4.1. The Statistics of Particles Possessing Individuality
The Gibbs paradox is about the release of a constraint, so that gas molecules that were confined to a fixed region become free to move into a bigger volume. For the statistical treatment, we have to consider the new microstates that become available.
Consider again the standard example of an ideal gas in equilibrium in a volume of size
V that is brought into contact with a gas of the same kind and in the same macrostate, in a volume of the same size
V. Suppose that, before the removal of the partition
W micro states were available to each of the two gases. As discussed in the previous section, the new number of micro states in the total system is
: each way of dividing the total number
of particles into two distinct groups of size
N corresponds to another total particle configuration. As we have seen in
Section 3, this way of counting is based on the assumption that each particle possesses its own individuality. For the sake of illustration, suppose that at some initial instant (with the partition in place) the particles in the left compartment are numbered
, and the particles on the right side
, and also that exactly
N locations are available in each of the two compartments. In this case, the number of microstates on each side before the removal of the partition is
, and therefore the initial number of states in the total system
. After the removal of the partition, there are exactly
locations available to
particles, so that the number of microstates of the total system has grown to
. This illustrates the increase of the number of microstates by the factor
(In a realistic illustration, we should of course consider a number of possible locations that is much greater than the number of particles. This complicates the calculation because in this case we have to take into account (non-equilibrium) situations in which the particles are not evenly distributed over the total volume; they could, for example, all be in the left compartment. The probability consideration that follows also covers this case.).
The basic assumption in the Boltzmannian approach to statistical mechanics is that all microstates of the same energy have an equal probability of being occupied (This is justified by the ergodic hypothesis or one of its modern successors—this is a subject in itself, which we are not going to discuss). If we adopt this assumption, the probability of having
particles in the left compartment and
particles in the right one (with
the fixed total number of particles) is given by the binomial distribution
The particle numbers
and
have now become stochastic variables; it has been assumed that on average each ideal gas particle finds itself equally often in the left and right compartments so that the probabilities of being on the left or right are
. Note the appearance of the factors
and
in Equation (
7). These come from the binomial factor
, whose presence is justified by the assumption that it makes a difference
which individual molecules out of the total collection find themselves in the volumes
and
, respectively. The probability in Equation (
7) is proportional to the size of the phase volume of the total system (as a function of
), so that we may take the logarithm of
as the entropy of the system.
The appearance of the factors
and
in Equation (
7) is suggestive: as we have seen in the beginning of this section, insertion of such factorials makes the entropy expressions extensive and dissolves the Gibbs paradox.
The relation with extensivity is made more explicit by the following consideration. If we have two volumes of different sizes,
and
, and let the total particle number and also
go to infinity, while the particle density remains finite and constant (the thermodynamic limit), we find for the limiting probability that
particles are in
:
in which
K is a constant. The entropy of an
N-particle system with volume
V in contact with an infinite particle reservoir therefore becomes (
N is the particle number, fluctuating around the equilibrium value at which it is sharply peaked):
This essentially is the derivation of the N-dependence of the entropy given by the grand canonical ensemble (the grand canonical ensemble characterizes systems in contact with a heat bath and an infinite particle reservoir). The resulting entropy is extensive, in the sense that it varies linearly with the particle number when this number fluctuates due to particles flowing in and out of a particle reservoir.
However, in the Gibbs set up, there is no external particle bath, but only two finite gas volumes that are brought into contact with each other but whose combination is assumed to be isolated from the rest of the world. If the initial two compartments were each in open contact with particle reservoirs to begin with, the situation would change and we would no longer have the original Gibbs problem (However, even in the case of open systems in contact with infinite particle reservoirs, a variation on the Gibbs paradox can be reconstructed ([
5], p. 309), in spite of the occurrence of the factorials in the grand canonical expressions). Thus, let us see what the predictions are of Equation (
7), with its factorials, if it is used directly for the actual Gibbs case. In particular, we are interested in the question of whether the factorials in Equation (
7) provide the extensivity needed to solve the paradox.
