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Article

Synthetic Central Bank Digital Currencies and Systemic Liquidity Risks

by
John E. Marthinsen
1 and
Steven R. Gordon
2,*
1
Economics Division, Babson College, Babson Park, MA 02457, USA
2
Operations and Information Management Division, Babson College, Babson Park, MA 02457, USA
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Int. J. Financial Stud. 2024, 12(1), 19; https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs12010019
Submission received: 31 December 2023 / Revised: 2 February 2024 / Accepted: 8 February 2024 / Published: 18 February 2024

Abstract

The failure of major banks in 2023, such as Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), Signature Bank, First Republic Bank, and Credit Suisse, points to the continuing need for financial institutions to price liquidity risk properly and for financial systems to find alternative sources of liquidity in times of dire need. Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), fiat-backed stablecoins (fsCOINs), and synthetic central bank digital currencies (sCBDCs) could offer improvements, but each comes with its own set of problems and conditions. Prior research reaches conflicting conclusions about the effect that each of these three financial assets has on systemic bank liquidity and fails to adequately address their net benefits relative to each other. This paper addresses these issues, including those connected to financial disintermediation, bank runs, outsourcing central bank activities, financial interoperability, cash equivalents, maturity transformation, required reserves, and changes in nations’ monetary bases. After addressing the strengths and weaknesses of fsCOINs and CBDCs, we conclude that sCBDCs provide the most significant net liquidity benefits when risks and returns are considered.
Keywords: bank runs; cash equivalents; central bank digital currencies; disintermediation; interoperability; systemic liquidity; financial institution liquidity; monetary base; outsourcing; stablecoins; synthetic central bank digital currencies bank runs; cash equivalents; central bank digital currencies; disintermediation; interoperability; systemic liquidity; financial institution liquidity; monetary base; outsourcing; stablecoins; synthetic central bank digital currencies

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MDPI and ACS Style

Marthinsen, J.E.; Gordon, S.R. Synthetic Central Bank Digital Currencies and Systemic Liquidity Risks. Int. J. Financial Stud. 2024, 12, 19. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs12010019

AMA Style

Marthinsen JE, Gordon SR. Synthetic Central Bank Digital Currencies and Systemic Liquidity Risks. International Journal of Financial Studies. 2024; 12(1):19. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs12010019

Chicago/Turabian Style

Marthinsen, John E., and Steven R. Gordon. 2024. "Synthetic Central Bank Digital Currencies and Systemic Liquidity Risks" International Journal of Financial Studies 12, no. 1: 19. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs12010019

APA Style

Marthinsen, J. E., & Gordon, S. R. (2024). Synthetic Central Bank Digital Currencies and Systemic Liquidity Risks. International Journal of Financial Studies, 12(1), 19. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs12010019

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