Knowing and Unknowing Purchases of Undeclared Healthcare Goods and Services: The Role of Vertical and Horizontal Trust
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Materials and Methods
3. Results
4. Discussion
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Undeclared Healthcare Goods and Services | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total | Of Which (1): | ||||||
Knowing | Unknowing | ||||||
All Knowing Reasons | By Reason: | ||||||
Lower Price | Faster/ Better Service | Social Ends | Unavailable (2) | ||||
Cyprus | 9 | 65 | 57 | 41 | 41 | 16 | 20 |
Greece | 7 | 80 | 69 | 24 | 31 | 16 | 9 |
Italy | 2 | 58 | 50 | 8 | 42 | 8 | 46 |
Malta | 13 | 41 | 33 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 67 |
Provider of Undeclared Services (1) | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Known Private Persons | Other Private Persons | Firms or Businesses | Public Service Providers | ||
Undeclared Healthcare Goods and Services | Total | 27 | 71 | 35 | 16 |
Of which(1): | |||||
Knowing | 37 | 75 | 28 | 16 | |
Lower price | 41 | 73 | 31 | 17 | |
Faster/Better | 62 | 52 | 54 | 43 | |
Social ends | 37 | 77 | 19 | 11 | |
Unavailable (2) | 38 | 75 | 49 | 35 | |
Unknowing | 3 | 66 | 54 | 21 |
Model 1 Undeclared Healthcare Goods and Services | Model 2 Undeclared Healthcare Goods and Services | Model 3 Undeclared Healthcare Goods and Services | Model 4 Undeclared Healthcare Goods and Services | |||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total | Total | Knowing | Unknowing | |||||||||
Coef. | (SE) | Coef. | (SE) | Coef. | (SE) | Coef. | (SE) | |||||
Socio-economicprofile (control variables) | ||||||||||||
Gender (R: Man) | ||||||||||||
Woman | −0.207 | (0.151) | −0.047 | (0.157) | −0.076 | (0.196) | −0.265 | (0.266) | ||||
Age (exact) | 0.002 | (0.006) | 0.004 | (0.006) | −0.006 | (0.008) | 0.013 | (0.012) | ||||
Education (R: Up to 15 years old when stopped full time education) | ||||||||||||
16–19 | 0.007 | (0.209) | −0.050 | (0.217) | 0.093 | (0.283) | −0.531 | (0.340) | ||||
20+ | 0.184 | (0.243) | 0.100 | (0.249) | 0.189 | (0.315) | −0.467 | (0.442) | ||||
Still Studying (1) | −1.064 | * | (0.622) | −1.047 | (0.640) | −1.422 | * | (0.861) | −0.773 | (0.975) | ||
Household composition, aged 15+ (R: One person) | ||||||||||||
Two | −0.003 | (0.219) | −0.036 | (0.227) | −0.194 | (0.271) | −0.024 | (0.383) | ||||
Three | 0.228 | (0.257) | 0.180 | (0.265) | −0.176 | (0.328) | 0.360 | (0.448) | ||||
Four or more | 0.273 | (0.265) | 0.088 | (0.274) | −0.212 | (0.331) | 0.462 | (0.461) | ||||
Employment status (R: Self-employed) | ||||||||||||
Employed | −0.260 | (0.248) | −0.085 | (0.259) | −0.154 | (0.301) | −0.168 | (0.532) | ||||
Not working | −0.076 | (0.261) | 0.047 | (0.275) | 0.033 | (0.321) | −0.140 | (0.556) | ||||
Financial difficulties (2) (R: Most of the time) | ||||||||||||
From time to time | 0.033 | (0.211) | 0.132 | (0.218) | 0.085 | (0.254) | 0.604 | (0.487) | ||||
Almost never/Never | −0.165 | (0.236) | −0.158 | (0.243) | −0.277 | (0.294) | −0.107 | (0.511) | ||||
Country (R: Italy) | ||||||||||||
Greece | 1.041 | *** | (0.250) | 1.166 | *** | (0.256) | 1.420 | *** | (0.320) | −0.729 | (0.528) | |
Cyprus | 1.345 | *** | (0.264) | 1.615 | *** | (0.272) | 1.675 | *** | (0.346) | 0.702 | (0.468) | |
Malta | 1.834 | *** | (0.255) | 2.550 | *** | (0.275) | 2.121 | *** | (0.366) | 2.664 | *** | (0.389) |
Vertical and Horizontal Trust | ||||||||||||
