Philosophies

10 pages, 191 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Fragments and Lies

by Eugenie Brinkema

Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 105; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040105 - 11 Jul 2024

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This article considers the formal and critical consequences of organizing an aesthetic corpus around the philosophical concept of the fragment via a reading of Aryan Kaganof’s “Ten Monologues from the Lives of the Serial Killers” (1994). This experimental video sets spoken accounts from [...] Read more.

This article considers the formal and critical consequences of organizing an aesthetic corpus around the philosophical concept of the fragment via a reading of Aryan Kaganof’s “Ten Monologues from the Lives of the Serial Killers” (1994). This experimental video sets spoken accounts from the perspective of the likes of Ted Bundy and Charles Manson alongside grainy, ambiguous imagery. Instead of thematic meditations on violence, the monologues circle around quasi-nostalgic reflections on the past and the nature of identity. The film frustrates any language of formal analysis that would rely on accounting for what is present in the film, instead proposing a sympathy with poststructuralism’s efforts at displacing the metaphysics of appearance. Violence is not what resides ready-made within the work, nor is it reducible to the realm of the visible or the audible, but is an unstable process bound up with the act of reading itself. The fragment as a formal problem holds out the abstract, general notion of a break in ways that compel a rethinking of violence as something impersonal, rhythmic, and grammatical. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Cinema and Philosophy: Exploring the Intersections of Time, Identity, Ethics and Aesthetics)

6 pages, 165 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Achilles’ To-Do List

by Zack Garrett

Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 104; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040104 - 11 Jul 2024

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Abstract

Much of the debate about the mathematical refutation of Zeno’s paradoxes surrounds the logical possibility of completing supertasks—tasks made up of an infinite number of subtasks. Max Black and J.F. Thomson attempt to show that supertasks entail logical contradictions, but their arguments come [...] Read more.

Much of the debate about the mathematical refutation of Zeno’s paradoxes surrounds the logical possibility of completing supertasks—tasks made up of an infinite number of subtasks. Max Black and J.F. Thomson attempt to show that supertasks entail logical contradictions, but their arguments come up short. In this paper, I take a different approach to the mathematical refutations. I argue that even if supertasks are possible, we do not have a non-question-begging reason to think that Achilles’ supertask is possible. The justification for the possibility of Achilles’ supertask lies in the possibility of him completing other supertasks of the same kind, and the justification for the possibility of him completing these other supertasks lies in the possibility of him completing yet more supertasks ad infinitum. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Zeno’s Paradoxes Today)

13 pages, 206 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The Necessity of the Death of God in Nietzsche and Heidegger

by Duane Armitage

Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 103; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040103 - 11 Jul 2024

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Abstract

This paper explores the philosophical perspectives of Nietzsche and Heidegger, tracing their analyses of the death of God and its aftermath. My aim is to clarify the diagnosis of this nihilism and its underlying causes, as well as evaluate the proposed remedies put [...] Read more.

This paper explores the philosophical perspectives of Nietzsche and Heidegger, tracing their analyses of the death of God and its aftermath. My aim is to clarify the diagnosis of this nihilism and its underlying causes, as well as evaluate the proposed remedies put forth by Nietzsche and Heidegger. Ultimately, I argue that the seemingly ambiguous consequences of the death of God are not only hopeful, but necessary, if human beings are to rise above and transmute a meaningless, resentment-laced existence, however, not by jettisoning Judeo-Christianity and its values, but rather by reinterpreting them. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Creative Death of God)

16 pages, 210 KiB

Open AccessArticle

On Splits, Big and Little: Towards an Intensive Model of Media and Mediation

by Eric S. Jenkins

Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 102; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040102 - 10 Jul 2024

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Abstract

This essay forwards an intensive model of mediation contrasted with the extensive model implicit in much of media theory, which conceives of communication media as an extension of human faculties. An intensive model, instead, conceives of mediation as a phenomenological process of splitting [...] Read more.

