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Philosophies
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Time Travel 2nd Edition
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Time Travel 2nd Edition

A special issue of Philosophies (ISSN 2409-9287).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (30 April 2024) | Viewed by 14150

Special Issue Editor

Dr. Alasdair Richmond

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH8 9AD, UK
Interests: time travel; time; space; philosophy of science; British empiricism
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

I am pleased to invite submissions for a second edition of this Special Issue of Philosophies, to be devoted to papers in the philosophy of time travel. The first edition features a wide range of work by outstanding practitioners of the philosophy of time travel, covering, e.g., problems in backwards causation, precognition, probability, agency and decision making, while also covering how time travel illuminates differing attitudes to future events, as well as multi-dimensional time models of time travel.  However, in addition to the above, there are still plenty of areas of the subject for this Special Issue to explore. The philosophy of time travel now ranges from theories of how different interpretations of quantum mechanics might try to resolve Grandfather Paradoxes, through to discussions about the impact that time travel cases might have on our understanding of life’s value and death’s harm.  Other topics include questions about philosophical aesthetics, probability theory, historical artefacts, abstract entities, divine identity, and the ultimate cosmological/theological origins of the universe. The philosophy of time travel can contain discussions of issues in ethics, the philosophy of religion, philosophy of science (including quantum physics and spacetime physics), theories of persistence, personal identity, the philosophy of fiction, or even the philosophy of computation.  With time travel discussions proliferating in a host of philosophical sub-disciplines, my hope is that a second edition of this Special Issue may help extend the philosophy of time travel still further. Papers are invited from potential contributors on any aspect of the philosophy of time travel (including, but not exhausted by, the topics mentioned above and the topics in the list of keywords below). I look forward to your submissions.

Dr. Alasdair Richmond
Guest Editor

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Published Papers (8 papers)

