, the Chandrayaan-3 mission achieved a historic milestone by successfully landing at the Moon’s south pole, a feat that no other nation had previously accomplished. This significant achievement showcased India’s advanced capabilities in the domains of space exploration and technological innovation.

The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) has also announced its objective to explore Mars with the Mangalyaan Program. The Mangalyaan 1 (also known as the Mars Orbiter Mission) was launched into Earth’s orbit in November 2013 and successfully entered Mars’ orbit in September 2014. This achievement positioned India as the fourth nation to reach Mars’ orbit, the first Asian nation to do so, and the first to achieve this on its inaugural attempt. In August 2018, India unveiled plans for a human spaceflight program, called Gaganyaan. The program is scheduled to initiate three uncrewed missions in 2025, with the inaugural crewed mission slated for 2026 [52].

Currently, India’s space program is a leader among Asian nations, with advanced capabilities in both civil and military space activities [26]. The program’s achievements include missions to the Moon and Mars, Earth observation and navigation, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons capability, and the ability to launch satellites into multiple orbits simultaneously [53].

The Indian space program’s achievements over the past 20 years have led to heightened expectations for further expansion, as evidenced by the development of a new space diplomacy, security program, and national space industry [54]. Indian diplomatic channels have shifted their focus to leveraging the success of the space program to secure benefits in cooperative agreements with other states [54] (p. 42). The India–U.S. relationship has undergone significant fluctuations throughout the latter half of the 20th century. However, the beginning of the 21st century marked a notable shift, primarily driven by a shared concern regarding China’s expanding capabilities and ambitions in outer space and their potential implications for the interests of both nations [55] (p. 151). India has demonstrated an active role in space cooperation, making bilateral agreements with most space-faring nations (Brazil, Russia, China, and the U.S.), while maintaining an equidistant position between the major space blocs, partnering with the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa Group (BRICS) but also joining the Artemis Accords. This strategic move is aimed at expanding India’s global influence and enhancing its status as a major player in the global space sector.

In recent years, India has given increased consideration to the military uses of space. For instance, India has launched advanced reconnaissance satellites, established a national system for precision navigation, and set up a military space command. Additionally, the country has engaged in open discussions regarding future kinetic anti-satellite capabilities and laser weapons. In March 2019, India became the fourth nation to successfully launch an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile, when its ASAT missile successfully intercepted a live satellite in lower Earth orbit. In the aftermath of this historic achievement, Prime Minister Narendra Modi delivered a nationally televised address, asserting that “India registered its name as a space power” [56]. He placed particular emphasis on the role of India’s space capabilities in projecting its global influence. As [57] suggest, India had learned its lesson in the 20th century from its failure to enter to the formal nuclear club, and the quick development and demonstration of ASAT capabilities on time would ensure India its membership in a future formal space club.

Also, India initiated a policy shift toward the privatization and commercialization of the local space industry. This strategic decision was made to cultivate a robust and independent domestic space sector, which would support the nation’s ambitious projects, stimulate innovation, and enhance investment and global competitiveness. A significant development in this regard was the establishment of N-SPACe (Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre) in 2020, which was designed to streamline private sector involvement in space-related missions, encompassing satellite launches and exploration initiatives.

4.2.5. Europe

European countries have historically been trailblazers in the field of space industry since the dawn of space activities in the 1930s and 1940s. Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy have consistently regarded outer space as a strategic domain and have prioritized space activities at the national level. Concurrently, since the origins of the European Union in 1957, outer space has also played a pivotal role in European cooperation. Since that time, two approaches have been used to manage space policy, programs, and activities. At the national level, each country has developed its own space policy. At the regional level, some countries within the European Union process have been able to cooperate in space activities. The initial step in this direction was the establishment of the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) and the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) in 1964.

The European Space Agency (ESA) was formally established in 1975 through the amalgamation of the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) and the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO). The agency officially came into being in 1980, with a total of ten founding member countries. Since its creation, the European Space Agency (ESA) has served as a model for scientific, technological, and political cooperation in space at the regional level. Nevertheless, given its intergovernmental nature, the ESA did not alter the structure of the European space industry, which remained focused on the national scale and concentrated in three countries: Germany, France, and Italy [58]. ESA was created as an independent intergovernmental space agency that is not officially under the jurisdiction of the European Union. Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom are ESA full members but not part of the EU, and Canada is also an ESA cooperating state.

The European Union has recently demonstrated a desire to assume a more prominent role in the international system, engaging in competition with other predominant stakeholders [59]. As part of this strategy, space activities have emerged as a critical factor. Despite the complex mechanisms of global governance within the European Union (27 member states) and the European Space Agency (ESA) (22 members, not all of them EU), there is a clear interest in making key investments in space activities, as it is considered one of the critical sectors for future international competition.

In recent years, the European Union (EU) has been developing and updating new strategic policies in space, coinciding with the increasing geopolitical tension in the international system. In 2016, the European Union published the ‘Space Strategy for Europe’, which delineates its primary objectives as follows: (i) the maximization of benefits derived from space for society and the EU economy; (ii) the encouragement of a globally competitive and innovative European space sector; (iii) the strengthening of Europe’s autonomy in accessing and utilizing space in a secure and safe environment; and (iv) the fortification of Europe’s role as a global actor and the promotion of international cooperation [60]. In April 2021, the Council and the European Parliament adopted a regulation establishing the new EU Space Program for the years 2021 to 2027. The program formally took effect on 1 January 2021, and is designed to bolster the security and autonomy of the European Union. It also serves to strengthen the EU’s standing as a dominant player in the global space sector [61]. Finally, in 2022, the first-ever EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence was developed. In the contemporary geopolitical context, marked by escalating power competition and the intensification of threats, the European Union (EU) is undertaking measures to safeguard its space assets, defend its interests, deter hostile activities in space, and fortify its strategic posture and autonomy [62].