This essay forwards an intensive model of mediation contrasted with the extensive model implicit in much of media theory, which conceives of communication media as an extension of human faculties. An intensive model, instead, conceives of mediation as a phenomenological process of splitting or folding affective capacities. An extensive model results in a dualistic, essentialist theory of communication media and unresolvable normative debates about the connecting or disconnecting consequences of media. An intensive model avoids these limitations by diagramming various modes of mediation and illustrating how their consequences stem from alterations to intensive properties, thereby helping constitute subjects and media objects alike rather than presuming a media bridge between pre-existing subjects and objects. The essay employs a number of examples to illustrate the extensive model, including telephone conversations, cinema, animation, and social media. The essay concludes with the division of families over QAnon conspiracies to illustrate the analytic gain from an intensive model. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophy and Communication Technology)

7 pages, 172 KiB

Open AccessEditorial

The Ontology of Artifacts in the Long Middle Ages: An Introduction

by Henrik Lagerlund, Sylvain Roudaut and Erik Åkerlund

Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 101; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040101 - 9 Jul 2024

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Abstract

What is an artifact [...] Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Art vs Nature: The Ontology of Artifacts in the Long Middle Ages)

15 pages, 352 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Proclus on ἕνωσις: Knowing the One by the One in the Soul

by Van Tu

Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 100; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040100 - 8 Jul 2024

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Abstract

At Plato’s insistence to become as godlike as one can, the Neoplatonists seek their salvation in union with the first principle they call the One, identifying this union as the highest end of philosophy. As with all aspirations, the transition from theoretical ideal [...] Read more.

At Plato’s insistence to become as godlike as one can, the Neoplatonists seek their salvation in union with the first principle they call the One, identifying this union as the highest end of philosophy. As with all aspirations, the transition from theoretical ideal to practical implementation remains a perennial problem: how is it possible for a person, as a mere mortal, to leave the person’s confined ontological station to unite with the divine, transcendent first principle? This paper is an attempt to reconstruct Proclus’ highly distinctive answer to this question of enormous importance through a close examination of his development of the late Neoplatonic notion of the One in the soul (τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἓν). Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ancient and Medieval Theories of Soul)

21 pages, 282 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The Absurdity of Rational Choice: Time Travel, Foreknowledge, and the Aesthetic Dimension of Newcomb Problems

by Craig Bourne and Emily Caddick Bourne

Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 99; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040099 - 6 Jul 2024

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Abstract

Nikk Effingham and Huw Price argue that in certain cases of Newcomb problems involving time travel and foreknowledge, being given information about the future makes it rational to choose as an evidential decision theorist would choose. Although the cases they consider have some [...] Read more.

Nikk Effingham and Huw Price argue that in certain cases of Newcomb problems involving time travel and foreknowledge, being given information about the future makes it rational to choose as an evidential decision theorist would choose. Although the cases they consider have some intuitive pull, and so appear to aid in answering the question of what it is rational to do, we argue that their respective positions are not compelling. Newcomb problems are structured such that whichever way one chooses, one might be led by one’s preferred decision theory to miss out on some riches (riches which others obtain whilst employing their preferred decision theory). According to the novel aesthetic diagnosis we shall offer of the Newcomb dialectic, missing out in this way does not render one irrational but, rather, subject to being seen as absurd. This is a different kind of cost but not one that undermines one’s rationality. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Time Travel 2nd Edition)

11 pages, 212 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Personal Time and Transmigration Time Travel

by Cei Maslen

Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 98; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040098 - 5 Jul 2024

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Abstract

Lewis argued that although paradoxes such as the famous Grandfather Paradox can be solved, only a limited set of time travel fiction is consistent. In this paper, I discuss how to extend a Lewisian approach to a class of time travel fiction not [...] Read more.

Lewis argued that although paradoxes such as the famous Grandfather Paradox can be solved, only a limited set of time travel fiction is consistent. In this paper, I discuss how to extend a Lewisian approach to a class of time travel fiction not considered by Lewis: transmigration or mental time travel fiction. To this end, Lewis’s definition of personal time needs refining, and this is the primary focus of my paper. I discuss some alternative refinements of Lewis’s definition: a Solely Mental definition and a Causal definition. I end by also applying these definitions to cases of reverse aging. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Time Travel 2nd Edition)

24 pages, 357 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Quantum Mechanics, Fields, Black Holes, and Ontological Plurality

by Gustavo E. Romero

Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 97; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040097 - 4 Jul 2024

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Abstract

The ontology behind quantum mechanics has been the subject of endless debate since the theory was formulated some 100 years ago. It has been suggested, at one time or another, that the objects described by the theory may be individual particles, waves, fields, [...] Read more.

