Search Results (132)

This article aims to offer a comparative analysis between Buddhist thought and Peircean semiotics, situating the discussion within the framework of a Buddhist theory of signs that addresses aspects related to perceptual processes and cognitive experience. The influence of signs on cognition is what led Buddhism, from its earliest formulations, to adopt contemplative practice as a means of liberation from the effects of semiosis—an aspect that this paper hypothesizes to be represented by the nāmarūpa dyad. Following an examination of the perceptual and sensory processes underlying the functioning of nāmarūpa, the paper will analyze occurrences of this technical term and propose its semiosic functions, subsequently exploring how contemplative practice aspires to disengage from the power of signs. Full article

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later remarks on religious belief (from around the mid-1930s onwards) have often been and continue to be interpreted in connection with other terms he used in his later philosophy. The most common interpretations argue that Wittgenstein understands religious belief as a language-game or a group of language-games, as (part of) a form of life, and/or as a hinge/part of a world-picture. The term ‘Weltanschauung’ is also occasionally used to interpret Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious belief, and finally, Wittgenstein himself sporadically uses the term ‘style of thinking’ in connection with religious belief. In this paper, I will first conduct a meta-analysis of the secondary literature, presenting examples of the various lines of interpretation and criticism of these approaches. Subsequently, the various interpretations are examined to see whether or not they can actually be read from Wittgenstein’s remarks. The result of this investigation is that those interpretations which pursue a systematizing presentation of Wittgenstein’s remarks are, to a certain extent, reductive representations insofar as they can only draw on some of Wittgenstein’s remarks to support their interpretation, while other remarks stand in tension with the respective interpretation. Full article

Wittgenstein’s philosophy has influenced the philosophy of religion quite considerably. This is hardly due to his rather few remarks on religion. Instead, Wittgenstein’s influence seems to be connected to a certain, without doubt common, interpretation of his later philosophy, mainly of Philosophical Investigations. I speak about one interpretation because in my view the purportedly different interpretations of the sense in which certain key-concepts in the Philosophical Investigations are supposed to be fruitful for understanding religious language, in fact have a common, unacknowledged presupposition: that Wittgenstein’s account of language rotates around the quite traditional, philosophical concepts of subjectivity and objectivity. In the interpretations at stake, these concepts form the backdrop of questions about what “can” intelligibly be assessed by an individual and what “has to be” accounted for in “our” common language. There are discussions in the Philosophical Investigations that do give rise to such questions. However, what I take to be the main direction in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is the movement away from the concepts of subjectivity and objectivity. Most clearly, this is visible in the second volume of Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, where Wittgenstein dissolves the idea of the inscrutable inner of the other. As I will show, these remarks are in tension both with the views that his followers, such as Peter Winch, put forth and with his own remarks on religion in Culture and Value. Full article

As Zen Buddhism continues into its second century in the United States, the practices and philosophies transmitted have gone through major, though necessary transformations. At present, the vast majority of Zen temples and centers are “convert” communities that have over time adjusted language, ritual, and tradition to suit pastoral and theological needs. This article lays out a blueprint for a Zen public “theology” by discussing the transformation of the exoteric, physical practice of Zen to an esoteric practice that governs inner conduct and community cohesion. For this piece, esoteric is used less in a mystical capacity, but more in terms of referring to a closed community of practitioners and initiates. The transformation from a historically exoteric practice in Japan to a generally esoteric practice in the United States reconfigured the priorities for longstanding Zen communities, who were (and still tend to be) diffuse and dependent on lineage bearing. The esoteric character of Zen practice in the U.S. is a response to several challenges in a “western” market economy- informed society. Challenges from the mindfulness industry, its minority status in a broadly Abrahamic society, and the struggle to understand the notion of tradition while in dialog with the main Soto Zen tradition in Japan present unique hermeneutical categories for Zen in America, prompting a reckoning with the fundamental principles of Mahayana Buddhism and the tenuous pluralism operative in American society. Full article

