Search Results (14)

This study analyzes displaced families’ disintegration amidst multifaceted crises in the Far North Region of Cameroon. The focus is on displaced families in four divisions where host communities along the border of Nigeria have fled Boko Haram, due to sociopolitical instability and environmental degradation. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses show how insecurity and precarity have resulted in disintegrating, dispersing and sometimes recomposing the traditional structure of the family institution by disrupting marriage traditions, gender roles and intergenerational relations. Such shifts in the family occurred as a result of the challenging contexts in their hometowns, during flight and after settling in the host towns. The findings demonstrate the effects of the multifaceted crises, which created intergenerational, but also inter- and intra-community rifts that are challenging to repair amidst mass distrust and continued insecurity. This study contributes especially to understanding how these crises affect family cohesion and intergenerational relations as part of dynamics of great social change. Full article

This study examines how the issue of ethnic identity is approached in Cameroon within the context of combating Boko Haram terrorism, considering the influence of the rise of social media on journalistic practices. The advent of these platforms has fundamentally altered the landscape of media coverage, challenging the traditional monopoly of journalists in shaping the narrative of news. How does this technological shift affect the discourse, especially in the designation of events and actors in the reporting of Boko Haram terrorism in Cameroon, whether in traditional print media or on online platforms like Facebook? Do these designations in print media and Facebook discussion forums indicate shifts in the dynamics of the Cameroonian media sphere (censorship, government repression, etc.), resulting from the emergence of new voices in digital discursive spaces? This study employs a dual analysis, integrating a critical examination of media discourse with a sociological study of journalistic production. The scrutiny of media discourse is based on the investigation of 497 articles published between 1st January and 30 June 2015, sourced from seven Cameroonian newspapers. The online corpus encompasses 450 written publications from three Facebook forums. We aim to establish a dialectical relationship between newspaper discourse, online content, and the sociological foundations shaping their production. The observed quality of designations in the studied forums unveils a surge in hate speech within the ethno-political landscape of Cameroon. While this phenomenon remained manageable through the intervention of state regulatory bodies in traditional media, the unrestrained nature of online content, coupled with the absence of state control, has facilitated the rise of inter-ethnic discursive hatred in politics. In conclusion, this study underscores the challenges stemming from the evolution of journalistic practices in a technological landscape and emphasizes the urgent need for regulatory frameworks to counteract the upswing in hate speech and inter-ethnic tensions within political discourse. Full article

Conflicts such as the Boko Haram insurgency, herder–farmer conflicts, and armed banditry attacks are major concerns affecting the livelihoods and food security of households in Nigeria. In this paper, firstly, we reviewed and synthesized the nature, spatial extent, and implications of conflicts on food security in Nigeria. Secondly, using survey data and econometric models, we examined the effects of conflict-induced shocks, such as forced migration and fatality on household food security indicators. Our review shows that the underlying causes for the majority of violent conflicts in Nigeria are linked to competition for productive resources, economic inequality, and ethnoreligious tensions. Review results also indicate spatial variations in the nature and severity of violent conflicts in Nigeria. While the Boko Haram insurgency is prominent in the North-East, the North-Central is mainly exposed to herder–farmer conflicts, and there is a high prevalence of communal conflicts in the South-South region of the country. In terms of gender dimensions, women are more vulnerable to conflicts and shoulder more social and economic burdens than men. From our empirical analysis, we found that conflict-induced shocks such as forced migration, fatality, abduction, and injury significantly exacerbate the severity of food insecurity and deteriorate the dietary diversity of households. Conflicts also affect agricultural investment decisions with a negative consequence on future agricultural productivity and food security. Based on the findings, the key policy suggestions include the need for tailored interventions to resolve state or region-specific conflicts, policy interventions on property/land rights and livestock management systems to address herder–farmer conflicts, and targeted investments in building the resilience capacity of households. Full article

