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Games
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Advances in Evolutionary Game Theory and Applications
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Advances in Evolutionary Game Theory and Applications

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (31 July 2013) | Viewed by 49417

Special Issue Editor

Prof. Dr. Theodore C. Bergstrom

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Department of Economics, University of California, 2127 North Hall, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9210, USA
Interests: pure and applied microeconomic theory; public finance; welfare economics; resource economics; health economics; international trade; game theory; evolutionary theory; economic anthropology

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Evolutionary game theory is a fertile source of insight into the foundations of game theory as well as in the fields of anthropology, biology, ecology, economics, medicine, philosophy, psychology, and sociology. This issue is intended to reflect the richness and variety of this subject by including work on a variety of subjects, motivated by the evolutionary dynamics of natural selection.
Among the general topics of research to be considered are:

  • Theory of evolutionary games and population dynamics
  • Evolutionary foundations of preferences and behavior in humans and other animals
  • Applications of game theory to biological and cultural evolution

Theodore C. Bergstrom
Guest Editor

Submission

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. Papers will be published continuously (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as communications are invited.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are refereed through a peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed Open Access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The article processing charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). English correction and/or formatting fees will be charged in certain cases for those articles accepted for publication that require extensive additional formatting and/or English corrections. For further details see here.


Keywords

  • evolutionary game theory
  • population dynamics
  • animal behavior
  • cultural evolution
  • natural selection
  • evolution of preferences

Published Papers (5 papers)

