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Ethical Concerns in Early Confucianism
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Ethical Concerns in Early Confucianism

A special issue of Religions (ISSN 2077-1444).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 30 June 2025 | Viewed by 10626

Special Issue Editor

Prof. Dr. Meihong Zhang

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
School of Philosophy and Sociology, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou 730000, China
Interests: Chinese philosophy; Confucianism; neo-Confucianism; ethics; comparative philosophy
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

I am writing to invite you to contribute to the Special Issue of the Religions journal entitled “Ethical Concerns in Early Confucianism”. Although the theme has somewhat been addressed in many correlational studies for over a century, the explanation of its core issues and the revelation of the internal relations among them remain unsystematic and incomplete. With this in mind, our intensive focus on the ethical concerns of early Confucianism of today from a broader perspective still seems very significant and particularly necessary.

In this Special Issue, original research articles and reviews are welcome. Topics covered may include (but are not limited to) the following:

  1. Ethical dilemmas and the rise of early Confucianism;
  2. Ethical thoughts in the early classical texts of Confucianism;
  3. Ethical views of the representatives of early Confucianism;
  4. Modes of ethical argument in early Confucianism;
  5. Ethical debates between early Confucianism and Daoism /Mohism;
  6. Comparative studies on early Confucian ethics between China and the West.

I look forward to receiving your valuable contributions.

You may choose our Joint Special Issue in Philosophies.

Prof. Dr. Meihong Zhang
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a double-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Religions is an international peer-reviewed open access monthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1800 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • early Confucianism
  • ethical concerns
  • classical text
  • representative
  • ethical argument
  • ethical debate

Published Papers (7 papers)

