Blockchain Technology: Security Issues, Healthcare Applications, Challenges and Future Trends
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- Blockchain 1.0: the programmable currency represented by bitcoin led the new digital payment system. The decentralized, key-based digital currency transaction model makes it the origin of blockchain technology.
- Blockchain 2.0: based on the programmable society, blockchain-based applications are widely used in social fields such as finance, P2P transactions, information creditable registration, ownership and copyright confirmation, and intelligent management.
- Blockchain 3.0: it makes blockchain more widely applied to decentralized applications (DApps), and through decentralization, non-tampering, and trusted sharing, improves operational efficiency and the trust level of the society.
1.1. The Concept and Features of Blockchain
- Peer-to-peer network immutable distributed ledger: ensures that the single node ledger is structurally immutable through the data structure of blockchain.
- Security technology such as encryption: cryptography and hash algorithms guarantee the security and privacy of transactions.
- Consensus algorithms: a pure mathematical mechanism for collective verification of blockchain to establish a trusting relationship between all parties and uses technology to ensure that the consensus results.
- Smart contract: A new concept of the contract was introduced by Nick Szabo in 1994, who called this new contract “smart” because it includes a set of agreements by which contract participants can enforce these commitments. Smart contracts guarantee trusted business deals without third-party involvement, and the main purpose of smart contracts is to provide a security method and reduce transaction costs with other contracts. Therefore, smart contracts ensure that all the transactions between the nodes are credible and reliable [18].
- Sharing and openness: the system is open to all participants, who have the right to know and equally enjoy blockchain information.
- The consensus: through the voting of particular nodes to complete the verification and confirm transactions in a fraction of the time. If several nodes can reach a consensus without the related interests for a transaction, it considers the network’s consensus.
- Fair competition: the operations of all nodes are calculated by algorithms, and algorithms determine the accounting rights.
- Authenticity and integrity: each record is recorded truthfully and completely under supervision.
- Safe and reliable: data encryption and cryptography mechanisms prevent the data from being tampered with and forged; the complex checksum sharing mechanism ensures integrity, availability, and confidentiality. Multiple attackers are detected through an encryption standard (digital signature) in which every node has its key, and the packet transmission is performed when the key is in a valid state [19].
1.2. Limitations and Challenges of Blockchain Security
- Limited transaction performance and scalability: blockchain’s limited transaction processing capacity and the slow time for transactions to form blocks.
- Sharding: the idea of sharding is to divide the overall state of the blockchain into different blocks and process them in parallel.
- Off-chain: high throughput of transactions can be achieved by moving the computation and verification process to a separate protocol off-chain; blockchain is used as an agreement layer to manage the sum of a sequence of transactions.
- DAGs (directed acyclic graph): a graph organization consisting of vertices and edges (vertices are purposes within the graph, and edges are methods from one point to a different graph). A DAG guarantees that there are not any cycles that allow acquiring the grouping of nodes along with the topological sequence.
- Limited privacy protection: blockchain can be tamper-proof and decentralized, but precisely because the user’s ledger is transparent to participating organizations, that is, any organization can access the same data. Unmasked users’ private data on the chain will amplify the risk of user privacy leakage. Currently, in public chain systems such as Bitcoin, all transaction information is public (including transaction amounts). This means it does not meet some regulatory privacy requirements, such as General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [25]. There is a need for the following related security technologies to make further breakthroughs:
- Homomorphic encryption: HE encrypts the transaction data and protects it with the public key. The transactions are ciphertext operations, and the final ledger is encrypted and stored. The obtained ledger records cannot be decrypted even if the node was compromised. The process of HE is shown in Figure 3.
- Zero-knowledge proof: ZKP verification can be made without any useful information provided by the verifier and without revealing the proven message to the verifier during the proof process.
- Trusted execution environment: the security zone of the principal processor that ensures the code and information loaded inside are secured classification and respectability.
- Storage constraints: the blockchain database is stored indefinitely that only can be added but cannot be changed. Consequently, data storage adds a major expense for the circulated network, and each full node must store ever-increasing data endlessly. Thus, storage is an immense obstacle for any real-world application based on a blockchain.
- Swarm: an Ethereum P2P sharing protocol that allows users to store application code and data in the swarm nodes under the main chain, and then users can access the blockchain to exchange the data.
- The Storj network: files and data are sharded, encrypted, and distributed to multiple nodes so that each node can only store a small part of the data.
