Search Results (49)

Sales competition and recycling rivalry are critical factors affecting the operation of closed-loop supply (CLSC). The existing research on competitive CLSCs primarily analyzes the impact of competition between two sales entities and/or two recycling entities on management decisions. To make the study more realistic, this study constructs a Stackelberg game model with the manufacturer as a leader, and analyzes the impacts of competition among $n$ retailers ($\mathrm{w}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e} n\ge 2$) and rivalry among $m$ third-party recyclers $(\mathrm{w}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e} m\ge 2)$ on the decision-making and profits of both node enterprises and the supply chain system, and proposes a linear transfer-payment contract to coordinate the CLSC from an economic perspective. Numerical analyses are conducted to visualize the effects of competition on the decisions and profits. The key findings are as follows: (1) In the centralized system, inter-retailer competition reduces optimal order quantities but does not affect optimal retail prices. In the decentralized system, however, it decreases both optimal order quantities and retail prices. (2) Rivalry among recyclers reduces their optimal recycling volumes but does not affect their optimal recycling prices in the centralized system. In the decentralized system, however, such rivalry not only decreases recycling volumes but also increases optimal recycling prices. (3) The manufacturer’s product wholesale price and used product recycling price remain independent of competitive interactions among retailers and recyclers in the decentralized system. (4) Competition among retailers and recyclers positively affects the profits of the CLSC and the manufacturer, but negatively impacts those of retailers and recyclers. (5) When the reward–penalty factors for product order and used product recycling fall within a specific range, the linear transfer-payment contract can coordinate the CLSC in the presence of competition in both retail and recycling. (6) All enterprises’ profits are sensitive to the penalty–reward factor, but this sensitivities also gradually decrease as the number of retailers and (or) recyclers increases. Full article

With the large-scale power batteries approaching their retirement phase, efforts are being made to advance the recycling and cascade utilization of power batteries for electric vehicles (EVs). This paper constructs a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) of power batteries led by the battery manufacturer (BM) and composed of the electric vehicle manufacturer (EVM) and third-party recycler (TPR). The study investigates the optimal pricing strategies of this CLSC with the consideration of recycling competition under the government’s reward–penalty mechanism. This paper establishes five recycling modes, namely independent recycling and cooperative recycling, under dual-channel recycling, and further discusses the effects of the government reward–penalty mechanism and recycling competition on the recycling rate, profits, and recycling pricing of the CLSC in each recycling mode. The following conclusions are found: (1) An increase in the reward–penalty intensity will increase the recycling rate, sales price of EVs, wholesale price, transfer price, recycling price, and the profit of each recycler in the CLSC. (2) An increase in the recycling competition will result in the reduction of the profit of each enterprise, and will also lead to the reduction of the recycling rate. (3) Cooperation between enterprises can inhibit the recycling volume of other enterprises to a certain extent. The cooperation between the EVM and BM can increase the recycling volume and the sales volume of EVs. (4) The leadership of the BM in the supply chain is embodied in the recycling and profit. For other members of the supply chain, it is very important to strive for cooperation with the leaders in the supply chain. These research conclusions can provide theoretical support for optimizing the power battery recycling system, formulating relevant policies, and improving the efficiency of resource recycling, thereby promoting the sustainable development of the new energy industry. Full article

Amid the global push for agricultural green transformation, sustainable agriculture requires not only technological innovation but also market mechanisms that effectively incentivize green practices. Agricultural e-commerce is increasingly viewed as a potential driver of green technology diffusion among farmers. However, the extent and mechanism of e-commerce’s influence on farmers’ green production remain underexplored. Using survey data from 346 rural households in Inner Mongolia, China, this study develops a conceptual framework of “e-commerce participation–green cognition–green adoption” and employs propensity score matching (PSM) combined with mediation analysis to evaluate the impact of e-commerce participation on green technology adoption. The empirical results yield four main findings: (1) E-commerce participation significantly promotes the adoption of green production technologies, with an estimated 29.52% increase in adoption. (2) Participation has a strong positive effect on water-saving irrigation and pest control technologies at the 5% significance level, a moderate effect on straw incorporation at the 10% level, and no statistically significant impact on plastic film recycling or organic fertilizer use. (3) Compared to third-party sales, the direct e-commerce model more effectively promotes green technology adoption, with an increase of 21.64% at the 5% significance level. (4) Green cognition serves as a mediator in the relationship between e-commerce and green adoption behavior. This study makes contributions by introducing e-commerce participation as a novel explanatory pathway for green technology adoption, going beyond traditional policy-driven and resource-based perspectives. It further highlights the role of cognitive mechanisms in shaping adoption behaviors. The study recommends that policymakers subsidize farmers’ participation in e-commerce, invest in green awareness programs, and support differentiated e-commerce models to enhance their positive impact on sustainable agricultural practices. Full article