Nevertheless, the EU has encountered significant challenges in establishing a unified European security policy, and it continues to seek a comprehensive space security strategy. The establishment of the EU Space Program Agency (EUSPA) in 2021, an EU agency distinct from the ESA, has given rise to controversies. The EUSPA will assume oversight responsibility for the EU Program for Space Activities. Despite the close collaboration between the two entities, there is an evident overlap in their respective functions within the context of the EU [41].

Moreover, several experts in the field of space industry have expressed concerns regarding the performance of the European space sector. A report by Mario Draghi in 2024, entitled “The Future of the European Competitiveness”, dedicated an entire chapter to the necessity of the European Union to increase its space budgets, develop a unified space strategy, and enhance its competitiveness. Draghi states that “Overall, the total European institutional funding of space programmes is not only a mere 20% of the US level, but it is also highly fragmented” and “there is a lack of strategic and political cooperation between the EU Member States regarding space policy-making” [59] (p. 180).

4.2.6. Japan

Japan has established itself as a leading space power, with a half-century of achievements in areas such as space science, human spaceflight, satellites, launchers, and robotic devices [26] (p. 43).

Since the beginning of its space activities, Japan has demonstrated a consistent reluctance to engage in any military-related utilization of space. The period from the 1950s until the 1990s can be characterized as the R&D phase in Japan’s space history [63]. The program’s primary objectives are typically commercial or scientific, reflecting a non-military orientation. This non-military nature of Japanese space policy was largely unproblematic due to the presence of the United States–Japanese alliance, which provided the necessary infrastructure for intelligence gathering and telecommunication from space.

The public’s perception of security issues underwent a significant shift in 1998 when the Taepodong, a North Korean satellite launcher/ballistic missile, flew over Japanese territory, raising concerns about the imminent threat posed by North Korea. This event caused significant disruption to the prevailing pacifist Japanese space policy paradigm, leading to widespread panic among the Japanese public and policy community. In response, Japan enacted the Basic Space Law in 2008, which broadened its space policy. This shift in policy allowed for a wider range of space uses, including defense, under the interpretation of the concept of “exclusively peaceful purposes”. The Japanese government’s objectives in enacting this law were to ensure international peace and security, as well as contribute to the nation’s security. The Basic Space Law emphasizes the promotion of civilian space utilization, the strengthening of Japan’s space industry, and the enhancement of its international competitiveness. Notably, the law also addresses space security, a previously absent element in Japan’s legislative framework [64].

The Japanese government’s current stance on space-related matters is characterized by its proactive approach across multiple domains, including the economic, military, and diplomatic sectors. This proactive stance is further underscored by the recent emergence of a domestic debate surrounding the role of space in national security, prompted by growing security concerns. The Japanese space program is currently undergoing a significant transition, shifting from a primary focus on scientific research to a multibillion-dollar industry with a pronounced emphasis on national security, marked by a notable expansion of its military component.

The 2020 revision of the Japanese Basic Plan on Space Policy underscores the significance of outer space to national security, the growing societal reliance on space systems, and the expanding space activities of the private sector, including the emergence of novel business models. Japan, a pivotal ally of the United States, was among the first to sign the Artemis Accords, thereby aligning itself with the American vision concerning the exploration and utilization of extraterrestrial resources. In June 2021, Japan enacted the “Act on the Promotion of Business Activities for the Exploration and Development of Space Resources (Space Resources Act)”. This act includes provisions on the ownership of space resources. Japan is the fourth country to have a space resources act [65] (p. 6) [66].

4.2.7. Emerging Middle Space Powers

In addition to the growing role of the existing and new space powers, an increasing number of emerging middle space powers have been identified in the 21st-century space system. These emerging middle space powers are developing new space capabilities, including space policy, agencies, and budgets, as well as military, commercial, and civil applications. These applications are playing a significant role in the space domain. The significance of these actors’ contributions is not solely attributed to their own developmental trajectories, but also to their strategic alignments (or divergences) with the predominant space powers.

The emergence of space powers or “nascent space powers” in the space domain has been identified as a primary feature of the 21st century space age [67,68]. The initial step in the development of a national space program is the establishment of a national space agency that serves to unify, coordinate, and execute all space-related activities. An analysis of the proliferation of space agencies worldwide is noteworthy. For instance, within the 20-year span from 2000 to 2020, the number of national space agencies increased by 37, including those in Japan, Iran, Mexico, South Africa, and Portugal [69].

A considerable number of emergent middle powers have demonstrated remarkable progress, including Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Australia, among others. It is essential to identify and examine a selection of these cases to comprehend the significance of the emerging middle power dynamic.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) entered the 21st century with no significant activity related to outer space. In 2006, the government established the Emirate Institute for the Advancement of Science and Technology (EIAST) with the objective of positioning the UAE at the forefront of space science and technology development, thereby diversifying its economic base beyond a petroleum-centered economy [70]. Subsequent to this initiative, the nation has witnessed several significant milestones, including the establishment of the UAE Space Agency in 2014, the inauguration of the Mohammed Bin Rashid Space Center in 2016, the launch of the National Space Program in 2017, and the issuance of the Federal Law on the Regulation of the Space Sector in 2019. The UAE’s current space program includes a lunar mission in collaboration with the Japanese company I-space and SpaceX, and a Mars mission in partnership with U.S. universities and JAXA. The UAE’s assertive space diplomacy has resulted in numerous agreements with various entities, including Germany, the UK, South Korea, and France, as well as with prominent space agencies such as NASA, JAXA, ISRO, and Roscosmos. The UAE has also established partnerships with private sector entities, including SpaceX and I-space, and with academic institutions, such as universities, further demonstrating its commitment to international cooperation in the field of space exploration [71].