- The IPFS: an optional peer-to-peer hypermedia protocol that provides a high-throughput block storage model based on content-addressable hyperlinks. Essentially, it allows files to be stored permanently and distributed while providing historical versions of files, thus removing duplicate files.
- Decent: a distributed content-sharing platform that allows users to upload and digitally monetize the sharing of their work (videos, music, e-books, EHR, etc.) without relying on a centralized third party for sharing.
- Alliance chain: the data can be archived in the alliance chain. Blockchain operating system only retains recent data, preserving historical data through archiving.
1.3. Motivation and Contribution
2. Literature Review
2.1. Research and Significance of Blockchain Security
- Studying the security of blockchain helps to accelerate innovation development. Blockchain involves many aspects, such as the basic cryptographic scheme, distributed consistency, economic incentives, and network security.
- Studying the security of blockchain helps to accelerate technology promotion. Incomplete theoretical security analysis, lack of code evaluation, and frequent security incidents limit the development of blockchain. The study of safe and efficient solutions can be applied to more healthcare scenarios, and gradually widened application examples will also better test the security of blockchain in practice.
- Researching blockchain security helps to realize a trustworthy programmable society. The programmability and automatic execution show smart contracts’ intelligent features; studying blockchain’s security will help improve the security level and design principle of smart contracts, simplify the development process, and enhance inter-operation. Secure blockchain architecture and self-executing smart contracts can technically enforce contracts, reduce default risk, and build a trusty programmable society.
2.2. Security Objectives on Blockchain
2.2.1. Consensus Security
2.2.2. Smart Contracts
2.2.3. Privacy and Content Protection
2.3. Parallel Security of Blockchain
3. Security Issues of Blockchain Technology
3.1. Data Layer
- Quantum computing: The blockchain data layer’s transactions and data blocks involve various cryptographic components [83]. In order to meet higher privacy protection requirements, some blockchains are required privacy protection technologies such as ring signatures and zero-knowledge proofs, but those will affect the security of the data layer [84].
- Improper key management: Blockchain-based applications, especially in the financial field, are easily the targets of greedy attackers, relevant digital asset transactions, and healthcare involved in personal details.
- Leaks and lost keys: Due to improper use and storage, it has brought immense losses to users; therefore, a reasonable key management mechanism is required. Password-protected secret sharing (PPSS) is an online threshold wallet scheme [85], and it is the mainstream research direction for blockchain to realize secure key management in the future.
- Closely related transactions: Most blockchain-based digital platforms use digital pseudonyms, but this method only provides weak identity anonymity; the correlation between transactions and transaction amounts is disclosed on the blockchain. Once an address is exposed, all public key addresses of the user may be inferred. Through the transaction cluster analysis and transaction graph analysis [86], the user’s real identity can also be inferred from the statistical characteristics of the transaction.
- Code Vulnerability: Some of the cryptographic components may also have flaws and loopholes in the process of compiling. The transaction malleability attack [87] is an attack against data layer code vulnerabilities, which exploits the malleability of transactions using digital signatures during the compilation process, often used to attack bitcoin trading platforms.
3.2. Network Layer
- P2P network security vulnerabilities: The P2P network [90,91] provides a distributed and self-organizing connection mode for nodes in a peer-to-peer network environment, lacking mechanisms such as identity authentication, data verification, and network security management. The P2P network adopts it impossible to use firewalls, intrusion detection, and other technologies for targeted protection due to unequal working modes. The nodes in the network are more vulnerable to attack.
- Node’s network topology: The node’s network topology can create the convenience for attackers to find the attack targets and carry out attacks. Attackers can monitor the network topology by actively injecting packets or passively monitoring the data packets transmitted between routes. The eclipse attack [92] is a typical attack method in which attackers use the topology relationship between nodes to achieve network isolation. The solar eclipse attack can be used as the basis for other attacks [93]: the attacker implements the solar eclipse attack on the node with a computing power advantage, realizes the separation of computing power, affects the distribution of mining rewards, and further reduces the difficulty of attacks such as (self-mining) and double payment [94].
- Privacy protection issues: The privacy protection at the data layer cannot avoid the correlation between transaction and user IP address during network transmission; attackers can use the method to monitor and track the IP address destroying privacy protection. The network layer provides the mixing service for anonymous payment in the field of digital currency [95]. Mixing service refers to mixing and outputting multiple unrelated inputs to make sure the outsider cannot correlate the transaction to ensure the flow of digital currency cannot be distinguished to achieve anonymity payment [96].