Increased risk of intimate partner violence (IPV) has been well documented among women and girls living in conflict zones. However, how residence in a conflict area differentially impacts adolescent girls and young women (AGYW) compared to older women is less understood. This paper examines whether the levels of IPV changed more among AGYW compared to older women in six Boko Haram (BH)-affected States in Nigeria. The Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey data was used to compare the level of the three types of IPV (emotional, physical, and sexual) among AGYW compared to older women before and during the BH conflict (2008 and 2018). We ran a multiple linear regression model with an interaction term for ever-partnered female respondents living in six Northeast States, adjusting for relevant covariates. A significantly higher proportion of both older and younger women reported experiencing emotional and sexual IPV in 2018 than in 2008, with a higher increase reported among AGYW. Sexual IPV increased by six percentage points more among AGYW compared to older women. AGYW in the BH-affected States are more vulnerable to experiencing sexual IPV relative to older women. This study highlights the need for youth-focused IPV interventions in the BH-affected States. Full article

Insurgencies like Boko Haram may impact the physical health and well-being of adults and children living in geographic areas under their political control. However, it is difficult to obtain reliable health data in conflict-affected areas. This study explored the potential to use data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) to examine the determinants of under-five mortality in Northern Nigeria. Data were derived from DHS conducted before and after the start of the Boko Haram insurgency in 2009. A multi-level mixed effects logistic regression model was used to identify predictors of under-five mortality in an armed conflict setting. Results were reported as adjusted odds ratios (aOR) and 95% confidence intervals (CI). Residence in an armed conflict setting was not significantly associated with under-five mortality (aOR = 1.06; 95% CI: 1.00, 1.10). However, twin gestation (aOR = 3.18; 95% CI:2.96, 3.42), wealth index of family (richest versus poorest: aOR = 0.42; 95% CI: 0.37, 0.47), religion of mother (Islam versus Christianity: aOR = 1.50; 95% CI: 1.43, 1.57); highest educational level of mother (higher versus none: aOR = 0.33; 95% CI: 0.29, 0.37), and parity of mother, significantly predicted death before the fifth birthday. Repeated studies are needed to assess the impact of Boko Haram insurgency on physical health outcomes, particularly in areas where primary data collection is difficult or impossible. Full article

Since July 2009, when the popular founder of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf, was extrajudicially killed by the police, the group has become radicalised. Boko Haram started by terrorising the country, particularly the northeastern zone, which extends to Cameroon, Niger, and Lake Chad. Several works on the group, mostly by foreign commentators and scholars, have mainly attributed its rise to political and economic factors. Many of those works have not also recognised the metamorphosis from terrorism to insurgency, wherein the group is now replacing the secular status of Nigeria’s configuration with a monolithic Islamic caliphal rule in the swathes of land that it has captured. Even though the Nigerian government has adopted the factors canvassed by those scholars and also denies the group an ideological anchorage, I argue that Boko Haram’s ideological scaffolding is hinged on ultra-jihadi Salafism. Relying on qualitative sources, I employ a historical and interpretive framework in explicating the origin of Boko Haram and in content analysing President Muhammad Buhari’s 2015 inaugural speech, which denies the group of any ideological leaning on Islam. I then contend that such a denial has made counter-insurgency measures of the government counter-productive, as efforts at meeting political and economic factors are difficult to achieve in the present circumstance. I, therefore, recommend counter-insurgency measures, which include, amongst others, Western education, Islamic de-radicalisation processes, and counter-insurgency narratives, as well as ideas to cut off the recruitment of youth into the group and military engagement, as both short- and long-term strategies. Full article

North-East Nigeria is recovering from a decade of terrorism by Boko Haram during which the region collapsed socioeconomically and millions were displaced. The displaced live in various camps in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe States, and serve as the primary source of data for this research. The Nigerian government has expressed their desire for the displaced to return home following peace restoration to the region. Their unwillingness to return despite the perceived gains of reintegration prompted this research to examine economic determinants of willingness for reintegration. Logistics regression results show a strong positive influence of having an assurance of finding employment back home on the willingness for reintegration. The results further suggest that displaced persons are 14 times more willing to return home when the government guarantees employment. To encourage willingness for reintegration, the authors recommend that displaced persons be empowered economically through the provision of jobs upon their return to their various home communities. Recommendations for the Nigerian government and interested parties are presented with suggestions to expand social institutions and their collaboration with the government. Full article

