Risk Assessment of a Hydrogen Refueling Station in an Urban Area
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Methodology
2.1. Scenario
2.1.1. Selection of the Location
2.1.2. Selection of Weather Conditions
2.1.3. Selection of Accident Scenario
2.2. Hydrogen Risk Assessment Model (HyRAM)
2.2.1. Scenario Model
Jet Fire
Overpressure
Method of French Land Use Planning
3. Results and Discussion
3.1. Results of HyRAM Simulation
3.1.1. Results for Jet Fire
3.1.2. Overpressure Result Value
3.2. Results of French Land Use Planning Method
3.3. Discussion
4. Conclusions
- As a result of the analysis based on the HyRAM’s jet fire modeling, the risk effect distance of a jet fire that occurs after hydrogen leakage due to small and medium leaks is small enough to comply with the jet fire safety distance suggested in the KGS Code. Large leaks are less likely, since the leak diameter is larger than the pipe diameter. Therefore, we conclude that installation would be safe even if a jet fire occurs in the tube trailer and hydrogen storage tank, which stores the largest quantity of hydrogen.
- Based on the HyRAM’s overpressure modeling, if an explosion occurs after a long-term leakage, which indicates a later ignition point, the damage will be considerable; however, hydrogen cannot stay in one place for a long time. Therefore, by analyzing the graph of the change in overpressure of the tube trailer and hydrogen storage tank, if the hydrogen remains for approximately five seconds after the leak and then explodes, the explosion impact would be considerable.
- As a result of analyzing the overpressure results obtained through PHAST 8.0, the risk impact distance of the scenarios for small and medium leaks did not exceed the range of the HRS; therefore, no effect on the outside area of the HRS was identified. Large-leak scenarios would impact the outside of the HRS. Using the French land use planning technique, all scenarios correspond to MMR2, which is the extent to which hazardous facility permits can be issued after implementing all possible safety measures.
- According to the accident frequency data, the probability that a catastrophic rupture will occur at an HRS is very low. In the LUP matrix, the catastrophic rupture scenarios correspond to MMR2. Only two scenarios correspond to this category and are appropriate for the existing plant.
Author Contributions
Funding
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Year | 2022 | 2025 | 2030 | 2040 | 2050 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
The number of HRS dispensers | 310 | 450 | 600 | 1200 | 2000≤ |
Method | Number of Stations | |
---|---|---|
Hydrogen supply type | Offsite | 119 |
Onsite | 4 |
Method | |
---|---|
Hydrogen supply type | Offsite |
Pressure | Tube trailer: 20 MPa Storage tank: 80 MPa |
Hydrogen delivery | Tube trailer |
Explosion | Fire | |
---|---|---|
Condition | Overpressure point: 1 psi (0.07 bar) | Exposed to radiant heat of 5 kW/ for 40 s |
Wind Speed | Atmospheric Stability | Atmospheric Temperature | |
---|---|---|---|
Condition | 1.5 m/s | F | 25 °C |
Component | Tube Trailer | Hydrogen Storage Tank | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
Inventory | Pressure (Mpa) | 20 | 80 | |
Temperature (°C) | 15 | 15 | ||
Mass volume (m3) | 22.82 | 26.3 | ||
