Introducing the Extended Safety Fractal: Reusing the Concept of Safety Management Systems to Organize Resilient Organizations
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Building the Safety Fractal
2.1. Modelling Safety Management Processes
- (1)
- Specify: defining the processes, identifying risks and control measures, based on task analysis of human and technological performance as risk control measure.
- (2)
- Provide: ensuring that the measure is designed, built, procured, installed and adjusted to its operating circumstances.
- (3)
- Promulgate and train: informing and training workforce to perform the designated actions.
- (6)
- Monitor/evaluation: detecting (potential) deviations from the specified functioning of risk control measures and evaluating performance at both the operational and management level.
- (7)
- Maintain/change: restoring or improving the functioning of risk control measures, including organizational learning.
- (8)
- Collect state of the art: learning from internal and/or external sources to improve operational and managerial performance.
- (9)
- Assess risks of proposed changes: identifying the potential impact when deciding to change risk control measures or delivery systems.
- (4)
- Threats and the internal process: the threats that could put in danger the adequate performance of human behavior, the technical system and/or the interaction between both, and that are to be managed by the steps at the management level of the delivery system.
- (5)
- Actions executed at the sharp end: the direct execution of the primary work process, by humans and technology, to be compared with the expected performance.
2.2. Taking into Account Process Capability
- A level of process performance that is modelling the direct functioning of the components that interact during process execution (“doing things”). This is also the level where variation against process specifications can be observed. The direct execution, as well as the sustainable performance, of a process results from the adequateness and capability of the delivery system that is composed of the following levels of process implementation and process control. This is in line with the definition of safety management, introduced by Lin [23], as “the process to provide the resources and controls designed to ensure that the internal processes are working properly to analyse and deal with the threats that interfere with it, so that they are managed to an acceptable level”.
- A level of process implementation, providing the resources and means to ensure the correct functioning (“doing things right” according to Zwetsloot, [24]) of the process components during process execution. Where the “Dutch” model identifies a behavioral and a technological component as relevant to be managed for control over process execution, the performed analysis identifies the additional need to also manage an organizational component of process design and deployment. This finding emphasizes what already in 1965 was stated by Leavitt, in his diamond: that the performance of people and technology are affected by an organization’s structure and the processes or tasks to be performed (in Deschoolmeester and Braet, [43]). Managing process performance will therefore require not only managing the separate components (an organization’s structure, the tasks or processes to be performed, the people and its technology) but also the possible interactions between them.
- A level of process control, ensuring the sustainable control of risks related to all activities of the organization in a possibly changing context (“doing the right things” according to Zwetsloot, [24]). The PDCA-cycle that is characteristic for the management system standards and that is also part of the “Dutch” safety management model finds its roots in system thinking and cybernetics [31]. Within a specified system, a process is executed to achieve a defined purpose, according to a specified pattern of progress. Because of external, environmental factors, progress can show some variation that is monitored at regular or irregular intervals to identify the gap between the desired and the actual state of the system. When a gap is identified, the system state is adapted. The identification of variables that allow the measurement of process performance is therefore an essential prerequisite. A similar logic is clearly present in the process attributes of the ISO 15504 capability model [32], resulting in the specification of three elements that together need to ensure the continuous and sustainable control of risks within a changing context: specify, verify and adapt.
2.3. The resulting Safety Fractal
- (1)
- Specify: the scope and desired outcome of an activity is specified, roles and responsibilities identified, disrupting events are anticipated and risk control measures (rules, barriers) are designed (i.e., work as imagined).
- (2)
- Implement—train, equip, organize: all is done to have activities performed by enough competent people, adequate technical resources are put available and maintained, work products and resources to be used are identified and work is planned in detail.
- (3)
- Perform: the activity is executed, responding to real life constraints and disturbances (i.e., work as done).
- (4)
- Verify: the system’s performance is monitored, i.e., verifying the match between work as designed and work as actually performed, as well as the elements that could affect this performance in the near term.
- (5)
- Adapt: it is known what has happened and lessons are learned from experience and the adequate changes to control, or implementation elements, are introduced.
