4.1. A Few Intuitions
The temporal theory of NCAs outlined above posits that the lack of unique temporal arrangement of the activity component, UTA, is a characteristic property of NCAs. In addition, the discussion in
Section 3.3, with all the reservations mentioned there, suggests that the amount of subevents in the activity component is of relevance, as well, which gives rise to the threshold condition, TC, in (59). There is no obvious implicational relation between these two characteristics: both UTA-positive and UTA-negative predicates show TC-effects. However, even if UTA and TC cannot be reduced to each other, I believe it is possible to view both of them as manifestations of a deeper semantic generalization.
Informally, this generalization, equidistance to the culmination (ED), is stated in (60):
(60) | Equidistance to the culmination (informal, first version) |
| NCAs describe a proper non-final part e of an activity component of an accomplishment event description such that the initial and final bounds of e are equidistant to the culmination. |
Let me introduce the intuition behind ED through the broken lock example again. It is repeated as (61).
(61) | Tuba Altai | | | | |
| Scenario 1. The lock in the door is broken. The agent tries to open the door with the key, then applies a picklock, then uses a crowbar, then tries to disassemble the lock, etc. At some point, he gives up. |
| amɨr | eki | minut | eʒik-ti | ač-tɨ. |
| A. | two | minute | door-acc | open-pfv.pst3sg |
| ‘Amyr spent two minutes opening the door.’ |
Example (61) describes an eventuality e that occurs in the evaluation world. This eventuality is a non-final part of a complete activity that opens the door. In the given scenario, it consists of a number of contextually salient subevents listed in (53) above. The crucial fact about e is that at the end of it the agent has not made any progress as to having the door opened. At the point where her activity stops, the change of state is as far from being realized in the evaluation world as at the point where the failed attempt starts. By the end of e, the evaluation world does not start looking more like the worlds, whatever they are, where e culminates.
The digital code scenario is different. Intuitively, every next number typed correctly on the digital keypad lock makes the culmination closer to realization. In (62), the more subevents from (51) occur in the actual world, the closer the moment is where the door opens.
(62) | *Scenario 2. The door is opened by typing a digital code that consists of a sequence of numbers, e.g., 2-5-9-6. After typing “2” and “5”, the agent stops. |
This is the intuition behind the idea of relative distance of the initial and final bounds of a preculminating part of an eventuality to the culmination. (60) says that for NCAs this distance is the same. This condition is satisfied in (61), but not in (62), hence the contrast in acceptability.
For (60) to be a theory of NCAs, one has to make the notion of (equi)distance to the culmination formally precise. But before attempting that, let me explore empirical expectations derivable from (60) a bit further.
The obvious question to ask is how the idea of the culmination not coming closer to realization in the evaluation world is related to UTA. Generalizing over the digital code scenario, it seems uncontroversial to say that if an activity consists of subevents temporally arranged in a unique way, then with every subevent unfolding, the culmination approaches; the evaluation world looks more and more like one of the culminating worlds. With UTA, the initial and final bounds of an eventuality cannot be equidistant to the culmination. UTA is thus sufficient for ED.
However, it is not necessary. It is not the case that the culmination only comes closer to realization if the subevents show a unique temporal arrangement. It is exactly the scenario in (55), repeated as (63), where the culmination is coming closer with every subevent without there being a unique temporal arrangement.
(63) | *Scenario 3. The door is opened by typing a sequence of any five numbers in whatever order. The agent types “2” and “7” and stops. |
If one has to push random five buttons to open the door, then, metaphorically, at the very beginning the culmination is five pushes away from the evaluation world. After two pushes, the distance goes down to three pushes.
UTA, therefore, asymmetrically entails ED.
The next question is: does ED not look very wrong when applied to the predicates that show the partial success non-culminating reading? One class of such predicates are incremental accomplishments like ‘dig up a vegetable patch’, ‘assemble a model’, ‘read a book’, or ‘write a letter’, discussed in
Section 1 and
Section 2 (see (9)–(11) and (47)). For incremental predicates like ‘read’, the problem with ED in (60) is that they show mapping to subobjects: the more an eventuality extends in time, the larger part of the incremental theme is involved. The culmination is defined by the spatial extent of the theme: as soon as the entire book is involved in reading, a reading eventuality culminates. Therefore, under normal circumstances, any part of reading a book occurring in the evaluation world makes the culmination closer to realization, just by virtue of the fact that at the end of any reading eventuality more is read than at the beginning. The same holds for any incremental theme predicate, of course, as well as for other types of incremental predicates including incremental path predicates, degree achievements and the like. On the partial success reading, such non-culminating accomplishments entail that some change has occurred.
