Beyond the Limits of Shannon’s Information in Quantum Key Distribution
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Communication Model
2.1. Quantum Communication
- The states are grouped by non-orthogonal pairs or , where .
- A non-orthogonal pair is measured with the same quantum basis X or Z. Both measurements yield the same result half of the times, i.e., if measuring with X (or Z) gives i, or measuring with X (or Z) gives i or , in both cases. We call those cases double matching detection event. Then, non-compatible measurements never occur.
- It implies that the bit encoded in the X or Z basis is transmitted from Alice to Bob. This communication model defines two communication channels, channel X and channel Z, because there are two bits enclosed in a non-orthogonal quantum pair: one bit over channel X and other bit in channel Z. Bob just chooses which channel he wants to use. Provided a double matching detection event is generated, both measurements are equally useful.
2.2. Example of Error Correction
2.3. Auxiliary Frames
- To achieve reconciliation in Shannon’s model, the first step is to ensure that auxiliary zero bits are error-free. However, Shannon’s 2 × 1 frames does not allow to identify errors in two consecutive zero bits (at least in one round iteration) as indicated by the following relations:In addition, when using 2 × 1 frames, there is a unique possible matching result (MR), that is written below; therefore, no secret information can be derived from MRs in Shannon’s model.
- By contrast, using 2 × 2 frames, errors in the auxiliary frames can be easily identified. Here, we list the error-free zero frames:which can be compared, for illustrative purposes, to the erroneous cases:
- Ambiguous SS are produced in regular frames. For example, to the left, we indicate that Alice sends the frame to Bob, who measures it using MR = 11. However, when applying the Z measurement basis, the photo-detector yields an error reporting instead ; so, we have:When Alice receives the string SS = 11,11 which belongs to , she knows it implies two possibilities: either SS comes from the error-free string under MR = 10 in or an error is produced in the first measured bit that actually corresponds to the string under MR = 11 in . To disambiguate it, Alice uses the auxiliary frame . Thus, she looks at a frame where the ambiguous row is allocated. Remember that each row is combined with each other. Previously, the second row of , i.e., , was verified as a zero frame. Then, suppose Alice finds the following case:
2.4. One-Time Pad XOR Equivalency
3. Distillation Method with 3 × 2 Frames
- The 3 × 2 frames must be identified: there are binary 3 × 2 frames.
- The measurement results (MR) must be specified: in 3 × 2 frames, there are 8 MR. Those MR are illustrated in Table A2 of Appendix A.
- Frames are classified as usable and useless frames: a usable frame is a frame that produces a distinct SS under each MR. In 3 × 2 frames, there are 8 distinct SS per frame and 24 usable frames. Sifting bits are written in Table A4 of Appendix A. Remember that Sifting Strings (SS) are composed by the sifting bits and the measured bits: . The is appended to achieve discrimination, and it can be considered as a parity sifting bit.
- Auxiliary frames which are intended to catch errors produced in regular frames must be identified. In 3 × 2 frames, there are 3 auxiliary frames labeled as , , and . The frame is the zero frame and is used to verify the two (below) rows of the testing frames and . The upper row of and is the row that is being tested. In the end, Alice will include the auxiliary frames inside the set of frames that Bob must remove. Auxiliary frames are listed in Table A1 of Appendix A.
- All usable frames under each MR must be expanded to analyze all possible errors through SS, from single to multiple errors. Then, ambiguous SS that can be corrected under the auxiliary frames must be detected. In addition, all the SS that cannot be disambiguated must be identified and the corresponding frames must be removed. We show in Table A5 the cases that can be successfully disambiguated.
- At Bob’s side, each (SS, MR) pair defines a secret bit (sb). For Alice, the same secret bit results from the pair (SS, ) because she knows the frame that is behind each SS. It must be guaranteed that each SS can be produced equally by both bits. In addition, it must be ensured that each secret bit proceeds from the same number of frames, so that the bit probability of each SS is the same in order to reduce the eavesdropper’s information gain (SS are publicly transmitted over the classical channel). This action may involve removing some extra SS. Alice sends to Bob the set of SS of all the frames that must be eliminated including auxiliary frames. Table A3 of Appendix A enlists SS, MR, frames, and sb.
