The Effects of Monitoring Activities on Loan Defaults in Group-Based Lending Program: Evidence from Vietnam
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Background and Empirical Literature Review
3. Group-Based Lending Program of the VBSP in Vietnam
4. Data and Methodology
4.1. Data Collection Process
4.2. Research Methodology
- -
- DefDi is the loan default of borrower (group member) i. It is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if a borrower was unable to pay loan or interest on time, and 0 if a borrower fulfilled the repayment.
- -
- DMk is a vector of k variables representing the delegated monitoring by the group leaders; PMm is a vector of m variables representing the peer monitoring by group members; Ctrln is a vector of n control variables. The prefixes L and M denote leader and member, respectively. The suffix D denotes a dummy variable. These variables are defined and presented in Table 1.
5. Empirical Results
5.1. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
5.2. Estimated Results of the Probit Model
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Variables | Definition | Expected Sign |
---|---|---|
Delegated monitoring variables | ||
LCommIncRate | Commission divided by income ratio | Negative |
GSize | Number of members of a group | Negative |
LYrs | Number of years in charge of leadership of the group leader | Negative |
LIncInfoD | Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the group leader has information about income of group members, 0 otherwise | Negative |
LPurInfoD | Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the group leader has information about purpose of using loan of members, 0 otherwise | Negative |
LBizInfoD | Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the group leader has information about business of group members, 0 otherwise | Negative |
LVisitD | Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the group leader comes to group members’ businesses or houses at least once a month, 0 otherwise | Negative |
Peer monitoring variables | ||
MIncInfoD | Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the group member has information about income of other members, 0 otherwise | Negative |
MPurInfoD | Dummy variable, equal to 1 if l the group member has information about purpose of using loan of other members, 0 otherwise | Negative |
MVisitD | Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the group member comes to visit other members’ businesses or houses at least once a month, 0 otherwise | Negative |
Control variables | ||
The personal and economic characteristics of the group leader | ||
LSexD | Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the group leader is male, 0 otherwise | Negative |
LAge | Age of the group leader (in years) | Negative |
LEdu | Number of years of schooling of the group leader | Negative |
LInc | Yearly income (in thousand VND) of the group leader | Negative |
LInc2 | squared yearly income of the group leader | Positive |
LLoanD | Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the group leader borrows from the program, 0 otherwise | Negative |
LLoan | Loan amount (in thousand VND) | Negative |
LOthFinD | Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the group leader borrows from other credit sources simultaneously, 0 otherwise | Positive |
LDefD | Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the group leader was unable to pay the loan or interest by the due date, 0 otherwise | Negative |
The personal and economic characteristics of the group members | ||
MSexD | Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the group member is male, 0 otherwise | Positive |
MAge | Age of the group member (in years) | Negative |
MEdu | Number of years of schooling of the group member | Negative |
MLoan | Loan amount (in thousand VND) of the group member | Negative |
MIncPerCap | Income per capita (in thousand VND) of the group member | Negative |
MOthFinD | Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the group member borrows from other credit sources simultaneously, 0 otherwise | Positive |
Variables | Obs. | Mean | Min. | Max. | Std. Dev. |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Dependent variable | |||||
DefD | 675 | 0.20 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.40 |
Independent variables | |||||
Delegated monitoring variables | |||||
LCommIncRate | 225 | 16.21 | 2.12 | 84.55 | 13.10 |
GSize | 225 | 45.76 | 23.00 | 60.00 | 9.64 |
LYrs | 225 | 10.02 | 3.00 | 24.00 | 3.68 |
LIncInfoD | 225 | 0.39 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.49 |
LPurInfoD | 225 | 0.97 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.16 |
LBizInfoD | 225 | 0.65 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.48 |
LVisitD | 225 | 0.46 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.50 |
Peer monitoring variables | |||||
MIncInfoD | 450 | 0.13 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.34 |
MPurInfoD | 450 | 0.31 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.46 |
MVisitD | 450 | 0.32 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.47 |
Control variables | |||||
The personal and economic characteristics of the group leader | |||||
LSexD | 225 | 0.75 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.43 |
LAge | 225 | 52.01 | 27 | 80 | 10.69 |
LEdu | 225 | 8.23 | 3 | 16 | 2.88 |
LInc | 225 | 99,375.95 | 12,000.00 | 336,000.00 | 56,371.72 |
LLoanD | 225 | 0.88 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.33 |
LLoan | 225 | 13,453.33 | 0.00 | 50,000.00 | 9535.94 |
LOthFinD | 225 | 0.27 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.44 |
LDefD | 225 | 0.20 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.40 |
The personal and economic characteristics of the group members | |||||
MsexD | 450 | 0.64 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.48 |
MAge | 450 | 49.25 | 23 | 82 | 12.14 |
MEdu | 450 | 5.67 | 0 | 15 | 3.01 |
MLoan | 450 | 11,228.44 | 2000.00 | 100,000.00 | 9241.82 |
MIncPerCap | 450 | 14,412.83 | 1599.60 | 84,000.00 | 10,391.74 |
MOthFinD | 450 | 0.25 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.44 |
Variables | Coefficients | z-Statistics |
---|---|---|
Delegated monitoring variables | ||
LCommIncRate | −0.03919 | −4.09 *** |
GSize | −0.01401 | −1.87 * |
LYrs | 0.02178 | 1.18 |
LIncInfoD | −0.41762 | −2.20 ** |
LPurInfoD | −0.07507 | −0.20 |
LBizInfoD | 0.25898 | 1.47 |
LVisitD | 0.05767 | 0.33 |
Peer monitoring variables | ||
MPurInfoD | −0.05389 | −0.32 |
MIncInfoD | −0.13181 | −0.59 |
MVisitD | −0.01128 | −0.07 |
Control variables | ||
The personal and economic characteristics of the group leader | ||
LSexD | −0.36265 | −2.09 ** |
LAge | −0.00015 | −0.02 |
LEdu | −0.00996 | −0.38 |
LInc | −0.00001 | −2.47 ** |
LInc2 | 3.09 × 10−11 | 2.13 ** |
LLoanD | −0.73188 | −3.59** |
LLoan | 1.00 × 10−6 | 0.13 |
LOthFinD | −0.04887 | −0.31 |
LDefD | 0.92515 | 5.27 *** |
The personal and economic characteristics of the group members | ||
MSexD | 0.19632 | 1.41 |
MAge | −0.00109 | −0.20 |
MEdu | −0.11173 | −4.62 *** |
MLoan | −9.00 × 10−6 | −1.15 |
MIncPerCap | 9.00 × 10−6 | 1.68 * |
MOthFinD | 0.87247 | 5.53 *** |
Constant | 2.30014 | 2.56 ** |
Number of observations | 648 | |
Pseudo R2 | 0.3169 | |
LR | 270.37 *** |
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Ba-Tri, T.; Truong, L.D.; Friday, H.S.; Pham, T.P. The Effects of Monitoring Activities on Loan Defaults in Group-Based Lending Program: Evidence from Vietnam. J. Risk Financial Manag. 2024, 17, 357. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm17080357
Ba-Tri T, Truong LD, Friday HS, Pham TP. The Effects of Monitoring Activities on Loan Defaults in Group-Based Lending Program: Evidence from Vietnam. Journal of Risk and Financial Management. 2024; 17(8):357. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm17080357
Chicago/Turabian StyleBa-Tri, Tran, Loc Dong Truong, H. Swint Friday, and Tien Phat Pham. 2024. "The Effects of Monitoring Activities on Loan Defaults in Group-Based Lending Program: Evidence from Vietnam" Journal of Risk and Financial Management 17, no. 8: 357. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm17080357