ED thus needs to be amended. The amendment I propose appears in (64):
(64) | (Equi)distance to the culmination (informal, amended version) |
| NCAs describe a proper non-final part e of the activity component of an accomplishment event description such that the difference in the distance to the culmination between the initial and final bounds of e is insignificant in the current context. |
The amendment in (64) is based on the following intuition: If the subject reads a novel, then in the course of a reading event the volume of what has been read is, of course, increasing. But when described by an NCA, this increase makes very little difference for the culmination, reading the entire novel, to become part of the actual world. Despite the fact that the initial and final bounds of the non-culminating reading are not literally equidistant to the culmination, the change in the distance is small enough to be disregarded.
Similarly, non-culminating sentences based on other incremental accomplishments (‘dig up a vegetable patch’, ‘assemble a model’, and so on) convey that while some digging up or assembling activities occur, by all contextually relevant criteria their contribution to making complete digging up and assembling events part of the actual world is negligible.
This view allows to make sense of the restriction illustrated in (47), where the acceptability of an incremental NCA co-varies with the size of the incremental theme, in the following way. The less extended an object being read is, the more difficult it is to come up with a context where a portion of reading activity makes no substantial difference for the culmination to come closer to realization. The contribution of reading 30 pages of À la recherche du temps perdu into reading the entire text is not substantial. With 30 pages out of more than 3000, it is relatively easy to set up a context where the initial and final bounds of reading count as equidistant to the culmination for all relevant purposes. But reading two sentences in a five-sentence note designates a significant advance on the way to the culmination, and a context compatible with equidistance is much more difficult to accommodate. As before, reading a symbol is a limiting case, since it does not have identifiable proper parts, let alone proper parts insignificant from the point of view of the culmination.
From the perspective of the amended version of the equidistance condition in (64), the TC effects discussed in
Section 3.3 can be treated in a parallel way. In (57), repeated as (65), the actual agent’s activity consists of a few pushes out of very many:
(65) | OK/?Scenario 4. The door is opened by typing a sequence of any 50 numbers in whatever order. After typing the first 15 numbers, the agent stops. |
Again, this activity does not make the distance to the culmination significantly smaller. In this respect, (65) contrasts with (63), where it is much harder to accommodate that two pushes out of four occur without the culmination coming closer to realization. The same reasoning extends to the assembling scenarios in (56) and (58). In (56), 20 min of assembling the wardrobe are compatible with there being no substantial progress in having the wardrobe fully assembled. In (58), upon driving two screws out of three, it would be very difficult to come up with a context that supports a parallel inference.
In a similar way, the contrast between (56), ‘assemble a wardrobe’, and (46), ‘set up a tent’, can be understood. As we have just seen, under appropriate circumstances, assembling a wardrobe can be construed as a complex activity consisting of a lot of subevents that occupy an extended interval. It would not be difficult to find a context in which an NCA sentence describes an interval where no easily identifiable progress is made as to achieving the culmination. Temporal bounds of this activity will then count as contextually equidistant to the culmination.
In contrast, setting up a tent, under normal circumstances, involves just a few conventional operations. As a result, it is extremely difficult, in any context, to pick up a part of the activity where the culmination is assessed as not being closer to realization at the final bound compared to the initial bound. (I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer who encouraged me to reflect on the difference between ‘assemble a wardrobe’ and ‘set up a tent’.)
Generalizing somewhat, one can say that what matters here is a relative “size” of a complete, culminating activity and its actualized temporal part occurring in the evaluation world under an NCA description. The smaller this ratio is, the easier it is to find a context where the change occurring in the course of an activity is disregardable in terms of the distance to the culmination.
It should be emphasized that whereas UTA effects and TC effects discussed above can hardly be reduced to each other, both fall out of the equidistance condition. Under normal circumstances a unique temporal arrangement of subevents of the activity component is incompatible with the equidistance. But longer chains of subevents make it easier to accommodate an equidistance context.
In (64), dependence of the equidistance on the context predicts that what counts as an (in)significant advance towards the culmination can be determined not only by the relative size of an activity and its actualized temporal part, but by other, sometimes very non-trivial factors as well. For instance, NCAs like ‘read a paragraph for an hour’ or ‘read a sentence for 10 minutes’ that sound odd out of the blue, improve in a context entailing that reading requires more effort than normally. If the text is written in a language not very familiar to the agent, esoteric, or merely not legible, it is entirely possible that one can make little or no visible progress after an hour of reading. This is what happens in (66), for example, given that it is common ground that reading the Phaistos disk has never culminated in our world.