- Alice sends some non-orthogonal quantum pairs either or where . Although quantum non-orthogonal pairs can be mutually interleaved they are numbered, so each pair can be identified by Alice and Bob
- Bob measures each quantum pair using the same measurement basis (X or Z) which is chosen randomly (under active basis measurement). Some double detection events are produced. Bob informs Alice the tag number of such quantum pairs.
- Alice computes all usable frames including null frames and auxiliary frames. She communicates to Bob the frame arrangement information. We call this step privacy amplification.
- Bob computes the Sifting String (SS) of each frame. He returns the set of Siting Strings he obtained to Alice.
- Alice analyzes the SS received from Bob:
- She generates frames to prepare the auxiliary frames.
- Using auxiliary frames, Alice removes ambiguity. Alice gets the secret bits using the relation (SS, ) and Table A3 of Appendix A.
- Alice informs Bob of the cases that must be eliminated (because they cannot be disambiguated).
- Bob removes the frames identified by Alice to reach Alice’s secret bit string. Bob’s secret bits are derived from (SS, MR) and Table A3 of Appendix A.
4. Secret Rate
4.1. Secret Throughput
4.2. Rate Code
4.3. Secret Key Rate
4.3.1. The Intercept and Resend Attack (IR)
- —
- Alice sends the non-orthogonal pair to Bob over the quantum channel. Eve measures them using Z basis, and let us assume she obtains a double matching detection event, say .
- —
- Eve prepares and sends the quantum pair to Bob.
- —
- Suppose Eve can force both quantum pulses to arrive to Bob’s optical station. There are two quantum measurement bases (X or Z) and five possible outcomes:
- –
- due to Bob’s Z basis: .
- –
- due to Bob’s X basis: .
To match Eve’s double detection event , Bob must choose the Z basis which occurs with probability, so Eve’s final probability is .
4.3.2. The Photon Number Splitting Attack (PNS)
- because of the probability to get a double matching detection event.
- due to basis matching. Eve must measure choosing between two different measurement basis (X or Z).
4.3.3. The Bases Choice Attack (BC)
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Useful Frames | Auxiliary Frames | ||
---|---|---|---|
MR = 000 | MR = 100 |
MR = 001 | MR = 101 |
MR = 010 | MR = 110 |
MR = 011 | MR = 111 |
Sifting String | Bob’s MR | Alice’s Frame | sb | Bob’s MR | sb | Alice’s Frame | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Measured | Sifting | ||||||
110 | 000 | 000 | , , , | 0 | 001 | 1 | , , , |
011 | 000 | 000 | , , , | 0 | 001 | 1 | , , , |
011 | 001 | 110 | , , , | 0 | 111 | 1 | , , , |
110 | 001 | 100 | , , , | 0 | 101 | 1 | , , , |
010 | 011 | 110 | , , , | 0 | 101 | 1 | , , , |
111 | 011 | 100 | , , , | 0 | 111 | 1 | , , , |
001 | 010 | 001 | , , , | 0 | 011 | 1 | , |
100 | 010 | 001 | , , , | 0 | 011 | 1 | , |
010 | 010 | 001 | , ,, | 0 | 010 | 1 | , |
111 | 010 | 001 | , , , | 0 | 010 | 1 | , |
001 | 011 | 110 | , | 0 | 100 | 1 | , |
100 | 011 | 101 | , | 0 | 111 | 1 | , |
001 | 100 | 000 | , , , | 0 | 010 | 1 | , |
100 | 100 | 000 | , , , | 0 | 010 | 1 | , |
010 | 100 | 000 | , , , | 0 | 011 | 1 | , |
111 | 100 | 000 | , , , | 0 | 011 | 1 | , |
001 | 101 | 111 | , | 0 | 101 | 1 | , |
100 | 101 | 100 | , | 0 | 110 | 1 | , |
010 | 101 | 111 | , , , | 0 | 100 | 1 | , , , |
111 | 101 | 101 | , , , | 0 | 110 | 1 | , , , |