Turkey is a noteworthy example of an emergent middle power. Its strategic geopolitical position as a historical bridge between Europe and Asia has been a source of its influence, and since President Erdogan took power in 2014, it has demonstrated a commitment to developing a national space program that will strengthen its regional and global power aspirations. After years of planning, Turkey established its own space agency, the Turkish Space Agency, in 2018 to unify and coordinate the Turkish space program. In a strategic move, President Erdoğan unveiled an ambitious 10-year space program in 2021, a first for the country, highlighting Ankara’s plans to compete with other countries both on the world stage and beyond. The 10-year plan includes the launch of a rover to the Moon by the end of the decade using a domestically built hybrid rocket engine that is currently being developed in Turkey [72]. In addition, the plan includes the launch of a Turkish citizen to the International Space Station by 2024. Turkish Air Pilot Alper Gezeravci became Turkey’s first astronaut as part of the Axiom Mission 3, which launched on 19 January 2024 [73]. Additionally, Turkey is an active member of the UN space system and, since 2006, a member of the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization.

Finally, South Korea is another salient example of space development in the last few decades. Despite the country’s economic success in certain sectors, such as electronics and automotive manufacturing, its space program lags behind those of other key Asian states, including India, China, and Japan. In the last two decades, South Korea has demonstrated a resolute commitment to developing an autonomous and robust space program, primarily driven by economic and national security imperatives [26] (p. 136). In October 2021, South Korea successfully launched the NURI-Rocket KSLV-2, becoming the seventh nation capable of placing a satellite weighing at least one ton into orbit. In August 2022, the Korea Pathfinder Lunar Orbiter was launched, and it was successfully inserted into orbit around the Moon in December 2022. In recent years, South Korea has notably accelerated its space development initiatives. In May 2024, President Yoon Suk Yeol inaugurated the Korea Aerospace Administration (KASA) [74]. In May 2021, the South Korean conglomerate SK joined NASA’s Artemis program, which aims to return humans to the lunar surface. To further develop its space capabilities for military applications, South Korea has established a task force and a space policy-oriented think tank. Furthermore, South Korea is developing plans to construct its own satellite navigation system and a 6G communications satellite network, with the ambitious goal of sending a spaceship to the Moon by 2030 [75].

5. System Dynamics—Global Power Dynamics

As previously mentioned, the concept of power in the international system is inherently relational, implying that the power of a state is determined in relation to other states. Consequently, global power dynamics—defined as the interactions and relationships between nations as they exercise influence over one another in political, economic, and military domains—become a critical factor in understanding the distribution of power in the system. The dynamics of international power politics are shaped by a range of factors, including competition over resources, capabilities, strategic alliances, and partnerships. These dynamics have the potential to shift power balances and produce changes in the structure of the space system.

In recent decades, states have demonstrated a marked emphasis on the development of space power. This emphasis has given rise to a variety of space strategies that are related to resources, relationships, and space development.

5.1. Expansion of the National Space Capabilities

The initial observable tendency in contemporary global power dynamics concerning the space system is the increasing development of national space programs, as evidenced by the allocation of resources for space-related activities and the advancement of novel space capabilities. There is substantial evidence indicating the interest of states in outer space.

In accordance with the Space Technology Ladder framework, which delineates the milestones achieved by nations in their pursuit of national space technology capability, the establishment of the inaugural national space agency constitutes the initial step [67]. From 2000 to 2020, 37 national space agencies were established, including those in Japan, Iran, Mexico, South Africa, and Portugal. A similar trend was observed in the subsequent years, with 16 space agencies being established between 2014 and 2019, including those in Australia, Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia [76]. In recent years, a growing number of countries have followed the same path, including Luxembourg (2019), Greece (2019), Uzbekistan (2019), Portugal (2019), Rwanda (2021), Costa Rica (2021), Spain (2023), and South Korea (2024).

Another indicator is the development of national space policy, directives, and programs that provide guidance in the development of space activities. In the preceding decade, the majority of space powers, including the United States (US Space Priorities Framework (2021) and the Artemis Program (2019)), China (China’s Space Program: A 2021 Perspective (2022)), European Union (EU Space Programme (2021–2027)), India, and Japan have updated their space policies and programs. Furthermore, a considerable number of emerging and smaller powers have formulated novel space policies over the past two decades.

Government expenditure on space programs has increased significantly since the conclusion of the Cold War. From 1990 to 2016, spending rose from USD 32 billion to USD 62 billion, and reached a new historic high of USD 117 billion in 2023, representing a 15% increase from the previous year (2022). The United States Government allocated approximately USD 79.7 billion to its space programs in 2024, positioning it as the nation with the highest space expenditure globally [46]. China is the second-largest space program, with an estimated expenditure of USD 19.9 billion, exhibiting an 11% compound annual growth rate. Russia’s investment in its space program stands at USD 3.9 billion. Additionally, seven other countries and the European Union collectively allocate more than USD 1 billion to their respective space programs, including Japan (USD 6.8 billion), France (USD 3.7 billion), Germany (USD 2.8 billion), Italy (USD 2.65 billion), India (USD 1.89 billion), the United Kingdom (USD 1.46 billion), and South Korea (USD 1.03 billion) [46].