(66) | Karachay–Balkar |
| alim | ike | saʁat | fest-ni | disk-ni | jüs-ü-ne |
| k. | two | hour | phaistos-gen | disc-gen | surface-3-dat |
| zaz-ıl-ʁan-ı-n | | oqu-du. | | |
| write-pass-pfct-3-acc | | read-pfv.pst3sg |
| ‘Alim spent two hours reading the inscription on the Phaistos disk.’ |
Another type of contextual variability can have to do with the agent’s teleological perspective. For instance, unlike reading an entire novel, reading an entire newspaper is not typically the agent’s goal. Imagine a reader who normally reads “Politics”, “Opinions”, “Science”, and “Arts” and always skips “Health” and “Sports”. This morning, he reads “Politics” and “Opinions” and stops. This makes a non-culminating sentence like ‘He read the newspaper for 15 minutes’ true, with the chance for a reading event to culminate being exactly the same at the beginning and at the end: around zero. In general, an agent whose intention is not to read the text to the end can interrupt reading at any point, and at any point the likelihood of a culmination would be more or less the same—very small
21.
The above discussion emphasizes the significance of contextual inferences in determining if an NCA interpretation is available. An anonymous reviewer points out that there is a more general question: can lexical constrains based on compositionality be changed with an appropriated context, or, in other words, can we pragmatically alter the semantic properties of the predicates and, if so, when?
I believe that nothing that has been said so far forces us to assume that this should be the case.
On the current view, the context can interact with NCAs in two ways. First, it can restrict the extension of a predicate to a set of relevant eventualities. Second, as has been discussed above, it is relevant for deciding whether distance to the culmination of the initial and final bounds of an eventuality is significant.
I will say more about the second point in the next section. At the moment, let me briefly address the first point.
Recall that non-culminating predicates like (38)–(39), repeated as (67)–(68), describe non-final parts of activities that bring about a change of state. In (67)–(68), these activities fall under the denotations of λe. wake
A(e) and λe.assemble
A(e).
(67) | λe.PART(λe′. ∃e″ [ wakeA(e′) ∧ … ∧ wakeCS(e′′) ∧ cause(e′′)(e′) ∧ incr(e′′)(e′)])(e) |
(68) | λe.PART(λe′. ∃e″ [assembleA(e′) ∧ … ∧ assembleCS(e′′) ∧ cause(e′′)(e′) ∧ mmfp(e′′)(e′)])(e) |
A natural assumption about the predicates like λe.wakeA(e), λe.assembleA(e), λe.openA(e), λe.readA(e), and the like is that their extensions in a world are very rich: they contain all waking up, assembling, opening, and writing activities admissible in that world.
Furthermore, some of these predicates are radically underspecified for descriptive content. This is the case with the so-called result verbs (discussed first by
Rappaport Hovav and Levin (
1998); see
Beavers and Koontz Garboden (
2020) for recent reflections). The meaning of ‘open the door’ only tells us that any
e from the extension of λe.open
A(e) has to be an eventuality that brings about a change of state of the door, but does not specify further descriptive characteristics of this eventuality.
The role of the context here is to narrow down a very extensive set of activities (more extensive for result verbs like ‘open’, arguably less extensive for manner verbs like ‘write’) to a more restricted contextually relevant set, as described, e.g., by the Scenarios 1–4 in (61)–(63) and (65). If this more restricted set contains eventualities that can satisfy conditions on the non-culminating interpretation, as, e.g., under the Scenarios 1 and 4, an NCA is licit.
Therefore, contextual information can strengthen the content of an activity predicate, but it is not supposed to weaken or override it. The effects we observe with ‘open’ and similar verbs are essentially strengthening effects: some contexts (e.g., Scenarios 1 and 4) facilitate an NCA interpretation while others block it. On the current view, this happens because the initial very weak denotation of openA is restricted to entirely different contextually relevant sets of eventualities.
We expect, correctly, that if a predicate comes with more specific inferences associated with its lexical content, strengthening effects will be weak or non-existent. We have already seen that, e.g., ‘set up a tent’ cannot derive an NCA more or less independently of the context. On the view advocated in this paper, this happens because the extension of λe.set.upA in an accomplishment structure like ‘set up a tent’ in (47) consists of eventualities incompatible with the derivation of an NCA to begin with. Contextual narrowing down of this extension is correctly predicted to have little consequences for the availability of an NCA.
The opposite view—that in certain contexts an NCA becomes available because in these contexts the denotation of a predicate is forced to change/coerce—is very difficult to maintain.
If the above reasoning is on the right track, the next step would be to make the notion of (equi)distance to the culmination more explicit and to address culmination-related contextual inferences. This is attempted in the next section.