Scenario | Leak size (mm) | Small leak | 0.4 | 0.23 |
Medium leak | 4.02 | 2.26 | ||
Large leak | 12.7 | 7.16 | ||
Leak rate (kg/s) | Small leak | 1.30 × 10−3 | −1.76 × 10−3 | |
Medium leak | −1.31 × 10−1 | −1.70 × 10−1 | ||
Large leak | 1.31 | 1.71 | ||
Orifice diameter (mm) | 7.92 | 7.16 |
Storage Pressure Range | Characteristic Pipe Diameter (I.D.) |
---|---|
>0.103 to ≤1.72 Mpa (gauge) (>15 to ≤250 psig) | 52.50 mm (2.07 in) |
>1.72 to ≤20.68 Mpa (gauge) (>250 to ≤3000 psig) | 18.97 mm (0.75 in) |
>20.68 to ≤51.71 Mpa (gauge) (>3000 to ≤7500 psig) | 7.92 mm (0.31 in) |
>51.71 to ≤103.42 Mpa (gauge) (>7500 to ≤15,000 psig) | 7.16 mm (0.28 in) |
Fire Radiation | Human Harm | Explosion Overpressure | Human Harm |
---|---|---|---|
5 kW/m2 | Pain for 20 s exposure, first-degree burn. Intensity tolerable for those performing emergency operations. | 5 kPa | No serious injuries to people located outdoors (<8 kPa). |
12.5 kW/m2 | First-degree burn after 10 s, 1% fatality in 1 min. | 14 kPa | Threshold for eardrum rupture (>13.8 kPa). |
35 kW/m2 | 1% fatality in 10 s. | 20 kPa | Threshold of survivability (>20 kPa, 20% probability of fatality indoors; 0% probability of fatality outdoors). |
Time (Seconds) | Overpressure (psi/kPa) | Time (Seconds) | Overpressure (psi/kPa) | Time (Seconds) | Overpressure (psi/kPa) | Time (Seconds) | Overpressure (psi/kPa) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 0.02/0.14 | 16 | 0.02/0.14 | 1 | 0.45/3.1 | 16 | 17.14/118.18 |
2 | 0.02/0.14 | 17 | 0.02/0.14 | 2 | 0.45/3.1 | 17 | 18.26/125.9 |
3 | 0.02/0.14 | 18 | 0.02/0.14 | 3 | 0.45/3.1 | 18 | 19.40/133.76 |
4 | 0.02/0.14 | 19 | 0.02/0.14 | 4 | 0.42/2.9 | 19 | 20.55/141.69 |
5 | 0.02/0.14 | 20 | 0.02/0.14 | 5 | 1.36/9.377 | 20 | 21.71/149.68 |
6 | 0.02/0.14 | 21 | 0.02/0.14 | 6 | 6.39/44.06 | 21 | 22.87/157.68 |
7 | 0.02/0.14 | 22 | 0.02/0.14 | 7 | 7.42/51.16 | 22 | 24.04/165.75 |
8 | 0.02/0.14 | 23 | 0.02/0.14 | 8 | 8.44/58.19 | 23 | 25.23/173.95 |
9 | 0.02/0.14 | 24 | 0.02/0.14 | 9 | 9.5/65.5 | 24 | 26.44/182.3 |
10 | 0.02/0.14 | 25 | 0.02/0.14 | 10 | 10.56/72.81 | 25 | 27.62/190.43 |
11 | 0.02/0.14 | 26 | 0.02/0.14 | 11 | 11.64/80.25 | 26 | 28.84/198.84 |
12 | 0.02/0.14 | 27 | 0.02/0.14 | 12 | 12.69/87.49 | 27 | 30.08/207.39 |
13 | 0.02/0.14 | 28 | 0.02/0.14 | 13 | 13.79/95.08 | 28 | 31.31/215.87 |
14 | 0.02/0.14 | 29 | 0.02/0.14 | 14 | 14.90/102.73 | 29 | 32.54/224.35 |
15 | 0.02/0.14 | 29.5 | 0.02/0.14 | 15 | 16.02/110.45 | 29.5 | 33.17/228.7 |
Time (Seconds) | Overpressure (psi/kPa) | Time (Seconds) | Overpressure (psi/kPa) | Time (Seconds) | Overpressure (psi/kPa) | Time (Seconds) | Overpressure (psi/kPa) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 0.02/0.14 | 16 | 0.02/0.14 | 1 | 0.44/3.03 | 16 | 17.78/122.59 |
2 | 0.02/0.14 | 17 | 0.02/0.14 | 2 | 0.44/3.03 | 17 | 18.97/130.79 |
3 | 0.02/0.14 | 18 | 0.02/0.14 | 3 | 0.44/3.03 | 18 | 20.16/139 |
4 | 0.02/0.14 | 19 | 0.02/0.14 | 4 | 0.42/2.9 | 19 | 21.37/147.34 |
5 | 0.02/0.14 | 20 | 0.02/0.14 | 5 | 5.54/38.2 | 20 | 22.59/155.75 |
6 | 0.02/0.14 | 21 | 0.02/0.14 | 6 | 6.60/45.5 | 21 | 23.80/164.09 |
7 | 0.02/0.14 | 22 | 0.02/0.14 | 7 | 7.68/52.95 | 22 | 25.03/172.58 |
8 | 0.02/0.14 | 23 | 0.02/0.14 | 8 | 8.73/60.19 | 23 | 26.29/181.26 |
9 | 0.02/0.14 | 24 | 0.02/0.14 | 9 | 9.83/67.78 | 24 | 27.54/189.88 |