5.2. Building Military Power

Since its origins, the space sector has been utilized for activities related to defense and security. The majority of the major space powers have allocated significant resources to military purposes in the domain of space. Despite the advent of a new era marked by the dissolution of the Cold War, which witnessed a diminution in geopolitical tensions, national space policies have persisted in pursuing dual objectives, encompassing political and economic interests, while concurrently giving due consideration to fundamental security and military considerations. The intensifying geopolitical tensions of recent years have prompted space powers to escalate their investments in the defense sector.

Throughout history, the primary focus of government spending has been on investments in civil space activities. However, in 2023, a substantial paradigm shift occurred, with defense expenditures now overtaking civil expenditures [46]. In 2023, for the first time, defense expenditures surpassed investments in civilian programs [77]. A substantial portion of the national budget is now allocated to defense expenditures, estimated at USD 59 billion of the total USD 117 billion. A notable surge has been observed in investments related to Security and Early Warning Systems.

Simultaneously, novel military organizations have been established or re-established in recent years. Notably, China institutionalized a distinct space service in 2015, designated as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Strategic Support Force (SSF), under the leadership of Xi Jinping. The PLA/SSF has integrated China’s expanding military space assets into a unified entity, intending to achieve dominance across the domains of air, space, and cyber. In 2024, the PLA/SSF underwent a reorganization, being replaced with a new structure with the creation of the Aero-space Force to support its armed forces [78]. Concurrently, Russia re-established the Russian Space Force after its dissolution in 2011. In 2019, the United States Space Force (USSF) was established as the independent space service branch of the U.S. Armed Forces. The USSF is the smallest branch of the U.S. Armed Forces, yet it is undergoing rapid expansion. For the 2025 fiscal year, the administration requested a budget of USD 29.6 billion for the Space Force, constituting approximately 3.5% of the total budget request for the Department of Defense. This budget request marks the fifth submission since the establishment of the Space Force, and it reflects a substantial increase in the service’s budget, which has nearly doubled over this period [79]. This trend has been emulated by other nations, as evidenced by the establishment of analogous space forces in France (2019), Iran (2020), and Spain (2022).

There is a prevailing determination to establish novel military space policies. In recent years, various world powers have announced their intention to conduct military activities in space, including the United States, Russia, China, India, and Japan. Furthermore, a significant number of countries possess their own reconnaissance satellites, including the United States, Russia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, China, India, Iran, and Israel. Japan and India, long-standing space powers that previously exclusively engaged in peaceful space activities, have transitioned their space policy from a “non-military” to a “non-aggressive” stance. The United States has developed its inaugural doctrine, designated “Spacepower”, within the context of its recently established military space branch. The United States considers spacepower to be a vital element of U.S. prosperity and security, and the military space forces are the warfighters who protect, defend, and project this spacepower. According to this doctrine, “the U.S. must adapt its national security space organizations, doctrine, and capabilities to deter and defeat aggression and protect national interests in space” [80].

5.3. Encouraging Space Economic Strength

Since the beginning of the space industry, states have emerged as the predominant force, while the private sector has historically assumed a more secondary role. However, a consensus among scholars has emerged that a new era in the history of space activities commenced at the turn of the 21st century, marked by the significant rise in the commercialization and privatization of the space industry [10,11,81].

According to some experts [26,80], the transition to a new space business model is underway. In this model, public space priorities increasingly share the stage with private initiatives. This new form of bottom-up, net-centric, commercially led space innovation is promising cheaper and more timely technological developments to those nations that can effectively exploit them. Consequently, traditional definitions of space power are being reshaped.

The United States, with its historically robust and dynamic private sector, has been a leader in facilitating private initiatives within the space industry. The commercialization of space has been a long-standing policy of the U.S. federal government, with corresponding legislation being instituted since the 1980s. However, following the conclusion of the Cold War, the United States government has demonstrated a renewed interest in enhancing the efficiency, innovation, and competitiveness of NASA, thereby facilitating the gradual entry of American companies into the space sector. This shift has led to the emergence of new commercial space companies, such as SpaceX and Blue Origin, founded in 2002 and 2003, respectively. These companies have competed for NASA contracts and have employed NASA scientists, who have been found to execute specific tasks with greater efficiency than NASA [82]. The result has been nothing short of astonishing. A novel ecosystem of American space companies has emerged, demonstrating rapid growth and effecting revolutionary changes in the space industry, including sectors such as space launch and communication. These companies have also played a substantial role in the American Artemis program.

This model has been adapted for other states that have recognized the importance of increasing the role of the private sector to strengthen their space economic power. Despite the efforts of Western European countries to cultivate a space commercial ecosystem, encouraging the commercialization and privatization of the space industry—particularly in countries such as France (Arianespace (Le Haillan, France), Airbus (Blagnac, France)), Italy (Leonardo (Rome, Italy), Thales (Rome, Italy)), United Kingdom (BAE Systems (London, UK)), and Germany (OHB (Bremen Germany), ISAR (Ottobrunn Germany))—European Union authorities recognized the necessity to enhance innovation and competitiveness in the face of emerging international competitors. This necessity is underscored by the EU’s formal documents, which call for the “fostering of a competitive and innovative European space sector” [60] and the provision of enhanced access to financial resources and public contracts for EU space companies [59] (p. 178).

Similarly, China and India, two countries with an absence of a space private sector, have transitioned their space policy to encourage the development of private initiatives within the space industry. Since Xi Jinping assumed power in 2012, China has permitted the gradual entry of private initiatives into the space domain. The issuance of Document 60 in 2014 aimed to modernize the financing channels of strategic sectors, including the space industry, thereby facilitating private investment in specific areas. Following the implementation of Document 60, China witnessed a substantial surge in private sector investment, with an estimated annual growth of approximately USD 3 billion. The Chinese commercial space market has undergone substantial expansion, exhibiting an annual growth rate that exceeds 23 percent from 2017 to 2024 [83].