Immediately after the removal of the partition (an infinitesimal time interval later, say), the particles
are still on the left and the other particles are still on the right (with the labeling as introduced above); according to the binomial distribution, this configuration has a probability of
(there is only one way of dividing the total collection of particles in these two groups). When the mixing has taken place, there will be a non-vanishing probability for all possible particle distributions (including the ones in which one of the compartments is empty). However, since the binomial probability is very sharply peaked around
, with overwhelming probability an equilibrium will be established in which the gas is (practically) uniformly distributed over the total volume. The associated change in entropy can be expressed as the logarithm of the new probability, which, according to Equation (
7), is:
If we start with two volumes V filled with N atoms of ideal gas A and N atoms of gas B, we find the same value for the entropy of mixing. This was to be expected because, on the particles microlevel, exactly the same dynamical processes, with the same probabilities, will take place in the two cases. Thus, even in the case of gases of the same kind, we obtain a non-vanishing entropy of mixing, if we compute probabilities on the assumption that the particles possess individuality.
There is, however, a way to avoid this conclusion, namely by arguing that, in the case of gases of the same kind, the situation immediately after the removal of the partition already is a state of maximum probability and maximum entropy because the particle density on both sides already has the equilibrium value at which the probability peaks. This would lead to the result (desirable from the thermodynamic point of view) that mixing of gases of the same kind (and same P and T) does not result in a growth of entropy.
However, note that this way of avoiding the statistical Gibbs paradox does not rely on the occurrence of the factors
in the entropies as justified by the binomial probability. The conclusion that there is no entropy of mixing in the case of gases of the same kind is here due to
our decision not to distinguish between the original situation in which the initial left and right particles were in their home compartments and the later situation in which the molecules have randomly redistributed themselves. This is a decision to disregard microscopic differences. By contrast, the probability Formula (
7)
presupposes the relevance of precisely such differences, by assuming that the permutation of particles leads to a new situation—this assumption motivated the
in Equation (
7). Forgetting about the microscopic differences actually goes
against the philosophy of individual particles that lies at the basis of Equation (
7); not taking these differences into account is therefore a purely pragmatic decision (i.e., motivated by our interests rather than by fundamental physical aspects of the situation).
The pragmatic nature of the argument does obviously not at all imply that the disregard of particle details is unjustified: evidently, when we are focused on the prediction of macroscopic thermodynamic quantities, it makes no sense to bother about micro differences. The point we make is that this solution of the Gibbs paradox is unrelated to the microscopic details of the situation, and independent of the appearance of the factors (in the binomial distribution) that is due to these microscopic details.
Another way of arriving at the same conclusion is by noting that the probability distribution of Equation (
7) cannot tell us how the entropy of the combined system depends on the total particle number—this number
is constant in the Gibbs situation. Therefore, we cannot derive from Equation (
7) that a factor
should appear in the total entropy. This means that the traditional solution of the paradox mentioned at the beginning of this section—namely: divide the numbers of states of the partial systems by
and divide the total number of states by
—cannot be justified by applying Equation (
7) to the Gibbs situation [
2,
4]. For suppose that we define the total entropy as suggested in the discussion above, following Equation (
7) ([
5,
9], see also [
10]):
with a constant
C that can be arbitrarily chosen. Then, it is true that a choice for
C can be made such that the resulting formula
suggests a total entropy that is extensive: choose
and we find
in which the total entropy is the sum of two partial entropies (In the more general case of unequal partial volumes
and
, we would arrive at the entropy expressions
, with
V the total volume). However, making the entropy linear in
N in this way would be achieving extensivity
by fiat, by the conventional choice of a different constant
C for each individual value of
N. This extensivity by choice clearly does not give us an explanation on the basis of what physically happens on the microlevel. Of course, it was not to be expected that we can derive a physical
N-dependence of the combined system because this system is isolated and
N is constant. Therefore, the factorials in Equation (
7) do not imply extensivity of the combined system and do not solve the statistical paradox (Swendsen [
11] has proposed an approach that formally looks similar, starting from Equation (
7) and entropy as the logarithm of the probability, but with the important difference that the probability in Equations (
7) and (
10) is interpreted in an information theoretic sense, namely as a representation of our uncertainty about where individual particles are located [
12]. Swendsen argues that the form of the dependence of the entropy on
N can in this case be derived even for closed systems: since we are ignorant about
which particles, from all particles of the same kind in the world, are located in the system in question, the probability formula Equation (
7), with the desirable factor
, applies. From a Boltzmannian point of view, this information theoretical argument about particles in other systems cannot yield a physical explanation for what happens in the isolated Gibbs set up. In [
13,
14], Swendsen responds to criticism, but does not address our concerns).
