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The Vienna Circle: Shaping Contemporary Analytic Philosophy and Its History
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The Vienna Circle: Shaping Contemporary Analytic Philosophy and Its History

A special issue of Philosophies (ISSN 2409-9287).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (25 May 2024) | Viewed by 1792

Special Issue Editors

Dr. Mirja Hartimo

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Department of Philosophy, History and Art Studies, University of Helsinki, 00100 Helsinki, Finland
Interests: history of analytic philosophy; philosophy of sciene; philosophy of mathematics; phenomenology
Dr. Anssi Korhonen

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Department of Philosophy, History and Art Studies, University of Helsinki, 00100 Helsinki, Finland
Interests: history of analytic philosophy; Bertrand Russell; metaphysics

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

An exciting trend in current analytic philosophy is the emergence of several topics that draw their inspiration partly from the work of Rudolf Carnap, a leading figure in the Vienna Circle. Approaches such as deflationary metaontology, conceptual engineering, logical pluralism, and related views on the normativity of logic are seen to have Carnapian roots; however, these topics are quite foreign to the once-prevalent but rather narrow reading of Carnap that derives from W. V. Quine’s and others’ appraisal of him in the 1950s and 1960s.

The case of Carnap raises questions about the potential narrowness of our understanding of the Vienna Circle in general.  While the reappraisal of the history of the Vienna Circle has been ongoing since the early 1980s, the more recent developments in analytic philosophy suggest that there might be even more interesting yet previously unnoticed views pertinent to present-day concerns.

This Special Issue collects such novel perspectives on the Vienna Circle. The covered topics range from rereadings of the doctrines of the members of the Vienna Circle, such as Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, and Moritz Schlick, but also less well known figures, including its female members or sympathizers. We look for constructive connections between the Vienna Circle and different philosophical traditions as well as new perspectives on various thematic questions, such as the development of contemporary logic and unity of science.

Topics relevant to this Special Issue include, but are not restricted to, the following:

  • The reception and impact of the Vienna Circle on contemporary analytic philosophy;
  • The relationship between logical positivism and other intellectual movements in Europe and the United States, such as phenomenology, existentialism, pragmatism, and critical theory;
  • Logical positivism and contemporary philosophy of science: legacy and relevance;
  • The Vienna Circle’s contributions to the philosophy of mathematics and logic;
  • Interdisciplinary and extradisciplinary perspectives on logical positivism and its heritage.

Dr. Mirja Hartimo
Dr. Anssi Korhonen
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a double-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Philosophies is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1400 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • Vienna Circle
  • Carnap
  • Schlick
  • Neurath
  • history of analytic philosophy
  • logical empiricism
  • logical positivism

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Published Papers (3 papers)