Similarly, the government of India has encouraged private space companies to establish collaborative relationships with the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) and engage in their numerous projects. In 2021, the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, established the Indian Space Association (ISpA), an industry body comprising both government and private companies. The objective of the ISpA is to complement the central government’s efforts in commercial space exploration and space-based communication.

5.4. Reconfiguration of Strategic Alliances

The historical evolution of the space system demonstrated a transition and a reconfiguration of the traditional alliances and partnerships in the space system. The bipolar scheme of the Cold War gave way to a new era in which both former adversaries (the United States and Russia) demonstrated a willingness to collaborate on space-related activities. This shift is exemplified by two significant events: the Shuttle–Mir collaboration in 1994 and the International Space Station (ISS) in 1998. The ISS, in particular, stands as a remarkable instance of global collaboration, encompassing all the major space powers by the late 20th century. In recent decades, global cooperation has transformed, marked by a reconfiguration of strategic alliances.

In a the current more competitive space system, the United States has reinforced its alliances with its traditional partners (Japan, Canada, and the EU) and has also pursued the expansion of its global collaboration by building a more extensive multilateral cooperation mechanism. In order to support the implementation of the NASA Artemis Project, the U.S. government decided to create the Artemis Accords, which represent a series of bilateral agreements between the United States and other countries. Initially signed in October 2020 by seven countries traditionally aligned with the United States—Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States—the Artemis Accords have since been joined by an additional 44 countries, including several established and emerging space powers (France, India, Brazil), representing all continents.

Recent decades have seen an increase in the activity of Chinese space diplomacy, coinciding with the robust development of China’s space program since the advent of the 21st century. The Chinese space diplomacy strategy is multi-directional in terms of forums and agreements. The CNSA has established 149 space cooperation agreements or memorandums of understanding with 46 national space agencies and 4 international organizations, as well as 17 space cooperation mechanisms. Additionally, it has participated in 18 international organizations [47]. Since 2005, China has played a leadership role in the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, comprising nations such as Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan. In 2021, China and Russia entered into a strategic agreement, establishing a framework for collaborative efforts in the construction of the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS). It is important to note that the International Lunar Research Station project is not exclusively Sino–Russian. The initiative is “open to all international partners interested in cooperation”, and other countries and international organizations are encouraged to contribute to “any aspect of the mission in every stage” [84] (p. 2).

Russia’s approach to space cooperation has undergone a notable shift throughout its history. During the Cold War, Russia engaged in a direct confrontation with the United States in a competition known as the “space race”. This was followed by a period of collaboration with the United States and European countries, as evidenced by the development of the Shuttle–Mir and ISS. However, this alliance experienced a shift in the early 21st century, marked by a resurgence in tensions with Western nations. This led to Russia’s strategic repositioning, as evidenced by its involvement in the ISS and ExoMars projects. In response to these developments, Russia has also cultivated new alliances with several emerging and developing space powers, including Iran, Brazil, India, and notably, China. Notably, Russia has established a strategic partnership with China, which is a significant development in the context of global space cooperation.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, India has undergone a reconfiguration of its strategic alliances. The ongoing rise of China and the unique relationship between Russia and China have compelled India to seek new strategic partnerships. In this context, India established a strategic partnership with the United States, as evidenced by India’s accession to the Artemis Accords in June 2023. Nevertheless, India has endeavored to preserve an independent and occasionally pendular position, maintaining relations with Russia, China, or Brazil within the context of the BRICS.

Japan and the European Union countries have maintained a robust alliance with the United States since the 20th century, initially as key partners in the International Space Station (ISS), and most recently by joining the Artemis Accords. However, there are slight differences between them. Japan has demonstrated a consistent alignment with U.S. interests, while the EU has expressed a commitment to reinforcing Europe’s autonomy in accessing and utilizing space and strengthening Europe’s role as a leading actor in the space sector [59,60,61,62].

The growing influence of emerging middle powers and other developing countries has prompted the adoption of various strategies and mechanisms for space cooperation. For instance, African and Latin American countries have entered into bilateral agreements with space powers to gain access to space technology, as is the case with China. Additionally, a majority of developing countries have participated in the establishment of regional space processes designed to create synergies, including the Latin American and Caribbean Space Agency (ALCE) initiative in Latin America, the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) in Southeast Asia, and the recently established African Space Agency in Africa.

5.5. The Rise of Regionalization Processes

A novel phenomenon, known as the regionalization of space, is emerging in the space system. This trend involves space actors opting to collaborate within their own geographical area rather than on a global scale. The majority of these regional processes have institutionalized cooperation and created new regional actors within the space system.

The European Space Agency (ESA), established in 1975 by its founding members, was the inaugural intergovernmental regional organization dedicated to space activities. This initiative has been met with notable success, expanding to encompass 22 members, predominantly EU countries, and forging meaningful collaborations with prominent global space agencies.

In the past three decades, numerous regional space processes have emerged, modeled after the ESA paradigm. These include the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (1993), the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (2005), the Arab Space Cooperation Group (2019), the Latin American and Caribbean Space Agency (2021), and the African Space Agency under the African Union (2023). All these regional processes are characterized by the pursuit of common objectives, including the establishment of space regulations, the adoption of a unified position in regional and international forums, and the initiation of collaborative initiatives.

5.6. Transitional Dynamics from Cooperation to Competition

The conclusion of the Cold War marked the advent of a novel international scenario in which the United States, as the sole superpower, assumed a leadership role in international space cooperation, uniting the majority of space powers under a collective initiative: the International Space Station. However, since the advent of the 21st century, there has been a gradual yet persistent shift in this global dynamic, marked by a transition from cooperation to competition among space powers.