Vertical Trust (Tax morale) | −0.242 | *** | (0.038) | −0.261 | *** | (0.044) | 0.171 | (0.121) | ||||
Horizontal Trust (estimated % of the population engaged in undeclared activities (R: Less than 10%)) | ||||||||||||
10–40% | 1.179 | *** | (0.265) | 1.484 | *** | (0.382) | 1.575 | *** | (0.482) | |||
Over 40% | 1.806 | *** | (0.289) | 2.188 | *** | (0.401) | 0.414 | (0.637) | ||||
Do not know | −0.423 | (0.389) | −0.482 | (0.624) | −1.541 | * | (0.854) | |||||
Constant | −3.561 | *** | (0.554) | −2.865 | *** | (0.656) | −2.781 | *** | (0.812) | −7.542 | *** | (1.533) |
Observations | 2882 | 2775 | 2775 | 2775 | ||||||||
Log likelihood | −705.16 | −637.12 | −442.96 | −254.26 | ||||||||
χ2 | 78.73 | 198.54 | 139.49 | 173.89 | ||||||||
p> | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Socio-Demographic Control Variables | Vertical and Horizontal Trust | n | Prob. > χ2/F | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Vertical Trust (Tax Morale) | Horizontal Trust (Estimated % Engaged in Undeclared Activities (R: Less Than 10%) | |||||||
10–40% | Over 40% | DK (2) | ||||||
Model 2 Undeclared Healthcare Goods and Services (Total) | No sample weights | Included | −0.242 *** (0.038) | 1.179 *** (0.265) | 1.806 *** (0.289) | −0.423 (0.389) | 2775 | 0.000 |
With sample weights | Included | −0.155 *** (0.059) | 1.710 *** (0.469) | 1.995 *** (0.501) | 0.346 (0.846) | 2775 | 0.000 | |
Imputed missing data (1) | Included | −0.238 *** (0.038) | 1.200 *** (0.265) | 1.811 *** (0.289) | −0.629 (0.387) | 3048 | 0.000 | |
Model 3 Undeclared Healthcare Goods and Services (Knowing) | No sample weights | Included | −0.261 *** (0.044) | 1.484 *** (0.382) | 2.188 *** (0.401) | −0.482 (0.624) | 2775 | 0.000 |
With sample weights | Included | −0.279 *** (0.064) | 1.876 *** (0.685) | 2.166 *** (0.702) | −0.847 (1.005) | 2775 | 0.000 | |
Imputed missing data (1) | Included | −0.255 *** (0.044) | 1.491 *** (0.388) | 2.174 *** (0.411) | −0.648 (0.626) | 3048 | 0.000 | |
Model 4 Undeclared Healthcare Goods and Services (Unknowing) | No sample weights | Included | 0.171 (0.121) | 1.575 *** (0.482) | 0.414 (0.637) | −1.541 * (0.854) | 2775 | 0.000 |
With sample weights | Included | 0.181 (0.147) | 3.332 *** (0.545) | 2.443 ** (0.957) | −1.793 ** (0.881) | 2775 | 0.000 | |
Imputed missing data (1) | Included | 0.162 (0.122) | 1.596 *** (0.483) | 0.409 (0.636) | −1.718 ** (0.841) | 3048 | 0.000 |
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Horodnic, I.A.; Williams, C.C.; Maxim, A.; Stoian, I.C.; Țugulea, O.C.; Horodnic, A.V. Knowing and Unknowing Purchases of Undeclared Healthcare Goods and Services: The Role of Vertical and Horizontal Trust. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 11561. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph182111561
Horodnic IA, Williams CC, Maxim A, Stoian IC, Țugulea OC, Horodnic AV. Knowing and Unknowing Purchases of Undeclared Healthcare Goods and Services: The Role of Vertical and Horizontal Trust. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2021; 18(21):11561. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph182111561
Chicago/Turabian StyleHorodnic, Ioana Alexandra, Colin C. Williams, Alexandru Maxim, Iuliana Claudia Stoian, Oana Carmen Țugulea, and Adrian V. Horodnic. 2021. "Knowing and Unknowing Purchases of Undeclared Healthcare Goods and Services: The Role of Vertical and Horizontal Trust" International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 18, no. 21: 11561. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph182111561