- Centralized mixer: Performed by a third-party server, the user sends the transaction token, and after multiple transactions are mixed, it will finally send to the recipient. This method destroys blockchain’s decentralization characteristics, hidden dangers such as third-party backdoors to steal tokens and the single point of failure.
- Decentralized mixer: Generates a new transaction by spontaneously mixing multiple transactions and redistributes the tokens according to the original transaction, thereby realizing anonymous payment.
3.3. Consensus Layer
- Incomplete proof of security: Consensus mechanisms need to consider various variables when modeling security, but new consensus mechanisms keep emerging, and some frameworks cannot fully security certify new mechanisms. Kiayias proposed a security model and proof method in synchronous networks [99]. Most of the provable security research on the consensus mechanism focuses on the PoW, which often only considers a single variable. The complex network environment also challenges the security analysis of the consensus mechanism.
- Unreliable security assumptions: The security evaluation of modern cryptosystems relies on computational complexity theory, but some security assumptions are easily broken in practical applications. As an example of Bitcoin using PoW, according to the mining pool computing power reach, 56.5% will easily break the security assumption of PoW, preventing the verification and recording of transactions and destroying the activity of the consensus mechanism.
- Inconsistent consistency: Consistency is a high property to measure the security of the consensus mechanism, but it is difficult to ensure stable consistency in practical applications. Even proof of elapsed time (PoET) [100] and proof of luck (PoL) [101] utilize trusted hardware to provide randomness to ensure that the consistency of the consensus mechanism is not affected by network conditions.
- Poor scalability: Scalability is an important attribute of consensus mechanism research and an indispensable part of blockchain usability [102]. The blocks will increase with the generations, but the number of transactions contained in a block is limited. The Elastico protocol is the first consensus mechanism based on the idea of sharding on blockchain [103]. The legal digital currency framework RSCoin scheme proposed by the Bank of England [104] also uses sharding technology in the permission-obtained blockchain to improve the scalability of blockchain. It seems that the sharding technology theoretically solves the problem of poor scalability, but it introduces the problem of cross-chain transactions, which requires strong security assumptions, and reduces the security of blockchain.
- Consistency unstable: The initialization of blockchain is the premise to confirm the stability and reliability of the consensus mechanism, directly related to whether the execution process of the subsequent consensus mechanism is safe and reliable.
- Difficult initialization and reconstruction: The consensus mechanism endows blockchain with immutability and improves its credibility, but it also increases the difficulty of reconstruction. Once the security is breached, the blockchain cannot be effectively restored to the previous state before the attack without trusted third-party control.
3.4. Incentive Layer
- The selfish mining attack: In the ideal condition, the node obtains mining rewards that are proportional to the computing power in the PoW blockchain, but in the actual mining process, some nodes will obtain more than their rewards, which means a selfish mining attack [108]. The selfish mining attack is an attack against PoW proposed by Eyal in 2013, which is not easy to detect and prevent. In theory, PoW-based permission-less blockchain systems may be attacked by selfish mining. It poses a serious threat to the system’s security and the incentive mechanism’s fairness.
- Block withholding: The mining pool reduces the cost of node mining so that every node can participate and get rewards. Some mining pools will use the target mining pool’s reward distribution strategy to implement block-withholding attacks to obtain higher rewards. By entrusting some miners to join the target mining pool to contribute to the invalid workload, share the rewards of the target mining pool, chase the entire mining pool, and obtain higher rewards.
- Unsustainable problem: The incentive mechanism of digital currencies such as bitcoin includes block rewards and transaction fees, but the main income of miner nodes gradually decreases due to the limit of blocks. With the reduction of block rewards, these blockchains will inevitably rely entirely on transaction fee-driven and face unsustainable problems. Carlsten studied the stability of blockchain in the extreme case of relying on transaction fees to motivate nodes [109] and points out that only relying on transaction fee rewards is difficult to avoid the tragedy of the commons, resulting in many blockchain forks, affecting the security and efficiency of the blockchain. However, the inflation will be with the continuous token issuance, and block rewards will not be attractive over time.
3.5. Contract Layer
- Exploited code: Ethereum uses the scripting language to smart code contracts, and it is difficult to avoid loopholes. According to the smart contract survey [111,112,113], attacks on Ethereum smart contracts [114] areas: transaction-ordering (TOD) attacks, time-stamp dependency attacks, DAO attacks, stack size limit attacks, immutable bugs attacks, gas-less send attacks, re-entrancy attacks, and the short address attack.