This transition can be characterized as a process of “securitization”, which refers to the incorporation of space activities into the broader international security agenda. Many space powers regard outer space as a substantial geopolitical asset, a perspective attributable to its strategic and economic value. According to Dolman [7], the prevailing sentiment is that the domination of terrestrial orbit directly correlates with the control of outer space, ultimately leading to the attainment of global preeminence. In the contemporary geopolitical landscape of the 21st century, classical geopolitics and the realist perspective are gaining prominence [8].

In light of the assumptions outlined above, certain experts posit that the present decade will be characterized by a period of revision in all spheres of interaction between the predominant space powers, marking a shift towards a more competitive and potentially conflictual space system. Within this emerging global context, there exists a risk that the inherent competitive dynamics could escalate into a confrontation, thereby leading to an expansion of the space dimension of the international security agenda [85].

5.7. Decentralized and Multilevel Interactions

A notable global power dynamic in the contemporary space system is the increasing decentralization of space interactions across multiple levels of action. The centralized global governance of outer space that emerged at the inception of the space age—which encompasses a global binding legal framework (Outer Space Treaty (1967)) and intergovernmental space institutions under the United Nations (COPUOS/UNOOSA (1958-1959))—has undergone a transition to a more decentralized and fragmented distribution of power.

This transition has been referred to by some experts as “the big bang of space governance”, which describes the evolution of the space system’s initial monocentric and hierarchical structure to a decentralized distribution of power [86]. In essence, states are shifting away from binding, mandatory, and supranational commitments, opting instead for more informal, non-binding, and multilateral agreements. Tepper and Oto define this phenomenon as “polycentric governance”, a term denoting a system in which multiple independent decision-making centers exist, with at least partial overlap in their respective jurisdictions [86,87].

In addition, this suggests the presence of a multitude of actors, engaging in a variety of interactions across multiple levels or arenas of action (local, national, regional, and international). This phenomenon serves to reinforce the ongoing process of fragmentation and decentralization, as well as the distribution of power among multiple centers [41].

6. Systems Structure—New Balance of Power in Space

In light of the global power dynamics that were previously analyzed, it is possible to determine the current power structure of the space system. This structure is manifested as a result of the interaction between actors, which ends up shaping a power system or global order that characterizes the system as a whole and normally determines dynamic domination and subordination relations among actors. In this regard, it is critical to understand how this process of power rebalancing unfolds among the major actors in space and the global structures they establish as a consequence.

6.1. Increasing Number of Space Actors

The new structure of the space system in the 21st century is characterized by an increasing number of states that demonstrate interest in, capability for, and influence over, power relationships in the space sector. This phenomenon gives rise to a multifaceted and multipolar space system structure, characterized by the diversity of space actors involved, and their respective interests.

As discussed in Section 4, space powers have been systematically investing in the development of economic, civilian, and military capabilities in space. However, an additional group of 80 countries, comprising emerging, middle, and small powers, is currently emerging in the space sector and has expressed a clear interest in participating in the global dynamics of the space system.

6.2. Shift in Power Geographic Distribution

A secondary significant characteristic of the contemporary space system structure is the transition in power distribution. This transition is not sudden, nor does it indicate a complete loss of power for traditional Western states. Instead, it is a gradual and persistent shift towards other countries, particularly China, which is gaining increasing influence in the global space system.

While the United States and some European nations have maintained robust investments in space, other non-traditional space countries have come to recognize the significance and advantages (economic, geopolitical, and social) of investing in space. These newcomers have developed ambitious space policies, plans, projects, and investments aimed at reducing the gap with established space powers. This trend is evident in the substantial investments made by emerging economies, notably the BRICS nations, as well as by countries experiencing low economic growth.

Despite the United States’ continued dominance in space power, the emergence of new competitors, particularly China, has introduced a shift in the global balance of power. China’s advancements in space technology have been particularly remarkable, posing a significant challenge to the existing order. While the United States continues to dominate global investment in space, its share of global spending has experienced a notable decline from 75% in 2000 to 59% in 2024, as an increasing number of countries engage in space-related activities [46].

China has made significant advancements in the field of space technology and aspires to become the leading space power by the year 2045, coinciding with the centenary of the establishment of the People’s Republic in 2049. China’s space program is closely aligned with that of the United States, with government spending on space programs reaching nearly USD 14 billion in 2023, marking a significant milestone as it surpassed Russia for the first time in 2021 [88].

6.3. The Persistence of Asymmetries

A persistent characteristic of the balance of power in space systems is the existence of significant asymmetries among nation-states. Historically, space activities have been the domain of a small, select group of states. However, the increasing involvement of countries in space-related endeavors could potentially lead to the establishment of a more democratic system. However, the existing evidence does not provide substantial support for this hypothesis.

Among the total of 193 countries that are member states of the United Nations, approximately 90 engage in some form of space activity, constituting nearly 45% of the total. Of these 90 countries, only 12 possess full launch capabilities [89]. The top ten countries with the largest space budgets collectively account for 92% of the global governmental investment in space programs, with the top five countries (the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and France) accounting for over 84%. Notably, the United States alone accounts for almost 60% of the global governmental investment in space programs [46].

In a manner consistent with the dynamics observed in other scientific and technological domains, there are new dispersion and centralization dynamics that are forming what many specialists consider to be a new geography of centrality and marginality of scientific and technological knowledge [90,91,92]. This dynamic suggests that scientific knowledge is disseminated in select centers, or “nodes”, leading to the exacerbation of inequalities between countries and regions and the emergence of new centers and peripheries.

Currently, the space industry exhibits a pronounced and expanding disparity between a select group of nations that boast advanced space programs and a substantial group of countries that demonstrate minimal or no development in this domain.