In the context of carbon trading policy, carbon emissions in the supply chain of new energy vehicles have received much attention in academic research and practice. Consumer preference for environmental friendliness is also growing in new energy vehicle supply chain operations, which has prompted new energy vehicle manufacturers to invest in carbon abatement technologies to improve the environmental friendliness of new energy vehicles. At the same time, the increased demand for new energy vehicles will also increase the green promotion of third-party power battery recycling companies to facilitate the recycling of power batteries. Considering these special features in the new energy vehicle supply chain, we applied a differential game model to examine the carbon emission reduction behaviors and green promotion technologies of the new energy vehicle supply chain members from a long-term and dynamic perspective. Supply chain equilibrium strategies under four different scenarios were analyzed and compared, numerical experiments were conducted to validate the theoretical results, and sensitivity analyses were performed to identify further insights. The results of the study show that a unit carbon trading price reaching a critical threshold is a prerequisite for technical cooperation between the new energy vehicle manufacturer and the third-party power battery recycling company. It provides a theoretical basis for the government to set the carbon price, and it effectively stimulates the cooperation and emission reduction drive of new energy vehicle companies. The study breaks through the traditional cost–benefit framework, internalizes the carbon price as a supply chain cooperation drive, and opens up a new paradigm for new energy vehicle industry research. Full article

The rapid development of the new energy vehicle (NEV) industry has led to concerns about battery quality and the transparency of green recycling, causing uncertainty among consumers. Many firms adopt blockchain technology to solve this problem, but blockchain adoption will bring privacy leakage risk to consumers. A Stackelberg game model of a three stage NEV supply chain is constructed to examine the impact of adapting blockchain on strategic decisions of supply chain participants. We consider a setting in which a battery supplier provides batteries to a NEV manufacturer, and a third-party recycler recovers retired batteries for a NEV manufacturer. We explore the influence of consumers’ green recycling preferences on the decisions of NEV supply chain members in three scenarios: not adopting blockchain traceability (NB), adopting blockchain with forward traceability (FB), and adopting blockchain with forward–reverse traceability (DB). We find that NEV supply chain members are more likely to adopt forward–reverse traceability under certain conditions. Moreover, the adoption of blockchain drives the battery supplier and NEV manufacture to increase wholesale price and retail price, especially under forward–reverse traceability. In addition, when consumers exhibit strong preferences for green recycling, third-party recyclers are more willing to invest in blockchain-based recycling due to its ability to enhance the accuracy and credibility of recycling data. Full article

This article investigates decision-making strategies for power battery recycling and cascading utilization within the context of rapidly advancing blockchain technology, aiming to enhance the sustainability and efficiency of energy storage systems. A closed-loop recycling supply chain model is proposed, integrating key stakeholders such as power battery manufacturers, OEM (original equipment manufacturer) vehicle manufacturers, third-party recyclers, tiered users, and consumers. The study focuses on critical factors including competition among recycling channels, the level of blockchain-enabled traceability, and the cascading utilization rate of retired batteries. By analyzing four hybrid recycling modes, the research identifies optimal recycling strategies and evaluates their economic and environmental impacts. The findings provide a theoretical foundation and practical insights for improving the sustainability of power battery recycling, contributing to the development of cleaner and more efficient energy systems. Full article

The sales of New Energy Vehicles (NEVs) have experienced substantial growth, resulting in a significant increase in the number of used NEV batteries. Improper disposal of these used batteries can lead to pollution and resource wastage. In line with the Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) principles, this research designs a three-level hybrid recycling closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, retailer, and third-party recycler. Furthermore, Stackelberg game theory is applied to develop distinct game models for analyzing the interactions among the supply chain participants. To research the interaction among multiple policies on the hybrid recycling system, it explores the optimal pricing and the CLSC’s recycling performance under the policy mix. In addition, a coordination mechanism is devised and validated to solve the decline in members’ individual profits caused by the policy mix. The findings indicate that battery tax policy may reduce total profits, and subsidy policies could result in enterprise dependency, but the policy mix can lead to increase in both recycling price and amount. This research demonstrates the policy mix can overcome the limitations of single policy, implement a long-term and dynamically adjustable incentive mechanism and provide a crucial reference for the government’s role as the “visible hand” in recycling. Full article