- External data source call problem: Blockchain technology is designed to ensure secure payments without the supervision of a trusted third party, but smart contracts need to access external data through trusted technology to establish a relationship with the outside. The TLSNotary and Towncrier schemes [115,116] use the Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) protocol to access external data, but they cannot guarantee the consistency and authenticity of the data accessed by different nodes nor avoid the data provider website maliciously changed data or attack to cause a single point of failure. The Auger scheme [117] requires specific users to return results at a specific time by setting a penalty mechanism, but it does not provide users with an interface to access the system at will, which limits its usability.
- Formal verification is not perfect: The security problems exposed by the EVM provided by Ethereum endanger the execution of smart contracts and users’ digital assets; thus, formal verification and program analysis tools are required to analyze the smart contract code and execution process. However, since most of the existing tools are for the detection and verification of known vulnerabilities, a future study needs existing anti-patterns and program analysis for dynamic detection.
- Privacy protection issues: Ethereum and Hyperledger are open-source platforms. Smart contracts involve many users, and the execution of transactions also requires users to provide transaction information. Like the data layer, cryptography provides technical support for improving the privacy-preserving properties of smart contracts. Some applications with high confidentiality requirements and complex functions pose challenges to designing and writing smart contracts. Cryptography also has limitations in practical applications.
3.6. Application Layer
- Difficulty in cross-chain operation: With many heterogeneous blockchain applications, it is imperative to connect them with cross-chain technology to build an interconnected, interoperable, and trustworthy application network. Decentralized blockchain, unlike traditional systems, achieves interoperability through central nodes. How to realize the connection between decentralized blockchain platforms is the biggest challenge faced by cross-chain technology. Blockchain developers have successively used technologies such as a notarization mechanism, sidechain or relay network, hashed time-locked contract (HTLC), and distributed private key control to achieve heterogeneous blockchain interconnection.
- Lack of regulatory technology: Security incidents similar to darknet transactions, ransomware, and theft of digital assets in Bitcoin and Ethereum have sparked wide debate in the community about the lack of oversight of blockchain platforms. Supervision technology consists of reporting, tracking, and accountability of illegal acts to ensure the security of the content of the blockchain platform. However, the decentralization, invariability, and obscurity of blockchain make it more delicate to set up a supervision medium. As the most mature blockchain platform operation with the highest demand rate, Bitcoin has naturally come to the forefront of supervisory technology exploration [120]. Since the network’s data monitoring and analysis schemes generally use a “one-size-fits-all” monitoring technology approach, risking the abduction of honest users who typically use Bitcoin for legal transactions; thus, supervision technology on Bitcoin is inevitably not applicable to other blockchain mining platforms.
- Other attacks: The code vulnerabilities in the development process of the application layer, especially in the application scenario where the third-party platform is involved, it is more prone to the risk of unauthorized vulnerability. In addition, in a multi-party blockchain application, an attacker can control the application software or hardware within the scope of personal authority, implement a MATE attack (man-at-the-end attack) [121], violate the application layer protocol regulations or Industry norms, maliciously leak or tampering with user information, destroying the confidentiality and integrity of data.
4. Blockchain-Based Healthcare
4.1. Implementation of Blockchain-Based Healthcare
4.2. Data Management in Blockchain-Based Healthcare
4.3. Future Trends of Blockchain-Based Healthcare
4.3.1. Zero-Knowledge Proof
4.3.2. Artificial Intelligence
4.3.3. Internet of Things
5. Future Research Focuses on Blockchain Healthcare Security
Issues Addressed | Blockchain-Based Healthcare Approach | Advantages | Limitations |
---|---|---|---|
Security attacks, data privacy | Medical records and data management | To reduce the various attacks on the healthcare system | High bandwidth and high computing power |
Security attacks | Patient Monitoring/ERH | Integration with IoT addresses security concerns | Mining incentives and some specific blockchain attacks are not a concern |
Data leakage | Drug traceability | Data authentication and privacy, increasing system flexibility | Drug traceability scene complex |
Patients’ data real-time monitoring security | Real-time patient monitoring/ERH | Systematic protection of data and use of patient data in a more relevant form | Time delay while verifying blocks |
Access control, data tampering | Medical records and data management | Ensure the patients’ data is legal, transparency of records, and the security of data | Transaction time lacking |
Data security | Medical records and data management | An Interoperable Trust Model for Healthcare IoT | Unable to recognize symptom patterns from wearables |
Data management | Medical records and data management | Paper works on the security issues | It cannot the security aspects/attacks of IoT |
Patients’ data monitoring and management | Real-time patient monitoring/ERH and data management | Medical devices read patient vital signs and share them with authorized doctors and hospitals in a secure blockchain network | Lack of communication between the server and devices |
- Confidentiality: The basic idea behind using a blockchain-based system is to enable trusted users better to share information or important content. In this case, the confidentiality of the information we are exchanging is critical.