6.4. The Formation of Space Blocs

The escalating geopolitical tensions and the rebalancing of global power dynamics that have characterized recent years have precipitated profound changes in the structure of the space system. In the contemporary geopolitical landscape, the distribution of power is becoming increasingly polarized along terrestrial lines.

The historically predominant status of the United States as a space power is currently being contested by emerging competitors who explicitly aspire to lead the contemporary space race. Since the end of the Cold War, space has been an arena of collaboration among nations; however, in recent decades, the nature of cooperation has been limited to bilateral and regional agreements led by major space powers. In this context, the emergence of new coalitions and alliances among space-faring nations signifies a shift towards repolarization.

In the current global context, the United States and China are at the heads of a coalition of countries that are willing to cooperate in the space domain, with each other, and in opposition to the other alliance. This phenomenon is creating an incipient but clear division among two polarized groups, also known as a “space bloc” [93].

Since October 2020, the United States has assumed a leadership role in a coalition of countries under the Artemis Accords, a multilateral agreement between the U.S. and other states participating in the Artemis program, the new American space project to return to the Moon and then to Mars. The initial international agreement was endorsed by eight nations in 2020, and, to date, it has garnered the participation of more than 52 countries, including a diverse array of nations such as Brazil, Saudi Arabia, India, France, and Japan.

In opposition to this new space bloc, China signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Russian Federation in 2021 for the creation of the International Lunar Research Station. This strategic bilateral agreement has evolved into a new bloc that aims to challenge the Artemis program. In April 2023, China formally established the International Lunar Research Station Cooperation Organization (ILRSCO), entrusted with the responsibility of overseeing and administrating the project. In contrast to the Artemis Accords, which is a nonbinding multilateral agreement, the ILRSCO is to be established as a formal organization with leadership and bureaucracy, both of which are likely to be sourced from China. As of January 2025, 13 states have joined the bloc, including Egypt, Serbia, and Venezuela.

Since that time, both coalitions have made attempts to attract nation-states, making the competition between space blocs more evident. These groups facilitate collaboration among nations within their respective blocs, while also fostering competition among the blocs themselves, resulting in the emergence of an emerging bipolar structure.

6.5. New Repolarization and Rebalance of Space Power

An examination of the major space powers and their interactions reveals a repolarization and a rebalancing of power among the states in the current space system. The analysis of global power dynamics within the space system, as outlined in Section 5, facilitates the visualization of repolarization and rebalancing of power, manifesting in the formation of novel coalitions and alliances among nations, along with substantial investments in the space domain aimed at enhancing economic, military, and institutional power.

The current space industry structure indicates that the United States is the leader in this sector. The U.S. accounts for nearly two-thirds of the total spending on space activities and possesses more than half of the world’s top space companies, including the top 10 companies by revenue, with SpaceX being the leader among them [94].

However, these indicators do not reveal the underlying trends behind the numbers. The United States emerged as the predominant space power in the 1990s, following the conclusion of the Cold War, establishing a unipolar global power structure. The United States has maintained its leadership position in this sector, but the analysis of global power dynamics suggests a gradual and consistent decline in the nation’s monopoly over the space industry. This transition from a unipolar to a more diverse global power structure is underway.

6.6. Potential Scenarios

At this moment in the century, as the first quarter draws to a close, predominant academic and scientific interests are focused on predicting or anticipating a future scenario of power relations in space systems. At this point, three potential scenarios of repolarization among states can be considered, as follows: (i) unipolar; (ii) bipolar; and (iii) multipolar.

6.6.1. Unipolar Structure

For the past 35 years, the geopolitical landscape of space has been characterized by a unipolar structure, with the United States maintaining a dominant leadership position. The central inquiry in this study pertains to the duration of the United States’ privileged position and the potential challenges from other states that could potentially replace it as the predominant space power. Both scenarios appear to be plausible, as set out below:

(i)

United States Leadership: Since the implementation of Space Policy Directive 1 in 2017, the United States has made significant efforts to revitalize its space program. These efforts initially included the establishment of the ambitious civilian Artemis Program, which involves private and international partners. Subsequently, in 2019, the United States Space Force was established as a space service branch of the U.S. Armed Forces. The prevailing sentiment in the United States is that America must preserve its space power advantage [95].

(ii)

A New Space Leader: It is evident that China is the only nation that has demonstrated both the ambition and capability to challenge the United States’ dominance in space. Over the past few decades, China has made significant progress in reducing its technological gap with the United States, with the objective of achieving a balanced power balance by the year 2050. Experts such as Allison have posited that the primary question is not whether China will replace the United States as the predominant superpower, but rather the timing of this transition [96].

6.6.2. Bipolar Structure

Several experts have considered the possibility of a new space race in the 21st century, Space Race 2.0, in which China would take the place of Russia [15,27,97]. The primary argument suggests that even if the United States is successful in its attempts to contain China (a highly improbable outcome), the restoration of unipolarity is likely unfeasible [98]. Therefore, most of the experts forecast, a bipolar world emerges, with the United States and China as the two poles.

For centuries, the international political landscape was characterized by the presence of three or more roughly equivalent powers. In the contemporary era, however, every nation that is likely to rank third—such as France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia, and the UK—is by no means a match for the United States or China in terms of geopolitical strength [99]. Based on the available evidence, China stands as the sole nation that has developed a robust space program capable of challenging the preeminence of the United States and provoking a transformation from a unipolar to a bipolar scenario.

6.6.3. Multipolar Structure

A multipolar structure with more than two space powers is considered a likely scenario in the space system. A wide range of scholars and some world leaders have begun to predict a return to a multipolar world [100]. The current space system is marked by a significant increase in the number of space powers, and while significant disparities remain among these powers, there is a discernible trend of China, India, Brazil, and the EU rapidly expanding their presence, catching up to, and potentially overtaking the United States.