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18 pages, 258 KiB  
Article
Carnap and Wittgenstein: Tolerance, Arbitrariness, and Truth
by Oskari Kuusela
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 114; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040114 - 30 Jul 2024
Viewed by 267
Abstract
This article discusses the relationship between Ludwig Wittgenstein’s and Rudolf Carnap’s philosophies of logic during the time of Wittgenstein’s interactions with the Vienna Circle and up to 1934 when the German edition of Carnap’s The Logical Syntax of Language was published. Whilst Section [...] Read more.
This article discusses the relationship between Ludwig Wittgenstein’s and Rudolf Carnap’s philosophies of logic during the time of Wittgenstein’s interactions with the Vienna Circle and up to 1934 when the German edition of Carnap’s The Logical Syntax of Language was published. Whilst Section 1 focuses on the relationship between Carnap and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, including Wittgenstein’s accusation of plagiarism against Carnap in 1932, Section 2 discusses the relationship between Carnap’s principle of tolerance and Wittgenstein’s similar principle of the arbitrariness of grammar. I argue that, although Carnap’s claim in Logical Syntax to ‘go beyond’ Wittgenstein has certain justification in relation to the Tractatus, so does Wittgenstein’s priority claim. The relationship between Carnap’s philosophy of logic and the Tractatus is thus more complicated than is often recognized. If the reference point is Wittgenstein in the early 1930s, however, Carnap cannot be described as going beyond him, and by 1934, Wittgenstein had advanced further than Carnap would ever venture. Despite evidence that Carnap knew about Wittgenstein’s principle of the arbitrariness of syntax well before his first articulations of his principle of tolerance, the extent of the influence of Wittgenstein’s principle on Carnap remains unclear. What can be established with certainty is that Wittgenstein’s principle predates Carnap’s and that Carnap resisted acknowledging him despite being urged to do so. Arguably, Wittgenstein’s account of syntax as both arbitrary and non-arbitrary is also superior in clarity to Carnap’s misleading claim about a ‘complete freedom’ implied by the principle of tolerance, because such a freedom only exists for idle syntactical systems that are not put to work. In Section 3, I discuss the relationship between Carnap’s notion of expediency and Wittgenstein’s account of the correctness or truth of logical accounts. As my discussion of Wittgenstein’s account brings out, Carnap’s rejection of truth in logic for expediency as the goal of logical clarifications does not follow from the principle of tolerance and is not justified by it. It remains unclear what justifies Carnap’s rejection of truth as the goal of logical clarification. Again, Wittgenstein’s account seems preferable, given the vacuity of the claim that expediency constitutes the basis of choice between different logical languages and clarifications. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Vienna Circle: Shaping Contemporary Analytic Philosophy and Its History)
13 pages, 218 KiB  
Article
Regrounding the Unworldly: Carnap’s Politically Engaged Logical Pluralism
by Noah Friedman-Biglin
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 110; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040110 - 23 Jul 2024
Viewed by 361
Abstract
Recent discussions of logical pluralism trace its origins to Rudolf Carnap’s principle of tolerance; indeed, the principle is seen as one of Carnap’s lasting philosophical contributions. In this paper, I will argue that Carnap’s reasons for adopting this principle are not purely logical, [...] Read more.
Recent discussions of logical pluralism trace its origins to Rudolf Carnap’s principle of tolerance; indeed, the principle is seen as one of Carnap’s lasting philosophical contributions. In this paper, I will argue that Carnap’s reasons for adopting this principle are not purely logical, but are rather founded in the Vienna Circle’s manifesto—a programmatic document that brings the Circle’s philosophical work together with a program of social change. Building on work by Uebel, Romizi, and others, I argue that we must understand the principle in light of Carnap’s role in writing the manifesto, and thus as integrated into the larger philosophical and political goals of the Circle. This history illuminates the often-ignored relationship between Carnap’s logical pluralism and his political views. Finally, I turn to the political situation of the post-World War 2 period in the United States. During this time, the Circle’s emigres in the USA transitioned their work from active efforts to reform society to the technical work that we recognize as the foundation of American analytic philosophy today. In this final section, I argue that the reasons that Carnap distanced himself from the political foundations of his view were due in large part to McCarthy-era persecution of left-wing academics. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Vienna Circle: Shaping Contemporary Analytic Philosophy and Its History)
12 pages, 215 KiB  
Article
G. H. von Wright on Logical Empiricism
by Ilkka Niiniluoto
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 108; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040108 - 16 Jul 2024
Viewed by 300
Abstract
Georg Henrik von Wright (1916–2003) started his studies in theoretical philosophy at the University of Helsinki in 1934. His teacher, Professor Eino Kaila (1890–1958), was an associate of the Vienna Circle who had changed the course of Finnish philosophy with his own version [...] Read more.
Georg Henrik von Wright (1916–2003) started his studies in theoretical philosophy at the University of Helsinki in 1934. His teacher, Professor Eino Kaila (1890–1958), was an associate of the Vienna Circle who had changed the course of Finnish philosophy with his own version of logical empiricism. Under Kaila’s supervision, von Wright wrote his early studies on probability and defended his doctoral thesis The Logical Problem of Induction in 1941. Von Wright met Ludwig Wittgenstein in Cambridge in 1939 and 1947 and eventually became his successor there in 1948–1951. Later, von Wright characterized these two philosophers as his “father figures”: “Kaila had turned me into a logical positivist or empiricist. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, thoroughly eradicated this personality of mine.” This article studies von Wright’s changing relation to logical empiricism. The main sources include his correspondence with Kaila in 1937–1958 and his books Den logiska empirismen (in Swedish in 1943; in Finnish in 1945) and Logik, filosofi och språk (in Swedish in 1957, in Finnish in 1958). In his “Intellectual Autobiography” (1989), von Wright described the former book as “a farewell to the philosophy of my student years”. Wittgenstein’s influence can be seen in von Wright’s denial of the unity of science and his cool cultural pessimism as expressed in his critical essays. But it is also evident that logic and exact thinking continued to be central tools and ingredients of his subsequent and highly appreciated work as an analytic philosopher. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Vienna Circle: Shaping Contemporary Analytic Philosophy and Its History)
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