4.2. Modeling Equidistance
The empirical success of the generalization in (64) depends on whether it is possible to make the concept of (equi)distance to the culmination sufficiently explicit. What does it mean exactly that the distance to the culmination between the initial and final bounds of an eventuality is the same or contextually insignificant? The purpose of this section is to offer an outline of an answer to this question. While many technical details of what is laid out below require further elaboration, I hope that a quasi-formal outline of the idea will suffice for the purposes of the current study
22.
I argue that the idea of the culmination being close or coming closer to realization can be given the following content. When an eventuality from the extension of an accomplishment predicate unfolds, there are options for the evaluation world to develop into a world where it culminates as well as into a world where it does not reach the culmination. We can say that the distance to the culmination decreases if in the course of an eventuality non-culminating options are eliminated in favor of culminating ones.
Let us look at the digital code scenario, which entails UTA, from this point of view. In this scenario, the door is opened by an eventuality e which is the sum of e2, e5, e6, and e9 events of pushing the corresponding buttons on the keypad lock, (62). At the left bound of e, there is one way for it to culminate: all of e2, e5, e6, and e9 have to occur in a world. Let us call all worlds in which this happens culminating worlds for e. At the beginning of e, all of them are an open possibility. On the other hand, the space of possibilities available at the left bound of e contains quite a lot of non-culminating worlds for e. These are the epy worlds in which e is incomplete or does not occur at all, i.e., the worlds where only e2, e5, and e6, but not e9 occur, the worlds where only e2 and e5 occur, the worlds where only e2 occurs, and the worlds where even e2 is not realized. Once e2 has happened, we find ourselves in a slightly different position. After e2, the number of available culminating worlds stays the same: the worlds where all of e2, e5, e6, and e9 occur. But the number of available non-culminating worlds is reduced, since the option that even the initial part of e has not occurred is now cut off, and the world of evaluation has more chances to develop into a culminating world than before “2” was pushed. The same happens at the next step and so on. In this type of scenario, the proportion of non-culminating options in the total population goes down with every subevent occurring.
To make this idea more explicit one can take Thomason’s 1984/2002 (
Thomason 2002, pp. 216–17) forward branching world-time model as a point of departure, which is employed (directly or in a modified way) in a number of studies of modality, tense, and aspect, e.g.,
Condoravdi (
2002),
Deo (
2009) and other related work.
Thomason defines his T × W frames as a quadruple <W, T, <, ≈>, where W and T are sets of worlds and times, respectively, < is the temporal precedence relation with the usual properties, and ≈ is a three-place equivalence relation between times and two worlds. For a given world w and time t, ≈ defines historical alternatives to w, worlds that share the past with w up to and including t and can only differ as to what is future with respect to t. We write “w ≈ t w′” for “w′ is a historical alternative to w through t”. For all w, w′ ∈ W and t, t′ ∈ T the following holds: if w′ is a historical alternative to w through t, and t′ precedes t, then w′ is historical alternative to w through t′. Historical alternatives can thus be thought of as possible variants of development of a world, starting from a certain time.
The set historical alternatives through the times
t and
t′ can be depicted as a branching structure in (69):
(69) |
![Languages 09 00371 i004]() |
In (69), all the worlds are historical alternatives to each other through t. The worlds w, w3, and w4 are historical alternatives to each other through t′. The diagram in (69) makes it clear that as time advances, the set of historical alternatives to a particular world decreases: what is an available alternative at some time can cease to be such at a later time, but no new alternatives can become available.
Let
e be an activity component of an eventuality that falls under an accomplishment description P
w0 in the evaluation world
w0. Let
ea be its temporal part that occurs in the evaluation world and is described by a non-culminating sentence. Let INI(e
a, w
0) be the time where
ea starts. Then, the entire set of historical alternatives to
w0 through INI(e
a, w
0) falls into two parts: culminating worlds, in which
ea develops into an eventuality from the extension of P
w0, and non-culminating worlds, where
ea stops before the culmination
23. On a non-culminating construal, the evaluation world
w0 itself is a non-culminating world.
Let R
NC(e)(t)(w) be the ratio of non-culminating worlds to all worlds for an eventuality
e at time
t in a world
w:
(70) | RNC(e)(t)(w) = |{w′: w ≈t w′ ∧ ¬culm(e)(w′)}| / |{w′: w ≈t w′}| |
Now we can use RNC to measure for the distance to the culmination. At INI(e, w), the initial bound of an eventuality in a world, there can be quite a lot of non-culminating worlds within the set of historical alternatives. RNC can be close to 1. As time advances, some of the historical alternatives are closed off, among them potentially being both culminating and non-culminating ones. We can say that the culmination is coming closer to realization if the proportion of non-culminating worlds in the entire population of historical alternatives decreases, i.e., if RNC goes down.
