Points of View and Disagreement

A special issue of Philosophies (ISSN 2409-9287).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (15 March 2022) | Viewed by 3590

Special Issue Editor


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Guest Editor
Department of Philosophy, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY 13902, USA
Interests: the intersection of philosophy of mind; metaphysics; epistemology and logic

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues:

Knowledge lies at the core of our being. It grounds everything we do. Realists tell us that there is only one reality. And reality is what we know, according to epistemologists. So all of human knowledge should cohere nicely, revealing to us this one reality we all live in.

Alas… this doesn’t even remotely describe what we actually experience. What we experience is a vast sea of conflicting knowledges, all expressed in passionate and sometimes deadly disagreements. Often, these differing knowledges concern the deepest, most important parts of our lives: the nature of the world we live in (e.g., was it created or not); whether science is good and truth-producing or mostly evil and a hoax; whether vaccines are a public good; whether the global temperature is rising and, if so, why; whether there are any just wars. And, this is just an introductory list. It looks, therefore, as if the 8 billion humans on Earth constitute at least that many points of view.

It is common, at this step, for someone to point out that while there are many, many points of view on important topics, for each such topic, only a few closely related points of view constitute knowledge of that topic. Opinions vary; knowledge does not. But the fundamental problem is here: Who decides who has knowledge and who has mere opinion? For every person who decides one way, there is another who decides some other way. Fortunately, Philosophies is running a Special Issue where this all can be worked out.

Topics include, but are not limited to:

  • Disagreements and points of view: How are points of view and disagreements related? Are we destined to always disagree?
  • Formal treatments of points of view, including logics incorporating and describing points of view.
  • How should we pick who adjudicates between the points of view that constitute knowledge and the ones that are mere opinion, assuming this very distinction isn’t question-begging?
  • Moral and ethical consequences of deciding that some people’s cherished point of view is wrong.
  • Ontological and epistemological status of points of view: Are points of view basic in any way? Are there different kinds of points of view?
  • Psychology and points of view: Why do points of view vary so much? Why do humans have differing points of view at all? Are points of view kinds of perceptions?
  • Relativism, of all varieties, and points of view: Does taking others’ points of view seriously mean that relativism is inevitable?
  • What social policies, if any, should govern how we decide who knows and who doesn’t? It can’t all come down to pragmatics because people disagree about what they regard as pragmatically reasonable.

Prof. Eric Dietrich
Guest Editor

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Keywords

  • Belief
  • Consciousness
  • Disagreement
  • Intentionality
  • Knowledge
  • Points of view
  • Phenomenology of believing
  • Phenomenology of knowing
  • Relativism
  • Science

Published Papers (1 paper)

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Research

18 pages, 887 KiB  
Article
Different Roles for Multiple Perspectives and Rigorous Testing in Scientific Theories and Models: Towards More Open, Context-Appropriate Verificationism
by Peter Cariani
Philosophies 2022, 7(3), 54; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7030054 - 19 May 2022
Viewed by 2927
Abstract
A form of context-appropriate verificationism is proposed that distinguishes between scientific theories as evolving systems of ideas and operationally-specified, testable formal-empirical models. Theories undergo three stages (modes): a formative, exploratory, heuristic phase of theory conception, a developmental phase of theory-pruning and refinement, and [...] Read more.
A form of context-appropriate verificationism is proposed that distinguishes between scientific theories as evolving systems of ideas and operationally-specified, testable formal-empirical models. Theories undergo three stages (modes): a formative, exploratory, heuristic phase of theory conception, a developmental phase of theory-pruning and refinement, and a mature, rigorous phase of testing specific, explicit models. The first phase depends on Feyerabendian open possibility, the second on theoretical plausibility and internal coherence, and the third on testability (falsifiability, predictive efficacy). Multiple perspectives produce variety necessary for theory formation, whereas explicit agreement on evaluative criteria is essential for testing. Hertzian observer-mechanics of empirical-deductive scientific models are outlined that use semiotic operations of measurement/evaluation, computation, and physical action/construction. If models can be fully operationalized, then they can be intersubjectively verified (tested) irrespective of metaphysical, theoretical, value-, or culture-based disagreements. Verificationism can be expanded beyond simple predictive efficacy to incorporate testing for pragmatic, functional efficacy in engineering, medicine, and design contexts. Such a more open, pragmatist, operationalist, epistemically-constructivist perspective is suggested in which verification is contingent on the type of assertion (e.g., heuristic, analytic, empirical, pragmatic), its intended purpose, degree and reliability of model-based evidence, and existence of alternate, competing predictive models. Suggestions for epistemological hygiene amidst the world-wide pandemic of misinformation and propaganda are offered. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Points of View and Disagreement)
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