3. Organizing Resilience through the Safety Fractal
3.1. From Managing Threats to Managing Performance Variability
3.2. The Informal Aspect of Managing Safety
3.3. Developing the Extended Safety Fractal
- (1)
- create a safety vision that is coherent with the values and principles of management;
- (2)
- give safety its rightful place in the organization and management and oversee it on a daily basis;
- (3)
- share the safety vision: influence, persuade and promote the flow of information through the hierarchy;
- (4)
- be credible: provide a coherent example;
- (5)
- promote team spirit and horizontal cooperation;
- (6)
- be available on-site to observe, listen and communicate effectively;
- (7)
- acknowledge good practice and apply fair sanctions.
4. Discussion
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Implement | Train (3) | personnel performing the defined process are competent on the basis of appropriate education, training, and experience | |
Equip (2) | resources (energy, matter, …) | ||
infrastructure (equipment, hardware, software, …) | |||
work environment | |||
Organise | process purpose/output (i.e., production of an artefact, a significant change of state, meeting of specified constraints, e.g., requirements, goals, etc.) | ||
process performance objectives | |||
process performance planning | |||
work products | |||
work product requirements | |||
a standard process (i.e., the fundamental elements to be incorporated into a defined process) | |||
clear and appropriate tailoring guidelines | |||
Control | Specify (1) | process scope | process performance conditions and objectives |
process interfaces/(internal/external) partnerships | |||
the sequence and interaction of the standard process with other processes/(internal/external partnerships) | |||
process information needs in support of relevant defined business goals | |||
quantitative objectives for process performance in support of relevant business goals | |||
responsibilities | responsibilities for performing the process | ||
authorities for performing the process | |||
accountability for process performance | |||
risks | risks to the achievement of the process objectives, to the achievement of the business objectives or related to regulatory obligations | ||
control activities that contribute to the mitigation of risks to the achievement of process/business objectives or regulatory obligations | |||
control limits of variation for normal process performance | |||
process improvement objectives that support the relevant business goals | |||
change (9) | technical, organizational and/or operational changes to the process | ||
Verify (6) | effectiveness (i.e., delivered process output vs expected output) | ||
compliance (i.e., process execution vs planning) | |||
quality control (i.e., supplied quality of work products vs expected or required quality level of work products) | |||
process efficiency (i.e., optimal resource consumption in relation to obtained results) | |||
efficiency of risk control measures (i.e., variation in performance of RCM) | |||
quality perception (i.e., outcome vs business goals/strategy) | |||
benchmark (i.e., performance compared to competitors or internal/external 3rd parties) | |||
Adapt (7) | to adjust process performance to meet plans | ||
to adjust work products as necessary to meet requirements | |||
to improve the suitability and effectiveness of the process | |||
to address special causes of variation | |||
to re-establish control limits (as necessary) following corrective action | |||
to address opportunities for best practice and innovation | |||
to integrate new technologies and process concepts |
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Level 0: Incomplete process The process is not implemented, or fails to achieve its process purpose. | |
Level 1: Performed process The implemented process achieves its process purpose. | PA 1.1 Process performance attribute |
Level 2: Managed process The previously described Performed process is now implemented in a managed fashion (planned, monitored and adjusted) and its work products are appropriately established, controlled and maintained. | PA 2.1 Performance management attribute PA 2.2 Work product management attribute |
Level 3: Established process The previously described Managed process is now implemented using a defined process that is capable of achieving its process outcomes. | PA 3.1 Process definition attribute PA 3.2 Process deployment attribute |
Level 4: Predictable process The previously described Established process now operates within defined limits to achieve its process outcomes. | PA 4.1 Process measurement attribute PA 4.2 Process control attribute |
Level 5: Optimizing process The previously described Predictable process is continuously improved to meet relevant current and projected business goals | PA 5.1 Process innovation attribute PA 5.2 Process optimization attribute |
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Accou, B.; Reniers, G. Introducing the Extended Safety Fractal: Reusing the Concept of Safety Management Systems to Organize Resilient Organizations. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020, 17, 5478. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17155478
Accou B, Reniers G. Introducing the Extended Safety Fractal: Reusing the Concept of Safety Management Systems to Organize Resilient Organizations. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2020; 17(15):5478. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17155478
Chicago/Turabian StyleAccou, Bart, and Genserik Reniers. 2020. "Introducing the Extended Safety Fractal: Reusing the Concept of Safety Management Systems to Organize Resilient Organizations" International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 17, no. 15: 5478. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17155478