This article examines the role of faith-based organizations (FBOs) in counter-radicalization in Nigeria, with emphasis on the Boko Haram terrorist group operating in northeast Nigeria and the greater Lake Chad region. A qualitative methodological approach is employed that makes use of primary and secondary documents, key informant and stakeholder interviews, and focus group discussions with critical religious actors and organizations. The findings of the article suggest that FBOs play a critical role in the disengagement and deradicalization process of countering the ideological and radical messages of Boko Haram. However, challenges such as the lack of effective stakeholder involvement in the various initiatives by the state in counterterrorism, fear of reprisal and attacks, lack of unison by various FBOs and clerics in countering these negative messages, and the inability of relevant stakeholders in addressing structural factors such as poverty, social and economic exclusion, and unemployment that give rise to radicalization amongst other challenges, have impeded the effectiveness of the FBO sector in its counter-radicalization efforts in Nigeria. To address these challenges, the article proposes a bottom-up approach to counterterrorism that provides room for the multi-sectoral involvement of major stakeholders, especially FBOs, to complement pre-existing initiatives and other measures to counter the negative weaponization of religion by radical and rogue clerics, and also to prevent Boko Haram from expanding its frontiers. Full article

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is a novel disease pandemic that emerged in late 2019 in China, and later spread to other parts of the world, including Nigeria. This review analyzes the preparedness of Nigeria to the COVID-19 pandemic and recommends strategies that could be useful in controlling the disease. Published articles on COVID-19 worldwide, socioeconomic and disease status and preparedness to COVID-19 in Africa and Nigeria, were retrieved from databases such as Pubmed, MEDLINE, Scopus, Web of Knowledge and Google search engine. Nigeria is the most populous black nation in the world, and is one of the largest crude oil producers in the world. However, its healthcare system is dilapidated and weak, due to years of neglect and widespread corruption. As a result, Nigeria is vulnerable to COVID-19, as evidenced by the current geographical distribution of the disease in its population. Many socioeconomic factors could potentially facilitate the spread of COVID-19 in Nigeria. This could lead to a high caseload in the country, which could overwhelm the health care system. The application of social distancing, personal hygiene, especially hand hygiene and mask-wearing, as practiced in many countries, has proven to be effective to reduce the spread of COVID-19. In Nigeria, social distancing, in many instances, may be impracticable, given its large population, and a high density of people living in crowded conditions like slums and camps. Moreover, there is a sizeable population of internally displaced people, due to the attack by Boko Haram fighters in Northern Nigeria, and herdsmen in Southern Nigeria. The implementation of these measures is likely to be a great challenge. Nigeria has announced a complete lockdown for the containment of COVD-19, but its implementation and efficacy are doubtful, due to the same reasons previously mentioned. Full article

For almost two decades, the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) in general and northeast Nigeria in particular have been subject to the insurgency of the Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram. This region is also known for its poor environmental conditions that mostly manifest in land desertification and water scarcity. We analyze the impact of the insecurity and conflict on migration from the most affected rural areas of northeast Nigeria to Maiduguri. We also explore the role that water scarcity and land desertification play in the decision of local people to migrate. Data were collected by interviewing 204 internally displaced persons (IDPs) at the Bakassi IDP camp in Maiduguri between March and May 2019. Experts were also interviewed at various governmental, non-governmental, and international institutions in Abuja. Respondents at the Bakassi IDP camp came from Guzamala, Gwoza, Marte, Monguno, and Nganzai. Though insecurity created by the conflict between Boko Haram insurgents and government forces was mentioned by all respondents as the main factor that triggered migration, this study shows that the decision to migrate was also a function of other factors that differ between communities. These factors include the geographical location of the community, land ownership, the socioeconomic status of the migrants, access to water and land, and wealth. This study reveals that in some communities, it was possible for people to live with conflict if they were still able to practice farming or if they had additional sources of income such as small businesses. The decision to migrate was only taken when the practice of such activities was no longer possible and they had nothing to hold on to. Full article

