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New Work on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion
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New Work on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion

A special issue of Religions (ISSN 2077-1444). This special issue belongs to the section "Religions and Humanities/Philosophies".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 31 May 2025 | Viewed by 5482

Special Issue Editor

Dr. Sebastian Sunday Grève

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Guest Editor
Department of Philosophy, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
Interests: AI; epistemology; mind; language; Wittgenstein
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

This Special Issue aims to explore the continuing relevance and impact of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion since, despite the extensive literature on Wittgenstein’s general philosophy, his contributions to the philosophy of religion remain underexamined and ripe for further exploration. Moreover, this Special Issue seeks to bring together new and innovative research that delves into Wittgenstein’s unique approach to religious language, practice, and belief.

Contributors are invited to examine topics such as Wittgenstein’s critique of traditional metaphysical approaches to religion, his concept of religious forms of life, and the implications of his thoughts on ritual and religious expression. We are particularly interested in papers that engage with Wittgenstein’s later works, including “Philosophical Investigations” and “On Certainty,” to uncover fresh insights into his religious thought.

This Special Issue will provide a platform for scholars to address how Wittgenstein’s ideas can illuminate contemporary debates in the philosophy of religion, including discussions on the nature of faith, the role of religious narratives, and the interplay between religion and ethics. By fostering a dialogue between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and current religious studies, we hope to advance a deeper understanding of both fields.

Submissions are welcomed from diverse philosophical perspectives, encouraging a rich and multifaceted exploration of Wittgenstein’s enduring influence on the philosophy of religion.

Dr. Sebastian Sunday Grève
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a double-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Religions is an international peer-reviewed open access monthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1800 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • Ludwig Wittgenstein
  • philosophy of religion
  • religious belief
  • religious language
  • religious point of view
  • ethics
  • faith
  • form of life
  • cognitivism
  • fideism
  • John Henry Newman
  • Kierkegaard
  • Tolstoy

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Published Papers (11 papers)