It is widely acknowledged that there is a similarity between Wittgenstein’s later conception of language and a “religious point of view.” An equally well-received view is that there is an essential shift in Wittgenstein’s thought from early to later. However, what both of these contentions ignore is that there is also a similarity between his early philosophy and the “religious point of view”, the negligence of which has led to an exaggeration of the divergence between his early and later philosophy. This paper aims to show that Wittgenstein in fact conducted his early philosophical work from a “religious point of view” and continued to demonstrate such a view in his later writings. I will first identify some essential characteristics of the “religious point of view” in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy by focusing on the mystical. I will then illustrate how these characteristics continue and are developed further in his later thought. The findings of this paper are critical in two ways: on the one hand, they clarify a host of misunderstandings through a comparative investigation into Wittgenstein’s early and later thought; on the other, they provide a more comprehensive overview of Wittgenstein’s “religious point of view,” which will help to deepen our understanding of his philosophy. Full article

This paper examines the philosophy of language in The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch (六祖壇經), demonstrating its centrality to Zen Buddhism and Buddhist sinicization. The sutra emphasizes the ineffability of ultimate truth (至道無言) and the principle that words falter in encapsulating the Dao (言語道斷), framing language as a provisional “raft” (筏) that must be instrumentalized yet transcended through a dialectic of employing and abandoning (用離辯證). It ontologically grounds this view in Buddha-nature’s (佛性) pre-linguistic essence, advocating transcending reliance on words and letters (不假文字) while strategically deploying language to dismantle its own authority. Historically, this constituted a revolt against Tang scholasticism’s textual fetishism. The text adopts a dynamic dialectic, neither clinging to nor rejecting language, exemplified by Huineng’s awakening through the Diamond Sutra, where recitation catalyzes internal insight. Operationally, it utilizes negational discourse, the “Two Paths Mutually Condition” method (二道相因) embedded in the “Twelve Pairs of Dharmic Forms” (法相語言十二對) in particular, to systematically deconstruct dualisms, while promoting embodied unity of speech, mind, and action (口念心行) to critique empty recitation. Ultimately, the sutra orchestrates language as a self-subverting medium: balancing acknowledgment of its limitations with pragmatic instrumentality, it presents an Eastern paradigm where language actively disrupts conceptual fetters to facilitate direct insight into Buddha-nature, reframing it as a dynamic catalyst for “illuminating the mind and seeing one’s nature” (明心見性). Full article

This paper examines the epistemological transformation prompted by the integration of generative artificial intelligence technologies into social science research, proposing the “adaptive epistemology” paradigm. In today’s post-digital era—characterized by pervasive infrastructures and non-human agents endowed with generative capabilities—traditional research approaches have become inadequate. Through a critical review of historical and discursive paradigms (positivism, interpretivism, critical realism, pragmatism, transformative paradigms, mixed and digital methods), here I show how the advent of digital platforms and large language models reconfigures the boundaries between data collection, analysis, and interpretation. Employing a theoretical–conceptual framework that draws on sociotechnical systems theory, platform studies, and the philosophy of action, the core features of adaptive epistemology are identified: dynamism, co-construction of meaning between researcher and system, and the capacity to generate methodological solutions in response to rapidly evolving contexts. The findings demonstrate the need for reasoning in terms of an adaptive epistemology that could offer a robust theoretical and methodological framework for guiding social science research in the post-digital society, emphasizing flexibility, reflexivity, and ethical sensitivity in the deployment of generative tools. Full article

Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) has gained significant attention from both industry and academia as an effective approach to managing product complexity. Despite its progress, current MBSE concepts, tools, languages, and methodologies face notable challenges in industrial applications, particularly in addressing design variability, ensuring model consistency, and enhancing operational efficiency. Based on the authors’ industry observations and literature analysis, this paper identifies the primary limitations of traditional MBSE, and introduces MBSE 2.0, a next-generation evolution characterized by comprehensive, integrated, and intelligent features. Key enabling technologies, such as model governance, integrated design methods, and AI-enhanced system design, are explored in detail. Additionally, several preliminary explorations were introduced under the guidance of the MBSE 2.0 philosophy. This study introduces the MBSE 2.0 concept to stimulate discussion and guide future efforts in academia and industry, emphasizing key advancements and highlighting several key and pressing perspectives to alleviate current limitations in industrial practice. Full article