These emerging space powers have demonstrated a growing interest in space activities, leading to increased government planning, organization, and execution of space-related initiatives. This has been evidenced by the development of national space policies, robust space budgets, and influential national space agencies. This shift has resulted in a redistribution of power among the various actors within the space system. This shift suggests the emergence of a multipolar system, comprising new space powers with global ambitions and a willingness to compete with the United States, as well as a new and diverse group of space coalitions and alliances.

7. Conclusions

This research examines the emergence of a new space system within the context of the ongoing repolarization of space powers in the 21st century international order. It analyzes the transition from a unipolar space system at the end of the 20th century to a new space system, where new space powers have emerged that exhibit global ambitions and a willingness to compete with and challenge the United States’ dominance. This transition has been accompanied by the emergence of new space actors and a shift in global power dynamics, resulting in a significant redistribution of power within the space structure.

The repolarization of power in space is a global and increasing empirical phenomenon with profound implications in the space sector. In the context of complex social systems, such as the space system, conventional scientific analytical methodologies may prove inadequate in addressing the increasing complexity. To address the growing complexity of space systems in the 21st century, this research proposes and employs a systems approach to analyze the novel empirical reality of the space system. The complexity of the space system can be analyzed through a systems perspective that identifies and simplifies the main components or actors, analyzes the main interactions and dynamics, and allows for the recognition of the type of structure that is created within the system.

The primary research hypothesis posits that the balance of power among the major actors of the 21st century space system is undergoing a process of transformation, redistribution, and rebalancing. This hypothesis is supported by this systems study, which has identified, described, and explained the primary dimension analyzed in the space system. Firstly, new space powers have been identified, such as China, and India, who exhibit global ambitions and a willingness to compete with and challenge the United States’ dominance. Secondly, new power dynamics have emerged, in which countries compete over resources, capabilities, strategic alliances, and partnerships within the space system. Thirdly, a new structure of the space system has been described, which is profoundly changing the foundation of the space system.

The general hypothesis has been confirmed by a reasonable standard of evidence. The evolution of a new and faster-moving space system that includes an expanding range of actors, dynamics, and power structure is underway. Propositions pertaining to substantial change, encompassing the evolution of space activities across multiple dimensions (i.e., actors, dynamics, and structure), as delineated in Section 4, Section 5 and Section 6, provide a substantial contribution to the overall conclusion that supports the hypothesis.

Table 1. Summary of the actors, dynamics, and structure of the space system.

Systems Approach	Space System	Findings	Examples
Context	International system	Transitional international system	The space system between the 20th and 21st centuries
Actors	Space actors	Space power	The United States, Russia, China, India, Japan, and the European Space Agency (ESA)
		Emerging middle power	Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Brazil, South Korea, the UK, the UAE, Israel, etc.
		Small power	Greece, Portugal, Vietnam, Chile, etc.
		No autonomous space activities	More than 50% of the United Nations State members
Dynamics	Global power dynamics	Expansion of national space capabilities	New space agencies, policies, and increasing space budgets
		Building military power	Military expenditures surpassed civil expenditures in 2023
		Encouraging space economic strength	Expansion of private space companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin
		Reconfiguration of strategic alliances	Use of space diplomacy for new partnerships
		The rise of regionalization processes	ESA, ALCE, APSCO, etc.
		Transitional dynamics from cooperation to competition	Securitization of space activities
		Decentralized and multilevel interactions	Informal, non-binding, and multilateral agreements in multiple levels of action (local, regional, national, and international)
Structure	Power Structure	Increasing number of space actors	There are 90 states involved in space activities
		Shift in power geographic distribution	From Western countries to Asia
		The persistence of asymmetries	The top 10 states represent 92% of total world investment
		The formation of space blocs	Artemis Accords ILRSCO
		New repolarization and rebalance of space power	From a unipolar system to a new space system
		Potential scenarios	Unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar structures

offers a synopsis of these findings and contributions.

This research makes significant methodological, disciplinary, and empirical contributions to the analysis of the space domain. First, it provides a comprehensive methodological application of the system approach to the study of space activities, providing a new framework of analysis. Second, it combines theoretical tools from two different disciplines (international relations and space studies), making a contribution to building a bridge that allows us to analyze complex phenomena, such as space activities, with an interdisciplinary approach. Thirdly, it examines several pieces of empirical data and information in great detail, providing a comprehensive scientific analysis of the current state of the space system.

Despite the innovative perspectives on the systemic study of outer space presented in this paper, it is imperative to acknowledge the inherent complexity of the subject of study, as well as the empirical, disciplinary, and methodological limitations that are inherent to this type of research. These limitations must be explicitly disclosed. First, addressing the complexity of the space system from a holistic perspective necessitates the simplification of space reality to offer a high-altitude view. Second, the election of some categories, variables, and dimensions of analysis, as well as the elimination of others, is part of the research decision process of this investigation and can generate omissions. Third, systems models in social science are a helpful methodological instrument but can be less reliable and predictable than mathematical models.

It is anticipated that these findings will have several applications, which will contribute to new academic explorations and the advancement of academic research on the study of outer space from a systems science perspective. New research directions and studies will be required to understand the role of new space actors (e.g., emergent powers), identify new global dynamics (e.g., space regionalization), and examine elements of the new structure of space power (e.g., possible scenarios). It is expected that the application of the systems approach in the field of space studies will contribute to the development of new theoretical and methodological answers, facilitate the creation of new public policies, and support the development of planning strategies for the private sector.