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14 pages, 238 KiB  
Article
Against Quasi-Fideism
by Annalisa Coliva
Religions 2025, 16(3), 365; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16030365 - 13 Mar 2025
Abstract
In a series of papers, Duncan Pritchard has argued that Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty (OC) provide the foundation for a quasi-fideistic account of religious belief. This account seeks to navigate a middle path between evidentialism—the view that religious belief is rational only [...] Read more.
In a series of papers, Duncan Pritchard has argued that Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty (OC) provide the foundation for a quasi-fideistic account of religious belief. This account seeks to navigate a middle path between evidentialism—the view that religious belief is rational only if supported by epistemic reasons—and fideism, which holds that religious belief cannot be rationally justified precisely because it is not grounded in epistemic reasons. Central to Pritchard’s quasi-fideism is a parity argument, which asserts that religious and non-religious beliefs are on equal footing. For the rationality of both depends on their connection to a background of a-rational foundational commitments, or “hinges”. In this paper, I challenge Pritchard’s account on two fronts. First, I argue that his quasi-fideism relies on a contentious interpretation of OC, and of Wittgenstein’s views about religious discourse, making it questionable whether it can genuinely be considered an application of Wittgenstein’s views to religious epistemology. Second, I contend that quasi-fideism, as developed by Pritchard, is inherently unstable, as it risks either collapsing into fideism or permitting relativism, contrary to Pritchard’s intentions. I then explore the potential for quasi-fideism—or, at any rate, a position meant to steer a middle path between evidentialism and fideism—under an alternative interpretation of OC. While this alternative framework may offer better prospects than Pritchard’s original formulation for avoiding the pitfalls of fideism and relativism, while sidestepping evidentialism, I argue that it ultimately fails to support a parity argument between religious and non-religious beliefs. Consequently, it cannot sustain a religious epistemology that avoids both evidentialism and fideism. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue New Work on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion)
17 pages, 238 KiB  
Article
Belief and Prediction: Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Religion in Dialogue with Predictive Processing
by Nasrin Bani Assadi
Religions 2025, 16(3), 330; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16030330 - 5 Mar 2025
Viewed by 188
Abstract
The present article aims to offer a new perspective on later Wittgenstein’s notion of belief by comparing the ideas in two well-known works of his, namely, On Certainty (OC) and Philosophical Investigations (PI), with ideas from a widely recognized theory of brain function [...] Read more.
The present article aims to offer a new perspective on later Wittgenstein’s notion of belief by comparing the ideas in two well-known works of his, namely, On Certainty (OC) and Philosophical Investigations (PI), with ideas from a widely recognized theory of brain function within the field of neuroscience known as predictive processing (PP). The purpose of this comparison is to demonstrate how Wittgenstein’s notion of belief transcends the conventional cognitive/non-cognitive dichotomy when examined alongside the PP framework—a model that, by integrating action with perception, already obscures the sharp boundary between these two categories. Employing a comparative philosophical approach, this study brings together insights from PP theory and Wittgenstein’s ideas on belief, exploring how PP could support and, in certain respects, shed light on Wittgenstein’s ideas about religion. One central point of the present analysis is to challenge the claim that Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion isolates religious discourse as uniquely evidence-resistant and/or evidence-repellent. By reading Wittgenstein’s ideas on world image and form of life through the lens of PP—with a special focus on the notion of self-evidencing—it is shown that the notion of belief, whether religious or not, in both Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and PP, is as much about being as it is about believing. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue New Work on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion)
17 pages, 237 KiB  
Article
The Emergence of Religious Narrative
by Jakub Gomułka and Jan Wawrzyniak
Religions 2025, 16(3), 318; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16030318 - 3 Mar 2025
Viewed by 205
Abstract
This article examines the conceptual connections between simpler and more complex forms of religiosity, focusing on the transition from ritual-based practices to religious narratives and theological reflection. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s method of perspicuous representation (übersichtliche Darstellung), the authors propose a series [...] Read more.
This article examines the conceptual connections between simpler and more complex forms of religiosity, focusing on the transition from ritual-based practices to religious narratives and theological reflection. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s method of perspicuous representation (übersichtliche Darstellung), the authors propose a series of models that illuminate this spectrum. These models demonstrate how religious narratives achieve autonomy of a sort that challenges reductionist interpretations. Rituals, initially guided by primitive reactions, become structured through linguistic conceptualisation and are woven into cohesive narratives that, in turn, serve as internal justifications for ritual practices, creating a linguistic space that encourages reflection. The article contends that theological reflection emerges when narratives encounter discrepancies—whether from external challenges or internal inconsistencies—prompting a systematic re-evaluation of beliefs. By critiquing Wittgenstein’s own reductionist tendencies, along with the “Wittgensteinian fideism” that emerged in its wake, the authors seek to emphasise the importance of recognising disputes within and between religious narratives as being integral to human life. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue New Work on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion)
29 pages, 382 KiB  
Article
“For If There Is No Resurrection of the Dead, Then Christ Has Not Been Raised Either”: Wittgenstein and the Cognitive Status of Christian Belief Statements
by Alois Pichler
Religions 2025, 16(3), 306; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16030306 - 27 Feb 2025
Viewed by 260
Abstract
The article engages in a critique of Wittgensteinian non-cognitivism about Christian belief statements but argues that Wittgenstein himself can only partially be classified under the non-cognitivist label. The article has three parts. First, it argues, contrary to a common view in the literature, [...] Read more.