The ontology behind quantum mechanics has been the subject of endless debate since the theory was formulated some 100 years ago. It has been suggested, at one time or another, that the objects described by the theory may be individual particles, waves, fields, ensembles of particles, observers, and minds, among many other possibilities. I maintain that these disagreements are due in part to a lack of precision in the use of the theory’s various semantic designators. In particular, there is some confusion about the role of representation, reference, and denotation in the theory. In this article, I first analyze the role of the semantic apparatus in physical theories in general and then discuss the corresponding ontological implications for quantum mechanics. Subsequently, I consider the extension of the theory to quantum fields and then analyze the semantic changes of the designators with their ontological consequences. In addition to the classical arguments to rule out a particle ontology in the case of non-relativistic quantum field theory, I show how the existence of black holes makes the proposal of a particle ontology in general spacetimes unfeasible. I conclude by proposing a provisional pluralistic ontology of fields and spacetime and discussing some prospects for possible future ontological economies. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophy and Quantum Mechanics)

5 pages, 137 KiB

Open AccessCommentary

Moral Responsibility and Time Travel in an Indeterministic World

by Joshua Spencer

Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 96; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040096 - 4 Jul 2024

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Abstract

I have argued against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities using a time travel-based counterexample. Kelly McCormick has responded to my counterexample by arguing that the time travel scenario must be a scenario in which a time traveler’s actions are causally determined; hence, she [...] Read more.

I have argued against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities using a time travel-based counterexample. Kelly McCormick has responded to my counterexample by arguing that the time travel scenario must be a scenario in which a time traveler’s actions are causally determined; hence, she claims, we should be suspicious of attributing moral responsibility to anyone in such a scenario. In this paper, I respond by arguing that one might be morally responsible in an indeterministic time travel scenario. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Time Travel 2nd Edition)

17 pages, 277 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Epistemic Injustices in Disaster Theory and Management

by Alicia García Álvarez

Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 95; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040095 - 29 Jun 2024

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Abstract

The present paper argues that the standardised treatment of disaster research and practice perpetuates the production of systematic epistemic injustices against victims of disasters. On the one hand, disaster victims are often prevented from contributing with their opinions and knowledge to the processes [...] Read more.

The present paper argues that the standardised treatment of disaster research and practice perpetuates the production of systematic epistemic injustices against victims of disasters. On the one hand, disaster victims are often prevented from contributing with their opinions and knowledge to the processes of disaster mitigation and disaster conceptualisation. On the other hand, disaster victims tend to lack the hermeneutical resources to make sense of their experiences intelligibly, due to the existence of significant hermeneutical gaps in the hegemonic terminology on the matter. I argue that both forms of epistemic injustice, the testimonial and the hermeneutical, are sustained by an epistemic privilege between the Global North and the Global South in matters of disasters. The second group comprises what I categorise generally as ‘disaster victims’. I identify two forms of structural prejudice that operate against disaster victims: one is the ‘non-expert’ prejudice, and the other is the colonial prejudice. Finally, because of the intercultural nature of disaster environments, I discuss the field of ‘multicultural competencies’ as a useful form of unveiling and counteracting the epistemic injustices contained in both disaster theory and practice. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Emergencies, Disasters and Catastrophes: Perspectives from Ethics and Political Philosophy)

17 pages, 304 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The Gap of Presence: Challenges in Describing Perceptual Phenomena

by André Dias de Andrade

Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 94; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040094 - 29 Jun 2024

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Abstract

This paper reconstructs Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical project in terms of a phenomenology of sensible transcendence. According to this framework, (i) any given data are correlative to a subjective apprehension, (ii) but they cannot be fully captured by this same experience. Therefore, subjective apprehension must [...] Read more.