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Research

14 pages, 302 KiB  
Article
Sage-King Naming Theory: A New Perspective on Understanding Xunzi’s Doctrine of the Rectification of Names
by Yingting Hao
Religions 2024, 15(2), 177; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15020177 - 31 Jan 2024
Viewed by 753
Abstract
By focusing on Xunzi’s concept of the sage-king and the sage-king naming theory, a new interpretive perspective can be applied to Xunzi’s doctrine of the rectification of names. During the Warring States period, mainstream views among Confucian and Daoist scholars tended to interpret [...] Read more.
By focusing on Xunzi’s concept of the sage-king and the sage-king naming theory, a new interpretive perspective can be applied to Xunzi’s doctrine of the rectification of names. During the Warring States period, mainstream views among Confucian and Daoist scholars tended to interpret the sage-king as the bearer of Heaven or Dao. However, Xunzi follows the principle of the division between Heaven and humanity, asserting that the sage-king is entirely subordinate to the realm of humans, embodying the ideal order of Confucian community. In light of this concept of the sage-king, this paper aims to address two questions: first, where the legitimacy of the sage-king naming prerogative comes from, and second, how the sage-king, as the master-signifier, quilts all floating signifiers to ensure the publicity and normativity of names. Moral norms emerge from the sage-king’s projection of intentions and emotions onto external objects. Sage-king naming theory provides the prerequisite for the superassertibility of moral norms, limiting the potential arbitrariness and private interpretations of names and norms, which ensures the public and authoritative nature of the social discourse system, thereby endowing the sage-kings with legitimacy. As the quilting point and stopping point, the sage-king performs the totalization and prohibition by means of which the floating names and norms are fixed and become parts of the structured Confucian discourse of meaning. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethical Concerns in Early Confucianism)
16 pages, 849 KiB  
Article
The Ethics of Contingency: An Alternative (to) Morality in the Analects
by Paul D’Ambrosio
Religions 2023, 14(11), 1367; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14111367 - 30 Oct 2023
Viewed by 1093
Abstract
An appreciation of the emphasis on flexibility in the Analects is one of the most consistent motifs in the various interpretations of this text. When applied specifically to normative readings, embracing adaptability, having malleable standards, and taking particulars into account are both promising [...] Read more.
An appreciation of the emphasis on flexibility in the Analects is one of the most consistent motifs in the various interpretations of this text. When applied specifically to normative readings, embracing adaptability, having malleable standards, and taking particulars into account are both promising and challenging ways to think about whether something might be moral or ethical. This paper attempts to deconstruct this familiar discussion along novel lines that can reveal new ways to reflect on the importance of flexibility in the Analects, while, at the same time, it reconstrues ways in which comparative projects might be oriented. The main argument is this: the Analects does not recognize a categorical distinction between a moral and non-moral realm. Whereas, in much modern academic thought, there is a distinction between what counts as contingencies and what is up to the individual, which, in turn, loosely corresponds to the non-moral and moral realms, the Analects does not make such clear distinctions. Everything, including core moral issues such as the individual’s own choice, moral guidelines, and the contextualization of (moral) models, is all ultimately grounded in contingencies. Nevertheless, the Analects provides ways of reflecting on choices and actions that aim to steer people in specific directions. We may understand this as a type of morality, but one that is significantly distinct from those wherein the difference between the moral (non-contingent) and non-moral (contingent) is foundational. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethical Concerns in Early Confucianism)
13 pages, 808 KiB  
Article
On the Coherence of Mencius’ Concept of Li: An Analysis Based on Moral Reasons Internalism
by Shuwen Liu and Xiaodong Xie
Religions 2023, 14(8), 1061; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14081061 - 18 Aug 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1291
Abstract
This paper addresses the problem of coherence, i.e., whether the internal and external dimensions of li (礼 rituals, rites, and the observance of them) are compatible. This problem stems mainly from Mencius’ seemingly conflicting statements. On the one hand, he emphasized the goodness [...] Read more.
This paper addresses the problem of coherence, i.e., whether the internal and external dimensions of li (礼 rituals, rites, and the observance of them) are compatible. This problem stems mainly from Mencius’ seemingly conflicting statements. On the one hand, he emphasized the goodness of xing (性 human nature) in terms of the goodness of the heart-mind. On the other hand, he defended the act of following li regardless of one’s heart-mind. This paper argues that Mencius held coherent moral reasons internalism, asserting that moral reasons are embedded in people’s universal and potential instinct to do morally good things. Consequently, he distinguished morality from non-moral normativity and claimed that the former takes precedence over the latter. The concept of li is thus divided into moral li and non-moral li, with moral li taking precedence over non-moral li. Therefore, the act of “following li regardless of one’s heart-mind” refers to following non-moral li, as long as it does not conflict with moral li. Based on the fact that Mencius’ concept of li is a kind of coherent moral reasons internalism, this paper further responds to some challenges from moral reasons externalism. It does so by clarifying the meaning of “seeking the cause within oneself” (反求诸己 fan qiu zhu ji), showing that Mencius believed every individual could establish rational inner guidance and be motivated to lead a reflective and autonomous moral life. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethical Concerns in Early Confucianism)
12 pages, 823 KiB  
Article
Rethinking the Mengzi’s Concept of Tian 天
by Kevin J. Turner
Religions 2023, 14(8), 1015; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14081015 - 8 Aug 2023
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 890
Abstract
There is an undeniable relationship between humanity and tian 天 in the philosophy of the Mengzi 孟子 where the latter is generally conceived as the metaphysical or ontological source of the morality and ethics of the former. However, this line of interpretation is [...] Read more.