The improper disposal of construction and demolition waste (CDW) exacerbates the consumption of raw materials and emissions of greenhouse gasses. In this study, due to the high recycling rate, focusing on the meltable materials of CDW, the recycling phase of CDW is divided into four stages, namely the on-site disposal stage, the transportation stage, the reprocessing stage, and the reproduction stage. Second, based on these four stages, a carbon emission accounting model (CEAM) is established to evaluate the carbon emission benefits of meltable materials during these stages. Third, the CEAM is applied to a typical old residential area to evaluate the carbon emission reduction benefits of the CDW recycling. The results indicate that (1) the full-process carbon emissions of recycled steel, recycled flat glass, and recycled aluminum per unit mass are 677.77 kg/t, 1041.54 kg/t, and 845.39 kg/t, respectively, which are far lower than their corresponding ordinary meltable building materials (OMBMs); (2) the carbon emissions during the reproduction stage represent the primary component of carbon emissions in the MW recycling phase, accounting for 88.52% to 97.45% of the total carbon emissions; and (3) the carbon emissions generated by the recycling of cullet per unit mass are very high, reaching 1768 kg/t, which is 4.3 times that of scrap steel (409.05 kg/t) and 3.6 times that of scrap aluminum (483.76 kg/t). The research findings could provide theoretical methods and experimental data for decision-makers to formulate treatment plans for meltable materials in CDW, thereby empowering urban carbon emission reduction and promoting sustainable development. Construction parties engaged in demolition tasks should enhance on-site sorting and collaborate with recycling companies to ensure its efficient recycling. Recycling companies need to focus on high-carbon-emission stages, such as the reproduction stage, and strengthen technological research to improve carbon reduction benefits. Full article

Cap-and-trade is widely recognized as an effective mechanism for curbing carbon emissions, and it significantly influences the operational decisions within supply chains. This study investigates a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of one original equipment manufacturer, one traditional retailer, and one independent third-party collector. The manufacturer invests in cleaner technologies to produce green products and remanufactures new products from used items recycled by the third-party collector. Considering different channel power structures, three Stackelberg game models are developed, and their optimal solutions are derived using the backward induction. Additionally, the combined effects of remanufacturing-related and carbon-related parameters on economic and environmental benefits as well as social welfare are investigated under different settings. Moreover, the derived results are validated via numerical simulation. The findings indicate that: (1) Each channel member is incentivized to act as the leader role within the CLSC to maximize profits. (2) A loose cap-and-trade regulation is conducive to enhancing the emission abatement rate, collection rate, and overall performance for the CLSC. (3) The retailer-led model is the best option for capturing more economic benefits and social welfare, while the third party-led model can always achieve the best environmental performance regardless of carbon trading price. These research findings can provide valuable insights for policymakers and decision makers engaged in CLSC. Full article

In view of the uncertainty regarding consumers’ perceived value of remanufactured products, a remanufacturing supply chain system with the manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader is constructed, in which the manufacturer faces three modes, namely the manufacturer recycling mode (M), the retailer recycling mode (R), and the entrusted third-party recycling mode (3P). The remanufacturing supply chain is analyzed using the game theory approach in these three recycling modes. Using game theory to analyze the optimal pricing and profits of each supply chain participant, we also discuss the impact of consumers’ perceived value uncertainty on the profits of each party under the different recycling modes, and we then explore the selection of recycling channels in the remanufacturing supply chain. The results show that when the perceived value uncertainty is at a medium or low level, retailers are responsible for recycling used products and producing remanufactured products, which brings higher profits to the supply chain system; when the perceived value uncertainty is high, the demand for remanufactured products in the market decreases, and the recycling revenue of remanufactured products is lower. Finally, the validity of the theoretical model is verified by a numerical simulation. Full article

Bike sharing facilitates the public’s daily lives and possesses substantial market demand, yet its overwhelming presence has triggered some environmental problems. To enhance resource utilization efficiency, we examine the decision-making strategies within a reverse supply chain considering the private information of the bike-sharing platform. Using Stackelberg games, two models are formulated in order to investigate whether the platform should share its own private information when the used shared bikes are recycled. A supply chain without private information is provided as a benchmark for comparison, and we obtain the optimal equilibrium strategies of the benchmark and the proposed model. Furthermore, how the optimal strategies change with the variation in parameters and the impacts of the private information on the optimal strategies are discussed. The results show that information asymmetry could lead to a reduction in supply chain efficiency. Thus, a two-part pricing contract is introduced to incentivize the platform to share information and coordinate the supply chain, which can effectively improve the performance of the integral supply chain and implement a “win-win” strategy for the third-party remanufacturer and the platform. Full article