Summing up, taking account of the individuality of classical particles in the orthodox approach justifies the use of binomial coefficients and therefore factors of the form
in the probabilities; however, this does not imply the extensivity of the entropy when two gases of the same kind are mixed and does not solve the statistical Gibbs paradox (This is not to deny, of course, that the grand canonical ensemble, with its factor
in the probability distribution as derived from the binomial distribution, plays an essential role in problems in which particle numbers can vary, for example in the study of dissociation equilibria [
9]. What we deny is that this grand canonical factor is relevant for the solution of the Gibbs paradox).
4.2. The Effects of Particle Permutability
The traditional justification for inserting a factor
in the entropy goes back to Gibbs himself and to Planck (see [
5,
9,
15] for references to the early literature) and relies on the argument that we have overcounted the number of states because a permutation of particles of the same kind does not change the state. In the case of a system consisting of
N particles of the same kind, we must accordingly divide the number
W—obtained by traditional counting—by
, the number of permutations of
N particles.
In order to judge this argument, we need to be clear about the intended sense of “exchanging particles” (cf. [
4], Sections 2 and 3). If a permutation of conventionally chosen particle
labels is intended, permutability is a truism. Empirical facts concerning a particle system are completely determined by physical particle properties, and names or labels that do not represent such physical features are irrelevant; this holds independently of whether the particles have the same intrinsic properties or not. This trivial character of label permutability makes it irrelevant for the Gibbs paradox. We need a more substantial notion of exchangeability if it is to be physically relevant.
The exchange notion implicit in most permutability arguments seems to be the following. Consider particles of the same kind (i.e., with the same intrinsic properties), suppose particle 1 is in the one-particle state
a, and particle 2 is in the state
b. Now take, not as a concrete physical process but merely in thought, particle 1 with its intrinsic properties and substitute it for particle 2, in the state
b particle 2 was in; and, vice versa, put particle 2 in the state
a first occupied by particle 1. Since the two particles have the same intrinsic properties, nothing has changed in the physical situation after this swap—except for the interchange of the labels 1 and 2 that attach to the particles. Since these labels are conventional, we can change them back (leaving the particles where they are), so that we end up in exactly the same situation as when we started. In this way, we obtain
permuted states of particles of kind
i with exactly the same physical properties. To eliminate this superfluous multiplicity, we can divide the total number of states
W of a system consisting of
particles of kind
i by the factor
, so that we obtain a phase volume that is smaller than the volume considered before permutability was taken into account. With Equation (
4), the new counting method leads to a reduced value of the entropy:
. As we have seen, this is exactly the expression needed for extensivity of the entropy and disappearance of the statistical Gibbs paradox.
This justification for dividing by , and thus for passing from ordinary state space to the “reduced state space”, is convincing if the exchanges are not associated with physical differences. The case of a particle interchange as just described is an example of such an unphysical change: here, the swapping of particles of the same kind was a mere mental operation and not a physical process. The intuitive appeal coming from the term “particle exchange” is deceptive in this context: it is obscure if there is anything exchanged at all. In the case of particles of the same kind, placing particle 1 in the state of particle 2, and vice versa, only makes sense if the particles possess an identity over and above their intrinsic physical properties and states. In philosophy, individuating principles of this sort are sometimes discussed (“primitive thisness” or “haecceity”), but such concepts are not recognized in physical theory. In accordance with this, statistical mechanics is not meant to consider situations as different that relate to each other by the permutation of putative non-physical particle identities. This seems to entail that, in the case of particles of the same kind, we should never use the usual unreduced state space but ought to always pass to the reduced state space where all states differing by exchanges of particle labels have been collapsed into one.