Consider an illustration in (71):
(71) |
![Languages 09 00371 i005]() |
In (71), the line in bold represents an eventuality from the extension of an accomplishment predicate Pw0, which has a blue part ea occurring in the evaluation world w0. The eventuality starts at t (=INI(e, w0)) in all of the historical alternatives to w0 through t except in w5. At t′ it stops in w3 and w4, but continues in w0, w1, and w2. At t′′, it stops in w0, but continues in w1 and w2. Finally, at t′′′ it stops in w2, but continues and culminates in w1. The culmination here and in the diagrams below is symbolized by a circle.
Now we can say that the distance to the culmination decreases from the initial and final bounds of ea, i.e., from t to t′′ in w0. This is so because by t′′ the non-culminating world w5, w3, and w4 cease to be historical alternatives to w0. If {w0, w1, w2, w3, w4, w5} are all worlds that there are, then RNC(e)(t)(w0) is 5/6, since the culmination is not reached in five out of six historical alternatives to w0, namely, in w0, w2, w3, w4, and w5. RNC(e)(t′′)(w0) is 2/3, since through t′′ three historical alternatives are available, and the culmination is not attained in two of them. A positive difference between RNC(e)(t)(w) and RNC(e)(t′′)(w) indicates that t and t′′ are not equidistant to the culmination. For there being equidistance, this difference has to be negligibly small, according to (64).
It should be pointed out that RNC(e)(t′′′′)(w1) is 0, since the only historical alternative available in w1 at t′′′′ is w1 itself, a culminating world. This seems to be an intuitively plausible result.
Illustration (71) is a possible representation of the structure of historical alternatives for the digital code scenario, where the door is opened by pushing the buttons 2, 5, 9, and 6 in that specific order, (72a-b). This is shown in (73).
(72) | a. | e2: pushing “2” | b. | e= e2 ⊕ e5 ⊕ e9 ⊕ e6 |
| | e5: pushing “5” | | |
| | e9: pushing “9” | | |
| | e6: pushing “6” | | |
(73) |
![Languages 09 00371 i006]() |
In (73), historical alternatives are individual worlds. Note that while
w3 and
w4 are different historical alternatives, this difference has nothing to do with the eventuality in question: in both worlds the same part of
e,
e2, occurs, and only this part. Whatever makes
w3 and
w4 different is irrelevant for the development of an eventuality and its culmination. We can therefore consider
w3 and
w4 one
option for an eventuality that culminates in
w1. Options for an eventuality will thus be classes of historical alternatives in which the same part of it occurs:
(74) | o1(e) = {w: e2 occurs in w and no other part of e occurs in w } = {w3, w4} |
| o2(e) = {w: e2 ⊕ e5 occurs in w and no other part of e occurs in w } = {w0 } |
| … |
Considering
w3 and
w4 one option, (74), and letting R
NC count options rather than worlds, we arrive at (75):
(75) |
![Languages 09 00371 i007]() |
The R
NC values for
e with respect to the option {w
1} at different times are shown in (76):
(76) | Time | t | t′ | t′′ | t′′′ | t′′′′ | |
| RNC w.r.t. w1 | 4/5 | 3/4 | 2/3 | 1/2 | 0 | |
As (76) makes explicit, the value or RNC monotonically decreases with time, representing the fact that in every world where the eventuality goes on, the culmination is coming closer to realization.
As seen in (75), on a UTA scenario, at any time an activity can either stop or have one specific continuation. With any other continuation, it is no longer an activity that can develop into an eventuality that falls under the description in question.
The broken lock scenario is crucially different in that at any time an eventuality can go whichever way without losing its potential of culminating into opening of the door. It is only required that the final subevent is e
sledgehammer; other subevents from (77) can be arranged in any possible way.
(77) | ekey = applying a key (orange line) |
| epicklock = applying a picklock (blue line) |
| ecrowbar = applying a crowbar (red line) |
| esledgehammer = applying a sledgehammer (green line) |
The structure of historical alternatives is shown in (78):
(78) |
![Languages 09 00371 i008]() |
In (78), in any world at any time the same options are available. After any of the subevents in (77) except esledgehammer, an activity can stop without reaching the culmination (black lines in (78)), or be followed by any of the subevents. If followed by esledgehammer, an activity culminates, other subevents can be further extended. The reader can check for herself that on this set up, any choice of times and options will yield the same RNC. This is the case of equidistance.
The structure behind the Scenario 3 in (63) involving a fixed number of pushes of arbitrary buttons is shown in (80). Let us assume for the sake of exposition a simplified version of the Scenario 3 where there are exactly two different buttons, “1” and “2” in (79), and to open the door one has to make three random pushes. As in (78), options where the activity stops are shown by black lines.