Modular design facilitates easy disassembly and reduces the manufacturer’s remanufacturing costs. However, the simplicity and modular structure of products can intensify competition between manufacturers and third-party recyclers. To improve recovery efficiency, this study examines the impact of modular design on the manufacturer’s selection of recovery strategies, including centralized, cooperation, and competition strategies. We examine the optimal recovery strategy for achieving both economic goals, such as supply chain profit, and environmental goals, such as collection quantity. Our results indicate that the manufacturer should adopt cooperation recovery and invest in higher modularity when faced with strong competition from third-party recyclers. Conversely, when the competitiveness of third-party recovery is relatively low, a competition recovery strategy is more advantageous. Contrary to conventional wisdom, which suggests limiting product disassembly to reduce third-party recovery competitiveness, our results indicate that manufacturers should invest in higher modularity and avoid engaging in price wars to prevent third-party entry. Moreover, competition recovery leads to a higher collection quantity, while cooperation recovery is preferred in terms of supply chain profit. This study provides theoretical guidance for manufacturers in selecting optimal recovery strategies and offers recommendations for governments on regulating product disassembly effectively. Full article

Enterprises adopting a circular economy approach can effectively solve the severe situation of resources and the environment, and recycling is considered an effective means to solve environmental issues. Simultaneously, blockchain technology (BT) has been used to enhance product quality trust. However, there is limited literature on how to choose between monopolistic and competitive recycling modes by considering BT. This paper uses a game involving a manufacturer, a retailer, and a third-party recycler (TPR) in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). The retailer can recycle on itself and compete with the TPR for recycling used products. The results show that BT adoption could increase the recycling rate and demand for remanufactured products. BT benefits the firms in the CLSC when they control usage costs, regardless of whether competitive recycling mode is used or not. In addition, whether BT is adopted or not, CLSC firms prefer competitive recycling mode only when the competitive intensity exceeds a specific threshold. Moreover, choosing an appropriate recycling mode can alleviate the negative impact of BT on the environment, then an all-win result can be obtained for CLSC firms, consumers, and society. These results can give suggestions for managers to optimize their supply chains regarding adopting BT and implementing recycling mode. In the future, we can expand our research on the transfer price of used products, the positive and negative effects of BT, and BT cost-sharing strategies. Full article

Recycling waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) has garnered considerable societal attention. To incentivize WEEE recycling within a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), a deposit-refund system (DRS) has been implemented. This study delves into the implications of a market-driven DRS on WEEE recycling under different recycling models. A Stackelberg game analysis is employed, where an electronics manufacturer (leader) has sufficient channel power over an electronics retailer and a third-party recycler (followers). The results indicate that the market-driven DRS significantly incentivizes consumer recycling efforts, ultimately elevating the economic efficiency of the supply chain. When the electronics manufacturer assumes responsibility for WEEE recycling, it streamlines the recycling process, thereby enhancing operational efficiency and profitability. Conversely, when the electronics retailer handles WEEE recycling, it reduces retail prices and simplifies the recycling process, positively influencing consumer purchasing behavior. However, when a third-party recycler undertakes WEEE recycling, the recycling volume tends to be minimal, resulting in the lowest level of supply chain profits. This paper provides theoretical and practical implications for improving the recycling effectiveness and operational efficiency of the CLSC. Full article

Core acquisition is essential to the success of the remanufacturing business. The value of sorting and grading cores into nominal-quality classes has been certified in industry and academia. In this paper, we investigate how many unsorted cores of uncertain quality should be acquired and how many sorted cores should be remanufactured by a third-party remanufacturer (3PR) before the demand is realized. We first develop analytically tractable solutions to the acquisition and production model under deterministic demand, and then we extend it to the model under the stochastic demand by fully characterizing the structure of the optimal policy. Subsequently, we investigate the impact of core quality fraction uncertainty on the solutions. Finally, numerical analyses are conducted to further verify the proposed models. The results are as follows. First, the optimal quantity of acquisition/production and minimum expected profit increase with an increase in the selling price and decrease with an increase in the uncertainty of demand and acquisition cost. Second, the optimal production quantity does not decrease in acquisition quantity, and the rate of utilization of the recycled parts (the ratio of production quantity to acquisition quantity) increases with a decrease in the acquisition cost. Third, the growth stage is most profitable stage, so the remanufacturers should pay more attention to remanufacturing activities early in the life of products. The proposed models and solutions can not only solve the core acquisition and production problem in remanufacturing, but also solve the combinatorial optimization problem. Full article