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Games, Volume 3, Issue 1 (March 2012), Pages 1-77

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Research

Open AccessArticle Responder Feelings in a Three-Player Three-Option Ultimatum Game: Affective Determinants of Rejection Behavior
Games 2012, 3(1), 1-29; doi:10.3390/g3010001
Received: 24 October 2011 / Revised: 16 January 2012 / Accepted: 7 February 2012 / Published: 13 February 2012
Cited by 3 | PDF Full-text (344 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text | Supplementary Files
Abstract
This paper addresses the role of affect and emotions in shaping the behavior of responders in the ultimatum game. A huge amount of research shows that players do not behave in an economically rational way in the ultimatum game, and emotional mechanisms [...] Read more.
This paper addresses the role of affect and emotions in shaping the behavior of responders in the ultimatum game. A huge amount of research shows that players do not behave in an economically rational way in the ultimatum game, and emotional mechanisms have been proposed as a possible explanation. In particular, feelings of fairness, anger and envy are likely candidates as affective determinants. We introduce a three-player ultimatum game with three-options, which permits the responder to either penalize the proposer or to penalize a third party by rejecting offers. This allows for partially distinguishing rejections due to a retaliation motive driven by anger towards the proposer from rejections due to inequity aversion driven by feelings of envy towards a third party. Results from two experiments suggest that responders experience feelings of dissatisfaction and unfairness if their share is small in comparison to the proposer’s share; anger, then, may trigger rejections towards the proposer. Responders also experience dissatisfaction and envy when third party shares exceed their own shares; however, in contrast to anger, envy does not trigger rejections and is dissociated from the decision to accept or reject an offer. We conclude that acting upon anger is socially acceptable, whereas envy is not acceptable as a reason for action. Furthermore, we find that responders generally feel better after rejections, suggesting that rejections serve to regulate one’s affective state. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Games and Psychology)
Open AccessArticle Coordination, Differentiation and Fairness in a Population of Cooperating Agents
Games 2012, 3(1), 30-40; doi:10.3390/g3010030
Received: 2 February 2012 / Revised: 27 February 2012 / Accepted: 29 February 2012 / Published: 5 March 2012
Cited by 1 | PDF Full-text (229 KB)
Abstract
In a recent paper, we analyzed the self-assembly of a complex cooperation network. The network was shown to approach a state where every agent invests the same amount of resources. Nevertheless, highly-connected agents arise that extract extraordinarily high payoffs while contributing comparably [...] Read more.
In a recent paper, we analyzed the self-assembly of a complex cooperation network. The network was shown to approach a state where every agent invests the same amount of resources. Nevertheless, highly-connected agents arise that extract extraordinarily high payoffs while contributing comparably little to any of their cooperations. Here, we investigate a variant of the model, in which highly-connected agents have access to additional resources. We study analytically and numerically whether these resources are invested in existing collaborations, leading to a fairer load distribution, or in establishing new collaborations, leading to an even less fair distribution of loads and payoffs. Full article
Open AccessArticle Games with Synergistic Preferences
Games 2012, 3(1), 41-55; doi:10.3390/g3010041
Received: 26 February 2012 / Accepted: 12 March 2012 / Published: 15 March 2012
Cited by 1 | PDF Full-text (93 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
Players in economic situations often have preferences not only over their own outcome but also over what happens to fellow players, entirely apart from any strategic considerations. While this can be modeled directly by simply writing down final preferences, these are commonly [...] Read more.
Players in economic situations often have preferences not only over their own outcome but also over what happens to fellow players, entirely apart from any strategic considerations. While this can be modeled directly by simply writing down final preferences, these are commonly unknown a priori. In many cases it is therefore both helpful and instructive to explicitly model these interactions. This paper presents a simple structure in the context of game theory, building on a model due to Bergstrom, that incorporates these ‘synergisms’ between players. It is powerful enough to cover a wide range of such interactions and model many disparate experimental and empirical results, yet straightforward enough to be used in many applied situations where altruism, or a baser motive, is implied. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fairness in Games)
Open AccessArticle Patience or Fairness? Analyzing Social Preferences in Repeated Games
Games 2012, 3(1), 56-77; doi:10.3390/g3010056
Received: 9 January 2012 / Accepted: 16 March 2012 / Published: 21 March 2012
Cited by 2 | PDF Full-text (459 KB)
Abstract
This paper investigates how the introduction of social preferences affects players’ equilibrium behavior in both the one-shot and the infinitely repeated version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We show that fairness concerns operate as a ”substitute” for time discounting in the infinitely [...] Read more.
This paper investigates how the introduction of social preferences affects players’ equilibrium behavior in both the one-shot and the infinitely repeated version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We show that fairness concerns operate as a ”substitute” for time discounting in the infinitely repeated game, as fairness helps sustain cooperation for lower discount factors. In addition, such cooperation can be supported under larger parameter values if players are informed about each others’ social preferences than if they are uninformed. Finally, our results help to identify conditions under which cooperative behavior observed in recent experimental repeated games can be rationalized using time preferences alone (patience) or a combination of time and social preferences (fairness). Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fairness in Games)

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