- Integrity: Another critical security concern associated with confidentiality is data integrity. Maintaining data integrity means the data should not be changed in any way. The data sent and received by the sender should be the original messages. If a third party intervenes in the middle and modifies some of the information, its integrity is compromised. The proper security protocol is required to ensure the content’s integrity.
- Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation means the inability to deny or take accountability for a transaction. When some node denies sending or receiving information to or from another node, this unaccountability issue becomes a significant security concern, which is unlikely to occur in a peer-to-peer network. Non-repudiation should also be addressed in the security procedures. It is accomplished by providing a transaction proofing method in which both the sender and receiver have proof of the transaction.
- Authentication: Blockchain is a widespread network with lots of users as participants. In such a case, users may forge their identities in order to commit fraud. To prevent this from happening, proper user authentication is required. Cryptographic techniques such as digital signatures ensure that no user can impersonate another person. Within a blockchain network, only authentic and authorized nodes can transact.
5.1. Breaking ”Impossible Trinity”
5.2. Privacy Protection and Controllable Supervision
5.3. Blockchain Interconnection
5.4. System-Level Security Architecture
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Advantages | Limitations |
---|---|
Reduce cost and increase efficiency. | Cost-effectiveness has yet to be proven. |
Secure, accessible, and real-time. | Insecure with data leaking issue. |
Network transactions database. | Regulatory issues and technical challenges. |
Better security against “pushing”. | Risk for potential compromise of data set. |
Easy communication in the more extensive network. | Smaller networks pose the same concern. |
Ref. | Application Domain | Implemented Algorithm | Summary |
---|---|---|---|
[29] | Healthcare medical claims in blockchain | Paillier encryption scheme | The insurance company sends the request to the hospital to verify the integrity of the patient’s EHR. |
[30] | Property digital copyright Protection | Large prime number (LPN) algorithm | Blockchain-based auction to protect the property’s digital copyright in an effective and practical way. |
[31] | Genomics, Health, National security, Education | HE, Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) | The paper presents a list of potential applications for HE in various domains to determine the importance of data privacy and security. |
[32] | Biomedical sensitive data sharing in the public cloud | El Gamal, Discrete Logarithms | The proposed solution brings a new simple model to minimize the risk of sharing medical data in the public cloud, the limitation of this model is that it needs to run online. |
[33] | Personal health data collection and storage | BGV scheme, Leveled homomorphic using modulus switching (RLWE) | The author proposed a system that applied HE to secure personal health data collection, storage, and transmission in the cloud. |
[34] | Healthcare medicine side effect query system | Smart and Vercauteren, SIMD Style FHE | A time-efficient privacy-preserving query system model and implementation in a real-world medicine side effect query system. Higher communication cost with or without threads, but still practical. |
[35] | Medical data collection | Fan and Vercauteren, Lattice based leveled homomorphic (RLWE) | HE applied in clinical research to help patients and doctors accelerate learning from real-world data. |
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Share and Cite
Wenhua, Z.; Qamar, F.; Abdali, T.-A.N.; Hassan, R.; Jafri, S.T.A.; Nguyen, Q.N. Blockchain Technology: Security Issues, Healthcare Applications, Challenges and Future Trends. Electronics 2023, 12, 546. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12030546
Wenhua Z, Qamar F, Abdali T-AN, Hassan R, Jafri STA, Nguyen QN. Blockchain Technology: Security Issues, Healthcare Applications, Challenges and Future Trends. Electronics. 2023; 12(3):546. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12030546
Chicago/Turabian StyleWenhua, Zhang, Faizan Qamar, Taj-Aldeen Naser Abdali, Rosilah Hassan, Syed Talib Abbas Jafri, and Quang Ngoc Nguyen. 2023. "Blockchain Technology: Security Issues, Healthcare Applications, Challenges and Future Trends" Electronics 12, no. 3: 546. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12030546
APA StyleWenhua, Z., Qamar, F., Abdali, T. -A. N., Hassan, R., Jafri, S. T. A., & Nguyen, Q. N. (2023). Blockchain Technology: Security Issues, Healthcare Applications, Challenges and Future Trends. Electronics, 12(3), 546. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12030546