When Wittgenstein (2009, § 116) writes that “[w]hat we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use”, many will presumably read this is an anti-religious statement. According to the everyday use of the word “metaphysical”, religion is metaphysical, one would then argue. However, the target of Wittgensteinian investigations is language “on holiday” (2009, § 38), that is, when language does not do any job. This explains why Wittgenstein can claim that philosophy “leaves everything as it is” (2009, § 124): removing “a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it” means removing something that is “not part of the mechanism” and therefore does not change the mechanism (2009, § 271). In other words, “metaphysics” does here not stand for a specific subject matter, such as religion. But what does it mean that something is “not part of the mechanism”? How does one show that something is not? Is it possible that religion is an instance of language on holiday? These questions are far more complex than they may seem at first, and the answer to the last question is not a general one—ultimately, it has to be answered in the first person. How do these difficulties manifest themselves? After a methodological discussion of the above points (sec. 1), two sections (2–3) discuss two examples of contexts in which these difficulties come into view. The discussions of these two examples thus aim to clarify what the distinction between the metaphysical and the non-metaphysical amounts to in two specific cases. In particular, the difference between a relation to a belief and to a person is highlighted. Paying attention to this difference is one way of getting out of the difficult constellation of religious belief and metaphysics. Full article

Focusing on the legend of Phaedra and Hippolytus as developed in Euripides and Seneca and especially in Racine’s Phèdre and taking into account as well its further development in works by Camillo Boito, Luchino Visconti, and Yukio Mishima, I make the following arguments: (1) Contrary to many theologians and philosophers of love, a pathological form of love that issues in murder and suicide should not be regarded as unworthy of serious attention. Racine’s tragedy provides a catharsis for universal experiences of unrequited love and jealousy, a major human phenomenon. (2) Contrary to Paul Valéry, Phèdre’s love cannot be called merely animal, since the analytical insight she develops into her morbid passion carries tremendous moral force and lies at the origin of the European psychological novel, as launched by Madame de La Fayette a year later. (3) Contrary to François Mauriac, even if she is a heroine of desire or concupiscence rather than of “true love” (in contrast to the relatively innocent affections of Hippolyte and Aricie), the incredible beauty of her language resists such an easy categorization. (4) Study of concrete presentations of “love” in literature confirms that the meaning and use of this word is marked by an irreducible pluralism. Philosophical and theological analysis of love has to come to terms with this. (5) The role of a work of art, in crystallizing archetypical emotions and situations in a way that carries authority, is to provide the middle ground between the abstractions of philosophy on the one hand and the uncontrollable diversity of the empirical on the other. Even psychologies or sociologies of love, which claim to be close to the concrete data, need to be anchored in and corrected by the special concrete vision that only great literature can bring. Full article

Friedrich Nietzsche can be an awkward topic for classicists and ancient philosophers, especially since an important part of his heavily critical philosophy begins as a reaction to, and critique of, his contemporary classical scholarship with which he was intimately familiar, being one of the most impressive ‘products’ of its development. Nietzsche was a thinker who in many ways turned the prevalent opinions about Greeks and contemporaries upside down, challenging his predecessors and successors with provocative readings of some of the most cherished philosophies in Western culture. This essay examines Nietzsche’s treatment of sophists—an important group of intellectuals whose reception had suffered greatly under the devastating judgement of Plato and Aristotle. While recent scholarship frequently regards sophists as philosophers, Nietzsche’s contemporaries were generally extremely dismissive of this group and regarded them in negative light as illegitimate thinkers and opponents to their contemporary ‘true’ philosophers (i.e., Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle). This paper traces two different moments in Nietzsche’s philosophical output that exhibit closer engagement with the sophists: the ‘early’ Nietzsche regards sophists as innovators in language and style, the ‘late’ Nietzsche sees them as countercultural revolutionaries. Despite the fact that in both stages, sophists are introduced as champions for ideas that are central to Nietzsche’s own philosophical preoccupations (the development of language, the overthrowing of values), his treatment of this group of intellectuals appears at first sight superficial and surprisingly unenthusiastic. The paper will examine our existing sources on Nietzsche’s treatment of the sophists and will suggest, ultimately, that his engagement with them was probably far more complex and multilayered than has been thus far assumed. Full article

As artificial intelligence (AI) undergoes rapid evolutionary advancements, two enduring queries in the philosophy of language and linguistics persist: the problem of other minds and coherence. This can be further explored by the following question: is there a fundamental difference between human-AI interactions and human–human interactions? More precisely, does an AI partner’s ability to understand discursive coherence sufficiently approximate that of the human mind? This study frames the problem of other minds as a problem in discourse analysis, positing that linguistic exchange inherently constitutes interactions between minds, where the act of decoding discursive coherence serves as a proxy for apprehending other minds. Guided by this perspective, this study uses four criteria of discursive coherence to examine how AI partners (with a focus on ChatGPT) achieve discursive coherence, thus reflecting whether an AI partner’s ability to understand discursive coherence suffices to simulate the human mind. Through a comparison between human–human interactions and human-AI interactions, the results indicate that while ChatGPT demonstrates proficiency in constructing discursive coherence along dictional, intentional, emotional, and rational coherence lines, the structural complexity and generative creativity of its coherence lines remain significantly below the threshold observed in human–human interactions. Moreover, ChatGPT’s emotional expressiveness pales in comparison to the rich, nuanced affect inherent in human–human interactions. Full article