(79) | a. e1 = pushing “1” (blue line) |
| b. e2 = pushing “2” (red line) |
(80) |
![Languages 09 00371 i009]() |
This setup involves eight (23) culminating options and 7 (1 + 2 + 4) non-culminating ones. At the initial bound of the activity, RNC is thus 7/15 for any world. After two pushes, there are three options available in any world where an activity continues: an activity stops or a push of any of the two buttons makes it culminate. RNC at this time is thus 1/3, which is by 2/15 smaller than at the initial bound. Note that the same difference obtains between RNC at t and at t′′ in (75), as (76) shows. In the scenario in question, therefore, despite the lack of UTA, as time advances, the number of non-culminating options decreases faster than that of culminating ones. The lack of equidistance in (75) and (80) correctly predicts that on these scenarios the speakers’ judgments pattern together.
TC-effects whereby a sentence improves with longer chains of subevents is what one can expect, as well. Imagine that in (63) instead of four pushes ten are required. Then, the number of culminating worlds is 210, while that of non-culminating worlds is 20 + 21 + … + 29. After two pushes, the former will be 28, while the latter 20 + 21 + … 27. The reader can calculate RNCs before and after two pushes and see that the difference between them is about 0.002 instead of 2/15 in the previous case. This is what is meant by (64) as a (contextually) insignificant distance to the culmination between the initial and final bounds of a relevant eventuality.
TC-effects for UTA scenarios like (58) are not surprising either. UTA scenarios involve non-culminating options being eliminated one at a time, as (75) makes evident. Therefore, the difference in R
NC between the
k-th subevent and
m-th subevent in a chain of
n subevents will be n-k-1/n-k – n-m-1/n-m. With
n increasing, the difference becomes negligible. I believe this provides a natural basis for characterizing the intuitions behind the TC-effects described in the
Section 3.3.
Finally, consider incremental accomplishments like ‘read a novel’ or ‘dig up a vegetable patch’ where the acceptability of a non-culminating reading depends on the size of the incremental argument. The discussion in the previous section suggests a parallelism between this effect and TC effects characterized above. Indeed, the structure of options for incremental predicates resemble the one in (80) except for being an instance of permutation without repetition. (As an idealization, let us assume that these predicates adhere to mapping to subevents, i.e., the same part of an object is not read/dug up more than once.)
Let
e be an activity component of an incremental accomplishment description that consists of three subevents, corresponding to three parts of its incremental theme. Such an activity can, for example, be digging up three parts of a small vegetable patch or reading a note consisting of three sentences, as in (81). Such a setup yields a considerably degraded sentence under normal circumstances, as we saw in (47) with ‘read a note’.
(81) | a. e1 = reading / digging up the first part of the object (blue line) |
| b. e2 = reading / digging up the second part of the object (red line) |
| c. e3 = reading / digging up the third part of the object (green line) |
The structure of historical alternatives is shown in (82):
(82) |
![Languages 09 00371 i010]() |
At the initial bound of an eventuality, there are six (3!) culminating and 10 (1 + 3 + 6) non-culminating options, with RNC being 5/8. After two subevents occur, RNC comes down to 1/2. The difference between the two comes close to other non-equidistant cases in (75) and (80). Again, with the number of subevents increasing, which happens if an incremental object is more structured, more spatially extended or more fine-grained, the difference decreases radically. If a chain consists of ten subevents rather than three, then after two subevents occur in the evaluation world, the RNC-difference between the initial and final temporal bounds of their sum will be less than 1/10−4. Exactly as the discussion in the previous section suggests, it should not be difficult to come up with a context where this difference is negligible.
Now I am in the position to formulate a more refined version of the ED:
(83) | (Equi)distance to the culmination (refined version) |
| NCAs describe a proper non-final part e of the activity component of an eventuality that falls under an accomplishment event description in a world w such that the difference value RNC(e)(INI(e,w))(w)—RNC(e)(FIN(e,w))(w) falls below μC, the negligibility threshold in the context C. |
According to (83), an eventuality e that falls under a NCA is a proper non-final part of an eventuality from the extension of an accomplishment predicate. For any world w, e should satisfy the following condition: the difference in the proportion of non-culminating options (i.e., ways in which w can develop into a world where e does not culminate) at the initial and final bounds of e in w should be negligibly small relative to the current context.
The difference value in (83) seems to be the simplest possible metric for the equidistance to the culmination, but it is certainly not the only admissible one. I believe that (83) can be formulated in terms of probability distributions, for example. I will leave an exploration of the alternatives for a future study, however.