However, the use of the unreduced state space for particles of the same kind is legitimate if the particle labels (which also number the coordinate axes of the unreduced state space) can be defined in physical terms. In the Gibbs set up, we may define such physically meaningful labels in the following way. Number the particles, in the initial state, according to their positions—for example, from left to right on the basis of their horizontal spatial coordinates. Thus, the particles in the left compartment receive the labels , and the particles on the right-hand side are numbered . Now, it is important that, although these assignment of labels is conventional, once given, the labels stick to the particles over time via the trajectory that each particle follows. Thus, given this initial labeling, it makes sense to say that, at some later point in time, particles 1 and may end up in states x and y, respectively, but that it may also be the other way around (1 in y and in x); and that these two states differ from each other because of the individuality of the particles. In the first case, the particle that originated from the left-hand corner of the container occupies state x, and, in the second case, it is another particle that does so. If particle labels are defined in this way, for particles of the same kind, there surely is a physically defined difference between “particle i at x, particle j at y” and “particle i at y, particle j at x”; and this distinction is in principle because it may be that the difference is practically irrelevant, in which case we may revert to the reduced phace space—see the discussion at the end of this section) relevant to the calculation of W. The numbering of axes of the unreduced state space, in cases where it is physically significant to use the unreduced phase space, should be definable in exactly this way: they must refer to physically defined individuality markers. What an interchange of two particle labels in this case captures is not that two duplicates of a state can be imagined by mentally swapping metaphysical particle identities, but rather that there are two different physical cases, a real physical swapping of particles, that lead to two distinct situations. This multiplicity of states plays a role in the orthodox calculation of probabilities, via the ergodic hypothesis or one of its modern successors, and there is therefore no a priori justification for discarding the differences through division by .
In a
closed system, even such physically understood multiplicities are unimportant for the calculation of entropies, though, because, for each microstate, the
same factors
appear in the number of ways it can be realized. This factor therefore drops out in the probability expression
, which means that all empirical predictions of statistical mechanics remain the same when we divide by
[
4]. In this case, the division is a harmless cosmetic operation, which can also be seen from the fact that
implies that all entropy values only change by the constant additive term
.
For systems that are subject to external manipulation, in the sense that something is done to the system that affects the number of possible particle trajectories, the situation is different, though. In the Gibbs case that starts with two equal volumes of equal gases, both with initial particle number N, the multiplicity of realizations of any microstate with the partition in place is because the particles cannot move out of their compartments (the N-particle states localized in each individual compartment can each be realized in possible ways). After removal of the partition, the multiplicity of states with N particles on both sides becomes much greater: now, we must take into account that the particles may go from one side to the other. As a result, after the removal, there are different ways that the particles can distribute themselves over the total volume.
There are therefore many more evolutions and states that lead up to macroscopic equilibrium than before: the only originally allowed situations, in which particles stayed in their own compartments, have become statistical oddities. Given any initial state just before the partition was removed, the probability is overwhelming that particles will move out of their original regions and will redistribute themselves approximately uniformly over the total volume. The total amount of phase volume available to the system has grown spectacularly, which is measured by the additional mixing entropy . Because classical particles always possess identity over time, the calculation of the mixing entropy remains the same regardless of whether the particles have the same intrinsic properties or not.
Summing up the results of these two subsections, the statistics of particles possessing individuality does not entail that the entropy is extensive in the Gibbs set up. Quite the opposite, individuality is the essential factor responsible for the appearance of an entropy of mixing: particles have their own individual trajectories according to classical physics, and the possibility of physical exchanges of particles leads to a growth of microstates and consequently to an increase of the statistical entropy.
Evidently, the growth in accessible phase volume that is at issue here will more often than not be without empirical consequences because its detection involves the identification of individual particle paths (if there are no chemical differences between the gases). This introduces a notion of
pragmatic non-individuality and permutability of particles. If we consider the difference between gas particles coming from the left and right as immaterial in practice (as we must do by definition if we are only interested in macroscopic quantities), there is no practical point in thinking of an increase of the phase volume. In the numbers of states bookkeeping, we can in this case divide all multiplicities after mixing by
(expressing that it does not matter from which compartment the particles originally came; we factor out the associated multiplicity)—this removes the entropy of mixing. This procedure gives us the right empirical entropy values, given the measurement limitations inherent in thermodynamics (In [
8], the authors present an elegant general information theoretic account of how entropies on different levels of description relate to each other. It follows from their treatment that ignoring particle individualities and trajectories leads to the appearance of a factor
in the entropy expression, in accordance with what we argue). The reduction of the number of states and the transition to the reduced state space is thus certainly justified, but we should not conclude that the unimportance of trajectory information for the usual phenomenal predictions implies the non-existence of differences on the microlevel (Saunders [
16], by contrast, takes the position that microstates really and literally remain the same, as a fundamental microscopic fact, when two particles of the same kind are swapped. According to his analysis, the absence of an entropy of mixing is due to this fact. This is a major difference with our argument).