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14 pages, 280 KiB  
Article
Determinism, Counterfactuals, and the Possibility of Time Travel
by Kadri Vihvelin
Philosophies 2023, 8(4), 68; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8040068 - 25 Jul 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2569
Abstract
The Consequence argument is an argument from plausible premises–our lack of causal power over the laws and past–to an implausible conclusion: that if determinism is true, we are equally powerless with respect to the future. What the compatibilist needs is a theory of [...] Read more.
The Consequence argument is an argument from plausible premises–our lack of causal power over the laws and past–to an implausible conclusion: that if determinism is true, we are equally powerless with respect to the future. What the compatibilist needs is a theory of counterfactuals that preserves the links between counterfactuals, causation, and the natural laws in a way that supports our commonsense belief that we have the power to make a causal difference to the future but no such power with respect to the past. Lewis’s critique of the Consequence argument was based on his theory of counterfactuals and his analysis of causation as a counterfactual relation between particular events. He argued that, at a world that is deterministic in the way that ours might be, counterfactuals are temporally asymmetric in a way that matches the contingent temporal asymmetry of cauation. So it is not surprising, but only to be expected, that the past is causally closed while the future is causally open. If this worked, it would be just what the compatibilist needs. But it doesn’t work. There is an argument, due to Tooley and recently endorsed by Wasserman, that a fundamental feature of Lewis’s theory of counterfactuals is inconsistent with the metaphysical possibility of time travel and backwards causation. If this is right, then Lewis’s response to the Consequence argument fails. I endorse this conclusion, but argue that there is a better theory of counterfactuals–a theory that leaves open the metaphysical possibility of time travel to the past and backwards causation. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Time Travel 2nd Edition)
28 pages, 2666 KiB  
Article
The Close Possibility of Time Travel
by Nikk Effingham
Philosophies 2023, 8(6), 118; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8060118 - 12 Dec 2023
Viewed by 3532
Abstract
This article discusses the possibility of some outlandish tropes from time travel fiction, such as people reversing in age as they time travel or the universe being destroyed because a time traveler kills their ancestor. First, I discuss what type of possibility we [...] Read more.
This article discusses the possibility of some outlandish tropes from time travel fiction, such as people reversing in age as they time travel or the universe being destroyed because a time traveler kills their ancestor. First, I discuss what type of possibility we might have in mind, detailing ‘close possibility’ as one such candidate. Secondly, I argue that—with only little exception—these more outlandish tropes fail to be closely possible. Thirdly, I discuss whether these outlandish tropes may nevertheless be more broadly possible (e.g., metaphysically or logically possible), arguing that whether they are or not depends upon your favored metaphysics of the laws of nature. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Time Travel 2nd Edition)
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14 pages, 220 KiB  
Article
Time Travelers (and Everyone Else) Cannot Do Otherwise
by G. C. Goddu
Philosophies 2024, 9(1), 28; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9010028 - 17 Feb 2024
Viewed by 2087
Abstract
Many defenders of the possibility of time travel into the past also hold that such time travel places no restrictions on what said time travelers can do. Some hold that it places at least a few restrictions on what time travelers can do. [...] Read more.
Many defenders of the possibility of time travel into the past also hold that such time travel places no restrictions on what said time travelers can do. Some hold that it places at least a few restrictions on what time travelers can do. In attempting to resolve this dispute, I reached a contrary conclusion. Time travelers to the past cannot do other than what they in fact do. Using a very weak notion of can, I shall argue that the correspondingly strong cannot do otherwise applies in the case of backwards time travel. I defend this result from objections. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Time Travel 2nd Edition)
12 pages, 805 KiB  
Article
Doing for Circular Time What Shoemaker Did for Time without Change: How One Could Have Evidence That Time Is Circular Rather than Linear and Infinitely Repeating
by Cody Gilmore and Brian Kierland
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 92; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040092 - 25 Jun 2024
Viewed by 929
Abstract
There are possible worlds in which time is circular and finite in duration, forming a loop of, say, 12,000 years. There are also possible worlds in which time is linear and infinite in both directions and in which history is repetitive, consisting of [...] Read more.
There are possible worlds in which time is circular and finite in duration, forming a loop of, say, 12,000 years. There are also possible worlds in which time is linear and infinite in both directions and in which history is repetitive, consisting of infinitely many 12,000-year epochs, each two of which are exactly alike with respect to all intrinsic, purely qualitative properties. Could one ever have empirical evidence that one inhabits a world of the first kind rather than a world of the second kind? We argue for the affirmative answer, contra Quine, Newton-Smith, and Bergström. Our argument for that conclusion differs from an argument for the same conclusion due to Weir. Weir’s argument is probabilistic and explicitly requires having evidence against determinism. Our argument is a direct appeal to the simplicity of laws, and it involves no probabilistic component. It is modeled on Shoemaker’s argument that one could have evidence of time without change. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Time Travel 2nd Edition)
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5 pages, 137 KiB  
Commentary
Moral Responsibility and Time Travel in an Indeterministic World
by Joshua Spencer
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 96; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040096 - 4 Jul 2024
Viewed by 730
Abstract
I have argued against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities using a time travel-based counterexample. Kelly McCormick has responded to my counterexample by arguing that the time travel scenario must be a scenario in which a time traveler’s actions are causally determined; hence, she [...] Read more.
I have argued against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities using a time travel-based counterexample. Kelly McCormick has responded to my counterexample by arguing that the time travel scenario must be a scenario in which a time traveler’s actions are causally determined; hence, she claims, we should be suspicious of attributing moral responsibility to anyone in such a scenario. In this paper, I respond by arguing that one might be morally responsible in an indeterministic time travel scenario. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Time Travel 2nd Edition)
11 pages, 212 KiB  
Article
Personal Time and Transmigration Time Travel
by Cei Maslen
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 98; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040098 - 5 Jul 2024
Viewed by 1177
Abstract
Lewis argued that although paradoxes such as the famous Grandfather Paradox can be solved, only a limited set of time travel fiction is consistent. In this paper, I discuss how to extend a Lewisian approach to a class of time travel fiction not [...] Read more.
Lewis argued that although paradoxes such as the famous Grandfather Paradox can be solved, only a limited set of time travel fiction is consistent. In this paper, I discuss how to extend a Lewisian approach to a class of time travel fiction not considered by Lewis: transmigration or mental time travel fiction. To this end, Lewis’s definition of personal time needs refining, and this is the primary focus of my paper. I discuss some alternative refinements of Lewis’s definition: a Solely Mental definition and a Causal definition. I end by also applying these definitions to cases of reverse aging. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Time Travel 2nd Edition)
21 pages, 282 KiB  
Article
The Absurdity of Rational Choice: Time Travel, Foreknowledge, and the Aesthetic Dimension of Newcomb Problems
by Craig Bourne and Emily Caddick Bourne
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 99; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040099 - 6 Jul 2024
Viewed by 1192
Abstract
Nikk Effingham and Huw Price argue that in certain cases of Newcomb problems involving time travel and foreknowledge, being given information about the future makes it rational to choose as an evidential decision theorist would choose. Although the cases they consider have some [...] Read more.
Nikk Effingham and Huw Price argue that in certain cases of Newcomb problems involving time travel and foreknowledge, being given information about the future makes it rational to choose as an evidential decision theorist would choose. Although the cases they consider have some intuitive pull, and so appear to aid in answering the question of what it is rational to do, we argue that their respective positions are not compelling. Newcomb problems are structured such that whichever way one chooses, one might be led by one’s preferred decision theory to miss out on some riches (riches which others obtain whilst employing their preferred decision theory). According to the novel aesthetic diagnosis we shall offer of the Newcomb dialectic, missing out in this way does not render one irrational but, rather, subject to being seen as absurd. This is a different kind of cost but not one that undermines one’s rationality. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Time Travel 2nd Edition)
10 pages, 193 KiB  
Article
Beaming Bodies: A Neo-Lockean Account of Material Persistence
by Richard Mark Hanley
Philosophies 2024, 9(4), 109; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies9040109 - 17 Jul 2024
Viewed by 626
Abstract
Conventional wisdom holds that human bodies do not and cannot persist through beaming: scanning and destruction of the body, followed by transmission of the scan information and replication of the body in another location. I argue that given the minimal time travel assumption [...] Read more.
Conventional wisdom holds that human bodies do not and cannot persist through beaming: scanning and destruction of the body, followed by transmission of the scan information and replication of the body in another location. I argue that given the minimal time travel assumption that information can be sent into the past, it is logically possible for (duplicates of) human bodies to exist in object loops. If so, then conventional wisdom is wrong, and bodies can persist through beaming. The lesson generalizes to all composite material objects that can persist through intrinsic change. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Time Travel 2nd Edition)
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