If equidistance to the culmination is operational in constraining the distribution of non-culminating accomplishments, the last question to address is: why is it operational?
4.3. Culmination and the Meaning of Activities
Equidistance to the culmination suggests that a non-culminating accomplishment describes an eventuality that does not reach the culmination in the evaluation world, and moreover, that the culmination does not come closer to being realized in that world. The literature on eventuality types (aspectual classes, actionality) starting from
Vendler (
1957) is not unaware of predicates that can be characterized in a similar way.
Predicates of activities and states describe eventualities that do not and cannot culminate hence trivially (i.e., at any interval in any world) meet the equidistance condition. The reader can check for herself that (83) would always yield 0 if the number of culminating worlds in the population of historical alternatives is 0, which is the case with activities and states. Specifically, classical non-derived activities like
walk would remain activities if defined in terms of the notion of equidistance. I believe this is a desirable result
24.
Therefore, a natural hypothesis relating the equidistance to the culmination and the distribution of NCAs would consist of the two parts in (83)–(84):
(84) | NCAs as activities |
| NCAs are perfective activities. |
(85) | Activity as equidistance |
| Equidistance to the culmination is a defining characteristic of activities. |
If being reinterpreted as an activity is necessary for the derivation of NCAs, (83), and if equidistance to the culmination is what makes activities actually activities, (84), then the question why equidistance is part of the semantics of NCAs can receive a satisfactory answer.
According to (83), ‘Kerim walked for two hours’ and ‘Kerim read a novel for two hours’ (or ‘Kerim opened the door for two hours’, impossible in English, but possible in Turkic) are both activity descriptions in the perfective past. The only difference has to do with the fact that walk is a lexical predicate of activities, whereas NCAs are created out of predicates of accomplishments by combining PART with an accomplishment vP.
Impossible NCAs of the form [PFV [ PART [vP …. ] ] ] discussed throughout this paper should thus be impossible because the combination of PART with a vP-level eventuality description fails to denote a well-defined activity. The infelicity/ungrammaticality observed in (14)–(16), (47)–(48) and similar examples should result from the failure of ‘setup a tent’, ‘open the door’, ‘read a word/a symbol’, etc., to present themselves as an activity after combining with PART.
Hypothesis (84) is not the received view of what activities are. Garden variety activities like ‘walk’, ‘cry’, ‘eat apples’ are typically separated from accomplishments (‘walk to the station’, ‘eat an apple’, ‘open the door’) by well-known characteristics like the subinterval property (
Taylor 1977) and cumulativity/quantization (
Krifka 1989,
1992,
1998;
Rothstein 2004).
However, these characteristics are not helpful in isolating the class of predicates that fail to derive NCAs. It is not difficult to see that after applying PART to an accomplishment description one would always get a non-quantized event predicate. This is so because any part of a non-final part of an eventuality is also a non-final part of this eventuality. If analyzed in temporal terms, [ PART [vP …. ] ] will have the subinterval property, for similar reasons. In this respect, [PART [set up a tent]], [PART [read a novel]], [PART [open the door]] are all alike: they pattern together with true activities, no matter if they are capable of deriving an NCA. If activities are defined by mereological characteristics like quantization or by the subinterval property, activityhood cannot be what isolates the class of impossible NCAs.
But if part of the definition of activities is equidistance to the culmination, we arrive at a much clearer picture of what NCAs are. The peculiarity of accomplishments that allow for a non-culminating construal is that eventualities in their extensions can have activity-like temporal parts, which do not make any detectable contribution to the culmination coming closer to realization. For instance, the extensions of ‘tear a thread’ or ‘open the door’ admit eventualities where non-final parts of the activity component bring about no change at all. After PART applies to such an accomplishment description, these temporal parts characterized by equidistance to the culmination will be in the extension of the resulting predicate [ PART [vP …. ] ]. The latter will therefore be a predicate of activities. If the extension of the original predicate provides no such eventualities, the PART-predicate will fail to be an activity, and the derivation of an NCA will not succeed.
Note that equidistance to the culmination as a property of activity predicates is easy to overlook if non-derived lexical activities are only taken into account, since the culmination of ‘walk’, ‘cry’, etc. is never at issue.
It is only in derived environments, i.e., with predicates that are created by applying PART to an accomplishment description, where the significance of (84) fully reveals itself. It allows us to discriminate between different types of PART-predicates, because not all of them would come out activities under (84). In particular, || [PART [set up a tent ]] || and similar descriptions will be told apart from || [PART [read a novel] ] ||. The latter will be an activity but the former will not.