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162 KiB  
Article
Population Games, Stable Games, and Passivity
by Michael J. Fox and Jeff S. Shamma
Games 2013, 4(4), 561-583; https://doi.org/10.3390/g4040561 - 07 Oct 2013
Cited by 58 | Viewed by 7850
Abstract
The class of “stable games”, introduced by Hofbauer and Sandholm in 2009, has the attractive property of admitting global convergence to equilibria under many evolutionary dynamics. We show that stable games can be identified as a special case of the feedback-system-theoretic notion of [...] Read more.
The class of “stable games”, introduced by Hofbauer and Sandholm in 2009, has the attractive property of admitting global convergence to equilibria under many evolutionary dynamics. We show that stable games can be identified as a special case of the feedback-system-theoretic notion of a “passive” dynamical system. Motivated by this observation, we develop a notion of passivity for evolutionary dynamics that complements the definition of the class of stable games. Since interconnections of passive dynamical systems exhibit stable behavior, we can make conclusions about passive evolutionary dynamics coupled with stable games. We show how established evolutionary dynamics qualify as passive dynamical systems. Moreover, we exploit the flexibility of the definition of passive dynamical systems to analyze generalizations of stable games and evolutionary dynamics that include forecasting heuristics as well as certain games with memory. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Advances in Evolutionary Game Theory and Applications)
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3884 KiB  
Article
An Evolutionary Theory of Suicide
by Balázs Szentes and Caroline D. Thomas
Games 2013, 4(3), 426-436; https://doi.org/10.3390/g4030426 - 13 Aug 2013
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 6858
Abstract
We analyze a model in which individuals have hereditary reproductive types. The reproductive value of an individual is determined by her reproductive type and the amount of resources she can access. We introduce the possibility of suicide and assume it is also a [...] Read more.
We analyze a model in which individuals have hereditary reproductive types. The reproductive value of an individual is determined by her reproductive type and the amount of resources she can access. We introduce the possibility of suicide and assume it is also a genetic trait that interacts with the reproductive type of an individual. The main result of the paper is that populations where suicide is possible grow faster than other populations. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Advances in Evolutionary Game Theory and Applications)
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641 KiB  
Article
The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Adaptive Dynamics
by Åke Brännström, Jacob Johansson and Niels Von Festenberg
Games 2013, 4(3), 304-328; https://doi.org/10.3390/g4030304 - 24 Jun 2013
Cited by 103 | Viewed by 17099
Abstract
Adaptive dynamics is a mathematical framework for studying evolution. It extends evolutionary game theory to account for more realistic ecological dynamics and it can incorporate both frequency- and density-dependent selection. This is a practical guide to adaptive dynamics that aims to illustrate how [...] Read more.
Adaptive dynamics is a mathematical framework for studying evolution. It extends evolutionary game theory to account for more realistic ecological dynamics and it can incorporate both frequency- and density-dependent selection. This is a practical guide to adaptive dynamics that aims to illustrate how the methodology can be applied to the study of specific systems. The theory is presented in detail for a single, monomorphic, asexually reproducing population. We explain the necessary terminology to understand the basic arguments in models based on adaptive dynamics, including invasion fitness, the selection gradient, pairwise invasibility plots (PIP), evolutionarily singular strategies, and the canonical equation. The presentation is supported with a worked-out example of evolution of arrival times in migratory birds. We show how the adaptive dynamics methodology can be extended to study evolution in polymorphic populations using trait evolution plots (TEPs). We give an overview of literature that generalises adaptive dynamics techniques to other scenarios, such as sexual, diploid populations, and spatially-structured populations. We conclude by discussing how adaptive dynamics relates to evolutionary game theory and how adaptive-dynamics techniques can be used in speciation research. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Advances in Evolutionary Game Theory and Applications)
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522 KiB  
Article
Dynamic Properties of Evolutionary Multi-player Games in Finite Populations
by Bin Wu, Arne Traulsen and Chaitanya S. Gokhale
Games 2013, 4(2), 182-199; https://doi.org/10.3390/g4020182 - 06 May 2013
Cited by 69 | Viewed by 8777
Abstract
William D. Hamilton famously stated that “human life is a many person game and not just a disjoined collection of two person games”. However, most of the theoretical results in evolutionary game theory have been developed for two player games. In spite of [...] Read more.
William D. Hamilton famously stated that “human life is a many person game and not just a disjoined collection of two person games”. However, most of the theoretical results in evolutionary game theory have been developed for two player games. In spite of a multitude of examples ranging from humans to bacteria, multi-player games have received less attention than pairwise games due to their inherent complexity. Such complexities arise from the fact that group interactions cannot always be considered as a sum of multiple pairwise interactions. Mathematically, multi-player games provide a natural way to introduce non-linear, polynomial fitness functions into evolutionary game theory, whereas pairwise games lead to linear fitness functions. Similarly, studying finite populations is a natural way of introducing intrinsic stochasticity into population dynamics. While these topics have been dealt with individually, few have addressed the combination of finite populations and multi-player games so far. We are investigating the dynamical properties of evolutionary multi-player games in finite populations. Properties of the fixation probability and fixation time, which are relevant for rare mutations, are addressed in well mixed populations. For more frequent mutations, the average abundance is investigated in well mixed as well as in structured populations. While the fixation properties are generalizations of the results from two player scenarios, addressing the average abundance in multi-player games gives rise to novel outcomes not possible in pairwise games. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Advances in Evolutionary Game Theory and Applications)
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649 KiB  
Article
The Dynamics of Costly Signaling
by Elliott O. Wagner
Games 2013, 4(2), 163-181; https://doi.org/10.3390/g4020163 - 26 Apr 2013
Cited by 20 | Viewed by 7719
Abstract
Costly signaling is a mechanism through which the honesty of signals can be secured in equilibrium, even in interactions where communicators have conflicting interests. This paper explores the dynamics of one such signaling game: Spence’s model of education. It is found that separating [...] Read more.
Costly signaling is a mechanism through which the honesty of signals can be secured in equilibrium, even in interactions where communicators have conflicting interests. This paper explores the dynamics of one such signaling game: Spence’s model of education. It is found that separating equilibria are unlikely to emerge under either the replicator or best response dynamics, but that partially communicative mixed equilibria are quite important dynamically. These mixtures are Lyapunov stable in the replicator dynamic and asymptotically stable in the best response dynamic. Moreover, they have large basins of attraction, in fact larger than those of either pooling or separating equilibria. This suggests that these mixtures may play significant, and underappreciated, roles in the explanation of the emergence and stability of information transfer. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Advances in Evolutionary Game Theory and Applications)
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