Next Issue
Previous Issue

Table of Contents

Games, Volume 3, Issue 2 (June 2012), Pages 78-118

  • Issues are regarded as officially published after their release is announced to the table of contents alert mailing list.
  • You may sign up for e-mail alerts to receive table of contents of newly released issues.
  • PDF is the official format for papers published in both, html and pdf forms. To view the papers in pdf format, click on the "PDF Full-text" link, and use the free Adobe Readerexternal link to open them.
View options order results:
content type | publication date

result details:
normal | extended | compact
Displaying articles 1-2
Show export options Hide export options
Select all
Export citation of selected articles as:

Research

Open AccessArticle What Behaviors are Disapproved? Experimental Evidence from Five Dictator Games
by and
Games 2012, 3(2), 78-96; doi:10.3390/g3020078
Received: 28 February 2012 / Accepted: 30 March 2012 / Published: 23 April 2012
PDF Full-text (247 KB) | Supplementary Files
Abstract
The literature on social norms has often stressed that social disapproval is crucial to foster compliance with norms and promote fair and cooperative behavior. With this in mind, we explore the disapproval of allocation decisions using experimental data from five dictator games with
[...] Read more.
The literature on social norms has often stressed that social disapproval is crucial to foster compliance with norms and promote fair and cooperative behavior. With this in mind, we explore the disapproval of allocation decisions using experimental data from five dictator games with a feedback stage. Our data suggests that subjects are heterogeneous in their disapproval patterns, distinguishing two main groups: (1) Subjects who only disapprove choices that harm them, and (2) subjects who disapprove socially inefficient choices. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fairness in Games)
Open AccessArticle Quantum Type Indeterminacy in Dynamic Decision-Making: Self-Control through Identity Management
by and
Games 2012, 3(2), 97-118; doi:10.3390/g3020097
Received: 29 February 2012 / Revised: 29 March 2012 / Accepted: 30 March 2012 / Published: 15 May 2012
Cited by 6 | PDF Full-text (337 KB)
Abstract
The Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that uses some elements of quantum formalism to model the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In a dynamic decision context, type indeterminacy induces a game with multiple selves associated with a state
[...] Read more.
The Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that uses some elements of quantum formalism to model the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In a dynamic decision context, type indeterminacy induces a game with multiple selves associated with a state transition process. We define a Markov perfect equilibrium among the selves with individual identity (preferences) as the state variable. The approach allows to characterize generic personality types and derive some comparative static results. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Boundedly Rational Behavior in Games)
Displaying articles 1-2
Show export options Hide export options
Select all
Export citation of selected articles as:

Further Information

Article Processing Charges Pay an Invoice Open Access Policy Terms of Use Terms and Conditions Privacy Policy Contact MDPI Jobs at MDPI

Guidelines

For Authors For Reviewers For Editors For Librarians For Publishers For Societies

MDPI Initiatives

Institutional Open Access Program (IOAP) Sciforum Preprints Scilit MDPI Books MDPI Blog

Follow MDPI

LinkedIn Facebook Twitter Google+
Back to Top