Therefore, the view that a [ PART [vP … ]] is a predicate of activities allows to reduce the derivation of NCAs to the derivation of perfective lexical activities like ‘walk’. Moreover, assuming that equidistance to the culmination is what all activities have in common predicts the restrictions on NCAs discussed above. These seem to be welcome consequences.
A separate question is what forces [ PART [vP … ]] to be a predicate of activities, i.e., what goes wrong if PART comes on top of predicates like ‘set up a tent’ or ‘open the door’ on the relevant scenarios.
To the best of my knowledge, this question has never been addressed in the literature. But if the above reasoning is correct, one hypothesis suggests itself. There is one property that || [PART [set up a tent ]] || and other predicates that cannot output an NCA have in common: they do not fall under any of the established eventuality types. They are not accomplishment predicates. The culmination which is part of the denotation of || set up a tent || is no longer in the denotation of the corresponding PART-predicate. But they are not activity predicates either, as we have just seen, since eventualities in their extensions fail to show equidistance to the culmination. If being neither an activity nor an accomplishment is offensive for the derivation, that would explain why NCAs in (12b)–(14b) and the like cannot be derived.
One can imagine two sources for this restriction. One source can be output constrains on operations on eventuality descriptions. Such constraints would define what is a well-formed output of the application of PART. The other would attribute the same effect to the input requirements that aspectual operators (in particular, PFV) impose on their arguments.
The first option can involve a principle that constrains operations on eventuality descriptions in the following way:
(86) | Closedness restriction on eventuality types |
| The set of eventuality types in a given language is closed under any operation on eventuality descriptions. |
If (86) is a principle of the grammar, no operation can create an eventuality type that does not exist independently in a given language. But predicates like || [PART [set up a tent ]] ||, which are neither activities not accomplishments, will represent such a new eventuality type that (86) rules out.
The other option would be to suggest that predicates that belong to no eventuality type are not offensive by themselves, but what is problematic is their interaction with other elements of the derivation. In the case at hand, that would imply that PFV, which takes [ PART [
vP … ]] as its argument (see (21)), can accept predicates of accomplishments and predicates of activities, but not predicates that fall under neither of these categories. A possible implementation of this option would be to have PFV only defined for well-established eventuality types, as in (87).
(87) | Domain restriction for PFV |
| || PFV || = λP: P falls under an eventuality type.λt.∃e [P(e) ∧ τ(e) ⊆ t] |
At the moment I cannot offer a full assessment of relative benefits of (86)–(87). However, it is not difficult to imagine what kind of empirical and theoretical considerations can be taken into account to decide between these two options.
One observation that seems to support (86) is: attested types of operations on event structure seem to conform with (86). For example, causatives and applicatives across languages can change an eventuality type of an input predicate, but do not seem to be able to create new eventuality types. For example, when a causative comes on top of a stative like ‘know’, the result is typically ‘let know’, ‘inform’, and the like, a well-defined accomplishment.
An argument against (86) would be that PART does not only appear in the derivation of NCAs. Presumably, it is also present in the structure of the imperfective clauses, which do not show restrictions parallel to what is observed with NCAs. As was discussed above, while an NCA construal is unavailable for ‘set up a tent’ and similar predicates, a corresponding progressive sentence is readily available in (iii), fn. 18. If both NCAs and the progressive involve PART, (86) cannot be maintained. But to what extent this argument is irrefutable depends on whether one can completely exclude a theory in which NCAs and the progressive/ imperfective do not share PART and are derived by two distinct mechanisms. An independent reason to doubt that both NCAs and the progressive/imperfective are based on the same PART is that many languages with the progressive do not have NCAs of the type discussed above. This is not expected if PART is operational in both configurations.
On the other hand, assuming (87) comes with implications which invite us for a lot of further reflection. Condition (87) can hardly be viewed as a universal characteristic of all aspectual operators. The progressive can make reference to any non-final parts of the activity components of accomplishment descriptions without this component being a well-defined activity. If one wants to say that (87) is a universal property of the perfective, not shared by the progressive, one has to explain why the two semantic aspects are different. If (87) is viewed as a domain restriction for a specific grammatical morpheme in a specific language or group of languages, the expectation would be that it should not be impossible to find languages where the same morpheme appears without such a restriction. Therefore, to find out if (87) is tenable, one should study domain restrictions associated with semantic aspects in more detail and identify existing patterns of cross-linguistic variation in this area of the grammar.
A lot of further reflection is needed to decide between the two options in (86)–(87). Assessing possible pros and contras would be a subject for a separate study, however. In the current one, I cannot have these questions settled, but I hope to have outlined a minimal prospect for a further inquiry. This having been said, I am ready to proceed to the concluding section of this article.