There is an undeniable relationship between humanity and tian 天 in the philosophy of the Mengzi 孟子 where the latter is generally conceived as the metaphysical or ontological source of the morality and ethics of the former. However, this line of interpretation is misleading because it not only imports foreign notions of transcendence into the thought of the Mengzi but also because it ignores the contribution humans make to tian. At the same time, there have been attempts to read the Mengzi in biological terms, thereby naturalizing human morality. This likewise does not satisfy as an adequate account of human morality because it also reduces it to a natural or biological realm where human culture is an external accessory. However, the relationship between humanity and tian in the Mengzi is one of mutual influence and emergence; therefore, this article analyzes their relationship and argues that tian is to be understood as “tradition” whereby humans in their process of becoming humans contribute to and invigorate it as successive generations carry it on into the future. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethical Concerns in Early Confucianism)
10 pages, 800 KiB  
Article
Interstate Relational Ethics: Mengzi and Later Mohists in Dialogue
by Ting-mien Lee
Religions 2023, 14(5), 659; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14050659 - 15 May 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1137
Abstract
The popular interpretation holds that Mengzi was strongly critical of Mozi because the Mohist moral theory was antithetical to Confucian relational ethics. According to this interpretation, Mohism promotes the norm of “impartiality” or “impartial care”, which violates the Confucian norms of “filial piety” [...] Read more.
The popular interpretation holds that Mengzi was strongly critical of Mozi because the Mohist moral theory was antithetical to Confucian relational ethics. According to this interpretation, Mohism promotes the norm of “impartiality” or “impartial care”, which violates the Confucian norms of “filial piety” and “graded love”. Accordingly, Mengzi thought that the Confucian ideal would not be realized if Mohism continued to prevail. Scholars have tried to nuance and revise this dominant interpretation. For example, some have pointed out the importance of family-oriented values in Mohist ethical theory, arguing that Mengzi likely misunderstood or purposefully mispresented Mohism. This article is an initial attempt to modify the popular interpretation by arguing that the debate between Mengzi and Mohist regarding relational ethics is predominantly about the relations between states rather than individuals. This interpretation sheds light on a core difference between Confucian and Mohist ethical theories and can help make better sense of some later Mohist passages. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethical Concerns in Early Confucianism)
17 pages, 779 KiB  
Article
The Positive Motivation of Shame: Moral Emotion in the Mencius
by Lan Yu
Religions 2023, 14(4), 495; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14040495 - 4 Apr 2023
Viewed by 1821
Abstract
For Mencius, shame is the human way of existing in a virtuous disposition and concretely manifests not only as the self-affirming of the passion of shame in the action of stopping something bad from happening, but also as a way of handling affairs [...] Read more.
For Mencius, shame is the human way of existing in a virtuous disposition and concretely manifests not only as the self-affirming of the passion of shame in the action of stopping something bad from happening, but also as a way of handling affairs and processing things. This paper explains how shame functions as moral motivation by analyzing the affective mindset of shame and aversion (xiu e zhi xin 羞恶之心) and its relation to honoring decorum (yi 义) in the Mencius. Furthermore, I clarify that shame not only refers to cases of shameful self-concern but also to cases of morally detesting others and that the object of both is honoring decorum (yi 义). This unique psychological affect that we call shame develops from the dissonance or misalignment between one’s own moral conduct and the criteria of socially beneficial interaction; however, for this reason, it is commonly misinterpreted as negative. In order to demonstrate the positivity of shame and lay out the moral groundwork for an ethics of shame, this paper unfolds the complex interrelation between honoring decorum (yi 义) and shame. Lastly, this paper argues that shame is a deeply-rooted natural disposition that grows and expands in connection with self-approved norms during interactions with other people; therefore, it is the unfolding of a coherence between affect and norm and a relational moral emotion that takes us beyond the symmetry and asymmetry of utilitarian and deontological ethics, respectively. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethical Concerns in Early Confucianism)
11 pages, 786 KiB  
Article
Models of Humanism in Ancient China: An Explanation Centered on Early Confucian Ethics
by Jana S. Rošker
Religions 2023, 14(1), 83; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14010083 - 6 Jan 2023
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 1651
Abstract
In China, humanism, especially within the framework of Confucian ethics, developed quite differently from humanist discourses in Europe. Therefore, it is important to understand the origins and development of Confucian ideas that place human beings at the center of culture and the cosmos. [...] Read more.
In China, humanism, especially within the framework of Confucian ethics, developed quite differently from humanist discourses in Europe. Therefore, it is important to understand the origins and development of Confucian ideas that place human beings at the center of culture and the cosmos. Through the lens of the cultural particularities of humanism, this knowledge can help us gain a more complex and multi-layered insight into the universal factors that make up human nature. This paper critically examines the foundations, development, and distinctive features of traditional Chinese humanism, which emerged within the framework of classical Confucian teachings. Beginning with an analysis of the Confucian view of the relationship between the individual and society, the author explains the conceptual origin and historical development of various models of humanism in the Chinese tradition. The paper then sheds light on the reasons for the transition from religions to humanities that took place in China during the Axial Age, and highlights various implications of this transition manifested in Confucian ethics and its search for a better social order. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethical Concerns in Early Confucianism)
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