The article engages in a critique of Wittgensteinian non-cognitivism about Christian belief statements but argues that Wittgenstein himself can only partially be classified under the non-cognitivist label. The article has three parts. First, it argues, contrary to a common view in the literature, that Wittgenstein moved not only from strong non-cognitivism to moderate non-cognitivism but also from general non-cognitivism towards partial cognitivism about Christian belief statements. Second, it examines three separate non-cognitivist Wittgensteinian claims about Christian belief statements and argues that these claims are untenable not only from a broad perspective, but also from the point of view of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. The three claims are: (1) “The cognitive aspect of Christian belief statements is superstition only”, (2) “The cognitive aspect of Christian belief statements is parasitic on religious attitude only”, and (3) “The cognitive aspect of Christian belief statements is cognitive in surface grammar only”. Third, the article considers the case of believing Christian martyrs and follows the view that their religious belief might be cognitive only at the surface grammar level, through to its ultimate consequences. The article argues, using Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, that the non-cognitivist position ends up with a cognitive point about the correctness or incorrectness of the Christian martyr’s depth grammar. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue New Work on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion)
14 pages, 235 KiB  
Article
Sheer Poison? Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Religion
by Duncan Richter
Religions 2025, 16(3), 266; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16030266 - 21 Feb 2025
Viewed by 242
Abstract
Anscombe once said to Anthony Kenny that “On the topic of religion, Wittgenstein is sheer poison”. This paper offers an assessment of that view. I take it that Anscombe meant that Wittgenstein was a bad influence rather than that his views were necessarily [...] Read more.
Anscombe once said to Anthony Kenny that “On the topic of religion, Wittgenstein is sheer poison”. This paper offers an assessment of that view. I take it that Anscombe meant that Wittgenstein was a bad influence rather than that his views were necessarily false, although she seems to have been uncertain about what exactly his views were. In “Paganism, Superstition and Philosophy”, she identifies five ideas that make up “a certain current in philosophy which has a strong historical connection with Wittgenstein”. I identify some of the sources of these ideas, in Wittgenstein’s writing and in work by some of his followers, and consider what Anscombe’s objections to them might have been. I also look at whether we should think of these ideas as belonging either to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion or to his personal beliefs. This will involve some consideration of how far we can, or should try to, separate the personal from the philosophical. So far as he held objectionable views about religion, I argue that these ought to be considered personal rather than philosophical. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue New Work on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion)
14 pages, 249 KiB  
Article
Persuading to See Differences: Religious Diversity and Deep Disagreement from a Wittgensteinian Perspective
by Marciano Adilio Spica
Religions 2025, 16(2), 212; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16020212 - 10 Feb 2025
Viewed by 473
Abstract
This article contributes to philosophical discussions on religious diversity by applying a Wittgensteinian lens, specifically drawing on insights from On Certainty. It examines interreligious disagreement as a form of “deep disagreement” and posits that Wittgenstein contends that argumentation has limitations in resolving [...] Read more.
This article contributes to philosophical discussions on religious diversity by applying a Wittgensteinian lens, specifically drawing on insights from On Certainty. It examines interreligious disagreement as a form of “deep disagreement” and posits that Wittgenstein contends that argumentation has limitations in resolving such conflicts. Instead, the article suggests that persuasion—a distinct process of making differences visible—facilitates a gradual reassessment of one’s world-picture. A key contribution of Wittgenstein’s thought to discussions on religious diversity lies in his emphasis on recognizing differences and understanding their transformative impact on our world-pictures. The article begins by differentiating between various types of disagreement, proposing that On Certainty addresses conflicts between world-pictures which can be characterized as deep disagreements. It then delves into Wittgenstein’s insights into the functioning of world-pictures and the crucial importance of grasping their dynamics for a better understanding of such disagreements. Building on this foundation, this article argues that persuasion, as a non-argumentative mode of engagement, is uniquely positioned to effectively make these differences visible in cases of deep disagreement. Finally, this article demonstrates how these ideas can help to address and resolve key misunderstandings within the philosophy of religious diversity. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue New Work on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion)
20 pages, 277 KiB  
Article
Philosophy of Religion: Taking Leave of the Abstract Domain
by Philip Wilson
Religions 2025, 16(2), 204; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16020204 - 8 Feb 2025
Viewed by 408
Abstract
John Cottingham argues that traditional university modules in the philosophy of religion take us into a ‘very abstract domain that is often far removed from religion as it actually operates in the life of the believer’. This paper makes four moves based on [...] Read more.
John Cottingham argues that traditional university modules in the philosophy of religion take us into a ‘very abstract domain that is often far removed from religion as it actually operates in the life of the believer’. This paper makes four moves based on Cottingham. First, it argues that the application of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s methods supports and facilitates a shift to the anthropological in the philosophy of religion (as evidenced in the work of Mikel Burley). Second, literature is examined as a tool for doing the philosophy of religion, following Danielle Moyal-Sharrock’s notion of the literary text as surveyable representation. Three works are investigated, namely Silence by Shūshaku Endō, The Brothers Karamazov by Fyodor Dostoevsky, and the Gospel of John. It is argued that, far from being merely illustrative of religion, story is (in its widest sense) constitutive of belief. Third, it is shown how Wittgenstein’s remarks on mysticism in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus can be read as a transmutation of literary writing that creates a non-abstract mysticism of the world. Wittgenstein’s remarks are placed in dialogue with Angelus Silesius’s poetry and Leo Tolstoy’s The Gospel in Brief. Fourth, the relevance of Wittgenstein to the current debate on cultural Christianity is brought out. Philosophers of religion must take leave of the abstract, if only to return to it and to view it differently. Wittgenstein’s thought is too important to ignore in this venture. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue New Work on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion)