This paper reconstructs Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical project in terms of a phenomenology of sensible transcendence. According to this framework, (i) any given data are correlative to a subjective apprehension, (ii) but they cannot be fully captured by this same experience. Therefore, subjective apprehension must remain open to a type of absence or radical indeterminacy. This notion of transcendence must be grounded in bodily experience, and the challenge is to develop a notion of logos that can account for its sensible donation. We describe that the critical apparatus mobilized to achieve this goal, primarily through the notions of “field of presence” and “presentation”, restores a logic of consciousness in these analyses that focus on the body. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Merleau-Ponty and Rereading the Phenomenology of Perception)

19 pages, 542 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Is God Sustainable?

by Eugene Halton

Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 93; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040093 - 26 Jun 2024

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Abstract

This essay approaches the “God is dead” theme by offering a new philosophical history addressing what would make belief in divinity, in God, sustainable and unsustainable. I claim that the death of nature and the death of God in the modern era are [...] Read more.

This essay approaches the “God is dead” theme by offering a new philosophical history addressing what would make belief in divinity, in God, sustainable and unsustainable. I claim that the death of nature and the death of God in the modern era are manifestations of a progressive distancing from a religious philosophy of the Earth that guided human development until the beginnings of civilization. I outline within the space limitations here a new way of looking at the rise of civilization and the modern era by re-evaluating large-scale epochal beliefs and assumptions of progress within a context of sustainable ends and what I have termed sustainable wisdom. From an original evolved outlook I call animate mind, rooted in a religious philosophy of the living Earth, succeeding contractions of anthropocentric mind and machine-centric mind have regressively disconnected from the community of life. This trajectory courses the disconnect from the livingness of things as defining cosmos, to that of machine-centric mind in the modern era, a devolutionary elevation of the feelingless machine, of deadness, of what Erich Fromm described as cultural necrophilia. I propose rebalancing these later contractions of anthropocentric and machine-centric mind with that deeper reality of animate mind, forged as the human evolutionary legacy still present in the human body-mind today. The renewed legacy of animate mind provides a key to what a sustainable God might mean. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Creative Death of God)

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12 pages, 805 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Doing for Circular Time What Shoemaker Did for Time without Change: How One Could Have Evidence That Time Is Circular Rather than Linear and Infinitely Repeating

by Cody Gilmore and Brian Kierland

Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 92; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040092 - 25 Jun 2024

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Abstract

There are possible worlds in which time is circular and finite in duration, forming a loop of, say, 12,000 years. There are also possible worlds in which time is linear and infinite in both directions and in which history is repetitive, consisting of [...] Read more.

There are possible worlds in which time is circular and finite in duration, forming a loop of, say, 12,000 years. There are also possible worlds in which time is linear and infinite in both directions and in which history is repetitive, consisting of infinitely many 12,000-year epochs, each two of which are exactly alike with respect to all intrinsic, purely qualitative properties. Could one ever have empirical evidence that one inhabits a world of the first kind rather than a world of the second kind? We argue for the affirmative answer, contra Quine, Newton-Smith, and Bergström. Our argument for that conclusion differs from an argument for the same conclusion due to Weir. Weir’s argument is probabilistic and explicitly requires having evidence against determinism. Our argument is a direct appeal to the simplicity of laws, and it involves no probabilistic component. It is modeled on Shoemaker’s argument that one could have evidence of time without change. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Time Travel 2nd Edition)

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17 pages, 315 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Elements of a First-Person Ecology: Historical Roots, Recognition and Ecospirituality

by Esteban Arcos, Damien Delorme and Gérald Hess

Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 91; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040091 - 21 Jun 2024

Viewed by 442

Abstract

Starting from the observation that there is a gap between knowledge of the environmental sciences and practical engagement, for example, in climate change or biodiversity loss, this article explores one possible explanation for this situation—namely, the process of objectification inherent in science. It [...] Read more.

Starting from the observation that there is a gap between knowledge of the environmental sciences and practical engagement, for example, in climate change or biodiversity loss, this article explores one possible explanation for this situation—namely, the process of objectification inherent in science. It then proposes to remedy the situation by defending the idea of a ‘first-person ecology’. This term refers to a field of research and practice that looks at the relationship between humans and nature from the point of view of the embodied and situated nature of lived experience. The lived experience of nature at the heart of a first-person ecology is first studied from an epistemic perspective using the concept of recognition, inspired by the Frankfurt School philosopher and sociologist Axel Honneth. It is then approached from a phenomenological perspective, using the emerging field of ecospirituality to describe the characteristics of this experience. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Environmental Philosophy and Ecological Thought)

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Philosophies, Volume 9, Issue 4 (August 2024) – 15 articles

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