This article attempts to shed light on the challenges confronting relevant actors (state and non-state) in countering the threat of terrorism recruitment by focusing on the Boko Haram terrorist organization, whose presence and activities threaten the security of the Lake Chad region. The article uses a qualitative research technique combining key informant interviews with stakeholders familiar with the conflict, academic and non-academic documents, reports, and policy briefs. The findings of the article suggest that despite the various initiatives by stakeholders aimed at containing the strategies of recruitment, the group continues to expand its base by launching coordinated attacks that further destabilize the region. These challenges stem from a lack of a clear-cut counterterrorism strategy, a dearth in technological and mutual trust between actors and locals in the management and utilization of intelligence, and the inability of state institutions to ‘coerce and convince’ citizens in terms of its capacity to counter the danger of terrorism recruitment and expansion. The article, amongst other things, recommends a community policing model similar to the ‘Nyumba-Kumi security initiative’ adopted by most countries in East Africa for the effective assessment and detection of threat forces; the state and its agencies should show the capacity to coerce and convince in dealing with the (ideological, religious, social, and economic) conditions, drivers, and factors promoting the spread of terrorism as well as other forms of violent extremism in the society; furthermore, there is a need for stakeholders to adopt a comprehensive and holistic counterterrorism/violent extremism strategy to reflect present-day security challenges as well as to guarantee sustainable peace. Full article

This paper proposes a new theory of non-state actors who engage in irregular warfare to seize territory and govern openly, called emerging-state actors. Emerging-state actors arise in periods of irregular conflict, such as the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The theory tries to answer “what is/was” the Islamic State because emerging-state actors differ notably from other non-state actors and insurgencies in irregular conflict. Causal diagrams as well as key propositions present the theory. Testing occurs against a system dynamics simulation called the “Emerging-State Actor Model” (E-SAM), loaded with the ISIS historical case in Syria and Iraq. Through experiments the simulation confirms evidence of emerging-state actor behavior as well as a range of contingencies showing their applicability. The novelty of E-SAM as a simulation for irregular conflict is its ability to handle multiple forms of conflict including political grievance, terrorism, insurgencies and emerging-state actors. E-SAM can also simulate multiple actors within each conflict: domestic and foreign state actors, local conflict actors, as well as different ethnographic groups. It can be parameterized with scenarios to simulate a variety of scenarios: ISIS in Libya, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Taliban in Afghanistan and even expatriated ISIS fighters returning to pursue new conflicts such as in Indonesia. Full article

The spillover of the terrorist activities of Boko Haram, a Nigerian jihadi group, into Cameroon’s north has resulted in security challenges and humanitarian activity opportunities for Christian churches. The insurgents have attacked and destroyed churches, abducted Christians, worsened Muslim-Christian relations, and caused a humanitarian crisis. These ensuing phenomena have adversely affected Christian churches in this region, triggering an aura of responses: coping strategies, humanitarian work among refugees, and inter-faith dialogue. These responses are predicated on Christianity’s potential as a resource for peace, compassion, and love. In this study we emphasize the role of Christian churches in dealing with the Boko Haram insurgency. It opens with a presentation of the religious configuration of Cameroon, followed by a contextualization of Boko Haram insurgency in Cameroon’s north. The paper further examines the brutality meted out on Christians and church property. The final section is an examination of the spiritual, humanitarian, and relief services provided by churches. The paper argues that although Christian churches have suffered at the hands of Boko Haram insurgents, they have engaged in various beneficial responses underpinned by the Christian values of peace and love. Full article

Boko Haram in Nigeria provides an important example of the combination of religion and violence in the conditions of the twenty-first century. It is both a movement in the pattern of religiously-justified violence and a significant representative of the emergence of new types of modern terrorism in recent years. This article examines both of these aspects of Boko Haram as an example of religious violence. In the general development of religiously justified violence, Boko Haram is the heir to a long jihad tradition in West Africa. Its emergence follows well-established patterns of older militant Muslim groups, but it also departs significantly from those patterns as it shapes itself as a movement in the patterns of contemporary, twenty-first century modes of religious violence. Boko Haram is also identified, in twenty-first century terms, as a religious terrorist organization. As a religious terrorist group, it fits the pattern of what David Rapoport calls the fourth wave—the religious wave—of modern terrorism. However, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, Boko Haram exhibits characteristics of a new style of religious terrorism that is more like the so-called Islamic State than the older type of terrorist organization of al-Qa’idah. Full article