12 pages, 198 KiB  
Article
God Unhinged? A Critique of Quasi-Fideism
by Zoheir Bagheri Noaparast
Religions 2025, 16(2), 186; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16020186 - 6 Feb 2025
Viewed by 438
Abstract
Drawing on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, Duncan Pritchard argues for a position he calls quasi-fideism. Quasi-Fideism is the view that hinge commitments such as “God exists” are exempt from rational scrutiny within the language game of religion. However, other religious beliefs, which are [...] Read more.
Drawing on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, Duncan Pritchard argues for a position he calls quasi-fideism. Quasi-Fideism is the view that hinge commitments such as “God exists” are exempt from rational scrutiny within the language game of religion. However, other religious beliefs, which are not part of the framework of hinge commitments, can be rationally assessed and evaluated. This view is to be contrasted with pure fideism, in which all aspects of religion are exempt from rational scrutiny. The success of quasi-fideism depends on demonstrating that “God exists” is, indeed, a hinge commitment. In this paper, I will review and criticize some of Pritchard’s reasons for arguing that God’s existence should be considered a hinge commitment. Additionally, I will offer reasons why “God exists” cannot be a hinge commitment. Considering the rational problem of evil, single and multiple divine attributes, and the emotional problem of evil, I will show that the non-circular rational criticism of God’s existence is possible. Following the distinction between subjective and objective certainty in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, I will suggest that a more fruitful line of inquiry for Wittgensteinians is to examine God as a subjective certainty. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue New Work on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion)
20 pages, 249 KiB  
Article
Newman and Wittgenstein on the Will to Believe: Quasi-Fideism and the Ground of Religious Certainty
by Modesto Gómez-Alonso
Religions 2025, 16(2), 174; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16020174 - 4 Feb 2025
Viewed by 509
Abstract
In this article, I argue that Newman’s emphasis on a gestaltic model of reasoning and the role played by the imagination in informal reasoning is a fruitful starting point for an exploration of convergence between the Grammar of Assent and Wittgenstein’s On Certainty [...] Read more.
In this article, I argue that Newman’s emphasis on a gestaltic model of reasoning and the role played by the imagination in informal reasoning is a fruitful starting point for an exploration of convergence between the Grammar of Assent and Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. I claim that Wittgenstein, like Newman, challenges both the claim that justification must be neutral and the prejudice according to which any form of persuasion that is not demonstrative is irrational or arational. Arguments are mainly focused on the picture of Newman’s epistemology provided lately by Duncan Pritchard. I argue that Pritchard misrepresents Newman’s conception of the illative sense so as to ascribe to him the thesis that religious belief is evidentially grounded in a broad sense of evidence. This creates a false dichotomy between the arational view of religious principles and the account of religious certainties as epistemically grounded. I suggest that Newman’s reference to both living persuasion and the role played by the will in religious conviction is part of his attempt to expose this false dichotomy. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue New Work on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion)
14 pages, 233 KiB  
Article
A Grammatical Investigation of Miracles
by David Ellis
Religions 2025, 16(2), 154; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16020154 - 28 Jan 2025
Viewed by 643
Abstract
Wittgenstein claims that religious belief does not stand on evidence, that only those with a religious point of view can see an event as a miracle, and that experiencing a miracle can influence a person towards religious belief. This has the unusual outcome [...] Read more.
Wittgenstein claims that religious belief does not stand on evidence, that only those with a religious point of view can see an event as a miracle, and that experiencing a miracle can influence a person towards religious belief. This has the unusual outcome that a miracle can lead a person to God, but a miracle cannot be evidence of God. This also faces two challenges. First, if miracles can only be seen from a religious point of view, then suggesting that a miracle can influence a person towards religion implies that a person can see a miracle before having a religious point of view. Second, if religious belief is not based on evidence, then those who report believing because of evidence are confused about their beliefs in a way we would not expect. I argue that these are not challenges to Wittgenstein’s account but symptoms of our misunderstanding of grammar and his distinction between relative and absolute miracles. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue New Work on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion)
10 pages, 239 KiB  
Article
Wittgenstein on the “Alien Will”: A Study of Compatibilism and Divine Influence
by Jakub Mácha
Religions 2024, 15(12), 1567; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15121567 - 23 Dec 2024
Viewed by 702
Abstract
In this article, I delve into Wittgenstein’s early manuscripts to examine the idea of an “alien will”, which may have been inspired by Schopenhauer and Weininger. By contrast with other interpretations, I treat this notion not as a metaphor but as the fundamental [...] Read more.
In this article, I delve into Wittgenstein’s early manuscripts to examine the idea of an “alien will”, which may have been inspired by Schopenhauer and Weininger. By contrast with other interpretations, I treat this notion not as a metaphor but as the fundamental idea that the world is independent of an individual’s will and appears instead to be influenced by a quasi-divine, alien will. This alien will, distinct from personal will, could either coincide or conflict with an individual subject’s will, affecting their happiness. I argue that this (dis)agreement involves the modal properties of objects rather than being a matter of factual consistency. Ultimately, I position Wittgenstein’s views as a form of pre-emptive compatibilism, according to which divine will shapes human conditions without compromising free will. This contributes a significant perspective to debates in the philosophy of religion. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue New Work on Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion)
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