This article utilizes the Zhuangzi’s critical approach to language to expand contemporary discourse on the philosophy of fanaticism beyond the conceptual categories derived from European Enlightenment-era critiques of religious and political fanaticism. Recognizing some of the problematic tendencies that stem from the method of comparison itself, an articulation of a post-comparative paradigm is proposed, which emphasizes approaches from non-Western sources that are not predicated upon the comparison of similarities or differences with Western sources. The main body of this article explicates the Zhuangzi’s critiques of a linguistically and discursively conditioned fanaticism. These critiques focus on the following: (1) the interdependence of binary linguistic terms that constitute shifei discourse; (2) semiotic chains of cascading distinctions that confound attempts to ground shifei judgements; and (3) the relationship between unhealthy forms of language, thought, and anxieties and a discursively conditioned fanaticism. This article concludes with a brief reflection on how the Zhuangzi’s critiques of a linguistically and discursively conditioned fanaticism might open discourse on the philosophy of fanaticism in more ways than by merely adding a token Chinese voice. Full article

The turn away from phenomenology in 20th century French philosophy was in large part due to an increased emphasis on Ferdinand de Saussure’s notion of “linguistic structure”, i.e., that language is the internal system of differences between signs. Thinkers such as Paul Ricoeur and Jean-François Lyotard famously offered a “semiological challenge” to phenomenology. The idea was that phenomenology, especially Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, reduces to the sensible world and cannot think linguistic structure. Thus, the argument goes that phenomenology leaves out a basic element of human life: not only can it not think linguistic structure, but it also cannot think about elements, e.g., writing and text, which are its result. This paper takes up this challenge, especially in reference to Merleau-Ponty’s terminology in Phenomenology of Perception of “speaking speech” (parole parlante) and “spoken speech” (parole parlée). I point out that, in retrospect of his later work, Merleau-Ponty very clearly did want to take linguistic structure seriously. This, however, means that we need to reconsider some of the basic themes in his work. Taking inspiration from the recently published “problem of speech” lectures, I reconstruct Merleau-Ponty’s idea that speech is a concrete limit situation from which we get both the idea of a language structure in which there are differences and of an ontological difference between being and beings. This is an internal criticism of both linguistic structure and formal ontology. I begin the paper by noting that, in Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of the tacit and spoken cogito, also in Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty criticizes the notion of a subject to which language refers and highlights the notion of a subject that defies representational and denotational structure. I do not, however, go along with Merleau-Ponty’s own criticism of the tacit ego, which he ultimately declared too subjectivistic. Ultimately, I hope to stress the importance of linguistic structure and writing in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology. This is an ontology of that is fragile and requires symbolization. This paper emphasizes under-developed themes in Merleau-Ponty’s work such as bodily event, difference, symbolization, and the writing of philosophy. Full article

This paper provides an analysis of the meaning–reference problem, as traditionally advanced in the philosophy of language, for imperative programming languages. Addressing the problem is relevant for the philosophy of computer science in the context of the debate of whether simulative programs can be considered representational theories of their simulated systems. This paper challenges the thesis that, since programming languages have semantics, they also have reference, presumably to the external world. First, denotational, operational, game theoretic, and axiomatic semantics are epistemologically analysed to provide a theory of meaning for high-level language programs. It is argued that programming language semantics can be seen, to some extent, under the light of Fregean descriptivism, thereby rejecting the view that it is reference that determines meaning. Secondly, descriptivist, causal, character, and intentionalist theories of reference are examined to argue that meaning is not sufficient for programming languages to determine reference, thereby rejecting the view that meaning determines reference. It is argued that it is the intentions of agents that allow programming language semantics to identify referents. The paper concludes that if the semantics of programming languages may determine their reference, the latter is not to the external world but to the internal operations of the implementation executing them. This does not prevent simulative programs from representing empirical systems, but they do so not on the basis of programming language semantics. Full article