10 | 0.02/0.14 | 25 | 0.02/0.14 | 10 | 10.94/75.43 | 25 | 28.80/198.57 |
11 | 0.02/0.14 | 26 | 0.02/0.14 | 11 | 12.06/83.15 | 26 | 30.08/207.39 |
12 | 0.02/0.14 | 27 | 0.02/0.14 | 12 | 13.16/90.73 | 27 | 31.37/216.29 |
13 | 0.02/0.14 | 28 | 0.02/0.14 | 13 | 14.31/98.66 | 28 | 32.67/225.25 |
14 | 0.02/0.14 | 29 | 0.02/0.14 | 14 | 15.46/106.59 | 29 | 33.98/234.28 |
15 | 0.02/0.14 | 29.5 | 0.02/0.14 | 15 | 16.63/114.66 | 29.5 | 34.63/238.76 |
Component | Scenario | Over Pressure [mbar] | Diameter [m] | Population [Persons] | Gravity Level |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Tube trailer | Large leak | 50 | 76.9 | 13.4 | Major |
140 | 32.2 | 0.0 | Moderate | ||
200 | 24.7 | 0.0 | Moderate | ||
H2 storage tank | 50 | 78.9 | 14.3 | Major | |
140 | 33 | 0.0 | Moderate | ||
200 | 25.3 | 0.0 | Moderate |
Component | Scenario | Overpressure [mbar] | Diameter [m] | Population [Persons] | Gravity Level |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Tube trailer | Catastrophic rupture | 50 | 369.9 | 416.3 | Catastrophic |
140 | 154.7 | 68.8 | Catastrophic | ||
200 | 101.4 | 26.8 | Disastrous | ||
H2 storage tank | 50 | 547.7 | 918.5 | Catastrophic | |
140 | 215.2 | 137.7 | Disastrous | ||
200 | 165.1 | 79.1 | Disastrous |
Gravity Level | 5% Lethal Effects | 1% Lethal Effects | Irreversible Effects |
---|---|---|---|
Disastrous | More than 10 | More than 100 | More than 1000 |
Catastrophic | 1–10 | 10–100 | 100–1000 |
Major | 1 | 1–10 | 10–100 |
Serious | 0 | 1 | 1–10 |
Moderate | 0 | 0 | Less than 1 |
Frequency Class | Qualitative Frequency | Quantitative Frequency | Semi-Quantitative Frequency | |
---|---|---|---|---|
E | Extremely unlikely scenario | Possible considering current knowledge, but never occurred anywhere worldwide | Less than 10−5 event/year | A hybrid risk-based model that takes into account factors/measures reducing the level of risk |
D | Realistic but unlikely scenario | Possible but never occurred in a similar facility | Less than 10−4 event/year | |
C | Improbable scenario | Already occurred in a similar facility worldwide | Less than 10−3 event/year | |
B | Probable scenario | Already occurred(or supposed to have occurred) during the lifetime of the facility | Less than 10−2 event/year | |
A | Frequent scenario | Already occurred(several times) during the lifetime of the facility | Less than 10−1 event/year |
Frequency Class | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
E | D | C | B | A | ||
Gravity level | Disastrous | NO MMR2 | NO | NO | NO | NO |
Catastrophic | MMR1 | MMR2 | NO | NO | NO | |
Major | MMR1 | MMR1 | MMR2 | NO | NO | |
Serious | OK | OK | MMR1 | MMR2 | NO | |
Moderate | OK | OK | OK | OK | MMR1 |
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Kwak, J.; Lee, H.; Park, S.; Park, J.; Jung, S. Risk Assessment of a Hydrogen Refueling Station in an Urban Area. Energies 2023, 16, 3963. https://doi.org/10.3390/en16093963
Kwak J, Lee H, Park S, Park J, Jung S. Risk Assessment of a Hydrogen Refueling Station in an Urban Area. Energies. 2023; 16(9):3963. https://doi.org/10.3390/en16093963
Chicago/Turabian StyleKwak, Jongbeom, Haktae Lee, Somin Park, Jaehyuk Park, and Seungho Jung. 2023. "Risk Assessment of a Hydrogen Refueling Station in an Urban Area" Energies 16, no. 9: 3963. https://doi.org/10.3390/en16093963