011 | 110 | 010 | ,, ,, , | 0 | 011 | 1 | , , , , , |
110 | 110 | 010 | , , , , , | 0 | 011 | 1 | , , , , , |
011 | 111 | 101 | , , , | 0 | 100 | 1 | , , , |
110 | 111 | 110 | , , , | 0 | 111 | 1 | , , , |
Alice | Bob | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
Frame | MR | SS | Disambiguated Bits |
---|---|---|---|
010 | 011,110 | 2nd & 3rd | |
101 | 011,111 | ||
010 | 110,110 | 1st & 2nd | |
110 | 110,111 | ||
011 | 011,110 | 2nd & 3rd | |
100 | 011,111 | ||
100 | 111,011 | zero & 1st | |
001 | 110,000 | zero & 2nd | |
010 | 110,110 | ||
101 | 110,001 | ||
110 | 110,111 | ||
000 | 110,000 | zero & 1st | |
010 | 110,110 | ||
100 | 110,001 | ||
110 | 110,111 | ||
011 | 110,110 | 1st & 2nd | |
111 | 110,111 | ||
111 | 111,011 | 1st & 3rd | |
100 | 111,011 | 1st & 3rd | |
111 | 111,011 | zero & 3rd | |
001 | 110,000 | zero & 1st | |
011 | 110,110 | ||
101 | 110,001 | ||
111 | 110,111 | ||
001 | 011,000 | zero & 3rd | |
011 | 011,110 | ||
100 | 011,111 | ||
110 | 011,001 | ||
000 | 011,000 | zero & 2nd | |
011 | 011,110 | ||
100 | 011,111 | ||
111 | 011,001 | ||
000 | 110,000 | zero & 2nd | |
011 | 110,110 | ||
100 | 110,001 | ||
111 | 110,111 | ||
001 | 011,000 | zero & 2nd | |
010 | 011,110 | ||
101 | 011,111 | ||
110 | 011,001 | ||
101 | 111,101 | 1st & 3rd | |
101 | 111,101 | zero & 1st | |
000 | 011,000 | zero & 3rd | |
010 | 011,110 | ||
101 | 011,111 | ||
111 | 011,001 | ||
001 | 111,010 | zero & 1st | |
011 | 111,100 | ||
101 | 111,101 | ||
111 | 111,011 | ||
110 | 111,101 | 1st & 3rd | |
110 | 111,101 | zero & 3rd | |
001 | 111,010 | zero & 3rd | |
011 | 111,100 | ||
100 | 111,011 | ||
110 | 111,101 | ||
000 | 111,100 | zero & 1st | |
010 | 111,010 | ||
100 | 111,011 | ||
110 | 111,101 | ||
000 | 111,100 | zero & 3rd | |
010 | 111,010 | ||
101 | 111,101 | ||
111 | 111,011 |
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Alice | Bob |
---|---|
, , | , , |
, , | , , |
, , | , , |
, , | , , |
, , | , , |
, , | , , |
, , | , , |
, , | , , |
, | , |
c | |
0 | |
1 | |
c | MR | Frames | sb | |
---|---|---|---|---|
00 | 10 | 0 | ||
11 | 1 | |||
00 | , | 0 | ||
01 | , | 1 | ||
01 | 01 | , | 0 | |
11 | 1 | |||
10 | 0 | |||
01 | , | 1 | ||
10 | 00 | , | 0 | |
10 | 1 | |||
00 | , | 0 | ||
11 | 1 | |||
11 | 11 | , , | 0 | |
10 | , , | 1 |
n | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
100 | 618 | 20,212 | 412 | 11,550 | 206 | 2887 |
500 | 15,593 | 2,588,562 | 10,395 | 1,479,178 | 5197 | 369,794 |
1000 | 62,437 | 20,770,875 | 41,625 | 11,869,071 | 20,812 | 2,967,267 |
IR | PNS | BC |
---|---|---|
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Lizama-Pérez, L.A.; López R., J.M.; Samperio, E.H. Beyond the Limits of Shannon’s Information in Quantum Key Distribution. Entropy 2021, 23, 229. https://doi.org/10.3390/e23020229
Lizama-Pérez LA, López R. JM, Samperio EH. Beyond the Limits of Shannon’s Information in Quantum Key Distribution. Entropy. 2021; 23(2):229. https://doi.org/10.3390/e23020229
Chicago/Turabian StyleLizama-Pérez, Luis Adrián, J. Mauricio López R., and Emmanuel H. Samperio. 2021. "Beyond the Limits of Shannon’s Information in Quantum Key Distribution" Entropy 23, no. 2: 229. https://doi.org/10.3390/e23020229
APA StyleLizama-Pérez, L. A., López R., J. M., & Samperio, E. H. (2021). Beyond the Limits of Shannon’s Information in Quantum Key Distribution. Entropy, 23(2), 229. https://doi.org/10.3390/e23020229